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In Chapters 1 and 2, it is argued that inter-rank relations in the Regular
army of 1902-14 were characterised by paternalism, deference, discipline,
formality and mutual respect. Relations in the auxiliary forces were more
relaxed. Officers' attitudes towards their men evolved in this period,
influenced by a lively debate on discipline.
In Chapter 3, the British army's attitude to morale, and the morale of the
British Expeditionary Force, which remained remarkably resilient, is considered.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the wartime officer corps: its social composition,
methods of selecting and training officers, and influences on concepts of
officership. It is argued that officers drawn from non-traditional sources were
inculcated with the 'public school' ethos of the Regular officer.
In Chapter 6 the
	 disciplinary regime of the wartime army, which generally
followed the pattern of the Regular army, is examined and placed into the
context of Edwardian society. It is argued that factors such as paternalism and
deference	 alleviated harsh discipline and some wartime units operated an
'auxiliary' style of discipline.
In Chapter 7 the inter-rank relationship is analysed from the perspective of
the officer.	 Particular attention is paid to the affection felt by many
officers for their men, and the institutionalising of paternalism.
Chapter 8 examines the rankers' view of the relationship. It concludes that
they tended to judge officers on their individual merits, but the
	 concept of
a 'comradeship of the trenches' remains valid.
Chapter 9 ties together many of the threads of the argument by concluding
that the officer-man relationship played a crucial role in maintaining British
military morale in the First World War. Comparisons are offered with the wartime
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Notes:
1) Regular and New Army infantry battalions are indicated by a number, followed
by an oblique, followed by the regiment, so 1/KRRC translates as the 1st
Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps. Territorial battalions are indicated by
this sequence: number, oblique, number, regiment.
2) Generally, the generic term 'private' (abbreviation: Pte.) has been used for
the lowest rank of infantry and cavalry regiments, although some regiments had
their own special titles (eg 'Rifleman').
- viii -
Introduction
Until fairly recently, judgeinents on the subject of officer-man relationships
in the British army in the 1902-22 period tended to be superficial and
polemical. Writing in 1961, Brian Gardner, for instance, claimed that officers
and men of the Edwardian army 'normally disliked, and often despised, one
another'. (1) No evidence was offered to support this statement. Gardner was a
member of the 'lions led by donkeys' school of the 1960s, (2) and to depict the
pre-war army as a class-ridden, divided organisation suited his thesis that
the Somme campaign was the consequence of British social and iey failings.
Other writers moved to the opposite extreme, painting a picture of pre-war
regiments as happy families, devoid of inter-rank tensions, consisting of loyal,
contented soldiers and paternal, benign officers. (3)
The first modern serious analysis of officer-man relationships was John
Baynes' Morale (1967) in which he examined the relationship in 2/Scottish
Rifles from the immediate prewar period to the aftermath of Neuve Chapelle in
March 1915.(4) Subsequently, Edward N. Spiers has examined officer-man relations
in the pre-war Regular army in several scholarly works, albeit briefly. (5)
Work on inter-rank relationships in the Indian army of the Raj, (6) in the U.S.
(1) B. Gardner, The Big Push (London, 1961) p.5.
(2) A. Danchev, "Bunking" and Debunking: The Controversies of the 1960s', in B.
Bond (ed.) The First World War and British Military History (Oxford, 1991)
pp.263-88.
(3) See for instance Maj. the Hon. J.J. Astor's introduction to R.A. Lloyd, A
Trooper in the 'Tins' (London, 1938) p.6.
(4) J. Baynes, Morale (London, 1967). See also J. Baynes, 'The Officer-Other
Rank Relationship in the British Army in the First World War', QR (Oct. 1966)
pp. 442-452, which covers much the same ground.
(5) E.N. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London, 1980) pp.26-29; E.M.
Spiers, 'The Regular Army in 1914', in I.F.W. Beckett and K. Simpson, A Nation
in Arms (Manchester, 1985) pp. 1.3, 55, 57; E.M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army
1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992) pp.112-14. See also B. Farwell, For Queen and
Country (London, 1981) pp.132-38.
(6) J. Greenhut, 'Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the
British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army', MA XLVIII,
No.1, (1984) pp.15-18. See also T.A. Heathcote, The Indian Army (Newton Abbot,
1974) and P. Mason, A Matter of Honour (London, 1974).
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Colored Troops of the American Civil War, and the Royal Navy of the mid-
eighteenth century also provide much food for thought for the student of the
British army of l902-22.(l)
My study of a New Army battalion remains the only full-length work devoted to
officer-man relations in the British army of 1914-18.(2) However, many works on
the British army of the period make some reference to officer-man relations.
(3) The debate has tended to focus on whether the experience of the officer
differed significantly from that of the other rank, or if it is possible to
speak of a coon experience. Ian Beckett, for instance, stresses the
considerable privileges enjoyed by officers which were denied to other ranks,
while Peter Liddle regards the idea that it was impossible to bridge the
'socio-military gap' between officer and other rank as misconceived.(4)
Turning to Dominion forces, Isabella D. Losinger has produced a revisionist
study of Canadian inter-rank relations in the Great War. (5) By contrast,
historians of the Australian Imperial Force have tended to repeat C.E.W. Bean's
views on its discipline and officer-man relations.(6) Christopher Pugsley's work
on the NZEF makes some brief but interesting points about the nature of
officer-man relations in New Zealand forces.(7)
(1) J.T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle (New York, 1990); 	 N.A.M. Rodger,	 The
Wooden World (London, 1988 edn.)
(2) G.D. Sheffield, 'The Effect of War Service on the 22nd (Service) Battalion
Royal Fusiliers (Kensington), with Special Reference to Morale, Discipline and
the Officer-Man Relationship' (MA thesis, University of Leeds, 1984).
(3) See for instance K. Simpson, 'The Officers', in Beckett and Simpson, p.85;
D. Winter, Death's Men (London, 1979 edn.) pp.59-62; T. Denman, 'The Catholic
Irish Soldier in the First World War: the "racial environment", INS XXVII,
No.108 (1991) pp.352-365.
(4) I.F.W. Beckett, 'The British Army, 1914-18: The Illusion of Change', in J.
Turner (ed.) Britain and the First World War (London, 1988) pp.107-08; P.R.
Liddle, The Soldier's War 1914-1918 (London, 1988) pp.80-81.
(5) I.D. Losinger, 'Officer-Man Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,
1914-1919' (NA thesis, Carleton University, 1990).
(6) C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 (Sydney,
12 vols., 1921-42); B. Gammage, The Broken Years (Ringwood, Vic. 1975 edn.)
pp.85-88, 230-63; but see also chapter 9 below.
(7) C. Pugsley, Gallipoli The New Zealand Story (Auckland, 1984) pp.13-l Ie, 78,
258-60; C. Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell (Auckland, 1991), passim.
With one exception (see below), Pugsley's On the Fringe of Hell is the only
major study of British military discipline in the Great War, although Dr. Alf
Peacock has published a number of short articles on the subject, concentrating
particularly on field punishment.(l) Three other aspects of discipline, namely
military executions, (2) military police,(3) and mutiny (4), have also received
informed attention, and these works have much to tell us about the nature of
the British army in the era of the Great War. The morale and discipline of the
BEF has been covered by J. Brent Wilson in his excellent, although now rather
dated, overview, and in recent years other valuable studies of particular
aspects of morale have appeared.(5)
The lack of a major study of officer-man relations in the British army of the
Great War means that a vital element is missing from our understanding of that
army. Ny 1984 study amply confirmed Tony Ashworth's view that a military unit
could	 become a community, a substitute family for the soldier.(6) As a
wartime temporary officer wrote, 'An army, like any other human society, is an
organism, whose well-being depends on the interplay of human relationships'. (7)
This thesis attempts to fill the gap in the historiography of the British army
of the Great War by examining this 'interplay of human relationships'.
An examination of such a broad theme is fraught with dangers. As a TF officer
(I) A.J. Peacock, 'Crucifixion No.2' Gunfire 4, pp.21'-21 is a typical example.
(2) A. Babington, For the Sake of Example (London, 1983); J. Putkowski and J.
Sykes, Shot at Dawn (Barnsley, 1989).
(3) G.D. Sheffield, 'The Operational Role of British Military Police on the
Western Front, 1914-18' in P. Griffith, (ed.) British Fighting Methods in the
Great War (forthcoming).
(4) G. Dallas and D. Gill, The Unknown Army (London, 1985); L. James, Mutiny
(London, 1987); J. Putkowski, 'Toplis, Etaples & "The Monocled Mutineer", ST 18
(1986) pp.6-'1.
(5) J.B. Wilson, 'Morale and Discipline in the British Expeditionary Force,
1914-18' (NA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1978) J.G. Fuller, Troop
Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford,
1991); S.P. MacKenzie, 'Morale and the Cause: The Campaign to Shape the Outlook
of Soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-18', CJH XXV (1990) pp.215
32; S.P. MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale (Oxford, 1992) pp.3-39.
(6) T. Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918 (London, 1980) p.8.
(7) A.D. Thorburn, Amateur Gunners (Liverpool, 1933) p.5.
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remarked, 'There were marked but perhaps subtle differences' in the inter-rank
relations existing in Territorial, Regular and New Army units.(1) I would go
further, to say that no two units were exactly alike. To take but one example,
the ethos of 2/4 and 2/6 DWR, two Territorial battalions of the same regiment,
were very different.(2) Ideally, to build up a coherent picture of officer-man
relations, discipline and morale in the British army of the first two decades of
the twentieth century, one would need an immense number of detailed case-studies
of individual units. At an early stage in my research it was decided that,
having already examined a battalion, this thesis should take the form of an
overview rather than an in-depth case study, even of a larger formation such as
a division. The aim of this thesis is to lay the foundations for future studies
of individual units. It is to be hoped that the usefulness of such a tour
d'horizon will outweigh the generalisations that will inevitably occur.
This thesis is based largely on published and unpublished writings of junior
officers, NCOs and private soldiers; the latter is a hitherto under-exploited
source. (3) By definition these writings reflect the opinions of individuals.
How reliable are the memoirs of soldiers which were often written many years
after the war? A former artillery officer wrote in 1964 that he found himself
looking at the 1914/18 war in some astonishment that the events of fifty
years ago can still be so vivid in an old man's memory...it is a conscious
effort to recall those World War I days. Yet when the effort is made, the
name of a place, or of a soldier, will immediately bring back a lively
recollection of an event, and of the circumstances that led to, and followed
after, that event.(4)
It is, perhaps, not surprising that veterans of the Great War should be able to
recall the most intense, exciting, traumatic and even, paradoxically, in many
cases, happy period of their life with great clarity.
(1) V.F. Eberle, My Sapper Venture (London, 1973) p.102.
(2) Unpublished account, notebook IV, B.D. Parkin papers, 86/57/1, IWM.
(3) P. Simkins, 'Everyman at War: Recent Interpretations of the Front Line
Experience', in Bond, The First World War p.312.
(4) Unpublished account, p.116, R.C. Foot papers, IWN.
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War fiction which was based at least in part on the author's own experience
has also proved very useful as a source. A novel, whatever its literary merit,
even if unreliable on matters of fact could nonetheless 'describe the sensations
of military service' just as effectively as a memoir. Indeed the ability of the
novelist to 'recreate soldiers' conversations' increases the usefulness of
fiction for the historian.(1)
Several frequently-used terms need explanation. Formally, private soldiers
were referred to as 'other ranks'; informally, as 'rankers'; both terms are used
here. The term 'ranker-officer' is used to describe a former other rank who
received a commission, regardless of his social background. 'Regimental
officers', as opposed to 'staff officers', were those who served with a unit.
When citing unpublished evidence it did not always prove possible to use
conventional forms of notation. It is unclear, for example, to whom many
rankers' letters were addressed. Generally, the following system has been used.
Firstly, the type of evidence is mentioned (diary entry, unpublished account,
letter). This is followed by the date or page number, as applicable, the
collection from which the evidence is drawn, the reference number of the
collection, and finally the archive. Unless otherwise stated, the individual
named in the reference was the author of the letter, memoir or diary. As an
individual may have held various ranks at different times, rank is omitted from
the citation. However, an indication of their rank, or at least their
hierarchical status at the time to which the evidence refers is generally
given in the body of the text and in the bibliography.
A handful of people deserve especial thanks. These are my supervisor,
Professor Brian Bond; Mr. Keith Simpson, who gave me access to his unique
questionnaires on officers of the Great War; Dr. Ian Beckett; Mr. Julian
(1) H. Cecil, 'The Literary Legacy of the War: the Post-war British War Novel -
a Select Bibliography' in P.H. Liddle, Home Fires and Foreign Fields (London,
1985) p.205.
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Putkowski; and Mr. Peter Simkins. I would also like to thank my colleagues in
the Department of War Studies, RIIA Sandhurst, especially Dr. John Pimlott, Mr.
Nigel de Lee, Dr. Steve Badsey, Mr. Sean McKnight, Dr. David Chandler, Dr.
Duncan Anderson and Dr. Francis Toase, and in the Sandhurst Collection, Dr.
Tony Heathcote and Mrs. Martine de Lee. Without the help of successive
Sandhurst librarians, Mr. John Hunt and Mr. Andrew Orgill, and the librarian at
Staff College, Mrs. Pam Bendell, and their staffs, this thesis could not have
been written. I also would like to thank successive Directors of Studies at
Sandhurst for providing the funding which enabled me to pursue this project.
At various archives a number of people gave me assistance far beyond the call
of duty: at the Imperial War Museum, Mr. Rod Suddaby, Mr. Nigel Steele, Mr.
Simon Robbins, and Mrs. Sarah Patterson; at the Liddle Collection, University of
Leeds, Mr. Peter H. Liddle and Dr. Ian Whitehead; at the Essex Regiment Museum,
Mr. Ian Hook.
To Lt.Col. (Retd) Bob Wyatt, Mr. Michael Orr, Dr. Hugh Cecil, Prof. Edward N.
Spiers, Mr. Geoff Inglis, Dr. Keith Grieves, Mrs. Rae Russell, Dr. Ilana Bet-
El, Ms. Isabella D. Losinger, members of the RMAS War Discussion Group, the
First World War Seminar at King's, and the branches of the Western Front
Association to whom I have presented my ideas, I offer my sincere thanks.
I have left thanking some of the most important people of all to last. Alan
and Mandy Bird, by forcing the Sheffield family to take a holiday with them,
saved me from a summer of self-imposed martyrdom in 1992, and they also
uncomplainingly provided accommodation on my visits to Leeds. Without the
financial support of my parents in the early l980s, I would never have been in a
position to pursue academic research. Above all, I wish to thank my wife,
Vivienne, for her steadfast support for a project which must have seemed never




Officer-Nan Relations and Discipline in the British Army, 1902-14
This is the first of two chapters that will examine aspects of the officer-
man relationship and discipline in the Edwardian army. To set these subjects
into context,	 it is necessary to outline the social composition of the
Regular army. The role of the NCO and the officers' perception of the inter-
rank relationship will then be discussed. Finally, after an examination of the
role of discipline in the Regular army, the ordinary soldier's views on the
officer-man relationship will be assessed.
1.1 The Social Composition of the Regular Army, 1902-14
The popular image of 'Kipling's army' is that it was recruited from the
highest and lowest social strata, and the gulf between officers and other
ranks was indeed one of the widest in British society.(1) In 1944 Sir James
Edmonds claimed that recruitment for the pre-1914 army had been aided by 'the
compulsion of hunger'. (2)
	 Edmonds' assertion, although unpalatable to the
official mind,(3) was not far from the truth. Various estimates of the
proportion of unemployed men enlisting in the army ranged from 70 per cent in
one area to in excess of 90 per cent for the country as a whole. (4) Skilled
and unskilled labourers accounted for 24 and 44.5 per cent respectively of men
joining the army in 1913 and a further 25.5 per cent of recruits consisted of
other working-class occupations such as carmen and carters, outdoor porters, and
(1) A.R. Skelly, The Victorian Army at Home (London, 1977) p.199.
(2) J.E. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-29 (London, 1987 edn.)
p.168.
(3) FO conents included in
	 Sir E. Bridges to Edmonds, 22 July 1944, CAB
45/81, PRO.
(4) A.J.A Wright, 'The Possible Effects of Compulsory Military Training on
Recruiting for the Regular Army', JRUSI LV, No.406, (1911) p.1590; Spiers, 'The
Regular Army', p.44.
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domestic servants. Professional men/students
	 and clerks constituted only 1 and
3 per cent respectively.(1) Thus the intake of recruits in a not untypical year
were drawn almost entirely from the working classes, with labourers, rather
than artisans, predominating.
Typically, the Regular soldier of the period was of urban provenance. As early
as 1851, a minority of soldiers came from rural areas, relecting the transition
of Britain from a largely rural to a largely urban society.(2). The educational
standards of the average soldier were low. On enlistment, recruits were graded
according to their educational class. These ranged from A, 'men of good
education', through to E, illiterates. In 1913, only 6 per cent to classed as A,
11 per cent were classed as E, while 58 per cent were men graded as C and D, men
of moderate and inferior education.(3) When his CO in the RHA reported that
W.J.Nicholson was 'well educated', Nicholson realised 'that he meant [well
educated] by army standards' and was not particularly flattered.(4)
The health of the other ranks was equally unimpressive.(5) Arthur Lee MP
believed that the majority of men 	 who enlisted in London were 'poor,
half-starved, unintelligent boys'. (6) The rejection on medical grounds of 40
per cent of those offering for enlistment during the Boer War had caused a
great deal of national soul-searching, but little result: in 1910 52.2 per cent
of recruits failed the medical.(7). Others scraped through the medical by a
(1) 'Trades of men offering for enlistment, year ending September 30th 1913',
PP. 1921, XX, CMD 1193.
(2) Spiers, 'Regular Army' pp.44-45, 53; Baynes, Morale 137; Skelly, pp.289-90.
(3) PP. 1921, XX, CHD 1193.
(4) Unpublished account, p.2, W.J. Nicholson papers, 78/31/1, IWM.
(5) But see a defence of the physique of the soldier in EW.E. Cairnesi The Army
From Within. By the Author of "Aii Absent Minded War".(London, 1901) p.65.
(6) A.H. Lee, 'The Recruiting Question: a Postscript to the Army Debate',
Nineteenth Century 49, (1901) p.1058.
(7) J. Stevenson, British Society 1914-45 (Harmondsvorth, 1984) p.43.
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subterfuge.(1)	 British medical officers were resigned to recruits being
'probably underfed'. (2)
	 In short, the British army of the Edwardian era was
largely composed of ill-educated men of indifferent health, from poor, urban
backgrounds.
The officer class was largely recruited, as it had been in the nineteenth
century, from what has been described as 'traditional sources of supply':
families with military connections; the gentry and peerage; and to some degree,
the professions and 	 clergy. (3)
	 British officers did not form a distinct
caste. Men of families from outside the traditional sources of supply of
officers, from parvenu families who had become landowners, or from 'trade', were
also commissioned.(4) The ethos of the officer class remained that of the landed
interest, however. There are several reasons for this. The military leadership
was overwhelmingly rural in background. (5) Thus even 'middle-class' officers
were usually of rural rather than urban/industrial provenance, and therefore
likely to be influenced by the traditions of the landed, rather than the
commercial, classes.
	 Moreover, for a son to be commissioned into a smart
regiment was tangible evidence of the social arrival of a family, and the son
would be keen to conform and to be accepted as an officer and a gentlemen. To
deviate from acceptable codes of behaviour was to risk ostracism or worse. As a
contemporary writer observed, those who worried about the commissioning of
officers who had 'nothing to recommend them but the riches which their parents
had acquired in trade' could rest assured: 'We can safely
	 leave these young
(1) Unpublished account, p.3, H.J. Coombes papers, PP/MCR/119, IWM.
(2) J.A. Baick, 'Recruiting in the German Army', JR.AMC XV (1910) pp.567, 571-72.
See also J.M. Winter, The Great War and the British People (London, 1987 edn.)
p.7.
(3) Spiers,'Regular Army', p.39; P.E. Razzell, 'The social origins of British
Officers in the Indian and British Home Army', MS 14, No.3 (1963) pp.249-53.
(4) G. Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London, 1977) pp.24-25.
(5) Spiers, Army and Society p.11.
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men to the tender mercies of their brother officers'. (1) Unfortunates deemed
'unsuitable' by their peers would be hounded out of the army, sometimes being
subjected to a mock court martial.(2)
The British officer class was educationally homogenous. An education at a
public school, especially a Clarendon school, was an almost essential rite of
passage for the aspirant officer.(3) By 1913, the majority of officers also
passed through Sandhurst or Woolwich.(4) The common educational background of
the majority of the officer class also helped to ensure that 'country house'
values permeated the officers' mess. (These values, and the effect they had on
officer-man relations, are discussed below).
In 1899 a 'genuine' ranker, as opposed to a gentleman-ranker, was described
as a man who joins the army 'without money or scrip, without influential or
sympathetic friends'.(5) In earlier times, the commissioning of such men had
been relatively common, particularly in wartime, but by 1913 only about 2
per cent of Regular officers were commissioned from the ranks each year. In
addition there were a number of ex-ranker quartermasters and riding masters, but
these were 'dead-end' promotions given to senior NCOs and WOs nearing the end of
their careers.(6) Soldiers who might have contemplated taking a commission were
deterred by the low rates of pay. (7) Although	 ranker-officers were not
(1) [W.E. Cairnes] 'A British Officer', 	 Social Life in the British Army
(London, 1900) pp.xviii-xix.
(2) See N. Newham-Davis, Military Dialogues (London, nd) pp.30-37; Cairnes,
Social Life pp. XVIII, 61.
(3) Simpson, 'The Officers', p.65; Harries-Jenkins, p.96; Spiers, 'Regular Army'
p.54; Baynes, Morale p.29.
(4) Simpson, 'The Officers'	 pp.64-65.
(5) Quoted in C. Dalton, 'Commissions for the British Ranks', JRUSI XLIV, No.2
(1900) p.167.
(6) Dalton, pp.167-176; R. Hargreaves, 'Promotion from the Ranks', AQ LXXXVI,
(1963) pp.200-210; Simpson, 'The Officers' p.65; H. Strachan, Wellington's
Legacy: The Reform of the British army 1830-54 (Manchester, 1984) pp.98-99.
(7) '6197/R.G.A. (s.w.)', 'The Ranker Officer', JRUSI LXIII, No.451 (1918) p.2.
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necessarily treated unkindly,(1) the privations endured by impecunious officers
ensured that the impact of the ex-ranker on the prewar British officer class was
a minor one.
It should be remembered that the British army was a collection of individual
regiments and corps, each fiercely independent, with its own traditions and
customs. There was an unofficial 'league table' of exclusivity with some
regiments demanding a large private income of their officers. Indeed, by 1912
there was a shortage of officers in the cavalry of the line, and the War Office
wo-s forced to ask that Sandhurst cadets be acquainted with the fact that it was
possible in some regiments to survive on an income of £300-400.(2) In spite of
these qualifications, the British officer class shared common values, and can
can be treated as a body which shared what has been described as a 'collective
mentality'. (3)
1.2 Relations between NCOs and Other Ranks in the Regular Army, 1902-14
Modern scholarship has thus confirmed the essential accuracy of J.F.0 Fuller's
view of the army of the period, that 'Recruited from the bottom of Society, it
was led from the top'.(4) The inter-rank relationship was, however, rather
more subtle than traditional views, discussed in the Introduction above, would
allow. The structure of the army was rigidly hierarchical, but there was
scope for informal relations. However, the relationship of the officer to the
soldier can be properly understood only if the position of the NCO, who played
a key role in the enforcement of discipline, is first examined.
(1) D.M. Henderson, Highland Soldier (Edinburgh, 1989) pp.113, 126. For the
problems of ranker-officers, see W.R. Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal
(London, 1921) pp.29-31; V. Bonham-Carter, Soldier True (London, 1963) pp.29-31.
(2) Cairnes, Army from Within p.197; Baynes, pp.29-30; letter, 8 May 1912,
RMC Register of Letters File index 1910-12, 4843, RNASA.
(3) E.A. Muenger, 'The British Army in Ireland, 1886-1914' (Ph D. thesis,
University of Michigan, 1981) p.93.
(4) J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time, (London, 1935) p.6.
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Sergeants were the non-commissioned equivalents of the section officer, wrote
an observer in 1914,
But of far more actual importance,...since parades frequently take place
in the absence of the troop or section officer, while the troop or
section sergeant is at all times responsible for the efficiency of his
men. (1)
The NCO stood between the private and the officer much as the pre-Reformation
priest stood between man and God. If a private wished to speak to an officer, an
NCO had to be present throughout the conversation.(2) The NCO might have been
on friendly terms with his men before his promotion, but once he had gained a
stripe, all social contact between them had to cease. Sergeants had their own
mess and billets, to 'emphasise their separateness from the rank and file' and
to improve discipline, but the unfortunate lance-corporal had to sleep in the
same room and share the same meals as his section.(3) A prewar NCO stated
that the newly promoted lance-corporal 'can be the most unhappiest man in the
army. He is immediately isolated from his old companions, and his new friends
jealously watch him for faults'. (4) This policy of segregation
	 seems to have
been effective. In the army of the 1870s it was said that 'The sergeant might
belong to a different race', and an NCO could be arrested for calling a private
by his Christian name. Similarly, forty or so years later, a corporal of 2/R.
Bde. was reprimanded for overfamiliarity with the men. (5) In the 2/Cheshires
this segregation was taken one stage further; corporals were not allowed to mix
with lance-corporals, although this does not seem to have been a general
(1) E.C. Vivian, The British Army From Within (London, 1914) p.52. See also R.
Blatchford, My Life in the Army (London, 1910) pp.177-78.
(2) F. Richards, Old Soldier Sahib (London, 1965 edn.) pp.155-56.
(3) Vivian, p.54.
(4) J. Lucy, There's A Devil in the Drum (London, 1938) p.63.
(5) Blatchford p.177, 181; unpublished account, p.20, J.W. Riddell papers,
77/73/1, IWN.
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practice in other regiments.(1) An exception to this general rule of
segregation, if a ranker's memoirs are to be believed, occutd in 19th Hussars.
(2) A natural result of the segregation of junior NCOs from the men was that
many men were reluctant to become lance-corporals.
However, relations between NCOs and privates varied from unit to unit. In
2/R. Bde. NCOs were generally detested by privates. An NCO of this unit felt
that the army would have been more efficient if a closer relationship could have
developed between NCOs and men, allowing men to feel that they could go to
their sergeants for advice and help. Instead,
The whole trouble about the pre-war army was fear, Privates for Cpls
& Cpls for Sgts (sic) and so on. There was no trust amo.ng the
troops, and as a result it was impossible to get the best out of the men,
although they were excellent...(3)
Although this evidence has been used to imply that this situation was common to
the whole army, (4) NCO-man relations seem to have been unusually poor in 2/R.
Bde. By contrast, a ranker's account of life in the 20th Hussars mentions one
NCO who abused his authority, but does not give the impression	 that the
private lived in 'fear' of their superiors.(5) Indeed, some young soldiers
admired their NCOs. (6)
The role of the NCO was not merely that of coercion. He also looked after the
welfare of his men and to some extent played the role of a father figure, but
most of all he was the vital link between commissioned officers and other ranks.
Inevitably, since the smooth running of the unit was largely dependent
(1) J. Hawke, From Private to Major (London, 1938) p.83.
(2) F.H. Maitland, Hussar of the Line (London, 1951) p.21.
(3) Unpublished account, pp.10,12,21, 44, J.W. Riddell papers, 77/73/1, IWN.
(4) V.G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse 1815-1960 (London,
1982) p.137.
(5) Unpublished account, p.l6, R. Garrod papers, IWN.
(6) Unpublished account, p.8, H.J. Coombes papers, IWM.
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on cooperation between officers and NCOs, relations were less distant, although
far from intimate. (1) (Wartime officer-NCO relations are considered in more
detail in a later chapter).
1.3 Officer-Man Relations in the Regular Army, 1902-14
Officer-man relations followed the pattern of the ideal 'country house'
relationship between the landlord and tenant, with loyalty and deference being
given in exchange for paternalism and leadership. The concept of deference is
discussed in a later chapter, but here 	 an analysis of paternalism is
appropriate. Paternalism was a set of widely held social attitudes rather than
a coherent social theory. It has been argued that paternalists of the Victorian
era believed that society 'should be authoritarian, hierarchic, organic, and
pluralistic.' A belief in a society which was hierachical was a central
pillar of the paternalist's Weltanschauung. Without inequality of wealth and
property, the poor would lack incentive to work, and the affluent would not
possess 'the wherewithal.., to rule, develop the arts of government and do
charitable work'. Society was organic, in that every individual had his place,
his responsibilities, 'his reciprocal obligations, and his strong ties of
dependency'. Finally, society consisted of a number of different hierarchies,
each contained within the greater hierarchy. (2)
The core of the paternalist's creed was noblesse oblige, the belief that
privilege entailed responsibility. The responsibilities of the paternalist can
(1) H. Wyndham, The Queen's Service London, 1899) p.151; H. Wyndham, 'Officers
and Men', USM XXI, No.882, (1902) pp.184-5.
(2) D. Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England (London, 1979) pp.2-6.
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be summarised under the headings of ruling, guiding, and helping. The first two
involved keeping order, punishing anyone who posed a threat to the stability of
society,	 and	 preventing turmoil through spiritual, moral, and political
guidance of those in the lower reaches of the hierarchy. The third consisted of
helping the poor, whether it was by building cheap housing or dispensing food in
time of want.	 Roberts' conclusions are broadly applicable to the Edvardian
period. By the early twentieth century, 	 paternal owners	 of	 industrial
factories accepted that they had to provide continuous work, good conditions
and materials. Such men were perceived by their workforce as being 'fair'.(l)
The attitudes of the Edwardian officer reflected these concepts of
paternalism. In the wake of the Curragh Incident in 1914 a retired Guards
officer, Lord St Audries, made a classic statement about the nature	 of
discipline and the officer-man relationship in the British army:
Discipline...is not kept up by fear of punishment, by threats, or by
bullying. Discipline is kept, partly no doubt by training, but a great
deal more by tradition, by esprit de corps, by the confidence,
respect, yes and the affection which exists between officers and
men. . . (2)
St Audries's belief 	 that the regiment formed a community, in which officers
and men were bound together in friendly common interest was widely held by
Regular officers.(3) Another common belief was that other ranks preferred to
be led by gentlemen. (4)
The officer's concept of inter-rank relations had evolved over the years.
(1) p . Joyce, Work, Society and Politics (London, 1980) p.99. For one
industrialist as a paternalist, see K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes (Manchester,
1989) pp.129-31.
(2) Hansard, 1st Series, Lords, XV, (30 Mar. 1914), col. 795.
(3) See N. Nicholson, Alex (London, 1973) p.26; W.N. Nicholson, Behind the
Lines (London, 1939) p.105.
(4) A.W. Taylor, How to Organise and Administer a Battalion (London, 1915) pp.9-
10.
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As Edward M. Spiers has argued, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards
officers' attitudes to their men gradually changed. 	 This reflected the
evolution of the social philosophy of the landed interest during this
period. The image of the port-sodden rake of the Regency period was replaced
by that of the Christian gentleman, a model of sobriety and propriety. In part,
pragmatism accounted for this change in officer-man relations. Some senior
officers believed that recruiting would suffer unless a more enlightened regime
was instituted. (1) One subaltern in the R. Warvicks had a more immediate
application for his practical paternalism:
[After a route march] we inspected all the men's feet to see that they
haven't any blisters etc...if you left a man alone he would never wash
his feet, but it is most important, as if your men can't march, they are
of no use.(2)
A similar message emerges from a book by Maj. Gen. E.A.H. Alderson, in
which two pictures are displayed side by side. One depicts a man standing beside
a horse, asking the groom "Well, Jim, has he fed all right?" The second shows
a group of soldiers seated around a fire. An officer is asking them '"Dinners
all right, men?" Underneath both pictures appears the words 'Noblesse Oblige'.
The original water-colours have, since the 1920s, hung in the officers' mess at
Sandhurst. Taken in isolation, these pictures would suggest that Alderson had a
severely pragmatic view, that men, like horses, must be cared for if they are to
be useful. However, it is clear from the text and the use of the words
noblesse oblige that Alderson is arguing that pragmatism is not the only motive.
Rather, it was every officer's duty to attend to the needs of his men. (3)
(1) Spiers, Army and Society pp.26-29.
(2) N. Hamilton, Monty - The Making of a General (London, 1981) p.72. See also
the comments of a contemporary of Montgomery's: B. Horrocks, Corps Commander
(London, 1977) p.154.
(3) E.A.H. Alderson, Pink and Scarlet, or Hunting as a School for Soldiering
(London, 1913) pp.198-99. See also E.A.H. Alderson, Lessons from 100 Notes Made
in Peace and War (Aldershot, 1908) pp.28, 89.
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Philanthropy was as at least as important as
	 pragmatism in the re-fashioning
of officers' attitudes. Noblesse oblige was not a concept that was new to the
army. In the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries many officers had
built up good relationships with their men, taking a close interest in their
welfare.(l) What was new was that by Edwardian times the officer class had,
almost without exception, accepted the notion that privilege entailed
responsibility. In the 1870s, such responsibilities were not so widely accepted;
'Old Paddy', the CO of a Fusilier battalion, was renowned for his paternalism,
and was 'loved' by the men 'like a father'. They were less enthusiastic about
some of the other officers, one of whom, an eighteen-year-old subaltern, 'used
to talk to the men as if they had been dogs'.(2) Thirty or forty years later,
such	 behaviour	 on the	 part of a subaltern would have been considered
unofficerlike. When a subaltern joined 2/Argylls in 1908, his company commander
impressed on him that he had to 'get to know the character and personal problems
of each soldier' in his half company.(3) Similarly, upon joining 4/R. Bde. eight
years earlier, a young officer was taken aside by a senior colleague and told
that '[your] first and most important duty is the care and welfare of the men
under your command'.(4)
Another set of assumptions, implicit in the whole concept of paternalism,
also contributed to the officer's view of the relationship. The men were
regarded in much the same way as children: unless their behaviour was carefully
regulated, the men would misbehave, and when they misbehaved, they needed to be
punished. Their lives needed to be closely supervised, for left to their own
devices, they were untrustworthy. An officer of the Leinsters wrote of the
(1) S. Conway, 'To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the
Revolutionary War', William and Nary Quarterly XLII, (1986) p.388; Strachan,
Wellington's Legacy pp.109-110.
(2) Blatchford, My Life pp.205-8.
(3) H.J.D. Clark, KRS Q.
(4) A. Bryant, Jackets of Green (London, 1972) pp. 168-9.
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'naivete, almost of childishness' of his men. (I) 	 It was not only Irish
soldiers who were regarded	 in this light, (2) and this curious mixture of
respect and mistrust formed the basis of the average Regular officer's attitude
towards the other ranks, and this was reflected in the disciplinary system.
Officers' opportunities for contact with their men in peacetime were limited by
the factors already discussed and the fact that they enjoyed long periods of
leave, from four to six months a year. (3) Could there, then, be any commonality
of experience in the peacetime army? In the sense that officers were not exempt
from the disciplinary process, there was.	 Officers could be disciplined for
misbehaviour and	 pressurised	 to conform by their peers. Officers of the
2/Essex were
enjoined to set an example to those whom they are placed in authority
by preserving at all times a gentlemanly bearing, both in language and
demeanour. (4)
More importantly, young officers were given a taste, albeit brief, of life at
the bottom of the military hierarchy. It has been argued that Sandhurst cadets
were given only a limited amount of instruction in the tasks of the ordinary
soldier, in contrast to cadets at West Point and Kingston where the cadet
'carried out all the functions' of an NCO. (5) In fact 	 the system of cadet
government used at Sandhurst meant that at least some Gentlemen Cadets took on
the responsibilities of NCOs, which included a number of unpleasant and tedious
tasks. (6) Sandhurst was a hierarchical society, with junior cadets in much the
same position as privates in a battalion. Until 1913, cadet under-officers and
(1) T.W. Metcalfe, Memorials of the Military Life (London, 1936) p.121.
(2) G. NacMunn, Behind the Scenes in Many Wars (1930) p.7.
(3) Cairnes, Social Life p.26.
(4) Standing Orders of the 2nd Battalion Essex Regiment (Pompadours) (Aldershot,
1903) p.13.
(5) Harries-Jenkins, p.l 1 8. See also G. J De Groot, The Pre-war Life and Career
of Douglas Haig (Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1983) p.71.
(6) RMCR, 1, (1912), p.9; Diary, K.A. Garratt papers, especially 25, 30 Nov.
1913, 76-251 (i), RIIASA.
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NCOs could award punishments to fellow cadets. (1) This situation, and the
inevitable bullying (2) was, of course, not dissimilar	 to life in public
schools.
Virtually all Regular officers shared one experience in common with rankers.
One former cadet commented that
the Sandhurst man ...has in some repects to undergo what the private soldier
undergoes...by day he is the simple recruit, hectored and crimed for the
slightest fault, savagely drilled...in all ways harshly and meticulously
schooled.
This man considered this to be an advantage, although it was not appreciated as
such at the time.(3) Cadets were not taught to be leaders: one man recalled
1WM4
that he had,(little about 'man management' at Sandhurst, while another recalled
that it had the reputation..f'turning out a very good private soldier'. (4)
Once they reached their regiments, newly commissioned subalterns had to
'pass off the square' - that is, undergo training in drill under a senior NCO
alongside private soldiers. Highland subalterns had to undergo the even greater
ordeal of passing off the square in Highland dancing.(5) A young officer would
find himself '"less than dust...learn[ing] his drill as an ordinary "rooky"',(6)
Indeed, in the course of the three months that J.A. Halstead (1/Loyals) spent
on the square, he felt that he 'learned something of the private soldier'.(7) A
TF officer recalled the humiliation of making blunders in front of social
inferiors, but thought it an important stage in gaining the respect of his
men.(8)
The extent to which the young officer became familiar with the lot of the
(1) Letter, 16 January 1913, WO/152/1913/5108, RNASA.
(2) Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs (London, 1960 edn.) p.20.
(3) Metcalfe, p.48.
(4) H.D. Thwaytes, W.J. Jervois, KRS Q; for Woolwich, see unpublished account,
p.7, L.A. Haves papers, 87/41/1, IWM.
(5) H.J.D. Clarke, KRS Q.
(6) W. Childs, Episodes and Reflections (London, 1930) p.15.
(7) J.A. Halstead, KRS Q.
(8) C. Kernahan, An Author in the Territorials (London, 1908) pp.17-23, 45-46.
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ranker	 should not be exaggerated. The experience was of relatively short
duration, and led directly to a privileged lifestyle. But it did give officers
a glimpse into the life of the rank and file, and ensured that they had first
hand experience of the methods favoured by the army for instilling
discipline. (1)
The use of small mobile columns by the British during the Boer War seems to
have brought about a diminution in differences between the ranks. Officers and
men shared the hardships of campaigning 	 and leadership became less a matter
of 'the formal dictates of rank', and came to rely more on the 'informal,
personal qualities of individual officers'.(2) 	 Certainly, some senior officers
were perturbed by the decline of formal discipline which was tacitly condoned
or actively encouraged by regimental officers.(3) Some officers would have
carried into the peacetime army some first-hand experience of the life of the
ranker on campaign.
Some officers certainly believed that they enjoyed close relationships with
their men. A subaltern wrote of the family atmosphere in the 16th Lancers. At
'stables' an 'opportunity was provided for the most intimate relationship to be
established between officer and men'. Privates discussed their affairs with
their officer, while old soldiers would give 'friendly warnings' to
inexperienced subalterns, without 'the least impairment' of discipline. (4) It
remains to be seen to how far other ranks shared this rosy view of officer-man
relations.
(1) Similiar coients about the value of training at RMA Sandhurst in the 198Os
were made by my JCSC 10/1 class of junior captains in Nay 1989.
(2) W. Nasson, 'Tommy Atkins in South Africa' in P. Warwick, (ed.) The South
African War (London, 1980) pp.127-28.
(3) 'Notes by Col. J.M. Grierson RA on return from South Africa', pp.75-77, WO
108/184, PRO; Report on Office of Provost Marshal, Pretoria, 15 July 1900, WO
108/259, PRO.
(4) 0. Mosley, My Life (London, 1968) pp.47-48.
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1.4 Discipline in the Regular Army, 1902-14
The ranker's view of the officer-man relationship was coloured by his
experience of miltary discipline. The nature and purpose of discipline and the
training of recruits will be considered at greater length in a later chapter,
but here it will suffice to quote one prewar ranker's view	 that the
intention was 'to destroy all vestige of individualism in us and to remould the
messy remains into an unshaken loyalty and devotion to the regiment'. (1) Formal
discipline was reinforced by the informal hierarchy of the barrack room.
Although sometimes a recruit came under the protection of 	 an 'old soldier', a
recruit could have a difficult time in barracks as experienced men exerted their
unofficial but real authority.(2) Other recruits were not overly worried by
discipline,(3) possibly, it will be suggested, because they were prepared for
the rigors of army life by their experience as a civilian.
For the soldier,thad ceased to be a recruit, discipline in the peacetime
Edvardian army was irksome rather than savage, except for those who chose to
fight the system. As..ex-NCO of 21st Hussars learned from bitter experience,
military law was based on the principle of 'Heads I win, tails you lose'.(4) The
ordinary soldier was governed by rules and regulations which reflected the
officers' view of the men as bovine. The standing orders of the Irish Guards (a
regiment which, as will be shown, had an enlightened attitude to officer-man
relations) presupposed rankers lacked the most basic standards of cleanliness,
thrift and honesty.(5) While there was some merit in this approach, given
(1) J.F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum (London, 1938) p.57. See also the
comments of J. Espiner, quoted in P.F. Stewart, The History of the XII Lancers
(Prince of Wales) (London, 1951) p.227.
(2) Lloyd,	 pp.13, 17; unpublished account, p.4, J.W. Riddell papers,77/73/1,
IWM.
(3) Unpublished account, pp.1-2, F.M. Packham papers, P.316, IWN.
(4) R. Edmondson, John Bull's Army From Within (London, 1907) p.16.
(5) Regimental Standing Orders of His Majesty's Irish Regiment of Footguards
(London, 1911).
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the impoverished background of many soldiers, the army treated the NCOs of the
Corps of Military Police (CMP) in much the same way. Yet CMP NCOs were very
different from the average private, having vastly more individual
responsibility, and being characterised by a high level of self-discipline.(l)
Although attention to correct dress was a fundamental tenet of discipline,
with NCOs as well as privates liable to be crimed for being 'improperly
dressed', the situation did vary slightly from regiment to regiment. One Life
Guardsman was convinced that the Footguards were engaged in 'manufacturing
crime' by deliberately looking for minor faults in dress. (2) Even if an
individual commanding officer was prepared to take a relaxed attitude towards
dress, the army as a whole wo.c not. One of the major reasons for the
unpopularity of the CMP was that they had to check the dress of soldiers who
were walking out. The importance that was attached to this can be gauged by the
issue, in May 1914, of passes to
	 Territorials	 temporarily stationed in
Aldershot which stated that they were entitled to walk out in service dress.(3)
1.5 The Rankers' Perspective
Some rankers recognised and resented the basic premise that underpinned
military discipline. Pte. Grainger (9th Lancers) confided in his diary that
as a soldier 'I did not belong to myself...I am only a small nut in the Great
Indian War Machine... I am a number, still retaining my name, but that being of
secondary importance'. A man such as this was atypical, not only because he was
(1) See Orders of CNP, 8 May to 9 Oct 1914, Acn.680, RMPA.
(2) Lloyd, pp.48-49.
(3) Orders of CMP, 12 May 1914, Ace. 680, RNPA.
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articulate and resented the disciplinary system, but also because conditions
varied from unit to unit. Grainger, for instance, seems to have been generally
disgruntled with his lot, and believed 	 that the 9th Lancers placed more
emphasis on 'bull' than some other regiments.(1)
Other, no less articulate men	 did not object to the disciplinary system.
Nicholson of the RHA wrote that the Regular soldiers were 'properly, though
(sic) not harshly, disciplined'. (2) Hawke of 2/Cheshires believed that strict
discipline 'did not deaden the intellect' and discipline allowed the BEF to
survive in 1914.(3)	 Deference aside, there were good reasons why men were
prepared to accept the system without complaint.
It has been suggested that prewar Regular battalions offered 'a nexus of
relationships, familiar faces and existing loyalties'. (4) The peacetime army
offered some men a more comfortable and fufilling existance than civilian life.
They were relieved of many of the worries of everyday life. Army food,
monotonous	 and inadequate that it might have been, at least was served
regularly, which had novelty value for some recruits.(5) There were other
benefits, ranging from the issuing of good, waterproof boots, to the provision
of facilities and time for leisure, whereas many working-class recruits would
have had little time or money for leisure. (6) When stationed in India, the
private could live well; servants could be hired to shave him in bed, 	 and
(1) Diary, 6, 9 Apr. 1903, T. Grainger papers, 7104-31, NAN.
(2) Unpublished account, p.17, W.J. Nicholson papers, p.17.
(3) Hawke, p.63.
(4) P. Kennedy, 'Britain in the First World War' in 	 A.R.	 Millett and W.
Murray (eds.) Military Effectiveness (London, 1988) I, p. 67.
(5) Stewart, XII Lancers p.227.
(6) Maitland, p.52-3 H. Meyers, interview; H. Bolitho, The Galloping Third
(London, 1963) p.190.
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to carry out his fatigues.
	 A more subtle benefit was that the meanest
British soldier exercised real power over Indians.(1)
For every disgruntled soldier like Pte. Grainger, it is likely that there were
several more like H.J. Coombes (RWK), who enjoyed the outdoor life of the army,
which	 gave him	 'a feeling of well being and fitness' or T.A. Silver (E.
Surreys) for whom	 the red uniform brought
	 a sense of self-esteem. (2)
Probably even more common was the soldier who sought a quiet life by avoiding
trouble. Riddell believed that after passing through the recruit stage, army
life was tough for dirty, dim or unathietic soldiers, but was easy and tolerable
provided one was proficient at 'spit and polish', possessed the Third Class
Educational Certificate,	 or was a good sportsman. (3) The prospect of a
comfortable and trouble-free existence was a powerful inducement for men to
internalise discipline and to conform.
A number of officers, from George V downwards, were alarmed at the
implications of the Curragh Incident for military discipline.(4) While it might
be true that working-class rankers had little sense of class solidarity, (5) for
officers to defy authority was to set a dangerous precedent. As one subaltern
commented:
how are you to preserve discipline after this, how are you to use your Army
to keep law and order against strikers when once (sic) the officers have
successfully resisted an attempt to use them to enforce a law which they do
not approve? (6)
(1) F. Richards, Old Soldier Sahib (London, 1965 edn.) p.75, 82; Heathcote,
Indian Army p.166; letter, 26 Dec. [1912?1, F. Williams papers,80/23/1, IWN.
(2) Unpublished account, pp.2, 11, H.J. Coombes papers, PP/NCR/119, 1W1t;
unpublished account, p.2, T.A. Silver papers, 74/108/1, IWN.
(3) Unpublished account, p.43, J.W. Riddell papers, 77/73/1, IWM.
(4) I.F.W. Beckett, (ed.) The Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914 (London, 1986)
p.6.; R. Jenkins, Asquith (London, 1967 edn.) p.318.
(5) Beckett, Curragh Incident p.124.
(6) Letter, 23 Mar. 1914, A.P. Wavell, in Ibid p.282.
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Day-to-day discipline could have been undermined, or worse, rankers, who did not
have the option of sending in their papers, could have been forced to choose
between obeying their officers and obeying the government. The men would have
probably refused to march against TJlster,(l) although one source claimed
'hundreds' of men were prepared to come 'out from the ranks' if given a lead
by the Labour Party.(2) At the very least discipline would have been placed
under severe strain. In the words of Capt. F.A. Forster (4/RF) the men would
follow their officers, but 'It's all very unfortunate & terribly bad for
discipline'. (3)
Paternalism can be seen as 'petty and heavy handed interference in the
private lives of vulnerable people'.(4) Did the rank and file see their
relationship with their officers in these terms? Certainly, that disgruntled
9th Lancer, Pte. Grainger, denounced his officers as 'blue Blooded Bacon
dryers, cheese mongers, or pork butchers that are in command and have money' and
said that soldiers sometimes had 'the greatest contempt and hatred for those in
position and command, whether civilian or militaryt(5) Conversely, other men
were fulsome in their praise of their officers.(6) Perhaps more typical than
either type was Pte. Fanton (1/Cheshires). In the course of his unpublished
memoir of army life, he mentions officers only once, and then in connection with
criticism of 'bull'.(7)
(1) Beckett, Curragh Incident p.16.
(2) Anon. to Macdonald, nd., J. Rainsay Macdonald papers, PRO/30/69/1158, PRO.
This letter may have been bogus, sent in an attempt to discredit the Labour
Party.
(3) Letter, 25(?) Mar. 1914, F.A. Forster, in Beckett, Curragh Incident p.132.
(4) H. Benyon, Working For Ford (Harmondsworth, 1984 edn.) p.36.
(5) Diary, 5, 9 Apr. 1903, T. Grainger papers, 	 7104-31, NAM.
(6) A.F. Corbett, Service Through Six Reigns 	 (Norwich, 1953) pp.47-48.
(7) Unpublished account, p.7, W. Fanton papers, 7802-78, NAIl.
- 19 -
Officer: played a very marginal role in the life of the average private. There
were several areas in which the ranks did come together. One was on the
sportsfield, where officers and men played in the same teams. This served the
invaluable function of allowing feelings to be relieved without endangering
discipline, for the private could hurl abuse at an officer from the touchline
with impunity. Another meeting place was the regimental dramatic troupe.(l)	 A
third was the freemasons' lodge, which men of all ranks could join, apparently
without damaging discipline, although in 2/RWF privates were less likely to
become freemasons than were NCOs. (2)
The views of articulate other ranks 	 on the officer-man relationship are of
interest. Horace Wyndham, who served as a gentleman ranker in a Fusilier
regiment from 1890 to 1897 stated that officers saw little of their men, and did
not know them individually. This was in part due to the nature of short service
and the constant movement of personnel. He claimed that regimental officers
were forced to spend hours before an inspection committing soldiers' details to
memory so that they might impress a visiting general with their 'active and
intellient interest...in the affairs of the rank-and-file'.(3) John 	 Lucy,
(2/R.I. Rif.) writing of his service just prior to the Great War, likewise
argued that that the officers' fond belief that they understood the men was
misguided. In reality the officer 'was not very much in touch' with the men.
(4)
Wyndham believed that one of the principal obstacles to establishing closer
relations was the attitude of the men themselves, who, 'like the average
schoolboy' was 'most comfortable when he is furthest removed from those in
authority over him'. Thus the private preferred to sing in the wet canteen
(1) Cairnes, Social Life p.26, 116, 120-22.
(2) Richards, Sahib p.157; J.11. Brereton, The British Soldier (London, 1986)
pp.110-111.




rather 1Jn the presence of	 officers who, meaning well, had 	 organised a
concert. Indeed, Wyndham implied that the officer class sometimes carried this
aspect of paternalism to excess. What the private desired from his officers,
argued Wyndham, was not close friendship but	 tact and 'an intelligent
appreciation of their work and the conditions under which it is performed'.(l)
Frank Richards (2/RWF) commented upon the occasion when a lonely officer struck
up a conversation	 with him: 'it shows how hard pressed he must have felt...'
(2)
Interestingly, in view of the alleged preference of the ordinary ranker for
gentleman amateur officers, Wyndham claimed that men greatly preferred officers
who were knowledgable about their work. Paternal officers, who for 	 instance
ensured that the men's food was properly cooked at the end of a day on
manoeuvres, were appreciated. Selfish officers, and the small number who made a
fetish of 'spit and polish', were disliked. Above all, Wyndham stressed the need
for officers to display man-management skills: to give the odd word of praise on
parade or to visit a sick man in hospital. (3)
Wyndham, Lucy and Richards came to broadly similar conclusions about the
nature of the officer-man relationship. The former wrote that relations needed
'no great alteration' provided that the 'officer is tactful'. Respect for
officers, Lucy said, was high, and in time of war the gallantry of the officer
'won the greatest devotion, and very often the affection, of the men'. Richards
believed that the social code of the army	 was based around 'mutual trust in
military matters and matters of sport, but no social contact'.(4) 	 Although
(1) Wyndham, 'Officers and Men' pp.183-84, 187.
(2) Richards, Sahib, p.274.
(3) Wyndham, 'Officers and Men' pp.183-90.
(4) Wyndham, 'Officers and Men' p.190;	 Lucy, p.94; Richards, Sahib, pp.I5556.
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evidence suggests that other ranks were influenced by espirit de corps and
regimental pride,(l)
	 neither the view that the prewar army was one big happy
family,	 or	 that which sees the inter-rank relationship as one of mutual
antipathy is entirely correct. Generally,
	 officers and men did respect each
other, but relations were far from intimate.
Finally, two incidents will be cited to demonstrate how subtle the officer-
man relationship could be. Shortly before the Great War, some men of 20th
Hussars refused to parade because the cookhouse had closed before they could
eat. A deputation of 'old soldiers' conferred with Naj. Cooke, the squadron
commander. Cooke defused the situation by buying food for the men with his own
money, and the men then went on parade. Cooke backed up this compromise with a
visible show of force. The army soon gained its revenge by criming the
protestors on various charges.
This incident, technically a mutiny but effectively a strike, is most
instructive. Cooke displayed an impeccable grasp of the paternalistic
relationship by acting to rectify a genuine grievance. He also displayed
considerable managerial skill. Had he attempted to act in a doctrinaire fashion,
applying the full weight of military law, this relatively trivial incident could
have escalated into something more serious. By his subsequent actions Cooke
reasserted his authority. As one ranker who was involved noted, the men's
grievances might have been real but 'orders given in the Army simply had to be
obeyed, and objections made afterwards'.(2) A similar lesson emerged from a
recruits' 'round robin' complaining of a bullying NCO which was sent to the
commander at an RFC base in 1913. The recruits were arrested and received a
(1) See for instance Maitland, passim.
(2) Unpublished account, p.10, R.G. Garrod papers, IWN.
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'severe choking off' - but the NCO was posted away almost immediately.(1)
As will be discussed at length in later chapters, both officers and men
recognised that their relationship was governed by certain unwritten rules.
Provided both sides observed those rules, the relationship, although devoid of
intimacy, was nonetheless effective.
(1) Unpublished account, C. King papers, DS/Misc/91, IWM.
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Chapter 2
Officer-Nan Relations and Discipline in the British Army 1902-14 (continued)
In this chapter, the social composition of, and the nature of officer-man
relations and discipline in
	 Edvardian auxiliary forces will be examined. The
contemporary debate on discipline in the army as a whole will then be analysed,
and a case study will be presented of a Regular officer with radical views on
discipline and officer-man relations. Finally, the influence of prewar officer-
man relations and discipline on the army of 1914-18 will be discussed.
2.1 The Other Ranks of the Auxiliary Forces
For the purposes of this thesis 'auxiliary forces' are defined as yeomanry
(cavalry) and Volunteer infantry and artillery units. In 1908 the Territorial
Force (TF) was created. The yeomanry were merged into the TF, but the Volunteer
Force was
	 abolished. However, in many cases Volunteer units simply changed
their name, and there was
	 much continuity between the two forces.(l) In
general, militia and Special Reserve units, which did not see active service in
the Great War, are not discussed in this thesis.
'A Yeomanry regiment may be said to be an an expression of the best of the
County on horseback...its ranks manned from the homesteads and farms whose
tenure has often been held for successive generations and officered...from the
great houses'. (2)
	 As far as the ranks were concerned this ideal may have
been generally realised in earlier times (3), but by 1902
	 the social
composition of the yeomanry was undergoing significant change. As early as 1893
(1) I.F.W. Beckett, Riflemen Form (Aldershot, 1982) p.253.
(2) G. Fellows and B. Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire
Hussars Yeomanry (Aldershot, 1928) p. XV.
(3) 'A Lieutenant-Colonel in the British Army', The British Army (London, 1899)
p.29; I.F.W. Beckett, 'The Amateur Military Tradition in Britain', War and
Society, 4, No. 2 (1986) p.7.
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it was noted that the depression in agriculture was adversely affecting
recruitment. (1) 	 By the turn of the century most yeomanry regiments were
enlisting	 increasing numbers of urban recruits. This reflected the increasing
urbanisation of British society.
The change in the rural character of yeomanry regiments was not universal.
Some regiments, such as the Montgomeryshire Yeomanry and the North Irish Horse
contained a majority of 'traditional' personnel down to the eve of the Great
War.(2) Significant proportions of traditional yeoman can be identified in other
regiments; 45 per cent in the Derbyshire Yeomanry in 1914, 50 per cent in the
Berks. Yeomanry in 1908. (3) Men of yeoman stock need not have lived or worked
in a rural area. One farmer's son chose a career in an urban environment in
Swindon but on the outbreak of war in 1914 joined the R. Wilts. Yeomanry. This
man, who had learned many traditional equestrian skills as a child, was to all
intents and purposes a prime example of the traditional yeoman class.(4)
Nevertheless, the urban recruit was becoming increasingly important. The
Imperial Yeomanry, in large part recruited from the towns and cities, had given
useful service during the Boer War.(5) In 1902 it was said that yeoman farmers
were mostly found in the midland counties: 'They do not exist in other
counties so much'.(6) This view is supported by the fact that when in 1901	 the
(1) W.H. Goodenough and J.C. Dalton, The Army Book for the British Empire
(London, 1893) p.374.
(2) R. Williams and B. Freeman, The Historical Records of the Yeomanry and
Volunteers of Montgomeryshire 1803-1908 (Oswestry, 1909) p.97; E. Dorman, 'The
North Irish Horse', AR III, (1913) p.540. Technically, the latter were a
Special Reserve unit.
(3) G.A. Strutt (ed.), The Derbyshire Yeomanry War History 1914-19 (Derby, nd)
p.8; J.P.B. Karlslake, 'The Berkshire Yeomanry' p.7, NAil.
(4) M. Moynihan, (ed) A Place Called Armageddon (Newton Abbot, 1974) pp.105-07.
(5) PP, 1902, LVI,	 Cmd. 803, 'Imperial Yeomanry Organisation and Equipment',
p.731.
(6) Evidence of Maj.Gen. J.P. Brabazon, 21 Nov. 1902, PP, 1903, XL, Cmd 1789,
'Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South
Africa', p.295.
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War Office was considering the raising of a unit in an apparently rural county,
Sussex, it was thought that there were too few of the 'Yeoman class' to sustain
a conventional cavalry regiment.(l) At governmental levels, officials were
having to coming to terms with the practical effects of demographic change. In
1904 the Adjutant-General's Department stated that 'a large number of Yeomanry
were really townspeople with no intimate knowledge of, or feeling for, horses'.
(2)
While some disliked the concept of the urban yeoman, most units seemed to
have accepted it (3) while some	 saw the skills of the urban recruit as
invaluable for modern, 'scientific warfare'. (4)
	
Having identified that the
cities were a useful source of mounted auxiliary soldiers, several practical
measures were instituted to slimulate recruiting. From 1901 onwards a series of
reforms in the pay and conditions of the yeomanry occured which opened the ranks
to the less affluent. As a consequence, the numbers of yeomen who owned
their own horses declined, along with standards of horsemanship.(5) On
mobilisation in 1914 the standard of horses made available for the yeomanry was
often grossly deficient.(6) It was seriously proposed to replace the yeomanry's
horses with bicycles, and many regiments came to use a mixture of bicycles and
horses. (7)
(1) 'Formation of Sussex Rgt [sici of Imperial Yeomanry', W032/7252, PRO.
(2) Quoted in S.D. Badsey, 'Fire and the Sword: The British Army and the Arme
Blanche Controversy, 1871-1921', (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Cambridge, 1981) p.277.
(3) W.C. Bridge, 'Gold Medal Prize Essay' JRUSI L, No. 338, (1906) p. !+2O; C.
Stonham and B. Freeman, Historical Records of the Middlesex Yeomanry 1797-1927
(London, 1930) p.65.
(4) Karlslake, p.7, NAM.
(5) PP, 1902, LVI, Cmd. 803, 'Imperial Yeomanry Organisation and Equipment'
p.732; R. Verdin, The Cheshire (Earl of Chester's) Yeomanry (Birkenhead, 1971)
p.7; 'Cardigan', 'The Cavalry of the Territorial Army', Nineteenth Century
(Nov. 1908) p.869.
(6) Strutt, p.3. See also H.H. Mulliner, 'Supply of Horses for the Territorial
Force' JRUSI LVI, No.412, (1912) pp.807-26.
(7) Badsey, p.276;	 R.A. Johnson, 'Military Cycling and the Home Army' JRUSI
L, No.336, (1906) pp.167.
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The raising of four yeomanry regiments in the London area was the logical
consequence of the urbanisation of the yeomanry. A study of one of these
regiments, the Surrey Yeomanry, raised in April 1901, reveals that it had a
distinctly middle-class character. (1) An insistance on potential recruits
being able to ride was not long maintained (2) and it seems likely that a more
proletarian type of recruit was later admitted but evidence dating from 1909
suggests that the 'class' character was still evident.(3)
A sister unit, the Westminster Dragoons, was also socially exclusive.(4)
Sheer expense would appear to have confined this corps to a reasonably affluent
class of men. A typical skilled London craftsman in 1900 was paid about 38s per
week, (5) while the would-be recruit to the regiment had to be prepared to pay
£2-2s to join, with a further annual subscription of £1-is. Other typical
expenses included joining the regimental shooting club (2s 6d) with a similar
fee payable as an annual subscription, or attending a dinner at the Trocadero
(5is 6d). (6) Constant harping on the socially exclusive nature of the regiment
drew the acid comment:
Scarlet coats faced purple, and blue breeches with a yellow stripe is
the modest uniform favoured by the "Gentleman's Corps". A corps of mere
common, vulgar people might have insisted upon having something loud in
the way of regimentals. (7).
Auxiliary infantry and artillery units could be divided into two categories:
the 'class corps', which like the London yeomanry regiments were recruited from
(1) R.A. Barclay to Lord Niddleton, 18 Feb. 1900, W032/7249; PWYG 1, No.2,
(1903) p.14.
(2) PWYG 1, No.3, (1903), pp.22, 24.
(3) Unidentified newspaper report of annual dinner held on 6 Jan. 1909, Surrey
Yeomanry, B Squadron, Woking Troop Report Book 1908, 7305-74, NAIl.
(4) 'Raising of Yeomanry in London', W032/7255; Regimental Order , Westminster
Dragoons, 3 Oct. 1901, 7503-21-5, NAIl.
(5) G.D.H. Cole and R. Postgate, The British Common People 1746-1946 (London,
1961 edn.) p.443.
(6) Figures are drawn from materials in Westminster Dragoons archive, 7503-21-5,
NAN.
(7) Unidentified newspaper clipping, c.i903, 7503-21-5, NAN.
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men of some social standing, and the rest. Although the former have received
more attention, the Edwardian	 Volunteer and Territorial Forces	 recruited
the bulk of their members from the working classes. Although the numerous
Volunteer Rifle Corps raised in 1859 had had a strongly middle-class character,
by 1904, much to the disgust of some venerable Volunteers,(1) 70 per cent of
the ranks of the Volunteers were drawn from the working class. 40.3 per cent
were artisans, 9.2 per cent were clerks and only 1.6 per cent were professional
men. (2) One battalion, 	 2nd VB E. Surreys, roughly matched this national
profile. This unit, recruited partly in the London suburbs, was in 1904 composed
of a few gentlemen, a 'fair proportion' of clerks, some small tradesmen, a
'large proportion' of artisans, and in the 'county companies', labourers and men
in country pursuits. The unit contained very few casual labourers, and the
service of those who did join was generally short. The average earnings of the
rank and file were estimated at 35s per week, which was in itself a further
indication of the predominance of artisans within this corps. (3)
It is possible that the next few years saw a slight decline in the social
standard of the infantry. 	 In 1911 it was noted that increasing numbers of
labourers, and fewer tradesmen and clerks, were joining the TF, and the
intelligence of the average Territorial recruit 'differs but little, if
anything, from that of the Regular recruit'.(4)
	
Like their Regular
counterparts, numbers of auxiliary recruits were suffering from the effects of
(1) The LRB Record V, (1907) p.10.
(2) H. Cunningham, The Volunteer Force (London, 1975) pp.33-34; Beckett,
Riflemen Form pp.82-83.
(3) Evidence of Col. E.H. Bailey, 5 Nov. 1903, PP, 1904, XXXI, Cmd. 2062,
'Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Militia and
Volunteers', p.296.
(4) 'Reports (with summary of General Officers Commanding-in-Chief) on the
Progress made by the Territorial Force in attaining the contemplated standard of
military Efficiency for Home Defence, and the Relative Value of Territorial
Troops as compared with corresponding units and Formations of the Regular Army
[hereafter GOC Report] (1911) p.9, WOL.
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poverty.	 17/, 18/, 19/ and 20/Londons
	
were described as being recruited
'mainly from artisans who are badly fed and nourished and who are frequently
small, of poor physique, and with little stamina'. (1) 'Slum battalions' were
also found elsewhere. The general standard of physique of 7/DWR, recruited in
Yorkshire, was described as 'miserable'; in general, battalions which included
large numbers of mill hands were noted for the poor physique of their soldiers.
(2)
The artisan, not the labourer or clerk, was recognised as being the backbone
of the TF. (3)
	
The London Regiment offers many examples of these artisan-
dominated corps, 6/Londons having companies sponsored by the South Metropolitan
Gas Co., Amalgamated Press and Associated Newspapers. (4) In some units, such
as the Cambridgeshire Battalion and 5/DCLI, middle-class and working-class men
served together. (5) Unlike the Regular army, the Volunteers and TF recruited
from the artisan rather than the labourer.
Many of the remarks already made about the social exclusivity of the
Westminster Dragoons and the Surrey Yeomanry also applied to infantry 'class
corps' such the London Scottish (14/Londons), 6/Manchesters, and 5/SR. They
recruited very largely from white collar workers: it was said that London class
corps	 contained 'men of higher intelligence and education, and finer
(1) 'Reports of General Officers commanding-in-chief on the Physical Capacity of
Territorial Force Troops to Carry Out the Work and Endure the Hardships which
were Incidental to the Manouevres, 1910' (hereafter Physical Capacity Report)
p.2, WOL. See also GOC Report (1909) p.17, WOL.
(2) GOC Report (1911) p.20, WOL.
(3) Bethune to PS of Secretary of State, 27 Nov. W032/11242, PRO.
(4) W. Richards, His Majesty's Territorial Army (London, nd) III, p.115; H.D.
Myers, KRS Q.
(5) E. Riddell and 11.C. Clayton, The Cambridgeshires 1914-18 (Cambridge, 1934)
pp.1-2; E.C. Matthews, With the Cornwall Territorials on the Western Front
(Cambridge, 1921) p.4.
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physique than most of the urban corps of the country'.(l) Some charged entrance
fees, and all were concerned to
	
exclude proletarians from their ranks.(2)
About 60 per cent	 of the other ranks of 7/Welch (Cyclists) were 'young
professionals and businessmen of the same social standing of (sic) the
officers'. (3) A member of the LRB said that a strong motivation for 'young
men in the banks, insurance offices, the Civil Service, and the City' to join
class corps was to enjoy social activities and sporting facilities.(4)
2.2 The Officers of the Auxiliary Forces
In 1899 it was claimed that half of the yeomanry's officers 'consist of
retired cavalry officers, landed proprietors and enthusiastic fox-hunters'. (5)
This assessment was broadly accurate. Although in 1905 the yeomanry was some
25 per cent below establishment in officers, (6) service in the local regiment
was a favourite pastime of such pillars of the Edwardian social and political
elite as	 J.E.B. Seeley	 (Rants. Carabiners) and	 Walter Long (R. Wilts.
Yeomanry).(7) Aihough half of the officers of the Oxfordshire Hussars, the Duke
of Marlborough and Winston Churchill among them, had non-rural occupations
connections with the countryside remained strong: 'all had been accustomed to
horses and hunting from their earliest days'.(8) In the yeomanry as a whole,
substantial numbers of officers had previously served in the Regular army, 34
(1) Sir J.H.A. Macdonald, 'The Volunteers in 1905', JRUSI, XLIX, No.330, (1905)
p.917.
(2) A.!!!. McGilchrist, The Liverpool Scottish 1900-19 (Liverpool, 1930) p.4; LRB
Record V, (1911) p.32.
(3) H. Morrey-Salmon, KRS Q; GOC Report (1909) p.67, WOL.
(4) B. Latham, A Territorial Soldier's War (Aldershot, 1967) p.1.
(5) 'Lieutenant-Colonel', p.189.
(6) H. Le Roy-Lewis, 'The Imperial Yeomanry in 1905, JRTJSI XLIX, No.331, (1905)
p. 1031.
(7) J.E.B. Seeley, Adventure (London, 1930) p.91.
(8) A. Keith-Falconer, The Oxfordshire Hussars in the Great War (London, 1927)
p. 25.
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per cent of officers	 serving between 1901 and 1909 in the Montgomeryshire
Yeomanry, and 20 per cent of officers serving between 1901 and 1914 in the
Westminster Dragoons, for example.(1) It was not uncommon for successive
generations of one family to provide officers for a regiment. (2) Why was
service in the yeomanry so popular amovlg the British elite?
One reason is perhaps that it was regarded simply as an extention of the
principle of noblesse oblige, a responsibility being the defence of the realm in
the face of what was perceived as an increasing threat from Germany. This neo-
feudal attitude can be linked to the obligation imposed on many tenant farmers
to serve in the yeomanry, although this practice seems to have declined markedly
by the Edwardian period.(3) Moreover, auxiliary cavalry had proved to be useful
in the Boer War, however inappropriate the lessons learned on the veldt might
have been for combat in southern
	 England.(4) Finally, a yeomanry commission,
like its Regular counterpart, helped to confer respectability on the nouveau-
riche.	 As 'new money' sought to emulate older-established families by
purchasing country estates, they naturally adopted the tradition of service in
the yeomanry. The presence of families of Jewish extraction in the Royal Bucks.
Hussars earned the regiment the nickname of the 'Flying Foreskins'. (5) At a
lower social level, a potato merchant's clerk, after service in South Africa,
attempted to obtained a commission in the
	 Lothian and Berwickshires
in order to improve his social standing.(6)
(1) Figures are drawn from Williams and Freeman, pp.116-123
	 and material in
Westminster Dragoons archive, 7503-21-5, NAN.
(2) For the case of the Northumberland Hussars, see H. Tegner, The Story of a
Regiment (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1969) pp.5-7.
(3) Le Roy-Lewis, p.1042.
(4) Bridge, p.418.
(5) Beckett, 'Amateur Military Tradition in Britain' p.12.
(6) Obituary of D. Anderson, The Scotsman 8 May 1918; information supplied by
Dr. D. Anderson.
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Not the least of attractions of service in the yeomanry was the opportunity
to participate in equestrian activities. The Regular adjutant of the R. Glos.
Hussars	 observed that	 the training season 'was most carefully timed not to
interfere with the May-fly season and to finish before the hunting.' (1)
	 When
the Essex Yeomanry was raised in 1901, the four squadrons were raised on the
basis of the four hunts in the county.(2) The yeomanry also allowed a man to
sample the more enjoyable parts of military life without the necessity of
making a career in the army. The history of the Cheshire Yeomanry contains
many examples of a social life which was similar to that of a smart Regular
cavalry regiment.(3)	 Service in the yeomanry, Churchill wrote in 1903, was 'a
great drain' on the resources of impecunious
	 officers.(4) In 1902 it was
officially estimated that it cost the average yeomanry officer £100 per annum
'for the privilege of belonging to the force, entirely separate from their pay
and allowances'. (5) It seems likely that membership of some regiments involved
the outlay of even greater sums.
Auxiliary infantry officers were generally of a lower social class than
their Regular and yeomanry counterparts. (6) In 1904 just over 6 per cent of
Volunteer officers were 'Gentlemen of independent means', while nearly 65 per
cent were either 'Professional men' or 'Men in business on their own account'.
That a proportion of officers were of lower- or lower middle-class origin is
(1) A. Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey (London, 1950) pp.43-44.
(2) G.O. Rickword, The Essex Yeomanry - Records and Recollections 1901-14
(reprinted from Essex Review LX, (April 1951) p.4.
(3) Verdin, pp. 7, 33-34.
(4) R.S. Churchill, (ed.) Winston S Churchill 1901-1914 Companion, 1, p.254. See
also D. Hart-Davis, (ed.) End of an Era: Letters and Journals of Sir Alan
Lascelles 1887-1920 (London, 1986) p.124.
(5) PP, 1902, LVI,
	 Cmd.803, 'Imperial Yeomanry Organisation and Equipment'
p.732.
(6) Viscount Mersey, Journals and Memories (London, 1952) p.134.
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suggested by the 21.3 per cent who were recorded as being 'employees', although
this term is too imprecise to easily acertain their exact social status. (1)
It is unlikely that there was a high incidence of working-class officers in
the Auxiliary Forces. In 1904, 59 per cent
	 of the Volunteer officers had
attended public schools and universities.(2) Other evidence from TF units also
suggests substantial numbers of middle-class officers. The officers' mess of
1/8th Londons (Post Office Rifles) was dominated by men of
	 middle-class
occupations.(3) In 1911 it was reported that Territorial infantry officers were
'almost all business men'. (4)
The middle-class domination of the auxiliary officer corps was in part a
result of the fact that the upper- and upper-middle classes found service in the
TF, except for the yeomanry,	 unattractive. Pace the alleged impact of the
public schools in promoting militarism, in the period 1908-12 only 4 per cent
of former members of cadet corps took a Territorial commission, and less than 2
per cent	 took a commission in the Special Reserve.(5) A report by Col. L.
Banon,	 the Assistant Adjutant-General (AAG) in
	 1912 concluded that this
situation arose from a variety of factors ranging from family hostility to the
TF (either because of attachment to the old militia and Volunteers or a desire
to introduce conscription), to the decadence of the young, which had eroded the
military spirit. The high standards required of an officer were a deterrent, as
was the expense involved, and many suitable candiates for commissions
(1) Cunningham, p.34.
(2) Ibid, p.58.
(3) A.H. Naude, (ed.) The 47th (London) Division, 1914-19 (London, 1922) pp.6-7.
(4) GOC Report (1911) p.54, WOL. See also comments of Naj. Narker, 'Report on a
Conference of General Staff officers at the Staff College' (1909) p.22, SCL.
(5) Col. L. Banon, 'Report on the Supply of Officers for the Special Reserve and
Territorial Force', 23 Dec.1912,	 p.2, WOL.
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preferred to serve in the ranks of class corps. The basic patriotism of British
youth, was not, however, questioned.(1)
The officer corps of the Volunteers was widely regarded as being socially
second-rate.(2) According to a wartime TF officer, pedantic and officious men
who held relatively lowly positions in civil life 'formed the great majority
[of officers] in the city regiments'.(3)
	 Although one Regular believed that
successful businessmen were 'accustomed to think for themselves' and were well
placed to judge character, and, somewhat less enthusiastically, in 1908 the
CIGS	 stated that middle-class auxiliary officers were 'enthusiastic' if
'touchy', many Regular officers were concerned about the low social status of
auxiliary officers. (4)
Col. Banon's report of 1912
	 expressed the view that auxiliary units should
be 'officered by young men of good social standing', whom he defined as being
'the sons of the gentry and professional classes', on the grounds of their
paternalism and 'their hereditary aptitude for command'. He doubted whether
members of nouveau-riche families possessed these qualities. However, he saw
that eventually auxiliary officers would have to be drawn from a wider social
background, and believed that some could 'acquire the ideas, manners and
standard of the professional classes'. (5)
(1) Col. L. Banon, 'Report on the Supply of Officers for the Special Reserve and
Territorial Force', 23 Dec. 1912, pp.3-5, WOL. See also Macdonald, 'Volunteers'
pp. 915-16.
(2) Evidence of Col. E.H. Bailey, 5 Nov.1903, PP, 1904, XXXI, Cmd. 2062,
'Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Militia and
Volunteers', p.298; Sir H. Roberts, 'The Auxiliary Forces Commission', USM
XXIX, No.909, p.504.
(3) D. Wheatley, Officer and Temporary Gentleman (London, 1978) pp.53-54.
(4) Comments of Col. R.H. Davies, 'Report of a Conference of General Staff
Officers at the Staff College' (1910) p.55, SCL and
	 Gen. Hon. Sir N.G.
Lyttelton,	 'Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff
College' (1908) p.39.
(5) Col. L. Banon, 'Report on the Supply of Officers for the Special Reserve and
Territorial Force', 23 Dec. 1912, pp.5-6, WOL.
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The social status of non-yeomanry auxiliary officers thus gave cause for
official concern. However, the AAG's pragmatic conclusion reflects the spirit
which underlay the decision to commission Regular NCOs on mobilisation, and
anticipated the discarding	 by the wartime army of the dogma that only men
with a public school background could possess leadership qualities.
2.3	 Discipline in the Auxiliary Forces
The	 social composition of the auxiliary forces was reflected in the
disciplinary regime of its units.
	 An important difference between
	 the
disciplinary structure of Auxiliary and Regular regiments lay in the role of
the NCO.	 Many auxiliary NCOs were drawn from the foreman class.(1) Some
contemporaries saw this as being beneficial to discipline, for the 'foreman,
small manager or head employee' would allegedly make a good NCO, 'for the same
qualities which have got him on in civil life get him on in the regiment and
give him a sense of discipline and command' (2); they were 'ready-made' NCOs
'accustomed to take responsibility and to take charge of men'. (3) Kipling,
writing of a TF battalion in 1914,
	 claimed that the officers knew their men
'intimately' in civilian life, and the relationships built up between sergeants
and privates who normally knew each other in the role of foreman and employee
enabled the unit
	 to work	 'with something of the precision of a big
business'.(4) A related point was made by an officer of the West Kent Yeomanry:
(1) Cunningham, p.64.
(2) GOC Report (1910) p.63, WOL.
(3) R.S.S. Baden-Powell, 'Training for Territorials', JRTJSI LII, No.369, (1908)
p. 1480.
(4) R. Kipling, The New Armies in Training (London, 1915) p.59.
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Frequently each troop was a happy family from the same town
or district, and if a Private received an order from a Sergeant with
the reply "All right, Ginger," it was not a term of disrespect but merely
the natural manner of answering a friend who has, we will say, married
your sister. (1)
Others had a less rosy view of the grafting of an industrial hierarchy onto
a military one. Some NCOs of units recruited largely from a single workplace
were selected because of their hierarchical status rather than their 	 military
ability.	 Nor was it always the case that the status of the workplace was
maintained in the TF. Among the factors cited in 1909 as tending to undermine
the position of the NCO were, in addition to the fear of losing face by the
admittance of ignorance of an NCO's powers, the fear of upsetting subordinates
who were socially superior, or who 'held higher positions in business'.(2)
Many Regular officers identified NCOs as being the weakest link in the
disciplinary chain of the TF, as these comments from a report of 1909 indicate:
Generally speaking, a Territorial NCO has little authority over his men,
and does not understand what is required him in respect of discipline or
the maintennce of discipline.
At present, the men will readily obey an officer or a non-commissioned
officer of the Permanent Staff [ie a Regular], but do not attach much
importance to the orders of the Territorial non-commissioned officer. (3)
In 1911	 Col. Fanshawe, the Regular commander of a TF brigade, stated that
Territorials were enthusiastic, but he feared the time when the novelty of
soldiering palled and the NCOs had to drive the men on. TF NCOs and officers
gave orders not
in such a way as to ensure instant obedience and action, but rather as if they
were asking a favour which they hardly expected to be granted in full, and the
men appear to be doing things 'to oblige', often after some delay, as if they
had been thinking over before acting whether the action was necessary or not.
This leads to slowness and indecision. (4)
(1) C. Ponsonby, West Kent (QO) Yeomanry and 10th (Yeomanry) Battalion The Buffs
1914-19 (London, 1920) pp.5-6. See also unpublished account, p.5, A.S. Benbow
papers, PP/MCR/146, IWM; unpublished account, p.4, A.W. Bradbury papers, IWM.
(2) GOC Report (1909), pp.9, 45, 65, WOL.
(3) GOC Report (1909) pp.17, 54, WOL.
(4) GOC Report (1911) p.15, WOL. Fanshawe went on to command a TF division, the
48th, in the Great War.
- 37 -
Things were little different in the yeomanry.(l)
The leadership of auxiliary units possessed little real coercive power. Fines
or dismissal from the unit (which carried some social disgrace) were, in
practice, the only formal sanctions available. (2) By the end of the ninenth
century, the discipline of the Volunteers had improved, (3) but still fell far
short of Regular standards. To take one example, in 1896, a Volunteer NCO was
reduced to the rank of private 'for writing a disgusting letter to the
Adjutant'. (4) An attempt to impose Regular-style discipline would have led to
men leaving the auxiliary forces. Thus although Volunteers were subject to the
Mutiny Act while brigaded with Regulars,
	 company commanders of 4th VB E.
Surreys were did not have
	 'the courage to hold an Orderly Room in camp'. (5)
In short, the discipline of auxiliary units was of a very different nature from
that of the
	 Regulars. As, under conditions of peace,
	 auxiliaries, unlike
Regulars, were under military discipline for only a few hours a week, it could
hardly be otherwise.
2.4	 Officer-Man Relations in the Auxiliary Forces
Given the absence of the tools of formal discipline, discipline in auxiliary
units was largely reliant on the social authority of the officer. Not
surprisingly, considering the social profile of yeomanry officers, the closest
approach to the inter-rank relationship in the Regular army was found in the
(1) E.W. Gladstone, The Shropshire Yeomanry 1795-1945 (Manchester, 1953) p.191.
(2) C.J. Blomfield, Once an Artist Always an Artist (London, 1921) pp.20-21;
'An Adjutant', 'The Volunteer Company Officer', US? .! XXVII, No.895, (1903) p.313.
(3) I.F.W. Beckett, 'The Problem of Military Discipline in the Volunteer Force,
1859-1899', JSAHR LVI, (1978) pp.66-78.
(4) Order Book, 5th yB R. Bde, 6 May 1896, WO 70/14, PRO.
(5) Anon, The 23rd London Regiment 1798-1919 (London, 1936) pp.6-7.
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yeomanry.	 The ideal of officer-man relationships in the yeomanry was that
they should be	 the 'happiest and most cordial possible', based on 'a true
feeling of comradeship and mutual confidence'. (1) Yeomanry officers had their
share of paternalism; in March 1907 E.E. Fiennes NP stated that many yeomanry
units, at considerable expense to their officers bought tents and 'complete camp
equipment for the messing of the men'.(2)
Paternalism was mixed with tact. it is significant that a prewar member of R.
Wilts. Yeomanry complained bitterly about the arrival of a Regular officer who
ignored the easy-going traditions of the yeomanry and instituted Regular
practices:
we are not a blithering pack of fools! This is an instance of the
lack of imagination of a Regular Commander, who all his life has
commanded Regular Army men, and who now cannot see the difference in the
mode of treatment desirable with a totally different style of man that
he has under him in the Territorials, and Yeomanry at that...(3)
Accounts of yeomanry dinners give something of the flavour of officer-man
relations. A witness of the dinner of B Squadron of the Westminster Dragoons was
left 'in no doubt about the popularity of Major Sir Simeon Stuart Bart' with the
men, and Trooper Hogg 'was loud in the praise of all the officers'.(4) In 1909
Lt. Crundell of the Dover Troop of the East Kent Yeomanry referred to his men as
'comrades - for he was proud to look upon them as such', and there was later a
call for a regimental (as opposed to squadron or troop) dinner to 'cement the
happy relationship' between officers and men and 'bring all into closer sympathy
with each other'. (5) It is less remarkable that such sentiments should be
(1) Keith-Falconer, p.26.
(2) Hansard,	 4th Series, Commons, CLXXI, (22 Mar. 1907) col. 1289.
(3) Quoted in Moynihan, p.120.
(4) Unidentified newspaper cutting, Surrey Yeomanry archive, 7503-74, NAN.
(5) East Kent Yeoman IV, No.1 (1909) p.9.
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expressed at a convivial dinner than such an event should be held at all, for
it is almost unthinkable that even the most enlightened of Regular officers
would have dined in similar circumstances with their men.
The relationship between officer and man in the yeomanry thus seems to have
been less distant than that prevailing in Regular units. The reasons behind
this peculiar yeomanry spirit would appear to have been a mixture of recognition
of the limitations of discipline in an auxiliary unit and
	 paternalism.
Moreover, horses, and the possiblity of being ridiculed by civilians gave
officers and men a commonality of interest that was (in general) denied to
Regulars. (1)
Matters were a little different in auxiliary infantry units. Underlying the
distaste of many Regular officers for middle-class auxiliary officers was the
belief that that, unlike Regular and yeomanry officers, they lacked the social
authority to command. An ungentlemanly Volunteer officer, argued one writer in
1905, was 'apt to play the Jack-in-Office'. (2) Certainly, such units were
heavily reliant on the individual qualities of the officer. An officer of the
4th VB E. Surreys declared that officers could secure obedience 'only by their
personal magnetism in handling their men'. (3) Tactful handling of their men was
essential. The discipline of one class corps, the 5/Londons or LRB, was
described as 'exceptional' but 'incomprehensible to a critical outsider', and
newly arrived Regular adjutants in particular found it difficult to comprehend
that discipline could be maintained 'without the administration of military
law'. (4) Officers and men were not divided by a social chasm -
	 in some
(1) I explore the social history of the Edwardian yeomanry in a forthcoming
article.
(2) 'Trainband', 'The Dearth of Volunteer Officers', USM, XXX, No.916, p.648.
(3) Anon,	 23rd Londons p.6; see also I.F.W. Beckett, The Amateur Military
Tradition (Manchester, 1992) p.104.
(4) Anon,	 The History of the London Rifle Brigade (London, 1921) p.60.
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units officers were often promoted from the ranks (1) - and it was perfectly
possible for a private and an officer to be friends or workmates in civilian
life. Peer-group pressure was an effective way of dealing with miscreants. By
the exercise 'of good sense and tact on both sides', discipline was maintained
'without familiarity' while on duty. (2) Of f duty, at social events 'every
member of the LRB, whatever his rank, met on a basis of comradeship; on parade
Army discipline and routine took over again'. (3) In short, both an informal
officer-man relationship and good discipline was maintained by the men's self-
discipline, and by peer-group pressure and sense of duty: as a London
Scottish officer explained, 'Esprit de corps is the foundation of all real
discipline'. (4)
2.5 Officer-Nan Relations and Discipline in Auxiliary Units: Three Case Studies
The journal of the Surrey Yeomanry offers a wealth of evidence concerning the
nature of,egiment's disciplinary system and inter-rank relations. All ranks
could contribute to the journal and the regular feature of a column giving news
and views from the various squadrons provided a mouthpiece - albeit at
secondhand - for less articulate rankers.
It is clear from contributions to this journal that some rankers were very
conscious of their relatively high social status and intelligence, and sought
insulation from their social inferiors. In October 1903, Col. Cubitt called
for 'Groups' to be recruited among the men's friends and acquaintances in
order to stimulate recruiting. These groups were to be kept together 'as much
(1) J.H. Lindsay (ed.) The London Scottish in the Great War (London, 1925) p.11e;
J. Reith, Wearing Spurs (London, 1966) p.'7.




as possible in tents and in
	 the field when in camp'.	 (1) This	 suggestion
clearly foreshadows the 'Pals' concept of 1914, and shows an awareness of the
importance of the primary group in the unit cohesion and morale. In November
1903 a regimental member claimed that such a system was already in use in A
Squadron to some extent, and	 it would help to stimulate recruiting by
preserving the 'class corps' nature of the regiment. (2)
The regimental leadership recognised, and made allowances for, the nature
of the middle-class citizen soldier. A measure of egalitarianism almost unheard
of in a Regular unit was tolerated. A trooper was sarcastic at an officer's
expense when the latter was late for riding practice and then wrote about it in
the journal, (3) and the journal 	 featured a column specifically designed for
the purpose of allowing rankers to give vent to annoyance. (4) The journal also
featured a protracted and heated debate between Capt. the Hon. Eric Thesiger
and an NCO over the former's (rather provocative) views on the regiment's
NCOs.(S) Although on one occasion a correspondent used extravagant praise of
NCOs to attack officers, asking whether the quality of the former was the reason
for the absenteeism of squadron officers, NCOs were not immune from attack. In
June 1903 'A Keen Yeoman' attacked the attend&nce record of NCOs at drills. 'How
can the rank and file', he asked, 'be expected to take an interest in the doings
of the regiment when they, unhappily, must realise that the "non-corns" do not
take an interest in them and their progress towards becoming efficient Yeomen'?
(6)
Paradoxically, such public complaints by rankers about NCOs and officers,
which in a Regular unit would have been considered as prejudicial to discipline,
(1) PWYG 1, No.6, (1903) p.57.	 (2) PWYG 1, No.7,(1903) p.72.
(3) PWYG 1, No.4 (1903) p.34.	 (4) PWYG 1, No.2 (1903) p.11.
(5) This debate began in P'WYG 1, No.11, (1904) p.26.
(6) PWYG 1, No.2 (1903) p.11.
- 42 -
are an indication of strong, but unorthodox discipline. In the very first
journal, a contributor declared that the regiment stood for discipline, but also
'individual and intelligent initiative; and the army or regiment that acts upon
this principle must be the most efficient in the warfare of the future'. (1) The
complaints about officers and NCOs must be seen in this light. It was not a
question, as in the Regular army, of regimental leaders having to watch out
for malingering and other 'old soldier' habits: a substantial number of rankers
wanted to improve their skills as soldiers. Officers had to live up to the high
standards demanded by their men. 'There is a feeling of confidence begotten in
the hearts of men above that of respect for a proved and trusty leader...'
claimed one correspondent in 1904,
with the standard of intelligence prevailing in the class of men from
which our Yeomanry are recruited, the measure of a good officer is soon
taken and his value appreciated.(2)
Inefficient or lazy yeomen came under pressure from their peers. The scruffy
appearance of an (unnamed) yeoman was condemned in the journal:
the "powers that be" were very lenient with us...even if full dress is
uncomfortable for walking out, let it be remembered that it is "orders",
and so grin and bear it. (3)
Yeomen who were infrequent in their attendence at parades also were subject to
censure; on separate occasions absentees were reminded of the cost to the
regiment in post cards 'to get you to put in the small number of drills you have
to do to become efficient' and reproached for failing to appreciate the efforts
of the regimental's leaders to make soldiering a pleasant experience.(4)
Comments such as these suggest why the regimental leadership tolerated what,
in a Regular regiment, would have been seen as insubordination. The men were
(1) PWYG 1, No.1 (1903) p.3.	 (2) PWYG 1, No.9, (1904) p.96.
(3) PWYG 1, No.1, (1903) p.5.
(4) PWYG 1, No.1, (1903) p.7; ibid 1, No.3 (1903) p.23.
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very different from the average Regular private. Many held positions of
responsibility in civilian life, and, above all, many were keen to become
'efficient yeomen', and	 they devoted their spare time to this end.
	 The
evidence of their enthusiasm and self-discipline largely negated the need for
Regular-style, externally-imposed discipline, which would have been counter-
productive. The informal relationship between officers and men, based on mutual
trust, was a by-product of this disciplinary system.
Informal disciplinary regimes were also to be found in some units recruited
from the working classes. Both 61w. Yorks. and 7/Manchesters had a relatively
cosmopolitan social profile. The former recruited mainly from the mills and
warehouses of Bradford, but with a company raised from the old boys of Bradford
Grammar School. (1) The latter were recruited from the suburbs of the city, and
in the ranks could be found both unskilled labourers such as carters and
packers and skilled men such as builders and joiners. Other soldiers had solidly
middle-class occupations such as clerks
	 and	 draughtsmen.(2)	 Both units,
unlike the Surrey Yeomanry or the LRB, thus contained considerable numbers of
the class of man from which the Regular army was recruited.
Neither battalion set much store by formal discipline. The 61W. Yorks., for
instance, marched off parade in January 1914 45 minutes late, only 80 strong
and 'Even this was considered a good attendance!'(3) The ethos of the
Territorial was very different from that of the Regular. The former took pride
in their civilian, non-military - or even anti-military - attitudes. Gerald
Hurst, an officer of 7/Manchesters wrote that they were
(1) E.V. Tempest, History of 6th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment (Bradford,
1921) pp.1-2, 12.
(2) G.B. Hurst, With the Manchesters in the East (Manchester, 1917) pp.1,7.
(3) Tempest, p.4.
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almost arrogantly civilian...The social traditions of the middle-class
urban population, from which the Territorials were drawn, had never
fostered the military spirit, nor the power to recognise or understand
that spirit in others. (1)
Similarly, most members
	 of the 61W. Yorks. enlisted 'as a relief from the
monotony of civil life, as an outlet for high spirits, and as a means of
spending a healthy holiday with good comrades' rather than for militaristic
reasons. (2)
Both	 units enjoyed good inter-rank relations and high esprit de corps.
Regular modes of officer-man relations and discipline were simply inappropriate.
A Regular brigadier described the discipline of 61w. Yorks. as being that of
'good will',(3) while Hurst wrote of the 'comradeship' which produced an 'easy
relationship between officers and men...[vhich] was the despair of the more
crusted Regular martinet', a form of discipline which was maintained without
requiring the 'the banishment of individuality and of the exercise of intellect
from Regimental life'. (4)
It was claimed that in 61W. Yorks. orders were at first obeyed 'simply because
of a mutual confidence and respect between officers and men, similar to that in
a workshop or any small society'. While the 'first bond was personal',
discipline, when it developed, was used to 'strengthen and regularize
relationships already existing'. (5) The personal element in these units was
reinforced by the fact that officers and men were drawn from the same city. Both
Bradford and Manchester had a strong tradition of civic pride, which was
reflected in battalion esprit de corps.
	 Manchester's Territorials had the




(4) Hurst, p.2; G.B. Hurst,
(Manchester, 1920) p.xiii.
(5) Tempest, p.10.
in S.J. Wilson, The Seventh Manchesters
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unit, Noel Lee, allowing Hurst to
	 claim that 'all ranks, from Brigadier-
General to private, came from one neighbourhood, and viewed life from much the
same angle'. (1)
Another example of the importance of the personal element in leadership of
Territorials can be drawn from another northern urban battalion, 6/LF. The
intake of recruits had
	 increased when an officer began to take a direct
personal interest in the welfare of the men, which included the provision of
extra sporting facilities.(2)
In sum, although the social composition of the Surrey Yeomanry was rather
different from that of 61W. Yorks. and 7/Manchesters, all three units adopted,
from a mixture, one suspects, of pragmatism and genuine pride in the nature of
the unit, a style of discipline and officer-man relations which was very
different from that of a Regular unit.
2.6	 Regular Views on Auxiliary Discipline
While some TF units	 did not have such an informal disciplinary code (3) the
need for careful handling of auxiliary soldiers
	 was	 understood by many
Regulars. Col. Williams, the commander of North Midland Mounted Brigade went
on record that Regular NCOs posted to TF units as Permanent Staff should undergo
a six month probationary period to judge both their skill as an 'instructor and
a disciplinarian', and,
	 significantly,	 their	 'tact and zeal in the
performance of his duties'.(4) Generally speaking, it would appear that most
Regular officers and NCOs posted to TF units managed to adapt to the
(1) Hurst, p.8.
(2) WO 32/11236, PRO.
(3) See Kernahan, passim.
(4) GOC Report (1910) p.'4.
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peculiar disciplinary system and officer-man relationship, although one wonders
how a Regular officer would have adjusted to the state of affairs in the
9/Manchesters, where among other things, an officer was heard to advise a
soldier to 'b-r off'.(l)
Territorial	 discipline coloured many 	 Regulars officers' views of 	 the
military efficiency of the TF.(2) One of the kinder views was that of Lt.Gen.
Sir Arthur Paget, GOC Eastern Command, who in 1909 likened the relationship of
the Regulars and TF to that of a 'strong, well grown man in the prime of
life and a young, immature but healthy child who...should some day develop into
maturity'.(3) In	 1910 GOC Western Command considered that the value of
Territorial infantry compared to the Regulars was 5.1:10 while the 'ratio' for
Territorial artillery was only 3.3:l0.(4) In 1911 Paget placed on record his
belief that after four months training, Territorial infantry would still be 50
per cent less effective than Regulars, and he believed that TF artillery was
even worse off. (5) The fact that the TF was intended for home defence only
was scant comfort, given the prevalent fears of invasion.
There was much evidence to stoke the fears of Regular officers, although the
seriousness with which	 training was taken varied from unit to unit. Much
depended upon the character and inclinations of individual officers and men. In
response to a question about the training of 6/Essex,	 one soldier answered
that he took it seriously, because it was his hobby, but the unit as a whole did
not.(6) In 6/Londons, the arrival of a new CO brought about a drive for
(1) Unsigned letters, 10, 13, 14 Sept. 1914 H.E. Politzer papers, P.430, IWM.
(2) Two notable exceptions were French and Baden-Powell. See R. Holmes, The
Little Field Marshal (London, 1981) p.131; Baden-Powell, 'Training for
Territorials' pp.1474-77.
(3) GOC Reports (1909) p.20. For another fairly optimistic view, see minute by
Bethune, 2 July 1912, WO 32/9192, PRO.
(4) GOC Reports (1909) p.68.
(5) GOC Reports (1911) p.10.
(6) E.A. Loftus, KRS Q.
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effiency, while Pte.	 S. Blagg of the South Notts. 	 Yeomanry welcomed the
replacement of a lenient commander by a stricter officer because it brought a
sense of purpose to their training.(I)
In some circles, the Edwardian yeomanry (as opposed to the Imperial Yeomanry
of the Boer War) seems to have been a byword for inefficiency. One critic
claimed that the fortnight's 'meagre annual training' was
chiefly regarded by the majority, both officers and men, as a pleasant outing
during which mounted competitions, regimental sports, and local race meetings
are the first consideration...
Training, it was claimed, rated a very poor second.(2) While there was often an
element of polemicisin in such comments, a number of yeomen admitted the truth
of some of the charges. A former member of Sherwood Rangers recalled that:
Good humour reigned, partly because this short period constituted
to the younger men their annual holiday, to the elder an escape
from wives and families, partly because to all of them it was a
masquerade. The whole of the youth of a county were playing at being
soldiers.. .(3)
Not all of the problems of the yeomanry can directly be attributed to
indiscipline or laxness, for it is unlikely that keen soldiers were found only
in the Surrey Yeomanry. The yeomanry suffered from the struggle over the future
of cavalry.(4) One officer complained that 'Every faddist in turn' had inflicted
their pet ideas on the long suffering yeomanry. (5) Time available (or training
was necessarily limited for all auxiliaries,	 and the training of a horsed unit
(1) H.D. Meyers,	 KRS Q; letter, 13 Sept. 1914, S. Blagg papers, PP/MCR/22O,
IWN.
(2) Bridge, pp. L.lB-l9. See also W.G. Knox, 'Yeoman Hopkins: An Asset in our
Armour', Nineteenth Century, (Mar. 1911) pp.560-572.
(3) 0. Sitwell, Great Morning (London, 1951) p.144.
(4) For details of this debate, see Badsey, passim and 	 E.M. Spiers, 'The
British Cavalry 1902-14', JSAHR, LVII, No.230, pp.71-79.
(5) Sir. L. Rolleston, 'The training of the Territorial Force. A - Mounted
Brigades', AR II, No.1, (1912) p.504.
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in an urban area had obvious inherent difficulties which were exacerbated by
the fall in	 the horse population of Britain by 11 per cent between 1904
and 1910, making it more difficult to obtain horses for training.(l)
The persist.'it absenteeism from which most auxiliary units suffered was not
wholly attributable to indiscipline.
	 Poorer men could not always afford to
attend all of the annual camp, and many employers were reluctant to give
Territorials time off from work. The annual camp gave auxiliary soldiers very
little grasp of the more unpleasant sides of soldiering. At camp, yeomen could
pool their resources to	 hire servants to clean their saddlery and equipment.
After a parade and stables in the morning, afternoons were free for leisure
pursuits, the evenings being spent drinking and chasing wonien.(2) In May
	 1909
a soldier of the East Kent Yeomanry wrote that the old, carefree days had
passed and now 'our fortnight of Annual Training is not the time for display
and recreation, but the time to continue and complete our training...' No doubt
the writer was sincere, but a glance at the regiment's training schedule, for
1909 reveals that training had to compete with numerous other committments,
including no less than ten entertainments provided by the Borough of Margate,
for a slice of those precious fifteen days. (3) The problem was insuperable:
camp constituted for many men their annual holiday. To have significantly
reduced the time alloted to recreation would probably have resulted in fewer men
attending camp and efficiency would have declined even further.
In sum it seems that much of the criticism of the standard of auxiliary
training was justified, and some of the problems resulted from indiscipline.
(1) 'The Scarcity of Horses in the British Empire', CJ, 6, No. 24, pp.472-84.
(2) Hatton, p.22; A.S. Hamilton, The City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders)
(London, 1930) p.4.
(3) EKY, 4, No.2, May 1909 pp.17, 23.
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However, to have imposed tighter discipline would have been counterproductive.
The ultimate test of Territorial efficiency came on the Western Front in
1914-15 where TF units performed surprisingly well. Their discipline, although
very different from that of Regular units, was sufficient to withstand the
strains of industrialised, attritional warfare.
2.7	 Contemporary Debates on Discipline
Having examined officer-man relations and discipline in both the Regular and
Auxiliary forces, it is necessary to examine the debate on these topics that
raged in the Edwardian army. In common with other European armies, many British
officers	 believed that the offensive could succeed in the face of 	 the
increased destructiveness of modern weaponry if the morale of the assaulting
troops was sufficiently high.(1)	 According to Travers, 'many'	 officers
conflated this	 view with that of another 'vague camp' which emphasised
increased discipline, producing a demand for a well-trained and highly
motivated soldier with high degree of self-discipline.(2) In effect, what was
being called for was an army composed of 'thinking bayonets', full of
initiative, who were also well-disciplined.(3) As we have seen, the process of
r
training and the hier*hical structure of the army was likely to fulfil the
first criterion, but not the second, for as one officer was later to write
Regulars 'were highly trained and well disciplined, but initiative in the
ranks was discouraged and had been drilled out of them' (4) This
(1) N. Howard, 'Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in P.
Paret (ed). The Makers of Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1986) p.522.
(2) T. Travers, The Killing Ground (London, 1987) p.47.
(3) This debate has echoes in earlier periods. See D. Gates, The British Light
Infanry Arm c. 1790-1815 (London, 1987) and P. Griffith, Military Thought in the
French army, 1815-51 (Manchester, 1989).
(4) Letter, 27 Mar. 1926, A.F. Duguid to Edmonds, CAB 45/155, PRO.
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dichotomy between desired results and the realities of army life fuelled a
lively debate, which, however, has hitherto been largely neglected by
historians.
The most prominent contributor to the debate was the foremost British military
intellectual of the day, Col. G.F.R. Henderson, Professor of Military Art and
History at the Staff College from 1892 to 1899. (1)
	 Henderson argued that
the ranks of the armies of the American Civil War were filled with men, many of
whom were of high intelligence, who did not take easily to formal discipline.
They would willingly follow men who had proved themselves or who they liked,
but proved resistant to 'military etiquette' in such matters as familiarity
between officers and men. They were 'thinking bayonets', in sharp contrast to
the armies of Europe (although Henderson was usually content to leave this point
implicit). (2)
Henderson was careful to point out the shortcomings of the lack of discipline
in these armies, but he stressed that successful generals recognised the nature
of their armies and adapted their methods of command and leadership
accordingly.(3) 5Foij.ti' Jackson recognised that 'his citizen soldiers were
utterly unfamiliar with	 the forms and customs of military life' and thus
with his troops	 'tact, rather than the strict enforcement of the regulations,
was the key-note of command', although offenders were harshly punished. (4)
Henderson saw the handling of Civil War armies as directly relevant to the
(1) On Henderson and his influence, see Lord Roberts, 'Memoir' in G.F.R.
Henderson, (N. Malcolm, ed). The Science of War (London, 1906) pp. XIV-
XXXVIII; J. Luvaas, The Education of an Army (London 1964) pp.216-247.
(2) G.F.R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (London,
1898) II, p. 417, ,429, 431, 455; Henderson, Science pp. 191, 208, 243.
(3) Henderson, Science pp.191-96, 244, 311; Henderson, Stonewall Jackson II, pp.
438-42.
(4) Henderson, Stonewall Jackson II, pp. 431,	 448- 52;	 Henderson, Science
p.243.
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Volunteer movement, of which he was a supporter. (1) In 1894, he suggested
that one day Britain might raise a large army composed 'at least in part' of
temporary civilian volunteers, and the
habits and prejudices of civil life will have to be considered in
their discipline and instruction, and officers will have to recognise
that troops without the traditions, instincts, and training of regular
soldiers, require a handling different from that which they have been
accustomed to employ.
An understanding that conventional discipline
	 was inappropriate for citizen
volunteers	 was 'one of the most important lessons to be learned from the
American War by English soldiers'. (2)
Henderson was unusual among Regular officers in suggesting that there might be
some merits in coming to terms with auxiliary discipline, rather than simply
bemoaning it, and far-sighted in his suggestion that this might have some
relev&nce to a future mass volunteer army. Indeed, in a discussion of 'The
tactical methods of handling
	 partially trained troops' at a General Staff
Conference in 1909, J.E. Edmonds, one of Henderson's former students, denied
that the greater intelligence of wartime volunteers would 'make a very great
difference, when we actually get into its zone of fire' and thus
	 dense
formations would be needed to harness the energies of troops which lacked the
lengthy training of the Regulars. Haig and Rawlinson were both present at this
discussion. Possibly one can trace the
	 genesis of the disastrous tactics of 1
July 1916 to the failure to assimilate Henderson's enlightened views.(3)
In the 1890s Henderson held largely conventional views about the discipline
(1) Luvaas, p.218.
(2) Henderson, Science of War p.310.
(3) 'Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College'
(1909) p.9, SCL.
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of Regular troops. (I) As a result of the initially poor performance of the
army in the	 Boer War he paid more attention to this subject. In an article
written in 1903, published in a widely read volume in 1906,
	 Henderson drew
a useful comparison between 'mechanical' and 'intelligent' discipline.
	 The
latter was compared to
a pack of well trained hounds, running in no order, but without a
straggler, each making good use of his instinct, and following the same
object with the same relentless perseverence.
Henderson believed that the army of 1899 had relied on 'mechanical' rather than
'intelligent' discipline, but under the conditions of modern warfare this was
inadequate. Instead the soldier had to use his initiative. (2) Henderson did
not take his argument to its logical conclusion by attacking the nature of the
disciplinary regime in the army, although he did admit that 'Monotony and
routine'	 part and parcel of soldiering, but were 'certain, if unrelieved, to
deaden ambition and to contract the intellect...'. He also criticised the lack
of educational opportunities for officers and of training facilities. (3)
The views expressed in Henderson's 1903 article represent the development of
previous ideas. It is possible, if he had lived beyond that year, that his ideas
would have developed further as a result of the debate on discipline conducted
within the army in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War. As it
was, Henderson's views were important because he was the the most influential
military intellectual of the period. Furthermore, in 1914 many officers faced
just the situation that Henderson had predicted twenty years earlier, when they
were placed in command of
	 untrained but enthusiastic civilian volunteers,
unused to military discipline.
Other Regular soldiers were thinking along similar lines and some exceeded
(1) Henderson,	 Stonewall Jackson II,
	 pp.44!.; 445-47, but see his views on
Wellington's Light Division in Science pp.200-201.
(2) Henderson, Science pp. !.1O, 412.
(3) Ibid p.393-95.
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Henderson in the radicalism of their approach to the question. Another prominent
military thinker, Sir J.F. Maurice, in an article of 1901 	 called for training
that would produce thinking, individualistic 'light infantry'.(l) At a much more
junior	 level, Lt. E.L.	 Spiers (11th Hussars) became dissatisfied with the
'insufferably dull routine' of training, and tested some new schemes on his
troop. Spiers deliberately strove to make these interesting for his men, and was
careful to take time explain them. (2) The Colonel Commandant of the Royal
Engineers, General Sir Richard Harrison, put forward some ideas not dissimilar
to Spiers'. In a lecture in 1906 Harrison argued for a greater degree of man-
management skills. Recruits should be taught to work 'in an intelligent and
methodical manner'; other ranks should not be treated as if they were stupid;
training should be made more interesting; generally, the lot of the men should
be improved, both by the provision of amusements and by preventing the
men from being 'humbugged about'.(3)
Officers such as these were critical of the system of training and discipline
which they saw as working against the ultimate objective of producing a
resourceful, individualistic soldier. However, the nature of the officer-man
relationship itself received little attention. Discussions on this subject
tended to focus on the practical side of paternalism, as in Baden-Powell's 1906
article on 'manmastership', which discussed such matters as the hygene and diet
of the soldier, although a brief paragraph acknowledged that concern for the
character of the soldier was also part of the officer's duty.(4) Harrison's
lecture, while touching on relevant matters, did not go into details on the
subject of the officer-man relationship, while Henderson subscribed to a
(1) Sir J.F. Maurice, 'The Army Corps Scheme and Mr Dawkins's Committee',
Nineteenth Century, (July, 1901) pp.l45, 148.
(2) E. Spears, The Picnic Basket (London, 1974) p.73.
(3) Sir. R. Harrison, 'Thoughts on the Organisation of the British Army', JRUSI
L, No. 335, (1906) pp.17-23.
(4) 'The Inspector of Cavalry', 'Maninastership', CJ, I, No.4, (1906) pp. 410-21.
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romanticised image of the relationship, particularly in regard to the role of
the NCO. (1)
	 Those officers who had radical views on discipline seem to have
in general shared the opinion of Maurice, that the officer-man relationship
was
the most	 organic relationship - that is, the one in which each class best
understands what the nature of the relationship is - and the most
cordial, hearty and friendly existing between an upper class and a lower
class anywhere in Europe.(2)
This view was by no means wholly erroneous, for the relationship was both
'organic' and 'cordial', yet this rosy view was strangely at odds with the
perspective of the other ranks.
It can be argued that it was a futile exercise to attempt to inculcate
initiative among the ranks without altering the basis of the relationship
between the officers and men. It was difficult in the extreme to graft a system
of devolved control (or Auftragstaktik) onto a rigidly hierarchical army whose
other ranks were regarded and treated
	 as	 little more than as cogs in a
machine, or, to change the analogy, as children who had to be spoonfed by
their officers. While some officers were prepared to criticise discipline nd
training,	 few were prepared to public1 7
	challenge an equally vital and
directly related topic, the nature of the officer-man relationship.
Despite the paucity of public debate on the inter-rank relationship, some
officers' attitudes to their men were undergoing change on the eve of the Great
War. This was, in part, a
	 pragmatic response to recruiting problems. (3) In
early 1914, treatment of recruits was recognised as a factor that affected
recruiting and tactful handling of recruits was urged, without, it must be said,
(1) Henderson, Science pp.392-93.
(2) Maurice, p.148. This paragraph had originally been written in the 1870s when
officer-man relations were rather more distant than in Edwardian times.
(3) See 'Colonel', 'How to Get Recruits', USM XXIX, No.909 (1909) pp.611-19.
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much discernable effect.(1)
There is also evidence of a greater willingness to trust soldiers with
responsibility. Most strikingly, in 1909-10 first senior officers and then the
Army Council accepted the need, however reluctantly, to overcome the shortage
of officers by commissioning selected NCOs upon mobilisation.(2) Even before
the outbreak of war, in 1914 it was planned to commission as many as 50 NCOs
although French, the CIGS, was opposed to2'Lomotions from the ranks on the
pattern of the French army, since this would upset the 'exceptionally happy'
officer-man relationship. (3)
This shift in opinion can also be detected in the pages of the
	 Soldier's
Small Book, issued to every ranker. The 1905 edition contained three and a half
pages headed 'OBEDIENCE IS THE FIRST DUTY OF THE SOLDIER'. This section set out
in graphic detail the various punishments for disobedience, including death. It
is perhaps significant that most of this material is omitted from the 1909
edition of this book. (4)
There are also indications of changing attitudes at regimental level. Lt. Col.
The Hon. G.H. Morris (1/Irish Gds.), who had a reputation as a radical, in a
'revolutionary step', set up a weekly consultative meeting with the other
ranks on welfare and similar issues, along the line of the Indian durbar (see
below).(5) The regimental historian of the King's Own discerned a considerable
(1) Minutes of 'Recruiting Conference', 5 Nay 1914, pp.8, 11, 19, WO 106/364,
PRO. See also Capt. C. Bonham-Carter, 'Suggestions to Instructors of Recruits',
AR VII, No.1, (1914) pp.1'9-27.
(2) 'Report of the Coimnittee on Supply of Officers on Mobilization, 21 Oct.
1909', Precis No.453 and 122nd Meeting of Army Council, 21 Mar. 1910, both in
WO 163/15, PRO. For further analysis of this question see E.M. Spiers, Haldane:
An Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980), pp.'41-42 and J. James, The Paladins
(London, 1990) p.1'2.
(3) Minute by CIGS, 6 Mar. 1914, and terms of reference of report, WO 32/8386,
PRO.
(4) Soldier's Small Books of G.A. Balaain and V.G. Ellis, ERII.
(5) T.R. Wairond to Lord Milner, 23 Mar. 1914,
	 in Beckett, Curragh Incident
p.277; P. Verney, The Micks (London, 1973 edn.) p.28.
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change in attitudes in this period. The extension of the franchise had given
some rankers the vote, and on polling day the regiment provided four motor cars
to take soldiers to the polling station. In 1913 each company of 1/King's Own
sent a representative to a messing committee, chaired by the sergeant-major,
while four years earlier well-behaved men were given the privilege of walking
out in civilian dress.(1) These concessions 	 e trivial enough in themselves,
but do appear to mark an increasing acceptance that the ranker was capable of
behaving responsibly.
On occasions, the officer-man relationship	 involved	 a measure of
consultation and even democracy. In 1903 the War Office proposed to extend the
length of service in the footguards. The regimental adjutant of the Scots Gds.
ordered that	 officers should obtain 'as far as possible the individual or
prevailing opinion' on this subject. The CO of 3/Scots Gds. 	 outlined the
scheme to senior NCOs, told them to acertain the opinion of the men in the
following week and report back. The CO personally interviewed 40 men who were
most directly affected by the proposals.(2) A similiar process took place in
2/Coldm. Gds. in 1903 when Col. Ivor Naxse asked the men whether they were
prepared to forego two days pay in order to have the use of a minature rifle
range. The men were given 15 minutes in which 'they could regard themselves as
a republic and talk the matter over' and at the end of that time a vote would be
taken - which produced a unanimous 'yes'.(3) One may question whether the
other ranks were truly free to express their own opinions but the mere fact
that officers	 were prepared to go through the motions of consultation
indicates that attitudes towards discipline and the officer-man relationship
were somewhat more complex than has sometimes been assumed.
(1) L. Cowper, (ed.) The King's Own - The Story of a Royal Regiment, II,
(Oxford, 1939) p.304. This innovation would have pleased one ex-sergeant;
Edmondson, pp.92-93.
(2) 'Extention of Service of the Footguards 1903-04', WO 32/6901, PRO.
(3) J. Hall, The Coldstream Guards 1885-1914 (Oxford, 1920) pp.313-4.
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2.8	 A Case Study: Major Philip Howell and the 4th Hussars
This chapter will conclude with an examination of one officer's views on
discipline and officer-man relations, and the way in which he put his ideas
into practice at regimental level. At the time of his death in 1916
	 Brig. Gen.
Philip Howell (GSOI, II Corps) was widely regarded as one of the rising stars of
the army. (1) He served with the Guides in India and entered Quetta in 1905.
Howell then took a series of staff posts and in 1913 he transferred into the
4th Hussars as major and second in command.(2) Although his close, if not
uncritical association	 with Haig would appear to mark him down as a
conventional officer,(3) Howell was far from being the archetypical cavalryman.
He was a keen student of his profession and had political views of a liberal
character.(4) As an Indian army officer he was
	 a relative outsider to the
British military establishment. This position allowed him to take a reasonably
detached view of the British army, and to come to some radical conclusions about
officer-man relations and discipline.
There are indications that Howell was thinking along radical lines on these
topics as early as 1908, (5) but his appointment as second-in-command of the 4th
Hussars in 1913 was a turning point. Howell
	 brought to the 4th Hussars
experience of the silladar system in use in many Indian cavalry regiments where
(1) Letter, 27 July 1931, F.P. Horsworthy, CAB 45/134, PRO; B.H. Liddell Hart,
'Impressions of the Great British Offensive on the Somme', p.58, CAB 45/135,
PRO.
(2) Biographical details have been drawn from ER. Howell], Philip Howell: A
Memoir by his Wife (London,1942) and Beckett, Curragh Incident p.428.
(3) Memo, from Haig, 12 Feb. 1906, P. Howell papers, IV/C/2/2, LHCNA; Haig to
Howell, 8 Mar. 1907, P. Howell papers IV/C/2/17, LHCMA; Howell, Philip Howell
p.4.
(4) B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London, 1972)
p.285; Howell, Philip Howell p.42; Howell to C Wigram, 22 Mar. 1914, in
Beckett, Curragh Incident, p.104.
(5) 'Some Notes for Mr Asquith', nd (but 1908) P. Howell papers, IV/C/2/43,
LHCNA.
- 58 -
rankers, who tended to be high caste,
	 were in the position of a contractor,
rather than a mere hireling.(l) Such units made effective use of self-
discipline.	 In the Guides, a durbar or 'open court' was held twice a week,
at which the men could air grievances and raise matters relating to welfare.
(2)
Howell painted a grim picture of life in the 4th Hussars:
Shortage of strength means more frequent fatigues...excessive youth
[of soldiers] means much elementary work, more boredom and more
mistakes: boredom and mistakes lead to punishments: and punishments to
desertions and unpopularity of recruiting (sic) - and so round and
round we go.(3)
Howell considered that modified discipline and officer-man relations would
produced a more contented soldiery, who would work more efficiently, and this
would lead to a more professional army. For example, he
	 regarded the military
obsession for cleaning as a symptom of a concern for 'outward appearances',
which, in his wife's words, 'torment the soldier without increasing his
efficiency'.(4) Howell was no less critical of the liberal use of punishments
in the regiment, making clear that he would look with favour on the sergeant
who produced the shortest, rather than the longest, list of defaulters. In a
similar vein, he would attempt to seek the root cause of indiscipline, rather
than simply punish it. On one occasion, tired of punishing a man, Howell
wrote to the parents of one young private, a persisttnt defaulter, and then gave
him home leave: he returned a changed man. (5) Howell came to see that reforms
were necessary if the best was to be made of the human material. He attempted
to make his subordinates lead rather than drive the men, and to improve
(1) Heathcote, Indian Army pp.39-40; Mason, Matter of Honour pp.376-77.
(2) G.J. Younghusband, The Story of the Guides (London,l908) p.194. For a
description of a durbar, see F. Yeats -Brown, Bengal Lancer (London, 1984 edn.)
pp.22-26.
(3) Draft of letter, 16 Dec. 1913, P. Howell papers, IV/C/2/41, LHCMA.




training techniques,	 believing that men could only learn when in a receptive
frame of mind, which was dispelled by 'cursing, swearing and noise. A man
becomes either frightened or surly'. Howell, supported by his likeminded
CO, Lt. Col. Ian Hogg, does seem to have brought a more enlightened disciplinary
system to 4th Hussars, although some of his ideas were not well received by the
men - a suggestion box remained empty, a reminder of the innate conservatism
(and desire for self-preservation) of the Regular ranker.(1)
Howell's aims and methods discussed thus so far would have won the approval of
many thinking officers. However, Howell extended the argument over discipline
by concluding that if independent action should cease to be the prerogative of
the officer, the officer class should be recruited by merit rather than
	 by
social status. At least as early as 1908 Howell had come to believe that
officers should be recruited from men of natural authority, regardless of
class. Education and training, Howell believed, could supply the army with
suitable leaders. (2)
	
The Curragh Incident led to calls, mainly from the political Left, 	 for a
	
'democratic' army: this notion appealed to Howell. In a letter to	 Ramsa.y
Macdonald, he argued that the interests of army officers and Labour leaders
coincided. Political impartiality and military efficiency could be helped by 'a
sound system' of promotion of rankers. ' A stratum of rankers of the right sort
would soon break down prejudices & make itself felt'. The main problem Howell
foresaw was not opposition to the scheme but the low quality of the ordinary
ranker, which Howell blamed on the lack of career prospects.(3)
(1) Ibid pp.45, 47.	 See also draft of letter, 16 December 1913, P. Howell
papers, IV/C/2/41, LHCNA
(2) 'Some Notes for Nv Asquith', nd (but 1908) P. Howell papers, IVIC/2/43,
LHCNA.
(3) Howell to Macdonald, 3 Apr. 1914, J.R. Macdonald papers, PRO 30/69/1158,
PRO. See also Macdonald's reply, 17 Apr. 1914, P.Howell. papers, IV/C/2/53,
LCHMA.
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In April 1914 the possibility of democratising the officer class appeared
remote. Within twelve months, under the pressure of war, the army had begun the
wholesale commissioning of men drawn from the lower reaches of British society.
Howell's predictions were vindicated. Army officers and military authorities
pragmatically accepted as officers
	 men from a far humbler social background
than the average prewar officer and gave them appropriate training. Howell's
fears concerning the poor quality of the available material proved largely
unfounded because considerable numbers of
	 high calibre wartime volunteers
and conscripts, who would never had joined the prewar army, provided the army
with an excellent source of officers.
2.9	 Conclusion to Chapters 1 and 2
Two distinct 'strands' of discipline and officer-man relations co-existed in
the prewar British army. The Regular version was characterised by a rigidly
hierarchical approach, reliance on 'imposed' discipline, and distant although
mutually respectful relations between officers and men. Auxiliary discipline
was, by contrast, much looser, with greater emphasis being placed on self-
discipline, and inter-rank relations were characterised by informality. Both of
these strands contributed to the disciplinary system and officer-man
relationship of the army of 1914-18.
The paternalistic ethos of the prewar Regular officer infused the wartime
officer class and was, it will be argued, a crucial factor in maintaining the
morale of the British soldier in the First World War. The disciplinary structure
of the prewar Regular army was used, for the most part, in the
	 mass army of
1914-18, inhibiting the development of the independently-minded soldier called
for by many of the protagonists in the prewar debate on discipline.
However, the relationship between the officer and soldier in the wartime army
- 61 -
came to resemble that which had existed in prewar Territorial rather than
Regular units, and many TF units maintained their prewar discipinary code until
late into the war. A similar code was adopted by the commanders of some New Army
units, following, consciously or not, Henderson's advice on the lessons of the
American Civil War.
Thus, it will be argued, there was much continuity between the officer-man
relationship and disciplinary system in the wartime British
	 army and its
Edwardian predecessor. While little was new, most wartime units took elements
from both the	 Regular and auxiliary traditions, in varying proportions
depending on the unit, to create
	 a style of officer-man relations and
discipline which showed traits inherited from both parents.
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Chapter 3
The British Army and Morale in the Era of the Great War
The subject of officer-man relations and discipline is inextricably bound up
with that of morale. This chapter will establish a framework for the discussion
of these subjects by defining morale, examining the attitude of the prewar army
to morale, and analysing means of assessing morale. The chapter concludes with
an overview of the morale of the BEF from 1914 to 1918.
3.1 Definitions of Morale
'Morale' is an imprecise term. An official study of the subject by Lt. Col.
Sparrow defined morale as 'the attitude of a soldier towards his employment'.
He argued that although it is legitimate to speak of 'good' and 'bad' morale, it
is often used 'as more or less the equivalent of 'keenness', and 'morale' is not
neccesarily synonomous with 'fighting spirit'. (1) Questions of morale affect
non-combatant troops and civilians as well as front line soldiers. A different
and rather more complex definition was given by T.T. Paterson in 1955. He
defined morale as 'obedience to an internal, personalised authority' which
emerged from
an ideal or value comon to the group, the end sought by the group being
defined by the ideal or value. Furthermore, action in obedience to the
sense of duty is essentially one of service in a role for furtherance of
the aim of the group in achieving its goal. (2)
The first definition is of individual morale, the second of group morale, or
group co1esion.	 Irvin L. Child's definition is simpler and briefer,
	
and
links the two: 'morale pertains to [the individual's] efforts to enhance the
effectiveness of the group in accomplishing the task in hand.'(3)
(1) J.H. Sparrow, The Second World War 1939-45 Army: Morale (HNSO, 1949) pp.1-2.
(2) T.T. Paterson, Morale in War and Work (London, 1955) p.99.
(3) Quo ted in I. McLaine, Ministry of Morale (London, 1979) p.8.
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Taking all these definitions into account, the relationship between individual
and group morale can be described as follows: unless the individual is
reasonably content he will not willingly contribute to the unit. He might desert
or mutiny, but he is more likely simply to refuse to work wholeheartedly
towards the goals of the group. High group morale, or cohesion, is the product
of a high state of morale existing among the individual members of that unit;
and the state of morale of a higher formation such as an army is the product of
the cohesion of the units which compose that army. The possession of
individual morale sufficiently high that a soldier is willing to go into battle
might be described as positive 'combat motivation' or 'fighting spirit'.
3.2 Clausewitz and British Army Morale
The work of Carl von Clausewitz gives a valuable insight into the nature of
collective miltary morale. He differentiated between professional armies, which
have 'military virtues' such as discipline, experience, and military skill, and
irregular, non-professional armies which possess 'bravery, adaptability, stamina
and enthusiasm'. Clausevitz divided morale into two components: 'mood' and
'spirit', and warned that one 'should take care never to confuse the real
spirit of an army with its mood'. An army which has 'true military spirit' is
one that 'maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire' and in defeat,
resists fears, both real and imaginary. Military spirit, Clausewitz argued, is
created in two ways, by the waging of victorious wars and by the testing of an
army to the very limits of its strength; 'the seed will grow only in the soil of
constant activity and exertion, warmed by the sun of victory.' (1)
(1) C. von Clausevitz, (N. Howard and P. Paret, eds.) On War (Princeton, NJ,
1976) pp.187-89.
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Clausewitz's analysis can be applied to individual as well as collective
morale. The mood of an individual soldier could be affected by such mundane
factors as the weather and availability of food. The mood of a soldier might
fluctuate from day to day or even from minute to minute. A private
	 of
7/Buffs noted in 1916 that the spirits of the troops were depressed by rain
but	 recovered 'as soon as the fine weather comes', while another ranker
commented that 'nothing changed one's spirits from bu.oyancy to utter despondency
or vice-versa quicker than a shortage or surfeit of rations'.(l)
	 If the mood
of soldiers was transient and subject to frequent change, 'military spirit' or
'fighting spirit' was concerned wiik the ultimate willingness of individuals or
groups to engage in combat. As will be demonstrated below, it was perfectly
possible for a soldier's mood to be poor but his military spirit to be sound.
Therefore, in arguing that the morale of the BEF remained fundamentally sound
throughout the war, it is not being suggested that solcii.ers were ecstatically
happy all the time. Rather, British soldiers and units remained committed to
fighting and winning the war, and this was reflected in their combat
performance.
It is, of course, always possible to find examples of groups or individuals
who, at a given time, lacked the willingness to fight. In March 1918 some
members of 1/Gordons were found to be drunk and indisciplined on a day on which
the enemy advanced close to the battalion's position.(2)
	 The rout of an Irish
battalion on the Sonime in September 1916, or the 'bolting' of 9/Cheshires on 24
March 1918 provide even more dramatic evidence of the failure of the military
spirit of specific units at specific times. However cases such as these were
(1) Unpublished account, p.52, R.Cude papers, IWM; [A. Smith] Four Years on the
Western Front (London, 1987 edn.) p.100.
(2) Lt. D.D.A. Lockhart, ts account in WD, 1/Gordons, WO 95/1435, PRO.
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exceptional: 9/Cheshires, for example, fought effectively a month later.(1)
While the battles of the BEF were not always crowned by success, and symptoms of
poor morale were discernable at various times, the performance of British troops
on the Western Front was rarely less than dogged. The BEF's mood fluctuated but
its spirit remained unbroken.
Clausewitz's analysis is particularly relevant
	 to the British army of
1914-18 in other ways. The BEF is a prime example of a largely non-professional
army which endured tremendous hardships and continued to fight effectively in a
sustained conflict. In addition Clausewitzian theory, or at least a bastardised
version of it, coloured British perceptions of morale during the era of the
Great War. Clausewitz's ideas were disseminated throughout the army via the
Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, through the medium of enthusiasts such
as Capper and Henderson,(2) and through popular interpretations.(3) Whether
Clausewitz's own work was much read is rather doubtful.(4)
By about 1909 British officers had developed
	 'an unofficial cult of the
offensive'(5) in which morale played an vital role. Morale was thus an important
concept	 for the British army. Field Service Regulations of 1909 stated
uncompromisingly that 'Success in war depends more on morale than on physical
qualities'. Thus it was
	 essential for the attacker to develop the 'moral
qualities' deemed necessary to exhaust the	 enemy's morale as well as his
physical fighting power. (6)
(1) Unpublished account, p.41, H.D. Paviere papers, 81/19/1, 1W!'!; 24 Mar. 1918,
WD, 17/RF, WO 95/1363, PRO.
(2) K.R. Simpson, 'Capper and the Offensive Spirit', JRUSI 118, No.3, (1973)
pp.51-56; Henderson, Science of War p.173.
(3) C.C. Anderson, The War Manual, I, (London, 1916) pp.33-34; S.L. Murray,
The Reality of War - An Introduction to Clausewitz (London, 1909).
(4) See the comments of J.E. Edmonds in 'Report on a Conference of General
Staff Officers at the Staff College' (1910), p.57, SCL.
(5) Travers, Killing Ground p.43.
(6) Field Service Regulations , Part 1, Operations, 1909 (reprinted with
amendments 1914) pp.13, 138, 142. See also Travers, Killing Ground pp.37-82.
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In contrast to some other European armies, the British did not have a formal
doctrine of war. FSR of 1909 mentioned the 'fundamental principles of war'
without stating what exactly these principles were. (1) Surprisingly little
attention was paid to the teaching of the creation and sustenance of morale at
Staff College, (2) or its development within the unit. While some in the army
felt that more attention should be paid to this aspect of training, others
were unsure of the wisdom giving lessons on morale to soldiers.(3)
The official booklet Infantry Training of 1914 mentioned the need to create a
'soldierly spirit' which would in turn bring moral values such as discipline,
self-confidence and courage.	 It instructed that annual individual training
should include lectures which aimed to develop 'a sense of personal honour,
duty, patriotism and esprit de corps', although beyond suggesting instruction
in military history and Imperial citizenship, the manual gave little indication
how these laudable aims might be achieved.(4) By contrast, a British officer
was favourably impressed with the instruction on morale given to French NCOs who
were training to become officers, a subject 'we entirely omit from the
curriculum of our cadet colleges'.(5)
3.3 Assessing Morale
The problems involved in attempting to assess the morale of a formation as
large as the BEF are many and obvious. While the ideal solution would be to
(1) FSR, 1, 1909 pp.13-14; Simpson, 'Capper' pp.51-54.
(2) Spiers,	 'The Regular Army' pp.44, 59; J. Connell, Wavell Soldier and
Scholar (London, 1964) pp.62-3.
(3) Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers (1910) pp.74-6, SCL.
(4) Infantry Training (1914) p.2, 12.
(5) Maj. N. Earle, report on 'French system of training NCOs for Commissions', 3
Feb. 1914, WO 32/8386, PRO. For the development of British army citizenship
education in relation to morale from 1917 onwards, see MacKenzie, Politics.
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assemble a whole series of case studies of individual units in order to build up
an overall picture, enough evidence does exists to draw some tentative general
conclusions about the morale of the BEF at certain points during the war. For
the period before 1916, the materials are scanty, although J. Brent Wilson (1)
in his important study analysed the morale of certain formations throughout
the war using the criteria by which high command judged morale. It is not
intended to duplicate Wilson's
	 work	 here. A brief
	 section	 will be
devoted to 1914-15, in which Wilson's work on the period will be summarised
and supplemented by some other material. Then some official reports on postal
censorship for 1916-18 (which were not available to Wilson) will be used as the
basis of a study of the morale of the BEF in the second half of the war.
Although British high command had a strong belief in the importance of moral
factors in war, and used an attritional strategy which had the explicit aim of
destroying enemy morale, no 	 organisation devoted to centralised
planning, direction, monitoring and	 sustaining of
	 the morale of the BEF
existed during the Great War. This is in sharp contrast to the practice of the
US and French armies.(2)
The British army's relatively casual approach to monitoring its men's morale
can be ascribed to three main factors. The first is a general belief among
senior British officers that the morale of their men was fundamentally sound,
and likely to remain so; in Lloyd George's jaundiced words,
	 generals assumed
that 'Allied soldiers were infrangible steel, and enemy soldiers ordinary
flesh'. (3) This attitude was rooted in, among other factors, a belief in the
(1) Wilson, 'Morale and Discipline'.
(2) T.M. Camfi.eld, "Will to Win" - The U.S. Army Troop Morale Program of World
War I', MA XLI, No.3, (1977) p.125; D. Englander, 'The French Soldier, 1914-
18', FR, 1, No.1 (1987) pp.50-i; E.L.Spears, Prelude to Victory (London, 1939)
p. 102-3.
(3) D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938 edn.) I, p. 825.
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'character' of the British soldier. It is also likely that high command had
confidence in the traditional paternalism of the officer corps, and the
practical measures taken by the army to sustain morale.(1) Finally, the British
regimental system inhibited the establishment of a centralised body concerned
with morale. As late as 1940, senior military personnel resisted the
establishment of an Army Welfare Scheme and the use of local welfare officers
that operated outside the unit, on the grounds that the welfare of the soldier
was the responsibility of the regimental officer.(2) It is entirely typical of
the British army's casual approach to morale that a campaign to mould the
opinions of the soldiers of the BEF by a programme of education sprang from the
initiative of individual staff officers, and was only implemented in 1918, the
last year of the war. This was a response to a perceived deterioration in
morale.(3) It is arguable that it might have been more sensible to introduce
such a scheme earlier, to prevent morale declining in the first place.
This is not to say that British high command took no interest in the morale
of their troops, rather that information on morale that was received by the
generals was not always reliable and some, but not all, was gathered in a
haphazard and unsystematic fashion. Wilson has argued that high command
attempted to acertain the state of morale and discipline in units by the
collection of quantitative data, especially figures for courts martial for
(1) T. Bogacz, 'War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-22; The Work
of the War Office Coninittee of Enquiry into 'Shell-Shock', JC}I 24, No. 2,
pp.230-I, 237-8; Wilson, 'Morale and Discipline' p.18.
(2) M.C. Morgan, The Second World War 1939-1945 Army: Army Welfare (London,
1953) p.1.
(3) S.P. MacKenzie, 'Morale and the Cause: The Campaign to Shape the Outlook of
Soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-18', C3H XXV, (1990) pp.218,
221-22, 224-28. Ttj cr4htt	 '	 o	 idt,(C.	 S1Qu'J
LL4 C&e&p rtpJdt.
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offences such	 as	 drunkenness, looting, and desertion, and statistics for
trench foot and shelishock. Wilson concluded that these indices were, on the
whole, 'unreliable'.(l) There was a tendency to confuse morale with discipline.
In reality well disciplined troops do not necessarily have high morale: men
serving sentences in military prisons are well disciplined, but unlikely to have
high morale. (2) Secondly, as will be demonstrated in a later chapter, not all
regimental officers attempted to apply prewar standards of discipline to their
troops, who were mere civilians in uniform. In some Territorial, Kitchener and
Dominion battalions, failure to salute might have	 Fe.c neither slack
discipline nor low morale. Applying criteria such as propensity to salute to the
whole army was an inaccurate way of judging the fighting efficiency of some
units.
One quantitative method which should be treated with caution is the use of
executions to judge morale in a unit. Men sentenced to death seem to have faced
something of a lottery as to whether their sentence would be commuted, for only
1 1 . 23 per cent of death sentences were actually carried out.(3) The composition
of the court martial, whether or not the accused was represented, the attitude
of the accused's hierarchical superiors (from his battalion commander to the
commander-in-chief); all these factors were important in deciding the fate of
the individual.(4) The execution of malefactors, who were mainly convicted of
desertion, was intended as a deterrent to others. The commanders of brigades in
which condemned men served were required to furnish a report 'as to the state of
discipline of the unit and his recommendations as to whether or not an example
was necessary'.(5) More generally, the decision of the commander-in-chief, who
(1) Wilson, 'Morale and Discipline' p.311.
(2) Sparrow, p.2.
(3) Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 1914-22 (London,
HMSO, 1922) p.649.
(4) Putkowski and Sykes, p.9.
(5) Childs, p.142.
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had the ultimate authority to confirm or commute a death sentence, was in part
influenced by 'the immediate needs of discipline', not necessarily that of the
individual's battalion.(1) The case of 	 Pte. C.W.T. Skilton (22/RF) who was
executed in December 1916 for deserting during the fighting on the Ancre in
November (2) illustrates the difficulties of generalising about the state of
morale of a unit from the execution of an individual. The Battle of the Ancre
was a severe trial for the British infantry, yet Skilton's battalion performed
well during the battle. The 	 22/RF was characterised by an enlightened
disciplinary regime, a high level of esprit de corps and excellent officer-man
relations.(3) The evidence suggests that Skilton was a poor soldier who had been
lucky to escape a court martial following his behaviour in an earlier battle. It
was possible that he was shell-shocked.(4) In sum, Skilton was an atypical
soldier and it would be unwise to generalise about the state of morale and
discipline in his battalion from Sicilton's fate.
Censorship of soldier's letters represented the most systematic, if far from
perfect, method used by the BEF for gauging morale. Reports based on such
censorship were submitted at regular intervals to GHQ and on occasions to the
War Cabinet. Other,	 ad hoc methods, were also used. The war correspondent
Philip Gibbs was interviewed in late 1917 by Lord Nilner and later by a British
liaison officer serving with the French who questioned Gibbs as to his opinions
of the morale of the BEF in general,and specifically whether he believed the
army would accept a compromise peace.(5) Another individual who advised the
(I) A. Babington, For the Sake of Example (London, 1983) pp.16-17, 18-19.
(2) 26 Dec. 1916, WD of 22/RF, WO 95/1372, PRO.
(3) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service' passim.
(4) WO 93/49, PRO; H. Berrycloath,	 interview; H.E. Harvey, Battleline
Narratives (London, 1928) pp.135, 157-8.
(5) P. Gibbs, The Pageant of the Years (London, 1946) p.210.
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War Cabinet on British military morale was	 General Smuts, who submitted a
report on his return from a tour of the Front in January 1918. (1)
More junior officers also had quantitative methods of gauging morale. The
Brigade Major of XIV Corps heavy artillery 'learned to assess the morale of the
infantry' by the number of complaints received from them of British shells
dropping short. He believed that many of the reports of 'short-shooting' were
'entirely unreliable', and the better the morale of the infantry was, the less
likely they were to issue false claims about the inaccuracy of the gunners.(2)
In December 1917, the officers of 1/9 King's saw the willingness of troops to
subscribe to War Savings Certificates as an indication of esprit de corps. The
men were initially reluctant to part with their money, but became more
enthusiastic when	 the scheme was presented as a means of increasing the
prestige of the battalion, and in fact 1/9 King's raised more money than any
other unit in their division. (3)
Quite apart from these 'statistical' means of establishing morale, officers
tt
used their experience and intuition to keep their finger on the pulse of(unit.
Obvious signs of high morale were spontaneous humour and singing.(4) The
subaltern soon learned that when marching men stopped singing and whistling
they were growing weary, or approaching danger.(5) R.W.F Johnston, an officer
of 16/R. Scots, drew a sharp contrast between the demeanour of the battalion
before an action of 25/26 August 1917, and one fought two months later. Before
the first, the men showed 'keenness', and a degree of esprit de corps. By	 the
(1) 'Memorandum of a visit to the Western Front by General Smuts', 27 Jan. 1918,
GT 3469, CAB 24/40, PRO.
(2) Letter, 26 May 1934, J.H. Bateson, CAB 45/132, PRO.
(3) E.H.G. Roberts, The Story of the '9th King's' in France (Liverpool,
1922) p.94.
(4) W. Slim, Unofficial History (London, 1970 edn.) p.12.
(5) EM. Plowman] 'Mark VII', A Subaltern on the Somme (London, 1928) p.66.
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22 October battle, the men were 'tired, dispirited and exhausted...without
thought of victory'. During the latter action, logistic arrangements had broken
down, leaving the men short of food. It is interesting that Johnston used the
the absence of 'jokes and singing in the ranks' as a criterion of low morale.(1)
Contemporary advice for young officers laid heavy stress on the necessity for
the officer to get to know his men (see chapter 5). While 'grousing' was not
necessarily a sign of low morale, the good officer was
	 able to sense when the
morale of his men was low.(2)
What is the historian to make of these methods of assessing morale? Gauging
morale is best regarded as an art rather than a science. The use of statistics
is fraught with danger, while, conversely, the opinions of regimental and even
staff officers (who mostly had recent regimental experience), however
subjective, cannot be lightly set aside. As this thesis seeks to demonstate,
many British officers developed close relationships with their men which made
them sensitive to changes in mood and spirit among the rank and file. Likewise,
the views of other well-informed individuals are worthy of attention. Smuts had
experience of commanding men in the field. Gibbs, who built up a close
relationship with 8/10 Gordons, claimed that he had 'complete liberty' to visit
all parts of the front, spoke to men in the front line and gained much knowledge
of 'the spirit and personal experiences of the troops'.(3) Certainly, one unit
recorded their satisfaction with Gibbs' account of a visit to them in July
1915.(4) Such evidence, along with that of censorship reports and
	 ordinary
soldiers, form the basis of the section that follows. Finally, it should not be
forgotten that combat performance offers valuable evidence of morale, for troops
(1) Unpublished account, pp.75, 87-88, R.W.F Johnston papers, 82/38/1 IWN.
(2) E.L.M. Burns, General Mud (Toronto, 1970) p.63.
(3) Gibbs, Pageant p.201; Gibbs to Edmonds, 26 July 1930, CAB 45/134, PRO.
(4) 0. Rutter (ed.), The History of the Seventh Service Battalion of the Royal
Sussex Regiment 1914-19 (London, 1934) p.21.
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that lack military spirit will not fight effectively.
3.4 The Morale of the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-18
The British official historians referred to the 'depression' experienced by
the men in the front lines in the winter of 1914-15.(1) Wilson has argued that
this depression was caused by a number of factors which included the harsh
climatic	 conditions, the terrain, the primitive nature of the logistic
infrastructure, poor quality of reinforcements for Regular units, and
frustration with trench warfare. All these things were important, but most
important of all, Wilson suggests, was the fact that the British army was not
adequately prepared to conduct a campaign of static, trench warfare. The
paucity of reserves and trench fighting equipment is symptomatic of the lack of
material preparation, but the effort needed to adjust mentally to trench warfare
was also of importance. However, Wilson concludes that this depression,
although serious in the short term, was 'transitory in nature'. The offensive
at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 demonstrated that the BEF's will to combat had
not been underinined.(2)
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the British military leadership
did indeed regard the morale and discipline of the BEF with some concern in the
winter of 1914-15. As early as 30 October 1914 a staff officer who had served
with 7th Division delivered a lecture to the as yet unblooded 8th Division in
which he warned that at Ypres the enemy had attempted to break the morale of the
infantry by artillery fire. He also stressed the necessity of maintaining strict
discipline, as did Rawlinson, who spoke after him.(3) In the same month, on
(1) J.E. Edmonds and G.C. Wynne, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1915,
I, (London, 1927) pp.2-3.
(2) Wilson, 'Morale and Discipline', pp.67-118.
(3) Lecture delivered by Brigadier-General R.A.X. Montgomery C.B. D.S.O. at the
camp of the 8th Division near Winchester, on 30th October 1914 pp.5, 9, Dept. of
Printed Books, 1W!!.
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arrival at Le Havre soldiers were treated to 'a homily upon morale' by a
'gorgeous figure'. (1)
The need to make strenuous efforts to maintain the morale of the ordinary
soldier was also well understood by the regimental officer. At the Staff College
in 1938, an officer who had served with 2/R. Bde. gave a lecture on the
upkeep of morale in the winter of 1914-15, which in itself indicates the
importance attached to this subject. The practical steps which were taken by
the officers of 2/R. Bde. ranged from the enforcement of strict discipline, to
'the provision of amusements in the form of organised games, sports, concerts,
boxing and horse shows'.(2)
It is clear that the	 'depression' of the winter of 1914-15 did not
permanently erode the military spirit of the British soldier. Indeed, some
contemporary observers were impressed by the fortitude of the other ranks.(3)
Moreover, this
	 period was not characterised by large-scale desertions or
mutinies, or by ineffective performances in combat. In the spring of 1915,
vigorous training was introduced to shake off what an officer of 4/Middlesex
described as the 'slow habits' of the winter.(4) The battle of Neuve Chapelle,
the first major British	 action of 1915, demonstrated that the BEF still
possessed a
	 considerable degree	 of offensive spirit.(5) In Clausewitzian
terms, the mood of the BEF might have appeared depressed, but its military
spirit remained intact.
(1) Anon, 'Around Armentieres and the Ypres Salient', Twenty Years After, Sup.
Vol. (London, 1938) p.503.
(2) Col. M.G.N. Stopford M.C., 'Trench Warfare - General - Winter 1914-15'
lecture to Junior Division, 1938, p.13, Conf. 3898, SCL.
(3) e.g. Diary, B.0. Dewes, 17, 21 Nov. 1914, 84/22/1, IWM.
(4) Diary, p.103, 18 Mar. 1915, T.S. Wollocombe, RMASL.
(5) Robertson, Private to Field Marshal pp.229-30.
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A letter written by Pte. J. Alison in early 1915 perhaps offers a clue to the
thinking of the Regular other rank in this period. Ailson, a soldier with many
years service, had escaped front line duty and was working in a base hospital;
he may have been wounded. After noting
	 his 'old mob KRR getting cut up (sic)'
Ailson opined that 'this war is going to be a very long one so I have settled my
mind down to it...the southafrican (sic) war was not a patch on this one'. He
went on to express a typical old soldier's grouse about the tardiness of the
progress of Kitchener's Army towards the front. There are
	 a number of
interesting points about this letter. Alison had deliberately (and illegally)
posted the letter through the civilian system, thus preventing an officer from
censoring it, because, he said, one 'carnt Put anything in it [a letter] to
much (sic)' if an officer was going to read it. In spite of the fact that his
letter was not going to be read by anyone in the military hierarchy, Ailson
concluded with the words 'God save the King'.(l)
Ailson's letter is	 evidence of a Regular private, albeit one who had
temporarily escaped front-line duty, coming to terms with the previously
unanticipated reality of a long, static war. He accepted the fact with a certain
amount of fatalism and even patriotism, tempered by a grumble. His views are
consistant with those of other prewar Regulars in this period. In his memoirs,
Cpl. John Lucy (ZIR. I. Rif.) wrote of the ebbing of his personal morale, and
the stultifying effects of trench warfare on soldiers trained for mobile
warfare, but his attitude to the war is summed up by the title of chapter 36:
Life Goes On. (2) Likewise, in his memoir Pte. Frank Richards (2/RWF) referred
in passing to the lowering of morale caused by the harsh conditions of the
winter of 1914-15, but the general tenor of his book is of stoic acceptance
(1) Letter, 7 Jan. (?) 1915, J. Allson papers, 85/15/1, IWM.
(2) Lucy, pp.255, 267, 311-12.
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of his lot.(1)
The morale of the BEF from the spring of 1915 to the eve of the Somme
offensive has received little attention from historians. Wilson's conclugion,
that there was an improvement in morale during 1915, and that spirits were
generally high by June 1916 (2) is broadly correct but there is also some
evidence of a reccurence of 'depression' among some troops during the winter
of 1915-16. In a memorandum submitted to Asquith in November 1915, Robertson
argued that 'depression at home is beginning to be reflected in the Army in
France'.(3) This view was probably influenced by the reports on postal
censorship received by high command. Although reports from this period have
not survived, the report of Third Army Censor submitted in November 1916
states that a year earlier 'Letters containing prolongued grousing' had been
'fairly common'.(4) At the other end of the scale, a Territorial private who
had served in France for almost year recorded in October 1915 that 'For the
first time since the war began, I have heard soldiers say that that we are
losing'. Although the writer retained his optimism, he believed the modest gains
and heavy losses incurred at Loos in September had undermined morale: 'It gives
one cold shivers to look at a map and see how far the Germans must be driven
back'.(5) Philip Gibbs believed that the winter of 1915-16 was worse even than
ft
the winter of 1914-15 and the one that was to follow the Somme offensive, for
the sacrifices of 1915 appeared to have achieved nothing.(6)
This feeling of depression does not appear to have been common to the entire
(1) F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (London, 1965 edn.) pp.60, 97-98.
(2) Wilson, 'Morale and Discipline' pp.139, 157.
(3) W. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918, I (London, 1926) p.206.
(4) 'Report on Complaints, Moral etc' Nov. 1916, pp.3-4, N. Hardie papers,
84/46/1, IWM.
(5) Letter, 28 Oct. 1915, P.H. Jones papers, P.246, IWM.
(6) P. Gibbs, The Battles of the Sotnme (London, 1917) pp.14-15; P. Gibbs, The
Realities of War (London, 1920) pp.169-70.
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BEF. With the exception of a handful of formations that fought at Loos, few of
the New Army units which had arrived in France by the early spring of 1916 had
taken part in the battles of 1915. Their morale was generally high. It is also
possible to find indications of high morale among troops who had been out in
France for some time; a middle-class soldier of 1/21 Londons wrote in October
1915 that 'it is only a matter of time before they [the Germans] give in',(l)
while	 Pte. Aridrews, a professional man serving in a working-class unit, 1/4
BW, believed that the men's 'spirit...was still excellent' although men were
less inclined to volunteer for 'dangerous duty' than formerly.(2) The
preparations for the Somme appear to have revived spirits in many units. The
mood of some of the troops was temporarily depressed in the winter of 1915-16,
but the BEF's military spirit remained essentially intact.
The Battle of the Sotume was the largest single battle that had been fought by
the British army up to that point. From July to November 1916 the Germans
were pushed back about seven miles at the cost of 420,000 British casualties.
(3) 57,000 casualties were incurred on the first day of the offensive alone. The
German army remained undefeated. Yet in November 1916 a report on the morale of
the Third Army based on the censorship of soldier's letters (the only such
records from the period to survive) could report that 'the spirit of the men,
their conception of duty, their Moral (sic), has never been higher than at the
present moment'. Not surprisingly, Haig commented upon reading the report 'It
is quite excellent'. Although Third Army did not play a major role in the
battle after the initial stage, divisions
	 from those Armies which bore
the brunt of the fighting were sent to Third Army in the course of the
offensive. Third Army's censorship report was complemented by those of other
(1) Letter, 26. Oct. 1915, G. Banks-Smith papers, LtJLLC.
(2) W.L. Andrews, The Haunting Years (London, nd) p.180.
(3) T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War (Cambridge, 1986) p.349.
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Armies.(1)
Hardie's reports offer strong evidence of the reliability of soldier's letters
as indicators of morale,	 and refute a recent suggestion that censors
deliberately selected positive statements from soldiers' letters in order to
produce falsely-optimistic reports for submission to high command.(2) Hardie
was not a sycophant. His reports in the autumn of 1917, as will be shown, made
no attempt to disguise symptoms of poor morale. In view of recent suggestions
that official documents and some private papers were censored or falsified in an
attempt to protect the reputations of senior commanders, it is noteworthy that
these reports were retained in Hardie's private papers and only emerged in to
the public domain in the 1980s.(3)
Many reasons have been given for the failure of the British attack on 1 July
1916, but poor morale is not usually one of them. Exceptionally, a staff
officer of 32nd Division suggested that a factor in that formation's partial
failure was physical and moral exhaustion caused by excessive digging and a
poor system of reliefs.(4) There is general agreement that morale, in the sense
of willingness to fight,	 was high on the eve of the Sonime offensive.(5)
Numerous reasons can be suggested for this. One gunner officer believed that the
change of scenery, from the 'dreary, drab and depressing surroundings of
Flanders to the open plains of the Somme' lifted the spirits of the men.
Certainly, in the	 first half of 1916 the Somme was a less active sector than
(I) Censorship Report, Third Army (Nov. 1916) pp.6,12, ai.'.d 'Summaries of
Censorship Reports on General Conditions in British Forces in France', N. Hardie
papers, 84/46/1, IWM.
(2) G. De Groot, Douglas Haig 1861-1928 (London, 1988) pp.235-36.
(3) D. Winter, Haig's Command (London, 1991) pp.303-15.
(4) Letter, 30 June 1930, A.C. Girdwood,	 CAB 45/134, PRO.
(5) See for example letter, 5 Sept. 1930, CAB 45/137, PRO (signature of writer
illegible); W. Turner, Pals: The 11th (Service) Battalion (Accrington) East
Lancashire Regiment (Barnsley, nd) pp.l31-32.
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the ever-dangerous Ypres Salient.(1) The obvious power and apparent
effectiveness of the British guns also boosted confidence, leading to a widely-
held belief, which filtered down from senior officers to the rank-and-file,
that the bombardment of the German positions would ensure that the infantry's
task would be an easy one, and that the forthcoming offensive would decide the
war. (2)
According to John Keegan, the BEF of July 1916 was 'a trusting army'. (3)
While there is a great deal of truth in this assertion, the extent to which the
optimism of officers was shared by ordinary soldiers should not be exaggerated.
It is instructive to compare an officer's recollections of Hunter-Weston's visit
to l/LF on 30 June with those of a private. The officer recalled that Hunter-
Weston's optimism was 'naturally conveyed to my men, it gave us all good heart.
In fact we thought that this must be the end of the war!!!' The private recalled
'the ugly mutterings in the ranks' during the general's talk, which told a
rather different story.(4) The 1/LF were, of course, a Regular battalion
with much experience of combat, which was perhaps less likely to be impressed
than an inexperienced Kitchener unit.
Percy Jones, a soldier of a veteran TF battalion, 1/16 Londons, was also
unimpressed by a senior officer's assurances that casualties in the assault on
1 July would be low because of the effectiveness of the British artillery.
Facing the formidable German defences at Gommecourt, most of Jones's fellow
rankers shared his scepticism about
	 'the carefully drawn up plans'. It is
important to note that this cynicism did not undermine the willingness of the
(I) Letter, nd, CAB 45/134, PRO (signature of writer illegible).
(2) Letter, 6 Nov. 1929, C. Howard, CAB 45/134, PRO; N. Middlebrook, The First
Day on the Somme (London, 1971) pp.96-97, 116.
(3) J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, 1978) pp.218-19.
(4) Letter, 12 Nov. 1929, J. Collis Browne, 	 CAB 45/132, PRO; C. Ashurst,
Bit; A Lancashire Fusilier at War 1914-18 (Ramsbury, 1988) pp.95-96.
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men of 1/16 Londons to fight. In two successive diary entries in late June
1916 Jones referred to the men's determination to go on 'until something stops
us'. (1) During the week before the assault, only 7 out of 966 men of all ranks
reported sick, 'a record', the battalion historian commented, 'rarely beaten in
peace time, even under the most favourable conditions', which indicated high
morale. (2) Using the most important test of morale of them all, both l/LF and
1/16 Londons fought well on 1 July, even though both of their divisions'
assaults ended in failure.
Many of the men who attacked on 1 July had never before taken part in a full-
scale battle.	 In a letter of 7 July 1916, a private of 1/13 Londons, newly
arrived from England, wryly recorded how his draft's unbridled enthusiasm, which
provoked an amazed response from veteran soldiers, was quickly tempered after a
few days in the trenches.(3) However, units, as opposed to individual soldiers,
were not committed to action unbloodied. By July 1916 some New Army units had
had as much as nine months experience of trench warfare, and on active service,
inexperienced	 troops quickly	 learned how to survive. (4) To choose two
regiments at random, of the 14 battalions of the Northumberland Fusiliers that
served with Fourth Army on 1 July 1916, eight had arrived in France in January
1916, two in November 1915, one in July 1915, and three in September 1915, while
of the five New Army and Territorial battalions of the Royal Fusiliers serving
with Third and Fourth Armies on that date, three had arrived in January, one in
(1) Diary, 26, 27 June 1916, pp.220-22, P.H. Jones papers, P.246, IWM.
(2) J.Q. Henriques, The War History of the 1st Battalion Queen's Westminster
Rifles 1914-1918 (London, 1923) p.84.
(3) Letter, 7 July 1916, P.D. Nunday papers, 80/43/1, IWN.
(4) C.E. Carrington, 'Kitchener's Army: The Sonune and After', JRUSI 123, No.11,
(1978) p.17. See also letter, nd but c.1936, Col. W. Robertson, CAB 45/137,
PRO; R.H. Mottram,Journey to the Western Front (London,l936) p.144. For an
example of 36th Division's learning experience, see P. Orr, The Road to the
Somme (Belfast, 1987) pp.118-19.
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March, and one in July 1915. (1) There was no repetition of Loos or Suvla
Bay, where inexperienced New Army troops had been pitched into battle without
first learning the rudiments of warfare on active service. Thus, in attempting
to explain how British morale survived the disappointment and casualties of 1
July, it necessary to dispense with the idea that the soldiers were 'lambs to
the slaughter'.
Writing of the later stages of the Soinme campaign, Haig's chaplain suggested
that the army's 'old "death or glory" spirit' had largely disappeared. In its
place all ranks displayed 'a quiet fortitude and a resolute determination to
carry on to the end'.(2) Capt. Hardie, Third Army's censor, came to similar
conclusions, writing in his report of November 1916 of a 'dogged determination
to see the thing through at any cost'. (3) The endurance of the BEF is a theme
which echoes through many reports from this period. In this respect some
comments made in September 1916 by B.H. Liddell Hart, then an enthusiastic
young company commander of 9/KOYLI, were typical. Liddell Hart wrote of the
'wonderful courage and discipline' of the infantry. A few of the men were
fearless, a few were too stupid to experience fear, but the majority, he
stressed, were just ordinary men. (4)
That is not to suggest that morale was always high. Individual actions fought
under particular conditions could place morale of units under some strain. In
August an attack of 351t(Bantam) Division failed, with some of the men, who were
(1) E.A. James, British Regiments, 1914-18 (London, 1978) pp.46-47, 113; H.C.
O'Neill, The Royal Fusiliers in the Great War (London, 1922) p.6.
(2) G.S. Duncan, Douglas Haig As I Knew Him (London, 1966) p.45.
(3) Censorship Report, Third Army, (Nov. 1916) p.6, M. Hardie papers, 84/46/1.
IWM.
(4) B.H. Liddell Hart, 'Impressions of the Great British Offensive on the
Somme', p.51, CAB 45/135, PRO.
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little more than children, being found crying.(l) In September, the morale
of 49th Division before its attack on Thiepval was adversely affected by the
knowledge that previous assaults on this objective, including one by this
division, had been failures.(2) 12th Division's action at Le Trarisloy in
October, according to one survivor, caused a lowering of morale. Another officer
of 12th Division mentioned two factors which indicated the decline of morale;
excessive straggling and a tendency for infantry to go to ground under
hostile artillery fire. In retrospect, this witness claimed that fighting for
'limited objectives' undermined the morale of the infantry: '[they were)
murderous affairs to all infantry, with nothing to stir the imagination as to
victory'. (3) The views of an officer of 7/Suffolks, who fought at Le Transloy
in 12th Division, must be set against this. This unit had suffered heavy
casualties during July and August, and in October was handicapped by
understrength companies, lack of training and the presence of many
reinforcements. In addition, the battalion's battle began with an exhausting
approach march along 'muddy tracks'. Yet the morale of the battalion was judged
to be 'very good' considering all the difficulties.(4) Again, we have evidence
that the spirit of the army was essentially sound, although external appearances
suggested otherwise.
The ultimate test of morale is willingness to engage in combat, and the
(1) Diary, 26 Aug. 1916, H. Dalton papers, Dalton I/I 130, BLPES.
(2) Letter, 30 Apr. 1936, E. Skinner, CAB 45/137, PRO.
(3) Letter, 13 Apr. 1936, CAB 45/132, PRO (signature of writer illegible).
(4) Letter, 31 Nar. 1930, L.A.G Bowen, CAB 45/132, PRO.
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BEF's divisions continued to fight, with some degree of success, throughout the
campaign. It is notable that the final operations of the campaign, on the Ancre,
were conducted fought under exceptionally bad conditions. The historian of 19th
Division declared that it had 'never known greater exhaustion or discomfort than
that experienced in November l916...'.(l) J.F.0 Fuller believed that the
conditions were responsible for causing 'considerable numbers' of British troops
to	 desert to the enemy, the only time in the war for which Fuller had
evidence of this occurring.(2) Yet Beaumont Hamel was captured by the British in
this final spasm of the Somme, just as the Germans had been steadily driven back
over the previous five months, albeit very slowly and at enormous cost to
the attackers.	 In sum, the evidence suggests that the BEF began the Soinme
campaign with a strong will to fight, and that the subsequent months of
fighting, while imposing severe strains on individuals and units, did not erode
the military spirit of the army. An artillery officer summed up the change when
he wrote that it was not that the will to win 'disappeared', but the 'spirit of
adventurous participation' that had motivated the New Army in July 1916 died
away during the Somme offensive.(3)
1917 saw a repetition of the strategy of the previous year on the Western
Front. The British Army engaged in two major offensives at Arras (April-May) and
at Ypres (July-November). Both of these battles became attritional affairs, and
both resulted in heavy British losses; 150,000 at Arras, 250,000 at Ypres. Capt.
Hardie's censorship reports, and other evidence, suggests that in the latter
(1) Anon, A Short History of the 19th (Western) Division 1914-18 (London, 1919)
p.29.
(2) Evidence of J.F.C. Fuller, PP, 1922, Cmd. 1734, 'Report of the War Office
Committee of Enquiry into "Shell-Shock", p.22.
(3) Unpublished account, p.176, C.E.L. Lyne papers, 80/14/1, IWM.
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part of 1917 the BEF's morale was strained but that it remained sound.
The weather in the winter of 1916-17 was exceptionally severe. In January 1917
one battalion recorded temperatures of '20 to 25 degrees of frost'. (1) However,
the morale of the troops does not seem to have been unduly depressed, although
at least one unit received a lecture on esprit de corps before going into
action, which suggests some doubts about their committment may have existed.(2)
Hardie's conclusions on the morale of Third Army in January 1917, can be summed
up in the phrase 'Tommy is still in the pink'. Complaints were to be found in
soldier's letters, but there were 'no indications' of a 'wish for premature
peace'; rather, there was a general acceptance that more sacrifices would have
to be made before victory could be achieved. Hardie believed that the
willingness of the ordinary British soldier to 'submit without a murmur to
guidance and authority, and be prepared simply to 'carry on' without comment
or discussion' indicated confidence in the Allied cause, in the conduct of the
war, and of 'the justice and efficiency of our military training and methods'.
(3)
Haig, writing at the begining of May 1917, was, perhaps predictably, at pains
to stress the confidence of the BEF and the general belief that German losses
were higher than those of the British. (4) Hardie's report of May 1917, the
period of the Arras offensive, in which Third Army took a prominent part,
confirms this view, registering little change from the generally optimistic
tone of previous reports.(5) In the second half of 1917, Hardie's reports were
(1) C.A.C. Keeson, The History and Records of Queen Victoria's Rifles (London,
1923) p.212.
(2) War Diary, 1/6 Londons, 17 Feb. 1917, WO 95/2729, PRO.
(3) 'Report on Morale etc III Army', January 1917, pp.1. 5, 7, M. Hardie papers,
84/46/1, IWM. See also Charteris to Macdonogh, 24 Feb. 1917, WO 158/898, PRO,
for favourable comments on Second Army's morale.
(4) Haig to Robertson, 1 May 1917, WO 158/23, PRO.
(5) 'Report on Morale etc' [May 1917], M. Hardie papers, 84/46/1, IWM.
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indicating a distinct change
	 in the tone of soldier's letters. In a report
based on 900 letters read over the period 8th July to 24 August, he stated that
'it must be frankly admitted that the letters show an increasing amount of war-
weariness.' He noted 'a tinge of despondency which has never been apparent
before' and considerable 'unsettled feeling about the continuation and
conclusion and after-effects of the war', leading to a replacement of 'active
enthusiasm' by 'passive acceptance'. Talk of peace, which had been rare earlier
in the year, was now 'frequent'. Complaints about matters such as lack of leave
outnumbered references to the strain of combat by about five to one, and the
average soldier did not seek 'peace at any price', but there was 'an immense
and widespread longing for any reasonable and honourable settlement that
will bring the war to a close'.(l) A further report of 19 October offered
even more
	 alarming conclusions: that the
	 willingness of the soldier to
abandon his rights as an individual and obey his military masters without
question was beginning to end. (2)
Hardie's views are supported by other evidence. Gibbs believed that Third
Ypres adversely affected morale:
For the first time the British Army lost its spirit of optimism, and
there was a sense of deadly depression among many officers and men
with whom I came in touch. They saw no ending of the war, and nothing
except continuous slaughter, such as that in Flanders. (3)
The French official history also commented on the 'weariness' of the BEF at the
beginning of winter.(4) However, as Gibbs himself stated, the discipline of the
BEF remained intact.(5)
	 Even Lloyd George, who denounced the 'stupid and
squalid strategy' of the last stage of Passchendaele, which, he believed,
exhausted the BEF and destroyed its confidence in its leaders, commented on the
(1) 'Report on Moral etc' [Aug. 1917], M. Hardie papers, 84/46/1, IWM.
(2) 'Report on Peace' 19 Oct. 1917, M. Hardie papers, 84/46/1, IWM.
(3) Gibbs, Realities of War p.396.
(h.) Quoted in Lloyd George, II, 1468.
(5) Gibbs, Realities of War p.396.
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dogged fighting of the army in this phase.(1)
Other evidence supports the view that the military spirit of BEF remained
intact at the end of 1917, whatever its mood. On 18 December 1917 a report
was submitted to the War Cabinet, compiled from a study of 17,000 frontline
soldiers' letters and general impressions formed during the previous three
months. This has been described as 'the nearest thing available to a gallup
(sic) poll' for the period. The report stated categorically that 'The Morale of
the Army is sound'. Positive and negative letters were about evenly balanced in
Second Army, which was taking the lead in the offensive at Ypres. The numbers of
negative letters written by men of other Armies were considerably outweighed by
positive letters, suggesting that the conditions at Ypres were indeed placing
the men of Second Army under considerable mental and physical stress. Despite
much unfavourable news (the 'Russian debacle and the Italian setback'), and
considerable 'war weariness' and 'an almost universal longing for peace', the
BEF remained willing to fight on to achieve victory. (2)
The success of the German counterattack at Cambral on 1 December 1917 placed
a question mark against the morale of some British formations. General Smuts
was sent to France to report on the situation. In two memoranda submitted to
the War Cabinet, he concluded that the 'Moral (sic) of the army is good'.
Smuts proceded to highlight some major problems which were likely to affect
the morale of the BEF. The men, particularly the infantry, were tired, a
problem exacerbated by the need to prepare defensive positions. This also
reduced the time available for training, and 'rest...a psychological factor of
the utmost importance'. Smuts foresaw that, should the British agree to the
(1) Lloyd George, II, p.1467.
(2) 'The British Armies in France as gathered from Censorship', 18 Dec. 1917,
GT 3044, CAB 24/36, PRO; G. Blaxland, Amiens 1918 (London, 1981 edn.) p.7.
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French request for the British to take over more trenches, 'we shall be running
serious risks. We shall be straining the army too far.' In sum, Smuts did not
believe that the resolve of the BEF had been seriously weakened, although
complacency was unwise.(1)
The fact that censorship reports included evidence that morale was less than
perfect caused some controversy. In October 1917 the CIGS recorded his belief
that 'by no means' every British soldier on the Western Front was 'possessed of
a good morale', and that this was 'only natural and to a greater or lesser
extent common to all armies'. (2) Writing two days later, the ever-optimistic
Charteris complained that Robertson had underestimated 'the extraordinary high
morale' revealed by the monthly censorship reports. (3) While a brief report
submitted to the Cabinet on 13 September certainly supports Charteris's view,
the rather more sombre tone of other extant reports tends to support the CIGS.
(4)
There are several factors which help to explain why the BEF's morale remained
relatively high in early 1917, declined as a result of the offensive at Ypres
but did not collapse. The British won a series of minor but important victories
in the first half of 1917. Offensive operations were renewed on the Somme in
January and the British obtained some success. The German retreat to the
Hindenburg Line in March 1917 appeared to be conclusive evidence that the
Germans were losing the war, and allowed the Soimue to be presented as a victory
(1) 'Memorandum' by General Smuts, 3 Jan. 1918, GT 3198, CAB 24/37, PRO: (see
also Appx B.1, 'Report by 3rd Army Commander' [Byng]); 'Memorandum of a visit to
the Western Front by General Smuts', 27 Jan. 1918, GT 3469, CAB 24/40, PRO.
(2) Robertson to Haig, 18 Oct. 1917, WO 158/24. PRO.
(3) 'Remarks of B.G.G.S., "I"', 20 Oct. 1917, WO 158/24, PRO.
(4) 'Note on the Moral of British Troops in France as disclosed by the
Censorship',13 Sept. 1917, GT 2052, CAB 24/26, PRO.
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because the Germans had abandoned the field of battle to the Allies.(1) The
brief phase of mobile warfare as the British followed up the retreating Germans
also seems to have provided a boost to the morale of some units. (2) The initial
success in the Arras offensive in April, and the seizing of Messines Ridge in
June, also offered evidence of British victories.
The failure of the initial stages of the Third Battle of Ypres, the heavy
casualties sustained, and poor weather help to explain the decline in morale in
August. Two factors which may have helped offset the decline in morale might be
mentioned. Firstly, the genuine success of the limited offensives fought by
Plumer's Second Army at the battles of Menin Road Ridge, Polygon Wood, and
Broodseinde; and secondly, although Passchendaele Ridge might have been gained
at an appallingly high price, its capture was proof that the British were
continuing to steadily advance, and the Germans were continuing to give ground:
'Troops were now resting where once they could not have stood up'. The BEF's
sacrifices had brought tangible reward.(3) Finally, the offensive at Cambrai,
although ultimately a failure, was initially brilliantly successful.
The evidence offered in this section could be supplemented by a host of other
examples drawn from lower echelons of the army.(4) The most important testimony
to the state of British morale during the Passchendaele offensive is the fact
that,	 with the atypical exception of the Etaples mutiny of September 1917,
which is discussed in a later chapter, the men of the BEF continued to obey
orders, and also to fight reasonably effectively. Taken together, the evidence
suggests that in 1917 the BEF's morale was tested, but not to destruction.
(1) The final frame of a 1917 version of the film The Battle of the Somme
makes this point by showing a map of ground abandoned by the Germans in early
1917. IWN video, 1987.
(2) Anon, The History of 2/6 Battalion The Royal Warwickshire Regiment 1914-19
(Birmingham, 1929) p.47.
(3) Blaxland, p.8.
(4) e.g. letter,	 Oct. 1963, A.R. Armfield, BBC/GW, IWN.
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For the BEF, the year 1918 brought large-scale mobile operations and victory.
Victory achieved at a heavy cost. The BEF lost 239,793 men in 40 days in the
spring	 of 1918, compared with the loss of 244,897 in 105 days of Third
Ypres,(l) although as has recently been pointed out, during the period of the
Allied offensive	 (8 August-11 November 1918) fatalities were remarkably low:
about 20,000 for Fourth Army, the spearhead formation.(2) This hitherto little-
noticed factor may well have played an effect in maintaining British morale.
Traditionally, the initial success of the German Spring Offensive which began
on 21 March 1918 has been attributed, in part at least, to 'the poor and
cowardly spirit of the officers and men' of Fifth Army.(3) These accusations
were in part politically inspired, but have been echoed by some historians.(4)
Did British military	 morale	 really collapse in the spring of 1918? The
evidence of the censorship report of July 1918 suggests it did not. In this
report, which was based on the study of 83,621 letters and covered the period
from April, it is stated that the 'High moral quality' of March was 'amply
confirmed by latter experience'. The comments on the morale of Fourth Army (as
Fifth Army had been renamed) are particularly interesting. It is frankly
admitted that it would have been 'misleading' to suggest that this formation
was	 'happy'.	 In addition to a general sense of war-weariness, there was
decline in confidence in politicians, and if not in the higher command, at
least in the 'higher administration of the Army'. Yet the men of Fourth Army's
'combative spirit'
remains very high, so far as the earnest desire for a successful finish
of the war is concerned, and the determination to stick it out to the
end is generally expressed in terms which leave no doubt.
(1) J. Terraine, The First World War (London, 1984) p.168.
(2) R. Prior and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front (Oxford, 1992) p.391.
(3) H. Gough, Soldiering On (London, 1954) pp.176-78
(4) e.g. Keegan, p. 276.
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Comments of a similarly positive nature were made about the morale of other
formations. 'The persistance and determination' of the men of Second Army, who
had borne the brunt of the German offensive around Ypres in April, was described
as 'remarkable': 'They were very tired but unbeaten'.(l)
A soldier of 2/Devons perhaps caught the essence of the morale of the BEF
during the spring battles when he wrote of the general belief that, despite all
setbacks, they remained confident that everything would be all right in the
end.(2) An artillery officer considered Haig's 'Backs to the Wall' message of 11
April 1918 to be damaging to morale on the grounds that many soldiers 'had not
admitted even to themselves' how serious the position was.(3) Furthermore, mere
rumours that the British were striking back at the Germans was enough, in good
Clausevitzian fashion, to boost morale.(4)
On 21 March 1918 the Germans took 98.5 square miles of ground from the
British Third and Fifth Armies (all but 19 square miles from the latter). The
British defenders suffered about 38,500 casualties, including 21,000 POWs.
Approximately 500 guns were taken by the Germans, mostly from Fifth Army. Heavy
losses of prisoners and guns are often taken as signs of defeat, and there is
also much anecdotal evidence of British soldiers surrendering without putting up
much resistance.(5)
However, it would be unwise to deduce from these facts and figures that
British morale was low in March 1918. As Martin Middlebrook points out, many
factors serve to distort the picture, not least the overall strategic plan and
the unfamiliarity of the British forces with the concept of defence-in-depth,
(1) 'The British Armies in France as gathered from censorship', Haig Diaries,
Appx. to July 1918, WO 256/33, PRO. For an example of a soldier's 'grousing'
masking a readiness to fight, taken from the 23 Mar. 1918 diary entry of Lt. F.
Warren (17/XRRC), see A. Bird (ed.) Honour Satisified (Swindon, 1990) p.87.
(2) R.A. Colwill, Through Hell To Victory (Torquay, 1927) p.103.
(3) Anon, 'A Heavy Gunner Looks Back', Twenty Years After I, p.12.
(4) Unpublished account, p.33, C.J. Lodge Patch papers, 86/9/1, IWM; Bird, p.77.
(5) M. Middlebrook, The Kaiser's Battle (London, 1978) pp.308, 322-39, 341.
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crammea &s many as one-third of the defenders into the forward zone, only to
be cut off by the advancing Germans. He suggests that although Fifth Army's
morale	 was far from 'excellent', the morale of at least some units was
'steady'. (1)
The records of stragglers collected by the military police also cast doubt on
the traditional belief that Fifth Army routed. Provost sources are unanimously
agreed that the majority of stragglers in the first days of the battle were not
drawn from front-line units. 	 Many of the stragglers that headed for the rear
at the beginning of the battle appear to have been non-combatants who had been
employed on defensive positions.
Some statistical evidence has also survived. The busiest periods for the
straggler posts of 8th, 24th, 50th, 66th and 16th Divisions occurred during
27-30 March, that is at least six days after the battle began. These figures do
not tell the whole story, for of these formations 16th, 24th and 66th Divisions
were in action from 21 March, but only 24th Division records any figures for the
first two days of the battle. Either the figures for the other divisions were
incomplete, or they did not collect any stragglers, which is possible. The
evidence of 24th Division certainly supports the contention that the worst
period for stragglers came towards the end of March. Thus the majority of
I 4 be*.	 4w .sope	 pt.t.
stragglers were picked up after their divisionL S1eer exhaustion seems to have
been a major factor in causing them to straggle. (2..)
Had the morale of Fifth Army indeed collapsed, the Germans would probably have
(1) Ibid pp.105, 332-39.
(2) 'Straggler Posts' pp.25, 30, RI1PA. This document is a short history of the
subject, apparently compiled shortly after the Armistice, which quotes at length
from contemporary documents, many of which have now disappeared. For a further
discussion of the subject see G.D. Sheffield, 'The Operational Role of British
Military Police on the Western Front, 1914-18' in P. Griffith, (ed.) British
Fighting Methods in the Great War (forthcoming).
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won the war: the autumn of 1918 was to demonstrate the serious consequences of a
genuine weakening in an army's morale. In Churchill's words, 'The Germans,
judged by the hard test of gains and losses, were decisively defeated'.(l) In
short, the British army fought the German ormy to a standstill. This is eloquent
testimony to the resilicnce of the military spirit of the British army in early
1918.
In the absence of a censorship report for the second half of 1918, a book by
Maj. Gen. A.A. Montgomery, the chief of staff of Fourth Army, is probably the
nearest we have to an 'official' view of British morale in the final campaigns
on the Western Front. Montgomery laid great stress on the increase in British
morale, and a simultaneous decrease in German morale, when the BEF took the
offensive in August.(2) Far more dramatically than during the Somme or
Passchendaele offensives, in the autumn of 1918 the British soldier was
presented with tangible evidence of success. British morale could be judged by
the criteria of victory: ground gained, guns and prisoners taken, and a
perceptible deterioration in the morale of many German units. In the words of an
officer of 46th Division, the BEF 'was at last obtaining a just reward for all
its dogged and patient fighting'.(3) It is interesting to compare these comments
with those of a German infantry officer:
There can be no doubt that the reason for the slow decline of morale
within the German Army over the final months of the war was the feeling
of the soldiers that they were being ground to pieces in one useless,
pointless, and hopeless offensive action after another. (4)
It is likely that the British infantry's morale was somewhat brittle by the
Armistice. R.H. Mottram argued that by late 1918 'a new spirit of taking care
(1) W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 II, (London, 1938 edn.) p.1289.
(2) A.A. Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred
Days, August 8 to November 11, 1918 (London, 1920) pp. 1,5, 9, 145-6, 237.
(3) R.E. Priestly, Breaking the Hindenburg Line (London, 1919) p.87.
(4) G. Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre IV, (London, 1973) p. 232.
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of one's self' had emerged among the infantry, who would have begun 'not
refusing but simply omitting to do duty' if the war had continued beyond 11
November. (1) Given the irrefutable facts
	 that British troops continued to
advance, win battles
	 and take casualties	 until the very end of the war,
Mottram's	 statement is clearly an exaggeration. After the Armistice came into
effect there was a distinct change in the attitude of many soldiers towards
their employment,	 in military terms, there was a collapse of morale 1
 (see
chapter 9 below) but this occud after, not before, the end of hostilities.
In conclusion, it would be difficult to improve upon Charles Douie's
assessement of British morale in 1918. Douie served as a temporary subaltern
in 1/Dorsets, and ten years after the war he wrote (in response to the
'disillusioned' school) of the generally 'magnificent' state of morale in the
BEF in the last year of the war. He argued that the BEF of 1918 was inferior
in quality to its predecessor of 1916. However,
it was good enough to sustain a defensive battle against a great
superiority of numbers on the Somme and the Lys, and to return to
the attack and remain continuously on the offensive from August to
November. The infantry at least had no doubt that they were winning, and
their faith was justified when the greatest military Power of modern
times finally collapsed in disordered retreat...(2)
Generally speaking, a rapid and decisive victory can only be achieved when
one side is greatly inferior to the other in terms of fighting power. On the
Western Front the two sides were roughly equally matched. In the March 1915-
March 1918 period, British offensive operations frequently commenced with an
attempt to reopen mobile warfare, but when the hoped-for penetration failed
to materialise such battles were continued in an attempt to 'wear out' the
(1) R.H. Mottram, J. Easton, E. Partridge, Three Personal Accounts of the War
(1929) p.127. It should be noted that Mottram was not serving with an infantry
battalion at the end of 1918. His views can be profitably compared with the
optimistic view of a private of 1/23 Londons; see letter, A.E. Abrey, 7 Oct.
1918, 84/4/1, IWM.
(2) C. Douie, The Weary Road (London, 1931) pp.lS-16.
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enemy's strength and morale. Thus although the opening phases of both the
Somme offensive of 1916 and the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917 were designed to
achieve a breakthrough, they evolved
	 into attritional battles. From early
1915 onwards Haig was convinced that German morale would shortly
collapse,(1) and thus continued to fight attritional battles designed in part
to deplete enemy morale. With some justice, in his final despatch Haig was able
to claim that the battles of the previous four years should be treated as 'a
single continuous campaign' which had contributed to weakening the German crmy.
(2) Certainly, for a variety of reasons, German military (and also civilian)
morale began to crumble in the summer and autumn of 1918.(3) In retrospect, the
Allied victory of 1918 can be ascribed in very large part to the fact that the
morale of the British soldier remained intact,Lthat of his German counterpart
finally gave way. This is not to deny the importance of factors such as
improvements in British tactical and operational methods; (4) but these would
have availed little had the morale of the BEF collapsed.
Attrition, as the French discovered in 1917, is a two-edged sword which is as
likely to damage the morale of the attacker as that of the defender. This
chapter has analysed the concept of morale and British official attitudes to
morale in the era of the Great War, and has demonstrated that British military
morale remained essentially sound throughout the campaigns on the Western Front.
With this essential groundwork laid, in the following chapters a major factor in
the resili*nce of the BEF's morale will be examined: the relationship between
the regimental officer and the soldier.
(1) Haig to Lady Haig, 1 Apr. 1915, Haig papers, NLS (m).
(2) J.H. Boraston, (ed) Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (London, 1979) pp.319-21.
(3) Why Germany Capitulated on November 11 1918 - A brief study based on
documents in the possession of the French General Staff, Appx. II, SCL; R.H.
Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918 (Stanford, Ca, 1934) pp.176-77.
(4) See Prior and Wilson; T. Travers, How the War Was Won (London, 1992).
-95-
Chapter 4
The British Officer Corps, 1914-1918
Regimental officers of the British army of the Great War can be divided into
seven broad categories. Firstly, Regular officers with peacetime service.
Secondly, officers who were granted permanent commissions during the war years.
I/UL
Thirdly, civilians who were granted Temporary commissions which valid for the
duration of the war only. Fourthly, Territorial officers commissioned in
peacetime. Fifthly, 'prewar' ranker-officers, men who had served in the ranks of
the Regular army before the war. Sixthly, 'prewar Territorial' ranker-officers,
men who had served as privates or NCOs in TF units before the war. Lastly,
'wartime Temporary' ranker-officers. The latter term does not necessarily
indicate that an individual was of the class that had dominated the ranks of the
prewar Regular army, for large numbers of middle- and even upper-class men
served in the ranks of the army in the first few months of the war.
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to examine the way in which the
British army responded to the need to recruit and train unprecedentedly large
numbers of officers during the years 1914 to 1918. It will be argued that many
of the men	 commissioned in this period
	 were of humbler social status than
their prewar Regular counterparts. The army pragmatically inoulded such men, by
a process of education, training and socialisation, into passable replicas of
the prewar Regular officer. Thus the ethos and values of the prewar Regular
officer class, especially paternalistic care for their men, were passed onto
their wartime successors. This had important implications for the maintenance of
British military morale on the Western Front. The chapter will begin with an
examination of the social composition of the officer corps. The process of
officer selection will then be assessed.
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4.1 The Social Composition of the Officer Class, 1914-1918
On 17 September 1914, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener,
announced that he was looking to volunteers and Regular NCOs
	 to provide
officers needed for the newly-expanded army.(l) Larger numbers of officers
drawn from 'non-traditional' sources
	 were commissioned during 1914-18 than
in any previous war. This was, in part, a consequence of the
	 very high
casualties sustained by junior officers, and the disproportionateiy heavy losses
inflicted on the social elite.(2) It was also a reflection of the sheer size of
the army raised between 1914 and 1918. Approximately 5,704,000 men served in
Eocc2S
the army during the course of the war. The total strength of the Lr'.k grew from
733,514 on 1 August 1914 to an estimated 5,336,943 on Armistice Day, 11 November
1918. (3)
There were 28,060 officers in the British army on 4 August 1914, of whom
12,738 were Regulars. On 11 November 1918, the army possessed 164,255 officers.
(See Table 1). In all, some 247,061 commissions were granted from the beginning
of the war up to 1st December 1918 to combatant officers, chaplains, and the
RAMC; this figure excludes Royal Defence Corps, Dominion and Indian Army
commissions.(4) The average number of commissions granted per annum between
1908 and 1913 had been a mere 649. (5)
In view of the fact that in 1910 the Adjutant-General had asserted that 'We
are coming to the end of our tether as regards candidates from the limited
(1) The Times 18 Sept. 1914, p.10.
(2) Winter, Great War pp.83-99.
(3) P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army (Manchester, 1988) p,XIV; Statistics of the
Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914-20 (H14S0, 1922)
pp.293O. 1L.. kUs.r fur(. l.cLi(tj LAo+ o..4 OtJ 'r 1A,' F,01p 5 .	 Sit	 Ls	 p. 26.(4) Ibid pp.234-36.
(5) M.A. Wingfield, 'The Supply and Training of Officers for the Army', JRUSI,
LXII, No.475, (1924), p.433.
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class which has hitherto supplied 	 the commissioned ranks' of the Regular
artny,(1) it is not surprising that the War Office had to reach far beyond its
traditional sources of supply of officers to provide enough leaders for the mass
army of 1914-18. However, it was not the original intention of the military
authorities to
	 broaden the social base of the officer class to any great
extent. The usual initial insiste.nce that potential officers should possess OTC
certificates A (from a public school OTC) or B (from a university OTC), and the
recruiting policies of many of the raisers of units in 1914-15 suggest that it
was hoped that officers could be provided for the enlarged wartime army with
the minimum disturbance to the social status quo. The pressure of war quickly
forced the abandonment of this policy.
There was an alternative to opening the commissioned ranks to middle- . and
working-class men. The German army attempted to preserve the social homogenity
and quality of its officer corps. A senior NCO, an officer cadet (Fahnrich) or
a 'substitute officer' (Offizier Stellvertreter) were habitually appointed to
positions such as platoon commander which in the British army would have been
held by commissioned officer.
	 In March 1918 each German infantry battalion
possessed an average of only seven officers, while at full strength each British
battalion should have had about thirty-six, although in the field the numbers
often fell below this. In all, during the First World War the Germans had
roughly the same number of officers as the numerically inferior British army.
(2) The British army's policy of awarding Temporary commissions also, in the
long term, insulated the officer corps. It was possible, although not easy, to
convert from a Temporary to a Regular commission; 1,109 Temporary officers were
among the total of 16,544 men who were granted Regular commissions from 5
(I) Ibid p.434.
(2) K. Demeter, The German Officer-Corps in Society and State 1650-1945 (London,
1965) p.47-48; D.B. Nash, Imperial German Army Handbook 1914-1918 (London, 1980)
pp.19-20.
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August 1918 to 1 December 1918. (1) Temporary officers were not always granted
Regular commissions in their original regiment. One, on hearing that he had
obtained a Regular commission in the E. Yorks. wrote that he had "Never heard
of 'em before" and that he was seeking a transfer to the first battalion of his
original regiment, the E. Surreys.(2) The parsimonious distribution of Regular
commissions ensured that the impact of the influx of lover-class men into the
British officer class was short-lived. The vast majority left the army in
1918-19, so the postwar British officer class more closely resembled that of
1913 than that of 1918 (see also chapter 9).
However, in the short term, 	 a revolutionary change occured in the social
composition of the wartime British army. This can be illustrated by the figures
for demobilisation of officers. Officers and men were placed in one of forty-
four	 occupational groups.	 The dispersal certificates of 140,573 of the
officers who had been demobilised by 12 Nay 1920 were analysed by the War
Office. There are some anomalies in the data, and the categories employed are
so broad that it is not always possible to determine exactly what job is being
referred to. Industrial group 1, Agriculture, seems to cover both farmers and
farm labourers, for example. However, these statistics do give a clear picture
of the social status of the officers corps in 1918. The three largest single
categories of officers' occupations are 'commercial and clerical' (group 37)
'students and teachers' (group 43) and 'professional men' (group 42). These
groups, which cover broadly middle-class occupations, account for 60.5 per cent
of the total (85,889 men).
(1) Statistics of Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War
(London, 1922) p.234.
(2) Letter, 4. Nov. 1915, WPN1/95, W.P. Nevill papers, IWM.
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Table I
Officers serving in the British army at the beginning and end of the Great War















NB: New Army figures apply to 1918 only. All figures are approximate.
Source: Statistics of Military Effort p.234.
Table 2
Principal occupations of officers demobilised, ii November 1918 to 12 Nay 1920,
as expressed as a percentage of those returns analysed.
Commercial and clerical
	
38,572	 (27.5 per cent )
Students and teachers 	 25,577	 (18 per cent)
Professional men	 21,740	 (15 per cent)
Engineering	 11,389	 (8 per cent)
NB: All percentages have been rounded up to the nearest .5 per cent.
Source: Statistics of Military Effort p.707.
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Even if one deducts the 'clerical and commercial' category, as likely to
contain men of a lover social status than the other two groups, one is still
left with the not unimpressive total of 47,317 men, or 33.5 per cent (See Table
2). Furthermore, when expressed as a percentage of all men, both officers and
other ranks, who were demobilized from the army from these occupational groups,
other significant patterns emerge. About 44 per cent of all professional men, 38
per cent of all students and teachers, (but only 8 per cent of commercial and
clerical workers) were demobilised as officers. By comparison, only 0.2 per
cent of general labourers demobilised in this period served as officers.(1)
As J.M. Winter has suggested, the raw data suggests a 'pattern of middle-
class domination of the officers corps' with only the body of engineering
workers providing an exception. (2) However, by comparison with the prewar
structure of the officer class, some significant variations can be noted. The
term 'middle-class' is a somewhat elastic one and undoubtedly includes men who
would not have been thought suitable for a commission in the old Regular army.
In the course of the war some men who were on the social borderline between
the lower-middle and upper-working classes came to be regarded as suitable to
take commissions. In October 1916, a general commented approvingly upon the type
of man to be found in 2/5 Buffs, a 'Bank Clerks Battalion', whom he considered
to be officer material. They were, of course, likely to have been very few
former bank clerks serving as officers in the prewar Regular army.(3)
It will be recalled that in 1913 only about 2/ of those commissioned had
passed through the ranks. If this may be taken as a benchmark against which to
judge working-class penetration of the prewar officer corps, the demobilization
(1) Statistics of Military Effort pp.707.
(2) Winter, Great War p.83.
(3) Book 7, .l6, G.G.A. Egerton papers, 73/51/1, IWM.
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figures reveal that the officer class had been considerably democratised by
1918. There are	 difficulties in interpreting the occupational groups, but
numbers of working-class men may be discerned, such as carters (148 officers)
dock and wharf labourers (184), seamen and fishermen (638), leather tanners
(99) coal and shale miners (1,016) and warehousemen and porters (266). These
figures may include some of the foreman/overseer type who perhaps shade into
the lower reaches of the middle classes. (1)
A rough-and-ready guide to the social status of each category is to compare
the numbers of men who became officers with those who remained in the ranks.
From our sample, 21,740 professional men became officers, as against 26,988 who
remained in the ranks. By contrast, 7,495 workers in agriculture became
officers, while 301,770 served in the ranks. 157 coachbuilders and woodworkers
were demobilised as officers, and 34,222 left the army as other ranks. In all,
r 4*.i
54,584 officers,	 or 39/of the sample, were demobilised from the 41 remaining
industrial groups, which, with the reservations noted above, may be classified
as broadly 'working-class' or at least 1lover-middle class'occupations. However
imprecise the figures, it is clear that in 1918 many men were serving as army
officers who would have been effectively excluded on educational and social
grounds from obtaining a Regular or even a Territorial commission before the
war. Many of these men, to judge from the occupational categories, were drawn
from the artisan class, with the engineering industry providing the largest
proportion of officers (11,389 officers, 359,948 other ranks).(2)
These bare statistics are supported by a wide variety of other evidence.
R.C. Sheriff used 'Trotter', a working-class ranker-officer archetype in his
play Journey's End,(3) for instance, while a middle-class ranker complained
(1) Statistics of Military Effort p.707.
(2) Ibid p.707.
(3) R.C. Sherriff, Journey's End (London, 1958 edn.).
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that by 1917 any 'Tom, Dick or Harry' could be put forward for a commission.(1)
More specifically, on joining a Special Reserve unit, 3/SLI, in October 1917, a
public school officer wrote that 'about sixty-five percent' of the officers were
'gentlemen', which, he opined, was about as many as could be expected. (2)
While it was true that a middle-class man was far more likely to receive a
commission than a member of the working-classes, and the latter were grossly
under-represented in officers' messes given the numbers of them serving in the
army, a limited meritocracy emerged in the British army during the Great War.
The official claim that 'no barrier' existed to prevent talented rankers gaining
commissions was an exaggeration, but perhaps a pardonable one. (3)
4.2 Sources of Officers: Territorial Class Corps
By the end of 1914, 4,082 officers of the BEF had become casualties, of whom
1,230 had died.(4) As early as mid-September 1914, 593 officers had been sent to
the BEF as battle casualty replacements, a rate which caused Kitchener some
concern.(5) Kitchener had to balance the requirements of the BEF and other units
on active service against those of the newly raised Territorial and New Army
units. The latter units, in training in the UK, necessitated the retention of a
number of officers who could have been used to supplement the reservists and
Special Reserve officers being sent as reinforcements to France, much to the
disgust of Henry Wilson, who complained that 'K's shadow armies' were robbing
the BEF of 'good officers and men'.(6) The military authorities were thus
compelled to look elsewhere for officers to fill the gaps in the battalions of
(1) H. Quigley, Passchendaele and the Somme (London, 1928) p.28.
(2) W. Hooper, (ed.) Letters of C.S. Lewis (London, 1988 edn.) p.67.
(3) PP, 1917, Cmd. 8642, Report of Committee on Promotion of Officers in the
Special Reserve, New Army and Territorial Force, p.608.
(4) Statistics of Military Effort p.253.
(5) Kitchener to French, 16 Sept. 1914, quoted in G. Arthur, Life of Lord
Kitchener III, (London, 1920) p.65.
(6) Wilson to Kiggell, 15 Sept. 1914, Ill/i, L. Kiggell papers, LHCMA.
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the BEF.
Men serving in the ranks of Territorial class corps in France, who combined
the advantages of reasonably high social status with experience of active
service, were an obvious source of officers. Class corps began to be viewed
with envious eyes by Regular commanding officers. Indeed, it had been proposed
by the War Office at the time of the creation of the TF that the Artists' Rifles
(1/28 Londons) should become an officers' training corps, but in the event, it
was agreed that ten per cent of its rank-and-file would be made available for
commissions on mobilisation.(l)
Training for Territorials commissioned in the field was initially scanty. In
November 1914, some men of the Artists' were commissioned and returned to the
trenches as an officer in a Regular battalion within twenty-four hours, wearing
a second-lieutenant's 'pip' on a private's tunic. By the beginning of December
1914 potential officers (or 'commissionairs') were being given crash courses in
officership, the Artists' having been turned into 'a Training Corps for Officers
in the Field'. (2) The training given was both theoretical and practical.
Potential officers received lectures and instruction and spent forty-eight
hours in the trenches before being posted to a Regular battalion.(3) This
system, rough and ready that it may have been, seems to have been regarded as a
success; Rawlinson, the commander of 7th Division, wrote to Kitchener in
November 1914 that the subalterns commissioned from the ranks of the Artists'
were 'first class...and the cry is "give us more of them"'. (4)
The ranks of Territorial class corps continued to be a fertile recruiting
(1) Blomfield, pp.66-7; A.R. Haig-Brown, The OTC and the Great War (London,
1915) p.77.
(2) Diary, 14 Nov., 3 Dec. 1914, B.O. Dewes papers, 84/22/1, IW?1.
(3) Sir. J. French, Dispatch 2 Feb. 1915; E. Wallace, Kitchener's Army and the
Territorial Forces (London, nd ) p.175.
(4) Rawlinson to Kitchener, 25 Nov. 1914, WB/7, PRO 30/57/51, Kitchener Papers,
PRO.
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ground for officers during 1915. During their eight months of service in the
Ypres salient to February 1916, 100 men of the Queen's Westminster Rifles (1/16
Londons) were commissioned or transferred to cadet schools. (1) According to a
rifleman of 1/5 Londons, in the spring of 1915 Regular commanding officers were
'only too eager' to take LRB veterans as officers, but the battalion Co was
reluctant	 to release his men for fear of his entire unit evaporating, some
ninety-five per cent of other ranks being suitable to take commissions.(2)
Similarly, not all the rankers of class corps were eager to see their units
transformed into officer training units.(3)
4.3 Sources of Officers: 'Dugouts' and the OTC
Reserve and Special Reserve officers, and those cadets hastily commissioned
from Sandhurst and Woolwich in the autumn of 1914 were mostly sent as
reinforcements for the BEF, and were therefore unavailable for the New Armies.
Kitchener wentextraordinary lengths to provide officers for his volunteer army.
He kept back cadres from the BEF, which in the case of infantry battalions
amounted to three officers and a proportion of NCOs, and arbitarily detained
500 Indian army officers who happened to be at home on leave. Kitchener also
tapped the reservoir of 'dugouts' or retired officers.(4) A document dated 6
September 1914 reveals something of	 his ruthless determination to obtain
officers. Kitchener ordered the Adjutant-General to obtain from the Post Office
the details of letters sent to individuals with military titles, and then write
to them with an invitation to rejoin the army 'in such a manner that he can
(1) Henriques, p.73.
(2) [A. Smith], Four Years On the Western Front. By a Rifleman (London, 1987
edn.) p.69.
(3) Diary, 14 Nov. 1914, B.O. Dewes papers, 84/22/1, IWM.
(4) See P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army (Manchester, 1988) pp. 212-25, for a
scholarly study of the provision of officers for the New Armies. See also G.H.
Cassar, Kitchener: Architect of Victory (London, 1977) p.202, 209-10.
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hardly refuse'. Kitcherier also ordered that the commander of every unit in the
country, including Territorials, should be asked to put forward the names of
likely WOs and NCOs for commissions. By methods such as these, Kitchener hoped
to bring about a situation in which newly raised battalions and units of the BEF
'have the same proportion, as far as possible of experienced and inexperienced
officers'. (1)
Another potential source of officers were men who had served in the OTC. An
announcement appeared in newspapers on 10 September 1914 that '2000 Junior
Officers (unmarried) are immediately required' to serve with the Regular army
until the conclusion of the war. They had to be cadets or ex-cadets of a
university OTC, or members of a university aged between seventeen and thirty.
Even at these stage, the War Office was prepared to accept men without OTC
experience, providing that they possessed the necessary educational and social
qualifications. 'Other young men of good general education' were advised to
apply, in person,
	 to the commander of their nearest army depot.(2) Depot
commanders would be able to judge, from seeing would-be officers in the flesh,
whether they would be acceptable in an officers' mess.
The Officers Training Corps was formed in 1908. It consisted of Junior and
Senior divisions, the first consisting of public school, the latter of
university corps.(3) In 1907, just prior to the formation of the OTC, there
existed eight cadet battalions, three Rifle Volunteer Battalions and 152 cadet
corps or companies.(4) These units were of doubtful military value. Great
attention was paid to shooting and drill, but very little to tactical training.
(1) 'Instructions of Secretary of State', 6 Sept. 1914, WO 162/2, PRO.
(2) Daily Mirror 10 Sept. 1914, p.4.
(3) Army Order 297, 1908. For the raising of the OTC see E.M. Teagarden, 'Lord
Haldane and the Origins of the Officer Training Corps', JSARR XLV, No.192,
(1967) pp.91-96, and Spiers, Haldane pp.135-41.
(4) W. Richards, His Majesty's Territorial Army IV, (London, 1911) p.165.
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In 1907 a War Office committee recommended that the OTC should be established,
on the basis of existing
	 corps, as a means of overcoming the shortage of
officers for the army.(1) By 1914 OTCs existed at 79 per cent of all public
schools, which amounted to about 60 per cent of all junior OTCs. (2)
The OTC was unpopular and underfunded in peacetime, and relied so heavily on
the goodwill of the part-time officers of the OTC that one claimed that the
country had 'solved the riddle of getting something for nothing'.(3) The success
of the scheme may be gauged from the fact that between August 1914 and March
'Jut
1915 approximately 20,577 (and possibly as many as 27,000) men whoserving, or
who had served, in the ranks of the OTC had been commissioned. This was
exclusive of the 6,322 men who had been gazetted from the OTC between 1908 and
the outbreak of war, or who had served in school cadet corps prior to the
formation of the OTC in 1908.(4)
Peter Simkins has pointed out that the use of the OTC as a source for officers
ensured 'that there was no sudden and radical change in the social composition
of the officer corps in the first year of the war'. (5) However, the use of the
OTC did occasion a more modest
	 change in the social profile of the
British officer. No less than 41 per cent of the officers who served in the Boer
War were drawn from the 'ten great public schools', with Eton alone providing
11 per cent. (6) While impressive
	 numbers of commissions were granted to
alum	 of the OTCs of such schools between August 1914 and March 1915 (350,
253, 506 and 403 from Eton, Harrow, Marlborough and Wellington respectively),
(1) PP, 1907, XLVI, Cd 3294, Interim Report of the War Office Committee on the
provision of officers (a) for service with with Regular Army in war, and (b) for
the Auxiliary Forces,
(2) C.B. Otley, 'Militarism and militarization in the public schools, 1900-
1972', BJS, 29, No.3 (1978) p.330.
(3) Anon, 'Experiences of an O.T.C. Officer', Blackwood's, CXCIX, No.MCCV,
(1916) p.399.
(4) Haig-Brown, pp. X, 97-99.
(5) Simkins, Kitchener's Army p.221.
(6) A.H.H. MacLean, Public Schools and the War in South Africa (London, 1902)
p.12.
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just 10 per cent of OTC commissions went to products of Clarendon schools.
Even omitting the 4,697 commissions given to Senior Division candidates from the
total, Clarendon commissions amounted to only 13 per cent. In absolute terms
more commissions were granted to the more numerous 'lesser' schools, although
taken individually,	 such schools tended to have greater numbers of former
pupils serving in the ranks: Dollar Institution provided 35 officers and 200
other ranks, and Wellingborough Grammar School 42 and 44 respectively.(1) Even
allowing for the fact that the available figures are incomplete, given the
strong correlation between 	 the prewar officer class and the great public
schools (2), there is a strong suggestion that the typical officer of the New
Armies was socially inferior to his prewar regular counterpart.
The term 'public school' had been defined widely when the OTC was created. 43
of the schools which possessed an OTC in 1914 were not actually listed in the
public schools yearbook of 1908, and 19 of those that were did not possess an
OTC.(3) St Dunstan's College, Catford did have an OTC, but its pupil's fathers
tended to have relatively low status occupations. Clerks abounded, along with
accountants, a 'grocer and provisions merchant', an engraver and a 'retail
fishmonger and poulter'.(4) Similarly, the boys of Royal Grammar School,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne	 tended to go on to study locally at Armstrong College
rather than to attend
	 the ancient universities, and made careers in such
solidly middle-class occupations as 'colliery manager', 'assistant surveyor of
(1) Haig-Brown, pp.99-106.
(2) See chapter 1 above and I. Worthington, 'Antecedent Education and Officer
Recruitment: the Origins and Early Development of the Public School-Army
Relationship', MA XLI, No.4, (1977) pp.187-88.
(3) H.F.W. Deane and W.A. Evans, Public Schools Year Book (London, 1908).
(4) D.W. Collett, St Dunstan's College, Catford, Roll of Honour for the First
World War 1914-19 (London, 1928).
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shipping' and 'architect'.(l)
In 1908, two criteria were employed when deciding which cadet corps were to
be allowed to convert to OTC. Firstly, corps had to 'show an enrolled strength
of not less than 30 cadets' over the age of 13 years. Secondly, it had to be
militarily efficient. Efficiency was gauged by such factors as the availability
of training facilities and qualified officer instructors, and the Army Council
reserved the right to disband units which failed to maintain required
standards.(2) Social considerations therefore appear to have played a relatively
minor	 role in deciding whether individual units were to be allowed to be
upgraded to OTC status. One commentator suggested that by using military
effectiveness as the primary criterion for conversion, the military authorities
armed themselves with means of checking the abuse of the system by schools who
wished to enhance their social prestige by acquiring an OTC.(3)
The implied division between schools of similar types was resented by some. In
1918 the Public Secondary Schools Cadet Association called for 'The sweeping
away altogether of the invidious and anomalous distinction at present existing
between OTC schools and Cadet Corps schools'.(4) Even in official circles, men
who had served in a cadet unit were generally assumed to be of low social
status.(5) The familiar story of R.C. Sherriff's unsuccessful attempt to gain a
commission in 1914 should be viewed against this background. Sherriff, who was
educated at Kingston Grammar School, 'a very old and good' school founded in
1567, was refused a commission because it was not listed as a 'recognised
public (school]'. Sherriff's rejection is perfectly explicable on military,
rather than social grounds, for his school did not have an OTC or even a cadet
(1) 'In Nemorium Royal Grammar School, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Newcastle, nd).
(2) Regulations for the Officers Training Corps, 1908.
(3) L.E.M. Savill, 'The Development of Military Training in Schools in the
British Isles' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1937) pp.15-16.
(4) Public Secondary Schools Cadet Association Camp Magazine (August 1918) p.11.
(5) Hamilton to Haldane, 22 Feb. 1910, WO 32/6622, PRO.
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corps, while the Wykehainist who preceded him in the queue, and was accepted, had
probably obtained his certificate A from his school's OTC.(l) Many young men
educated at grammar schools little different from Kingston received commissions
in this period on the strength of their OTC certificates. The War Office's
policy	 on officer recruitment was not entirely consisttnt in the early months
of the war. However, it is clear that the desire for military experience in
potential officers played a greater role, and snobbery a lesser role, in its
thinking in this period than has sometimes been allowed.
4.4. Sources of Officers: Promotions from the Ranks
In March 1915 12,290 men possessing OTC certificates were reported as serving
as other ranks in the army.(2) Large numbers subsequently applied for
commissions. Others did not, but were commissioned anyway. P.G. Heath, who
served in the OTC at Malvern, enlisted in 23/Londons on the outbreak of war,
only to be told one day in the autumn of 1914 that he was now an officer, as a
relative had applied for a commission on his behalf.(3)
Some newly-raised battalions were especially rich in potential officers. The
four battalions of the 'Universities and Public Schools Brigade' (18/-21/RF) had
provided 50 officers for the New Army as early as 23 September 1914, and
eventually provided more than 7,000 before their disbandment in early 1916.(4)
The potential of the rankers of the Public Schools Battalion (16/Middlesex)
was soon recognised, and 108 men from the battalion were commissioned by mid-
October 1914. This led to increasingly desperate, but unsuccessful, attempts by
its CO to stem the flow of other ranks leaving the battalion. (5) Less socially
(1) R.C. Sherriff, 'The English Public Schools in the War' in G.A. Panichas,
(ed.) Promise of Greatness (London, 1968) pp.136-37.
(2) Haig-Brown, p.99.
(3) Unpublished account, p.13, P.G. Heath papers, DS/Misc/60, IWM.
(4) The Times 23 Sept. 1914, p.10; Simkins, Kitchener's Army pp.224-25.
(5) See correspondence in W032/11343, PRO; letter, nd, J.H. Hall, CAB 45/134,
PRO.
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prestigious units, such as the four northern Pals battalions of 93rd Brigade,
were also rich sources of officers. (1)
Given the widespread belief that officer-like qualities were mainly to be
found among the social elite, 	 and	 the shortage of officers for both the
peacetime and wartime army, it is strange that the War Office should authorise
the raising of units such as the 16/Middlesex. It stranger still that having
sanctioned	 these units to be raised, they were not converted into officer
training units along the lines of the Artists' Rifles. Instead, large numbers
of potential officers were killed serving as privates. 'What would have not
given' lamented	 Capt. Dible RANC in late 1917,
to have had back the dead of the HAC, the London Scottish, the 9th HLI and
other kindred battalions; every man in them of the best material for
commissioned rank? (2)
The loss of such men was the penalty paid by the British army for operating a
laissez faire, voluntary system of recruitment at the beginning of the war.
However, it will be argued in this thesis that views such as Dible's
overestimated the importance of the loss of such 'officer material', for their
lower middle-class and working-class replacements were, generally speaking, just
as effective as junior regimental officers.
4,5 The Process of Officer Selection
In the summer of 1915, a rumour that no more privates would be considered for
commissions circulated among the men of 1/Coldm. Gds.(3) In reality, within a
few months, a new system of officer recruitment was adopted which ensured that
the vast majority of newly-commissioned officers had previously served in the
ranks. This new system formally recognised the trend of commissioning from the
ranks which had become apparent from at least early 1915 and was, of course, a
(1) Letter, 6 Nov. 1929, C. Howard, CAB 45/134, PRO.
(2) Diary, 20 Nov. 1917, p.60, J.H. Dible papers, IWN.
(3) Diary, 19 July 1915, H. Venables papers, LULLC.
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reversal of prewar policy on officer recruitment.
As early as 16 September 1914, commanders of New Army divisions and brigades
were given discretion to nominate men for commissions, who then joined their
units in anticipation of their confirmation by the War Office.(1) A War Office
circular of December 1914 stated that candidates could be accepted even if they
were not trained to command men in the field, if they were 'otherwise suitable
in all respects 1 to hold temporary commissions. On this occasion, no guidance was
given on the criteria of suitability. (2)
In fact, commanding officers would have known exactly what criteria to apply
to potential officers. Regular officers shared what has been described, in
another context, as 'unspoken assumptions', or 'certain beliefs, rules or
objectives which are taken for granted'.(3) In this case, it was assumed that
potential officers had to be gentlemen, or at least possess enough social
skills so that they would not disgrace themselves in an officers' mess or be
ridiculed by the other ranks. These unspoken assumptions were not simply the
product of snobbery, but also reflected the deeply-held belief that unless an
officer was a gentleman he could not be an effective leader, and his men would
not follow him willingly. A question posed in a set of instructions issued to
commanding officers in France in late 1914 struck at the heart of the matter.
If considering recommending a ranker for a commission, the commanding officer
had to ask himself whether he would be prepared to 'accept him as an officer in
his own unit'. (4) This concern for social standards was reflected byqman
commissioned from the ranks of the Wiltshire Yeomanry in 1915, who asserted,
tongue-in cheek, that provided the candidate did not pick his nose while being
interviewed and swore that he hunted he was sure to be commissioned. It is
(1) A.O. 394, 16 Sept. 1914.
(2) Circular of 16 Dec. 1914, WO 162/2, PRO.
(3) J. Joll, '1914: The Unspoken Assumptions' in H. Koch (ed.) The Origins of
the First World War (London, 1972 edn.) p.309.
(4) AROs,	 WD of Adjutant-General, GHQ, 22 Nov. 1914, WO 95/25, PRO.
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interesting that he did not refer	 to military prowess as a criterion for
officership.(1) This man was commissioned from a home service 	 unit. In
France,individuals had the opportunity to prove their leadership qualities on
the battlefield.
In April 1915 a more detailed set of instructions was issued 	 concerning
candidates for commissions. Rankers had to possess 'adequate military
knowledge', 'a public school education or its equivalent' and had to be under 27
years of age, except in 'exceptional circumstances'.(2) These criteria were to
hold broadly true for the rest of the war. Stated more simply, the first
criterion was considered fulfilled if the soldier demonstrated qualities of
leadership, or at least had the potential to develop them. The possession of a
public school education implied far more than educational achievement or even
social status; it also suggested 	 that a man was imbued with leadership
qualities and p oblesse oblige, and that he shared a certain set of social
values. A further filter to prevent socially unacceptable men from becoming
officers was provided by the need to supply references from public figures
such as JPs or clergymen. Thus Pte. Percy Copson supplied 	 two character
references, including one 	 from the former mayor of Northampton, with his
application. (3)
In practice, the phrase 'a public school education or its equivalent' was
capable of considerable elasticity in its interpretation. One brigade commander
would satisfy himself of the educational qualifications of potential officers
by asking them to spell the word 'Mediterranean'.(4) In late 1917 a letter from
a headmaster	 was enough to satisfy the army that a ranker was fit, in
educational terms, to be an officer. The essential part of one such letter,
from the headmaster of Diamond School, Sunderland, simply stated that '[Cpl.
(1) R. Wilson, Palestine 1917 (Tunbridge Wells, 1987) p.29.
(2) lID, First Army A and Q, 22 April 1915, WO 95/181, PRO.
(3) Latham, p.38; letters in P.G. Copson papers, IWN.
(4) C.E. Jacomb, Torment (London, 1920) p.177.
-113-
William Allen]
left when in the Senior Class having done well in the various forms, and I
consider that he is well qualified educationally to hold a commission in HM
forces. (1)
This reliance on the subjective system of personal recommendations, rather
than a formal, structured system for admitting men to officer training, was an
extention of normal peacetime military practice, whereby patronage and personal
connections	 played an important role in the career structures of British
officers. (2) It could be a laborious process to obtain recommendation for
officer training. A rather extreme example was recorded by a gunner serving in
48th Divisional artillery. In a letter of 24 August 1915 he recorded that he
obtained permission from his sergeant to apply for a commission. The sergeant
took him to see his section commander, with whom, in the would-be officer's
words:
I had a talk over it (sic), and finally, I got his permission to be taken to
the Colonel commanding 2nd battery...[who had] no say in the matter beyond
recommending me to the Brigade Cominander...he alone signs the forms finally -
after seeing me - and he alone recommends me to the General- to be seen in
turn by him, the latter being the Commander R.A. for the Division...(3)
Thus this man underwent a number of informal as well as formal interviews. In
the infantry prospective officers were usually interviewed by their battalion
and by their brigade commander, and often had 	 a preliminary discussion with
their platoon or company commander. This system was generally adopted after
February 1916.(4) Likely men could be recommended for commissions even if they
had not applied to become office5. By the spring of 1917, battalions had to
to furnish the names of five NCOs or privates suitable for commission every
month.(5) Pte. G. Hall (13/York and Lanes) was informed by his company officer
(1) Letter in 'General Aspects: Officers/Officer Cadets' file, LULLC.
(2) See Travers, Killing Ground, chapter 1.
(3) 'Wagger', Battery Flashes (London, 1916) p.148.
(4) J. Greenshield, KRS Q; B. Williams, Raising and Training the New Armies
(London, 1918) p.98.
(5) J. Terraine, (ed.), General Jack's Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1964) p.197.
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that Hall had been recommended for a commission, and Hall's diffident protests
that he was 'only a working lad' were overridden.(l) Although some soldiers saw
the system as arbiwary, in general, it worked well.(2)
This chapter has shown how the social base of the officer corps of the British
army was significantly widened during the Great War. The next chapter will take
the story a stage further by examining how the army created officers from men
who did not come from the traditional officer-providing classes.
(1) P.W. Turner and R.H. Haigh, Not for Glory (London, 1969) p.74.
(2) Diary, 6 Sept. 1916, G. Powell papers, 76/214/1, IWM.
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Chapter 5
British Military Leadership 1914-18: Influences and Training
In this chapter,	 influences on the British concept of leadership will be
discussed. Then the actual process of training officers will be examined.
5.1 The Nature of Leadership
Here it is appropriate to establish a theoretical framework for the study of
the role of the British regimental officer of 1914-18. Leadership has been
defined by W.D. Henderson as
the phenomenon that occurs when the influence of A (the leader) causes
B (the group) to perform C (goal-directed behaviour) when B would not
have performed C had it not been for the influence of A. (1)
This definition is useful, but incomplete. In 1927, F.C. Bartlett identified
three broad categories of leaders:
a) institutional leaders, 'who maintain their position by virtue of the
established social prestige attaching to their office';
b) dominant leaders, 'who maintain their position by virtue of their personal
capacity to impress and dominate their followers';
c) persuasive leaders, 'who maintain their position mainly by virtue of their
personal capacity to express and persuade their followers'. (2)
Bartlett's work suggests that leadership involves more than the imposition of
(1) W.D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington DC, 1985)
p.111.
(2) F.C. Bartlett, Psychology and the Soldier (Cambridge, 1927) pp.I38-39.
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one individual's will on a reluctant group. In Correlli Barnett's words,
Leadership is a process by which a single aim and unified action are
imparted to the herd. Not surprisingly it is most in evidence in times or
circumstances of danger or challenge. Leadership is not imposed like
authority. It is actually welcomed and wanted by the led.(l)
A combination of Henderson's and Barnett's assessments of leadership produces
the following definition:
Leadership is the phenomenon that occurs when the influence of A (the
leader) causes B (the group) to perform C (goal-directed behaviour) when
B would not have performed C had it not been for the influence of A; the
influence of A being generally welcomed by B.
Officers have five sources of influence over their men, influence being
defined as the process by which A modifies the behaviour and attitudes of B, and
power being defined as that which enables A to influence B.(2) These are:
a) 'Resource' power, the ability to give rewards;
b) 'Physical' or 'coercive' power;
c) 'Institutional' power, that is, power which flows from the acceptance of a
leader's hierarchical status;
d) 'Personal' power, that is power which flows from the identification of the
soldier with his officer, leading to the creation of ties of trust and
admiration;
e) 'Expert' power, the belief that the leader is professionally competent, and
has the necessary expertise and information which makes him well-equipped to
lead the unit.(3)
The ideal leader is one who relies mainly on personal and expert power. A poor
(1) Quoted in R. Holmes, Firing Line (London, 1985) p.340.
(2) C.B. Handy, Understanding Organisations (London, 1985) p.'18.
(3) Henderson, Cohesion pp.111-14; Handy, pp.121-27.
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leader is one who relies mainly on institutional and coerc.ive power. Used
wisely, the officer's influence can be instrumental in creating and sustaining
morale, for certain factors which tended to undermine the ordinary soldiers'
morale	 have emerged from sociological and pyschological studies of men in
combat:
1) Military service involves a loss of freedom, and better educated men feel
status deprivation more strongly than ill-educated men.
2) Military service involves suffering personal discomfort, and often conveys
the impression that the individual is a mere 'cog in the machine', powerless
and impotent in the face of an impersonal and arbibry coerdve authority.
3) Military life involves isolation from accustomed sources of affection.
4) Individual rewards are subject to both poverty and uncertainty in the army,
and 'job satisfaction' is often denied to the soldier.
5) Military service involves continual uncertainty, insecurity and inadequate
cognitive orientation. (1)
Many of these factors can be alleviated by the existence of good officer-man
relations and enlightened leadership. The leader has two main functions.
Firstly, he helps to create and sustain unit cohesion. This is a broadly
managerial function. The officer has to ensure that his men have sufficient
supplies of food, drink and other essentials. He also has to exercise man-
management, to prevent the alienation of the soldier, perhaps defending him
against the unreasonable demands of higher authority. The officer also has to
(1) S.A. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier (New York, 1965 edn.) I, p.365;
II, pp.77, 365;	 W.E. Hocking, Morale and its Enemies (New Haven, 1918) p.105.
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detect and correct behaviour which deviated from group norms. Ultimate success
could be judged by the achievement of cohesion, when the formal military unit
became for its members a substitute for family, the core of their social and
emotional lives. Secondly, the leader has to mould the cohesive group so that
their goals are congruent with those of the greater organisation, the army; in
short, he has to lead the group into battle.(l)
The interrelation of the two functions is demonstrated by a US army
experiment of 1960. (2) Of four parties dispatched across the polar ice cap,
two were placed on half rations. The underfed teams rejected the authority of
their formal leaders, and developed resistance to them. These leaders, who
equated to platoon officers, were placed in a difficult position. They were
responsible for their groups, but were unable to provide adequate food or
protect their men against the apparently unfair actions of the military
hierarchy. Their men began to attempt to steal food, for cohesion is a two-
edged weapon; survival of the group, rather than the accomplishment of the aims
of the army (usually, combat missions) can become the object of some military
primary groups. (3) The regimental officer is the vital link between the
primary group and the army.
5.2 Influences on Leadership: The Cult of Athieticism
It was widely believed that there was a direct connection between the ethos of
public schools, which emphasised the development of 'character' (the possession
of the virtues of 'physical and moral courage, loyalty and co-operation
(1) Henderson, Cohesion pp.11-16.
(2) R.W. Seaton, 'Deterioration of Military Work Groups Under Deprivation
Stress', in M. Janowitz, The New Military (New York, 1964) pp.225-49.
(3) The US Army in Vietnam suffered numerous problems of this type. See G. Lewy,
America in Vietnam (New York, 1978) pp.155-6, 159.
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and the ability both to command and obey' (1) and the ability to lead men in
battle. In 1921 Col. C. Bonham-Carter commented that 'the gift of leadership'
was 'almost a race inheritc.nce among public schoolboys'. (2) A prominent
industrialist, Sir Robert Waley Cohen, was reported as saying that a public
school and university education produced
	 men who were	 loyal to the
organisation, and	 were able 'to get on with their subordinates by just
treatment mixed with kindness' and treated their superiors 'with deference that
does not deteriorate into subservience'.(3) It is not surprising that such
members of the establishment should praise the public schoolboy. However,
confirmation of their views comes from the pen of an individual who rebelled
against the establishment: Richard Aldington.(4)
Aldington attended a public school, served in the ranks of the wartime army,
and was later given a temporary commission. In his novel Death of a Hero
(1929) Aldington draws a pen portrait of 'Lieutenant Evans', who was described
as a typical public schoolboy, 'ignorant', 'inhibited' but '"decent" and good
humoured'. He 'accepted and obeyed every English middle-class prejudice and
taboo' and was totally convinced of his superiority to the working classes.
Evans was xenophobic, sexually repressed, and philistine in his cultural
tastes. (5) In sum, Evans was depicted as a living example of the values that
Aldington despised as obsolete. Evans was also, as Aldington made clear, an
excellent officer:
(1) J.A. Nangin, 'Athleticism: A Case Study of the Evolution of an Educational
Ideology', in B. Simon and I. Bradley, The Victorian Public School (Dublin,
1975) p.147.
(2) C. Bonham-Carter, 'The Royal Military College, Sandhurst',
	 III, No.1,
(1921) p.105.
(3) S. Foot, Three Lives - And Now (London, 1937) pp.11-12.
(4) See J. Morris, 'Richard Aldington and Death of a Hero - or Life of an anti-
hero?' in H. Klein, ed., The First World War in Fiction (1978 edn.) pp. 183-92.
(5) R. Aldington, Death of a Hero (London, 1965 edn.) pp.285-86.
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[Evans] was honest, he was kindly, he was conscientious, he could obey
orders and command obedience in others, he took pains to look after his
men. He could be implicitly relied upon to lead a hopeless attack and to
maintain a desperate defence to the very end. There were thousands and
tens of thousands like him.(1)
In short, Aldington believed that public schools produced ideal subalterns for
the British army on the Western Front. Here it will be argued that Aldington was
essentially correct, and furthermore, that public school values were
successfully passed on to officers who had not attended public schools by a
process of education, training and socialisation. As a result, the lover middle-
class and working-class officers of the latter part of the war were imbued
with much the same values as their public school educated predecessors. The
public school ethos, described by a headmaster in 1913 as 'something
essentially English' consisting of 'a sense of honour, of esprit de corps,
and.. .a spirit of self-sacrifice' (2) therefore influenced far more officers
than had actually attended a public school.
Judging by the problems experienced by the Edvardian army in attracting
officers, public schools might appear to have been inefficient instruments of
militarisation. However, 	 the inculcation of values of officership by overt
means, such as compulsory service in the OTC, was less effective than other,
less tangible factors such as athleticism, the classics, and the concept of
chivalric gentlemanliness and self-sacrifice, all of which were very much a part
of the public school ethos. The Victorian and Edwardian public school has been
the subject of much attention in the last few years. Here it is not intended to
duplicate the work of other writers, but rather to discuss some aspects of
their work relevant to the officer-man relationship in the Great War.
(1) Ibid p. 286.
(2) Quoted in D. McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme (London, 1983) p.39. This
headmaster also recognised that the public school spirit could also lead to
snobbishness.
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In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the notion that sport was a
useful training for war was almost univerally accepted. Its most famous
mainfestation is probably Newbolt's poem 'Vitai Lampada', in which public school
cricket is explicitly linked with military leadership. Games were seen as
useful for two purposes. Firstly, they produced the 'character' necessary for
leadership. The playing of sport channelled aggression into co-operation,
taught self- and corporate-discipline, made boys physically fit and created team
spirit. By teaching boys to take rapid decisions on the playing field, games
prepared them to take similar decisions on the battlefield. On the sportsfield,
as on the battlefield, boys learned to take risks and to disregard their
personal safety. Team games, declared Haig in 1919, required
decision and and character on the part of the leaders, discipline and
unselfishness amor-ig the led, and initiative and self-sacrifice on the
part of all.
Haig went on to claim that the 'inspiration' of games 'has brought us through
this war, as it has carried us through the battles of the past'. (1)
In recent years the correlation between the cult of athieticism and military
leadership has been questioned. Geoffery Best, although generally critical of
the 'games ethic', recognises that games were useful as a means of inculcating
loyalty to the group, be it the team, school, regiment or Empire. (2) Peter
Parker is dismissive of the whole concept, suggesting that obsessive devotion to
the public school, or the house, detracted from loyalty to nation. Moreover,
Parker argued that a games player might be able to command respect from his
peers Ltit did not necessarily follow that he would be respected by strangers
in the army, and the cult of the athlete encouraged boys to work for
individual, rather than group goals.(3)
(1) Sir D. Haig, A Rectorial Address Delivered to the Students in the University
of St. Andrews, 14th May 1919 (St. Andrews, 1919) p.16.
(2) G. Best, 'Militarism and the Victorian Public School', in Simon and
Bradley, pp.143-44. See also J. Gathorne-Hardy, The Public School Phenomeneon
(London, 1977) pp.144-56.
(3) P. Parker, The Old Lie (London, 1987) pp.83-84.
-122-
Parker's criticisms are overstated. J.D. Burns, a Great War subaltern who
attended an Australian public school, argued in his school magazine that loyalty
to the school was the first stage in the development of a more mature code
of loyalty.	 Later, Burns argued, horizons widen and 'patriotism for the
Empire will succeed, though not replace, loyalty to the school'.(l) Parker's
second argument ignores the fact that the public schoolboy, on joining the
army, would find himself in an organisation that, like his school, placed a high
degree of emphasis on sport, and in which sporting prowess was greatly prized.
The individual would very soon have an opportunity to win the respect of his
fellow officers on the sportsfield. He would also be well placed to win the
respect of his soldiers, for interest in sport was by no means confined to the
social elite. Watching and playing sport, especially Association football, was
one of the principal forms of working-class leisure in the early twentieth
century. On the Western Front sport was important as a recreational activity
for the British working man in uniform. A Regular officer noted in his diary in
August 1914 that 'The men spent the evening in their usual manner, kicking a
football about', while in June 1915 a popular paper devoted a double page spread
to a picture of a typical scene of men 'resting' behind the lines by playing
football. (2)
In the later nineteenth century former public schoolboys codified sport.
Football was converted from a rough-and-tumble into a disciplined activity
conducted according to carefully defined rules. Thus the public school games
ethic, in a diluted form, influenced the working classes.(3) It is not
surprising that in	 the autumn of 1914, the football stadium proved to be
fertile ground for the recruiting officer. (4) An indication that sporting
(1) Memorial booklet pp. 4, 9, J.D. Burns papers, LTJLLC. The Australian public
school system closely followed the British model. See chapter 9 below.
(2) Diary, 15 Aug. 1914, T.S. Wollcombe papers, RMASL; The Graphic 5 June 1915,
pp.726-27.
(3) J. Walvin, Leisure and Society (London, 1978) pp.83-96.
(4) Yorkshire Post 2 Sept. 1914.
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fanaticism was by no means confined to the upper echelons of society, and that
a mutual interest in sport could bring officers and men together, is offered by
the fact that a soldier thought it essential to bring his officer news of the
1915 FA Cup Final during a tense moment in the second battle of Ypres.(1)
The idea that sport encouraged the boy to strive to achieve renown for
himself,	 rather than to seek honour for the team,was refuted by Burns, who
argued that the object of the athlete in training was not self-glorification but
the 'setting of an example', this being the 'duty of each individual in the
school'. (2) Other evidence would suggest that this was a common belief. (3)
Parker also attacks the notion that the cricket or rugby pitch was a valuable
training ground for subalterns. He argues that the taking of decisions on the
sportsfield and 'sporting strategy' (sic) are very different from the planning
of actions on the battlefield and 'making snap decisions' that place men's
lives at risk. Moreover, the discipline of the .5ports field could not be compared
with that of the battlefield. To some extent, Parker is supported in these
criticisms by Best.	 Superficially, these criticisms seem irrefutable; there
is inded a world of difference between football and war. Yet an examination of
the British army on the Western Front leads to the conclusion that these
criticisms are exaggerated, not least because leadership on the battlefield
occupies a relatively small proportion of the military leader's time.
S. S;to. s	 suggested that one of the functions of the sporting imagery used
in Ernest Raymond's ininensely popular novel Tell England, which was originally
published in 1922, was to provide psychological consolation for the bereaved.
If grieving relatives of fallen public school subalterns could believe that
the dead had regarded war, and death, in the same light as a cricket match,
then this would provide them with some measure of consolation,
	 however
(1) Diary, 25 Apr. 1915, T.S. Wolicombe papers, RNASL.
(2) Memorial booklet, p.4., J.D. Burns papers, LULLC.
(3) See for example P. Jones, War Letters of a Public School Boy (London, 1918)
passim.
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'spurious and limited', by helping them to make sense of the situation.(1)
Similarly,	 sport helped young officers to avoid the stress caused by 'role
ambiguity' (2) on joining his unit by helping the newcomer to make sense of
that situation by relating it to
	 a familiar experience. The young officer,
faced by his platoon for the first time, was able to fall back on his experience
in a sporting team. One extremely effective leader of men, the product of a
public school, was 'convinced' that games developed 'the ability to deal with
and handle men in later years'.(3)
Military leadership involves far more than just combat. One very important
field of responsibility for the regimental officer was that of training of men.
Throughout the war drafts arrived at frontline units having received only the
sketchiest of training at home depots.(4) As early as the autumn of 1914,
Regular battalions were complaining about the poor quality of the training of
the reservists that they were receiving.(5) Four years later, the 1/KRRC, a
nominally Regular unit, reported itself as 'Badly off for Lewis Gunners and also
NCOs with any experience at all...a large number of our new draft are only just
19 years old and out for the first time'. (6)
Changing tactical situations also called for the officers to retrain their
men, especially during the re-emergence of mobile warfare in 1918. An officer,
wounded in 1917, returned to France in October 1918 to be 'astonished' to find
(1) S. Sillars, Art and Survival in First World War Britain (New York, 1987)
pp.136-37.
(2) Handy, pp.60-2, 79.
(3) Carton de Wiart, p.14.
(4) Lt.Gen. Sir I. Maxse, 'Hints on Training. Preface', in Notes for Commanding
Officers (Aldershot, 1918) pp. 12-15; XV Corps. Notes on Minor Tactics Compliled
from Lectures to Company Officers p.3, RMASL.
(5) 23 Oct. 1914, WD, 1/R.I. Rifles, WO95/1730, PRO.
(6) 20 Mar. 1918, WD, 1/KRRC, WO95/1371, PRO.
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how profoundly the nature of warfare had changed. (1) Writing of the fighting on
the Marne in July 1918, the commander of 62nd Division confessed that 'these
operations were practically our first experience of open fighting'.(2) Mobile
warfare exposed any lack of appropriate training and made hasty improvisation
necessary. A typical formation, 17th Division, reported that in August 1918
that its troops were suffering from:
lack of tactical knowledge, which resulted in formations not being adapted
to suit ground, and lack of power to apply the principle of fire covering
movement, also lack of intelligent	 patrolling. (3)
Junior officers were often thrown back 	 on their own resources and
imaginations to train	 their men for a type of warfare for which they were
themselves ill-prepared. (4) They naturally drew upon their own sporting
experiences for inspiration, encouraged by official enthusiasm for sport as a
training aid. The training for the assault that was officially recommended in
the autumn of 1917, for instance, was heavily influenced by sport. The training
scheme began with basics, such as jumping over a trench and bayonet fighting;
the latter was often included as an event in unit sports meetings. Later stages
of training included assault courses and other exercises. The spirit in which
they were approached is1&ndicated by some instructions included in an official
manual, which insisted that 'there is a close analogy between cricket and an
exercise of this kind'; the 'players play the game under the agreed laws, and
under the orders of their Captain...the platoon commander', the umpires adhere
(1) E. Parker, Into Battle 1914-18 (London, 1964) p.93.
(2) Letter, 13 Sept. 1933, W. Braithwaite, CAB 45/126, PRO.
(3) Operations of 17th Division from 21 August 1918 to ii November 1918
p.1, Conf.3355, SCL. For details of another division's ad hoc training in this
period, see Anon, A Short History of the 19th (Western) Division 1914-1918
(London, 1919) p.100.
(4) C.N. Barclay, Armistice 1918 (London, 1968) pp.95-98.
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strictly to their allotted role, and the spectators 'keep away from their
pitch'.(I) Furthermore, in order to maintain interest and to encourage esprit
de corps, it was recommended that some training exercises were turned into
competitive events, so that, for instance, No.1 Section took on No.2 Section on
the rifle range, just as on another occasion the same sub-units would play each
other at football. An official pamphlet of 1918 recommended competitions
	 'in
Lewis and Machine Gun Practice, Revolver Shooting and Musketry, Bayonet
Fighting, Assault Training, Wiring, Yukon Pack Carrying, etc'. (2) By treating
training as a type of sporting activity, officers attempted to make training
interesting and comprehensible to their fellow sports enthusiasts in the ranks.
Moving from training to the battlefield, the Edwardian belief that sport was
essential training for military leadership was a development of a much older
belief in the importance of hunting. In the eighteenth century, for instance,
advocates of the chase were using very similar arguments to those used by
Edwardian sportsmen: that hunting toughened the individual, and developed
courage, coup d'oeil and	 leadership qualities. (3) Such views were far from
dead in the Great War. One 'fire-eating' gunner officer described combat in
terms of hunting. In a volume published shortly after the war, he paid tribute
to his 'stout hearted men' who had proved 'good partners...in the game of
killing the Hun'.(A)
In the period of trench-warfare, patrols into No Man's Land and trench raids
gave subalterns their main opportunities to show initiative.(5) The similarities
(1) Assault Training, September 1917 SS 185, (Sept. 1917.) pp.5-6, 15.
(2) XV Corps Notes pp.5-6;Notes and Hints on Training (Jan. 1918) p.6, RNASL.
(3) C. Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London, 1987) pp.49-50,
140-41.
(4) N. Fraser-Tytler, With Lancashire Lads and Field Guns in France, 1915-18
(Manchester, 1922) p.8, 144, 140.
(5) T. Ashvorth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918 (London, 1980) pp.70-98.
-127-
between	 sport and raiding were often noted by contemporaries. There was the
obvious relationship between stalking and carrying out stealthy operations; (1)
and cricket can be seen as a 'tamed' version of stalking. The language used to
report in an account of raid carried out by 5th and 7th Battalions CEF is
revealing. The writer	 asserted	 that the men practised for the attack 'with
the same relish as if training for a football match', and mentions that an
officer commanding an attacking party was 'a footballer'. This 	 piece of
information appears irrelevant until it is seen in the context of the belief
that raiding was	 an extension of sport, with similar training and tactics
being used for both activities. (2.) On occasions, raids appear to have become
another form of sporting contest between rival British units.(3)
When viewed against this background, the provision of footballs by Capt. W.P.
Nevill for his company of 8/E. Surreys to kick into action on 1 July 1916
becomes comprehensible. Far being an act of public school bravado or the
ludicrous action of a man obsessed with sport (4) it can be seen as a shrewd
psychological stroke. Nevill intended the footballs 	 to distract his men from
the terrors of their baptism of fire.(5) It is arguable that the use of football
on this and other occasions (6) also helped soldiers to make sense of a new and
terrible experience by presenting it in terms which they were immediately able
(1) For a good description of a patrol see E.C. Vaughan, Some Desperate Glory
(London, 1985 edu.) pp.120-21.
(2) J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, I, Appendices,
Appx. 6. pp.43, 46.
(3) Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War (War Office, Oct.
1932) p.24, W032/3116, PRO.
(4) Parker, pp.213-15; C. Veitch, "Play up! Play up! and Win the War":
Football, the Nation and the First World War 1914-15', JCH, 20,(1985) pp.363-64.
(5) G.H.F Nichols, The 18th Division In the Great WarTEdinburgh, 1922) p.40;
J.R. Ackerly, My Father and Myself (Harmondsworth, 1971 edn.) p.50.
(6) P. MacGill, The Great Push (London, 1916) p.73 (London Irish at Loos, 25
Sept. 1915); Letter, R. Grieg, 22 Apr. 1930, CAB 45/134, PRO (16/R. Scots on
Somme, 1 July 1916).
-128-
to comprehend; football 'was the common thread which bound together a group of
men facing the most severe challenge of their lives'.(l) Far from being a
ludicrous anachronism, the public school games ethic played a important role in
the war on the Western Front.
5.3 Nobility and Sacrifice: Chivalry, the Classics, and Popular Fiction
Mark Girouard has argued that the nineteenth century saw the resurgence of the
concept of chivalry, or at least a reinterpretation of it. Chivalry, although
based on an idealised view of the knightly code of the middle ages, had by 1914
metamorphosed into the concept of gentlemanliness. Chivalry can be defined as a
code of conduct which stressed honour, bravery, loyalty, courte.sy,
generosity, mercy and self-sacrifice. From the mid-nineteenth century, this
code was transmitted via the reformed public schools, and thus came to be the
dominant ethos of the upper-middle and upper classes. Games were a manifestation
of this; they taught,	 it was believed, gentlemanly virtues, and were thus
morally uplifting. In Girouard's words, 'the Victorians selected the qualities
which they admired in chivalry and remodelled games in the light of them'. (2)
Not the least influence of sport on the subalterns of 1914-18 was the fact
that they were thoroughly imbued with a sense of responsibility towards
other members of their team; a concept that, in the army, readily translated
into paternalistic responsibility for the well-being of their men. Two events
that took place shortly before the Great War admirably demonstrated the code
of the chivalric gentleman. Capt. Oates of 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons,
(1) Veitch, p.364.
(2) N. Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman
(London, 1981) pp.7, 16,	 235.
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who walked out into the snow on Scott's ill-fated polar expedition of 1912, and
the male passengers on the sinking ocean liner Titanic who, having given up
their places in the lifeboats to women and children, calmly awaited death, were
examples of gentlemen who had sacrificed their lives for the good of the larger
group.(1) As in the medieval version of chivalry, the code of self-sacrifice was
bound up with Christianity. Christ's dictum that 'Greater love hath no man than
this, that a man lay down his life for his friends' (John 15:13) dove-tailed
neatly with chivalric ideals. The result was a view of life summarised by the
Latin tag Dulce et Decorum est Pro patria mori: it is sweet and right to die for
one's country.
For much of the war, the British subaltern was not expected to be an expert
tactician, but rather was expected to exercise what might be termed
'inspirational' command. In the words of one such officer, 'in a defensive
battle his duty was to persuade his men to hold the position or die in the
attempt'; (2) in an offensive battle, he had to lead his men forward. Chivalric
influences, ingested via the public school, pulpit and sportsfield, left the
young men who served as subalterns in the trenches with little doubt as to the
standards expected of gentlemen placed in command of men who were fighting for
their country. One of many indications of the extent to which chivalric ideals
were	 seen as relevant to modern warfare can be seen in the church of St.
Michael the Archangel, Lyme Regis, Dorset, where there is a memorial window to
25-year-old Capt. G.H. Bickley of the Devons. The stained glass depicts various
scenes including a knight in armour kneeling in vigil, and another knight
receiving the Holy Grail from an angel. In sharp and ironic contrast to the
(1) Ibid pp.3-6, 8, 233-35.
(2) C.N. Barclay, Armistice 1918 (London, 1968) p.95.
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mystical imagery of his memorial, Bickley was killed near Ypres on 4 October
1917 while attached to 236 Machine Gun Company, a unit created to make use of
advanced technology, fighting in a battle that has come to symbolise twentieth
century techniques of industrial warfare.(l) As late as 1973 a public school
officer could write about the Great War in chivalric terms. (2) An equally
powerful testimony is that of Wilfred Owen's poem 'Dulce et Decorum est' which
is a denunciation of 'The old Lie' that underpinned the chivalric code of self-
sacrifice.(3) The bitterness of this poem can only be understood if placed in
the context of the Weltanschauung of the average public school educated
subaltern.
A further factor relevant to a study of the influences of British officers of
the Great War was the Greek heroic tradition. The public school curriculum was
dominated by the classics. Not surprisingly,
	 the classics had an enormous
impact on the public school ethos. The classical heroes, particularly those of
Homer's epics, were seen as role models for boys. Even in 1935, a classical
scholar who had grown to manhood in the nineteenth century could write that
'There are worse ways of educating a boy than to familiarise his mind from
childhood with great tales of splendid deeds and heroic men'. (4) Indeed, one
authority has argued that there were distinct similiarities between Edwardian
Britain and Homeric Greece, particularly in the great respect given in both
societies to military and political heroes. The generation of 1914 was
'profoundly Homeric', and 'in Homer, the hero was a warrior'.(5) The extent to
(1) Personal observation.
(2) V.F. Eberle, My Sapper Venture (London, 1973) p.22.
(3) W. Owen, 'Dulce et Decorum est', in B. Gardner (ed.) Up the Line to Death
(London, 1976 edn.) pp.141-42.
(4) T.R. Glover, The Ancient World (Harmondsworth, 1944 edn.) p.28.
(5) R.M. Ogilvie, Latin and Greek (London, 1964) pp.136, 143.
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which	 public schoolboys were soaked in the llia4 and Odessey can be gauged
from a per.sal of memoirs of the period. The Darda.nelles campaign, fought
almost in sight of the remains of Troy, brought forth a particularly fine crop
of Homeric allusions.(1) The Western Front also inspired references to ancient
Greece. One came from the pen of Stephen Graham, who served in the ranks of
the Scots Guards. Graham returned to Ypres shortly after the war and in
describing a monument in Polygon Wood referred to Thermopylae; an allusion that
he took for granted would be understood by his educated readership. (2) While
men who read the classics for pleasure were probably in a minority, even non-
intellectual former public schoolboys were influenced by classical and heroic
traditions, so deeply were they imbeded in the British public school ethos.(3)
There were three major ways in which the classics influenced the officer-man
relationship in the British army of 1914-18. Firstly, the study of Homer, Caesar
and the like ensured that a great part of the schoolboy's time was spent reading
texts that dealt with issues of war rather than peace, reinforcing the notion
that leadership in war was a natural part of the gentleman's duty. Secondly,
because the concept of chivalry was extended back into the classical era (Plato
was once described as 'the greatest of gentlemen'), 	 it gave support to the
concept of the leader as a gentleman, with all that implied in terms of
paternalism.(4) Finally, it reinforced the belief that the leaders of society
should be warriors, who physically led their men into battle. Hector, Achilles,
(1) See for example C. Mackenzie, Gallipoli Memories (London, 1929) pp.65-66; A.
Herbert, lions, Anzac and Kut (London, nd) p.169.
(2) S. Graham, The Challenge of the Dead (London, 1921) p.22.
(3) T. King, 'The Influence of the Greek Heroic Tradition on the Victorian and
Edwardian Military Ethos', unpublished paper given to BCMH conference, 6 Apr.
1991.
(4) Girouard, p.66; R.W. Livingstone, (ed.) The Legacy of Greece (London, 1921)
p.143.
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or for that matter Alexander the Great, were not generals who calmly directed a
battle from a safe distance in the rear. They were warriors who fought hand-to-
hand with their enemies.(l) A further, subsidiary influence of one classical
tradition, the Spartan, was that the harsh regime at public schools, of which
it was once claimed would have 'produce[d] an immediate revolution if applied to
the masses', was intended to toughen future leaders.(2)
The influence of the classics to modern Britain	 began to be challenged in
the years following the war. Livingstone's Legacy of Greece, a defence of
the subject, was published in 1921 in response to the new trend. However, the
continuing popular influence of the classical tradition and concepts of military
leadership is demonstrated by the success of Raymond's novel Tell England,
which was made into an immensely popular film in 1930. Set partly at a public
school, and partly on Gallipoli, the title is a deliberate echo of the epitaph
of the Spartans who died at Thermopylae. The final frame of the film shows a
gravestone inscribed with the epitaph:
Tell England, ye who pass this monument
We died for her, and here we rest content.
Thus through the pages of a successful novel and a feature film the traditions
of classical and modern warfare were explicitly linked. To continue Sillars'
thesis, it is possible that a reason for the success of the film was that, by
reaffirming heroic values, it offered psychological consolation to the bereaved
at a time when the whole concept of glory and self-sacrifice in war was under
(1) See King. For an example, see Homer, (M. Hammond, translator) The Iliad:
A New Prose Translation (Harmondsworth, 1987) p.271.
(2) Mosley, p.28. For a similar claim about the harshness of life at a public
school, see L.P. Hartley, 'Three Wars', in G.A. Panichas, Promise of Greatness
(London, 1968) pp.253-54.
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attack from the 'disillusioned' school of novelists. (1)
There are other aspects of the public school ethic which could be discussed,
such as muscular, evangelical Christianity, but here only one other influence,
that of popular writing, will be examined. The approved reading of middle- and
upper-class boys	 tended to purvey militaristic and paternalistic values.
Magazines such as Young England and the 	 Boy's Own Paper (BOP) published
articles designed to teach affulent readers their responsibilites towards the
poor. In an article of 1906, for instance, a clerical writer stressed that
noblesse oblige was a sacred duty:
Christ taught that the strong should support the weak, and all should
care for those who cannot help themselves.
In 1915 the BOP	 carried a typical article which featured the work of the
Shaftesbury Society and the Ragged School Union. The author was explicit in his
propagandistic aim in writing:
[If] every bright Lad of Advantage would be a Big Brother to every Lad
of Disadvantage, the occupation of the Ragged School Union would be
gone. It would have no raison d'etre.(2)
In terms of sales, G.A. Henty was the most important boy's writer of the late
nineteenth century, selling about 25 million books by 1914. His historical
adventure stories, which were often concerned with war, offered role models for
young military leaders. The protagonist was usually a boy of 15 or 16 who
learns about the responsibilities of leadership during the course of his
adventures. (3) Sometimes leadership is expressed outside the context of the
army. In 'The Old Pit Shaft; A Tale of the Yorkshire Coalfields' the themes
(1) Raymond, Tell England 	 pp.273, 314; E. Raymond, The Story of My Days
(London, 1968) pp.122-3, 162; J. Richards, Visions of Yesterday (London, 1973)
pp.153-4.
(2) Quoted in Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', p.59.
(3) G. Arnold, Held Fast for England (London, 1979) pp.17, 31-34.
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of courage, self-sacrifice and leadership are expressed as clearly as in the
purely military tales. An assistant engineer heroically rescues a beautiful
maiden after his cowardly and working-class 	 rival in love had run away
rather than risk his own life. The implication is clearly that the former was a
chivalric gentleman, while the latter was not.(1)
Henty was merely the most successful writer in the genre. His many rivals and
imitators also propagated the militaristic elements of the public school
ethos. An anonymous story, 'A Boy's First Fight' depicts the battle of Waterloo
through the eyes of a seventeen-year-old subaltern. This story features a
paternalistic quartermaster who attends to the material needs of the rankers,
and courageous, phlegmatic and self-sacrificing officers and NCOs who offer
leadership at the crisis of the battle. The rankers demonstrate their
'affectionate regard' for their wounded colonel. Heroism and dedication to duty
enable the youthful subaltern, and indeed the British army, to overcome all
difficulties and defeat the French.(2)
A writer possibly even more influential than Henty in shaping the ethos of
the officers of the Great War was Rudyard Kipling. It was largely through his
work that the general public gained their impression of both the private soldier
and the subaltern, although Kipling's military tales were based on his time in
India in the 1880s, and army life had changed somewhat in the intervening years.
He was also an advocate of the militarisation of British society. One story,
published in the aftermath of the Boer War, depicts the entire British nation in
(1) G.A. Henty ,'The Old Pit Shaft: A Tale of the Yorkshire Coalfields' in G.A.
Henty et al, Hazard and Heroism (London, 1904) pp.53-66. For a typical Henty
book with a specifically military theme, see In Times of Peril (London, 1881).
Interestingly, the copy examined for this thesis came from the library of an
Indian army officer who fought in the Great War.
(2) Anon, 'A Boy's First Fight', in Hazards and Heroism pp.317-42.
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arins.(1)
Kipling's subalterns were characterised by a moral code emphasising stoicism,
self-denial, obedience, loyalty to the Regiment and to their men, and
adventuro'sness. (2) In 'Only a Subaltern', published in 1895, Kipling created
'Bobby Wick', the ideal junior officer, a boy/man whose devotion to his men was
so complete that he died of cholera after nursing a private suffering from the
disease. By giving prominence to private soldiers as characters in his stories,
Kipling added another dimension to the portrait of the perfect officer.
Kipling's Toinmies eloquently admire officers who are liberally endowed with
public school values. At the end of 'Only a Subaltern', the soldier nursed by
Bobby Wick assaults a fellow private who failed to show sufficient sorrow at
Wick's death, uttering the words	 'Hangel! Blooming' Hangel! That's wot 'e
is!'. (3) Kipling's message was clear. Applying the public school ethos to
military leadership was effective. Paternal, courageous, self-sacrificing
officers earned the loyalty and love of their men.
In Puck of Pook's Hill (1906) Kipling's ideals reached their apotheosis.
Parnesius, centurion of the Thirtieth Legion, who despite being abandoned by
Rome and deprived of reinforcements doggedly defended Hadrian's Wall against the
assaults of the barbaric 'Wing Hats', exemplifies devotion to duty and self-
sacrifice.	 The	 Parnesius section of the book depicts 	 junior officers
continuing to do their duty when fk&r superiors have failed to do theirs. By
holding their position when surrounded, by fighting on with no thought of
(1) R. Kipling. 'The Army of a Dream', in 	 Traffics and Discoveries (London,
1904) pp.243-300.
(2) M. Edwardes, 'Oh to meet an Army Man', in J. Gross (ed.) Rudyard Kipling:
the man, his work and his world (London, 1972) p.40.
(3) R. Kipling, 'Only a Subaltern', in Wee Willie Winkie (London, 1920 edn.)
pp.101-20. See also the comments of Pte. Mulvaney in R. Kipling, 'The God from
the Machine', in Soldiers Three (London, 1911 edn.) pp.6,9.
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surrender, they saved the province of Britain from the invaders. (1)
It is notoriously difficult to establish the degree of influence that ideas
have on the conduct and opinions of individuals. In the case of the extent of
the influence of Kipling's views on qualities of officership, the career and
opinions of one man, Charles Carrington, offers a valuable guide. Carrington
was an upper-middle class boy of seventeen when the war broke out in 1914.
After a brief spell in the ranks in England, he was commissioned, and served
for most of the war in 1/5 R. Warwicks. After the war he wrote a number of
books, including his war memoirs and a life of Kipling. In the latter book, and
in letters and conversation with the present author, Carrington evaluated the
influence that Kipling had had on his concept of officership.
Puck of Pook's Hill was published when Carrington was at the impressionable
age of nine years old: Kipling's son, John, the model for Dan in Puck, was
Carrington's exact contemporary. Nine years later John, and thousands of boys
like him, were serving as subalterns on the Western Front. In 1955 Carrington
claimed that nothing else in the Kipling canon was 'more effective in moulding
the thought of a generation' than the Parnesius stories. Certainly, the story
was strangely prophetic. It took but a short leap of the imagination to see the
Wall as the Western Front, and the Wing Hats as the Germans; and Kipling's Roman
officers spoke, thought and acted very much like Edwardian subalterns. The Roman
stories, Carrington believed,'strengthened the nerve of many a young soldier in
the dark days of 1915 and 1941'.(2)
In retrospect, Carrington saw Kipling's fictional subalterns, and the real
(1) R. Kipling, Puck of Pook's Hill (Harmondsworth, 1987 edn.) pp.102-61.
(2) C. Carrington, Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work (Harmondsworth, 1970 edn.)
pp.446-47. See also Carrington to author, 10 Sep. 1983.
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junior officers of	 1914-18, as part of a long English tradition of the boy
officer which included the Black Prince at Crecy, 	 Chaucer's squire, and boy
ensigns such as James Wolfe at Dettingen. (1) Thus Kipling was tapping a long
tradition when he created his exemplary subalterns. Kipling, Carrington argued,
had 'moulded a whole generation of young Englishmen' in the form of Bobby Wick.
They rose up in their thousands in 1914, and sacrificed themselves in the
image that Kipling had created.(2)
John Kipling, killed while serving as a subaltern in the Irish Guards at Loos
in 1915, was among their number.
Writing in 1940, George Orwell,Aøwas at Eton during the Great War, argued that
from their earliest days, the majority of the middle-classes 'are trained for
war...not technically, but morally'.(3) It is difficult to disagree with this
conclusion. The average Edwardian public schoolboy would have had to have been
strong-willed indeed to resist the range of militaristic cultural influences
that have been summarised in this section under the heading of the 'public
school ethos'.
5.4 Officer Training 1914-18
This section and the next will examine the ways in which the public school
ethos, or at least those elements of it relevant to military leadership, were
passed on to officer cadets who had not attended a public school. It is
important to note that such men did not begin officer training totally ignorant
of the	 public school ethos, for in the next chapter it will be argued that it
also affected the thinking of lower-middle and even working-class youths.
(1) Carrington to author, 18 Aug. 1983; conversation with author 24 Feb. 1984.
(2) Carrington, Kipling p.152.
(3) G. Orwell, 'My Country Left or Right', in S. Orwell and I. Angus, (eds.)
The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell I, (Harmondsworth,
1970 edo.) p.589.
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In the autumn of 1914, training for junior officers was usually conducted
within the unit, with subalterns learning the rudiments of drill and the like at
the same time as privates. Some units and formations made their own
arrangements. In 16th (Irish) Division candidates for commissions were
interviewed by the divisional commander. Those successful applicants who lacked
military experience were told to enlist in 7/Leinsters, which had a 'candidates
company'. If they proved themselves fit to become officers, their names were
forwarded for commissioning. 	 In November 1914, this company contained 50
'excellent young fellows'. They attended lectures given to officers and had
certain privileges, but remained in the ranks. (1) 161 cadets graduated from
this company to become officers in 16th Division between November 1914 and
December 1915.(2)
W.P. Nevill of 8/E. Surreys was luckier than many temporary subalterns in that
he was sent on a junior officers' course at Staff College in November 1914.
His description of a typical day's work conveys something of the intensity of
the course. Parade was at 6.55am, which was followed by bayonet fighting and
PT before breakfast. This was followed by musketry instruction, and lectures on
military topography and tactics, and then more drill. Then there was a pause,
followed by another lecture on 'organisation' at 6.00pm. The evening was spent
copying up rough notes. In early 1916 Nevill was sent on a course
	 at Third
Army Infantry School which was 'almost identical to the one I had at the Staff
College, when I started'. ()
An attempt to restore some order to the process of officer training came in
(I) Parsons to War Office, 29 Nov. 1914, Sir L.W. Parsons papers, LHCMA.
(2) T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, (Dublin, 1992) p.43. For the
background to the establishment of the cadet company, see ibid pp. 1i2-46, 59-60.
(3) Letters, 30 Nov. 1914, 14 Feb. 1916 W.P. Nevill papers, WPN/2, WPN 149, lW!!.
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January 1915. From this date NCOs and other ranks who were recommended by their
commanding officers were sent on four week courses organised by OTCs and by
units such as the Artists' Rifles and the Inns of Court. If they passed their
course, they were sent for further training at a Young Officers' Company (YOC)
attached to a reserve brigade, before being sent on to their units. Some men
from civilian life also went to a YOC where they experienced 'fundamental army
discipline'.(I) Later in 1915 YOCs 	 were grouped together in threes, in an
attempt to ensure a uniform standard of instruction.(2)
By Army Council Instruction 357 of 14 February 1916 a series of Officer Cadet
Battalions (OCB) were set up. This system of officer training endured until the
end of the war. The majority of the 107,929 temporary officers who were
commissioned from February 1916 first served in the ranks and then passed the
four month OCB course. In addition, Sandhurst and Woolwich continued to
commission small numbers of Regular officers. It remained possible to take a
commission without having first served in the ranks of an ordinary unit, or at
least in an OTC, for some 'specially qualified young men' fresh from civilian
life were sent to the Inns of Court or Artists' Rifles OTC for two months
training in the ranks, before going on to an OCB for cadet training.(3) Of the
100 cadets of D Company, No. 14 OCB in September 1917, 51 had previously served
with Inns of Court OTC. This disproportionate number is probably explained by
the fact that this OCB was affiliated with the Inns of Court OTC and co-located
in Berkhamstead.(11) The institution of the OCS system virtually ended the
usefulness of the university OTCs, as the majority of their members were
(1) H.E.L. Nellersh, Schoolboy Into War (London, 1978) p.39.
(2) E.A. James, British Regiments, 1914-18 (London, 1978) p.119; Williams,
Raising and Training pp.96-97.
(3) Statistics of the Military Effort p.235; Williams, Raising and Training
p.99.
(4) The Barncroft Magazine (Berkhamstead, 1917) pp.5-8.
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eligible for training at an OCB.(1)
The OCB system was perceived as possessing a number of advantages. One of the
most important was that, as cadets were only commissioned upon successfully
completing the course, unsuitable men could be returned to their units. Under
the old system, it had proved extremely difficult to deprive unsuitable men of
their temporary commissions.(2) On the whole, the OCB system was regarded as a
success. One	 Territorial officer, for instance, commented on the noticable
improvement in the standard of officers after the system was introduced.(3)
Undoubtedly, some men applied to become officers simply to gain a few months
respite from the trenches. A ranker of 8/Queens with 'no great ambition' to be ai
officer was recommended for a commission in October 1918 and decided to accept
it for the sake of a spell in England.(4) In mid-1915, the Artists' OTC was
unpopular because the course, which was only five days long, was held in
France, not England.(5) Against this should be set the evidence of genuine
enthusiasm on the part of many cadets. At No.4 OCB a 'mutiny of patriotism'
occured in the spring of 1916 when a group of cadets wrote to the War Office
requesting that an inefficient dugout officer be removed from the staff.(6) In
November 1916 an instructor was howled down by the hard-bitten 'Expeditionary
Force men' of No.9 OCB when he attempted to deliver a lecture that they
considered insulted their intelligence.(7) One instructor at Inns of Court
OCB noted that cadets could be difficult audiences, inclined to heckle during
(1) Williams, Raising and Training p.99.
(2) Ibid p.98-99.
(3) Henriques, p.79.
(4) Unpublished account, pp.87-87a, A.J. Abrahams papers, P.101, IWM.
(5) Smith, Four Years p.74.
(6) Unpublished account, p.34, N.A. Pease papers, 86/9/1, IWM.
(7) Unpublished account, p.59, R.W.F. Johnston papers, 82/38/1, IWM.
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lectures.(1) In general, officer cadets were very well motivated: a 'very decent
collection', as one instructor described them.(2)
The content of the various officer training courses remained fairly constant
throughout the war. As a journalist commented in 1916, potential officers had an
enormous number of subjects to master.(3) Drill, tactics, interior economy and
military law were the staple fare. These topics were supplemented by lectures on
recent military history: an officer who had served as a brigade-major at Mons
gave a lecture on the battle at the Artists' OTC at Bailleul in March 1915,
which much impressed his audience.(4) Contemporary international affairs were
not neglected. In September 1916, in the middle of the battle of the Somme, time
was found for a Cambridge don to lecture to the Cadets at GHQ Cadet School on
Balkan history and the causes of the war.(5) The most obvious difference between
an OCB course and that of prewar Sandhurst or Woolwich lay in the fact that
officer cadets were not assumed to be leaders. Instead, at wartime OCBs
leadership was regarded as a subject to be taught, along with drill and tactics.
The remainder of this section will examine the ways in which leadership
qualities were inculcated.
One of the primary motives of the course was to teach the officer cadets to
think like an officer. This involved lifting the mental processes 'to a
different plane of vision'.(6) In basic training, rankers were conditioned to
obey orders in an unquestioning fashion. As officers, the same men had to issue
orders and think for themselves. At the OCB	 a rather more genteel version of
basic training took place, the aim being to wean cadets from the ranker's
(1)'Ganpat', 'Fallen Angels', B1ackwood, CC, No.MCCIX, (1916) p.5.
(2) Unpublished account, p.7, R.E. Barnwell papers, 85/7/1, IWM.
(3) The Times 5 Jan. 1916.
(4) (D.H. Bell], A Soldier's Diary of the Great War (London,1929) pp.107-09.
(5) E. Shephard, A Sergeant-Major's War (Ramsbury, 1988 edn.) p.137.
(6) Williams, Raising and Training p.101.
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mentality and to instil them with a version of the public school ethos. The
change in posture from deferential ranker to officer and leader was summarised
by an NCO instructor at an OCB at Keble College, Oxford, in July 1917, when he
told his cadets that 'Soldiering is more than 'arf swank. You've got to learn to
walk out as if the bloody street belonged to you.' (1)
Socialisation into the officer's role was an important part of the process.
Many OCBs were held in Oxford and Cambridge colleges and in provincial
universities such as Queen's, Belfast, and Bristol. One cadet wrote in late
1915 from Pembroke College, Cambridge that officer training involved hard work
but 'I love this life - it is what I have always longed for - and it will be
with feelings of regret that I leave it'. (2) Another described it as a
'priviledge' (sic) to be housed in Trinity.(3) At a time when there were very
few students at Cambridge University, the members of the three OCBs housed in
the colleges provided a semblance of normal undergraduate life, playing sport,
indulging in amateur dramatics, and producing magazines.(4) Billeted in
gracious surroundings very different from their peacetime environment, living a
relatively carefree life far removed from the drudgery of the office or factory,
many lower-class cadets proved particularly responsive to the need to play the
role that was demanded of them.
Part of the process of	 socialisation was to teach the cadets to behave in a
gentlemanly fashion.	 Officer cadets ate in a series of messes, and in one OCB
the custom was for a member of the Directing Staff to sit at the mess table with
(1) Hooper, Letters p.63.
(2) Letter, 19 Dec. 1915, L. Fanmerson papers, PP/MCR/152, IW!1.
(3) Letter, 16 Apr. 1916, W.B. Medlicott papers, 87/56/I, IWM.
(4) H. Strachan, History of The Cambridge University Officers Training Corps
(Tunbridge Wells, 1976) pp.145-46. See Barncroft Magazine for the undergraduate
nature of OCB journals.
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the cadets, looking out for standards of behaviour and etiquette. One of the
lectures given at Inns of Court OTC at Berkhampstead in 1916 was on 'Military
Etiquette'. According to the notes taken by one of the cadets, the lecturer,
Capt. A.L. Bonham Carter, gave such advice as:
a) Keep any 'lady' friends out of sight
b) If you find it necessary to get drunk - go home in a cab and hide
yourself
c) bar unco1ntional dress (socks (fancy) with shoes....etc) (1)
Similarly, the commanding officer of No.5 OCB, based at Trinity College,
Cambridge, lectured the cadets on correct behaviour and on one occasion
publically cQmplained that cadets had 'neglected to flush the WCs after use',
and that a cadet 'had been seen in the college precincts with his arm round a
girl's waist'. 'Neither ', he warned, 'must occur again!' (2) In this particular
OCB such warnings seem to have been taken very much to heart, for a few months
later the diary of 'Samuel Perys, Cadet', a feature of the OCB magazine, noted
that 'it is not seemly for a cadet to take the arm of a wench in the street'.(3)
The purpose of instruction of this kind was not simply to ensure that an
officer did not disgrace himself and his uniform by slurping the soup in the
mess, or by committing some other faux pas. Nor was it entirely a snobbish
reaction to the perceived social shortcomings of so-called 'temporary
gentlemen'. Rather, it was part of the army's pragmatic response to the shortage
of officers from the traditional officer-providing classes. It was an attempt to
manufacture passable imitations of gentlemanly officers by providing, via the
medium of an intensive course, the kind of social training young men received
in upper-class homes, at public schools and universities. The entire process was
rooted in the belief that the only effective officers were those who possessed
(1) Notes of lecture of 3 Feb. 1916, C.R. Tobbit papers, 83/43/1, IWN.
(2) Letter, 29 Apr. 1916, W.B. !ledlicott papers, IWM.
(3) Blunderbus, being the book of the 5th OCB, Trinity College, 2 (Nov. 1916)
p.2.
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certain qualities - in this thesis described as 'public school values'. By 1916,
the well of genuine public school products had largely run dry. In 1909,
during the debate on the shortage of officers, Sir Ian Hamilton had looked to
the ranks of sports-playing, charismatic junior NCOs to supply additional
officers for the army in wartime. (1) (See also chapter 2). Likewise, during
the war the army took rankers who already demonstrated a measure of leadership
potential and tried to turn them into officers by exposing them to the public
school ethos in a concentrated form. Teaching potential officers how to behave
at the dinner table was not directly relevant to making them leaders of men in
the same way as, for instance, instruction in tactics, but nonetheless it was
considered vital, for it was an article of faith that soldiers would only
follow gentlemanly officers.
The prewar habit of treating potential officers in a similar fashion to
recruits to the ranks was not entirely dispensed with. At the RHA barracks at
St. John's Wood, London, the basic training for candidates fresh from civilian
life (who included students, barristers, and dons among their ranks) emphasised
the more unpleasant side of soldiering. There was plenty of cleaning and
polishing, mucking out of stables with bare hands, 'physical jerks', drill,
riding, some basic instruction in gunnery, and much shouting by NCOs. As with
prewar Woolwich, no concessions were made to the social class of the recruits,
or the fact that they were shortly to hold the King's connnission.(2) One man who
passed through St. John's Wood and then went on to Royal Artillery Cadet
School at Exeter described the change as 'just like being transferred from a
lunatic-asylum to a well-run public school'. The choice of words is significant.
(1) See Hamilton's comments in WO 163/15, PRO.
(2) Thorburn, Amateur Gunners pp.7-il; C.N. Bowra, Memories 1898-1939 (London,
1966) pp.71-74.
-145-
At Exeter,	 unlike St John's Wood, cadets were not treated as 'half-witted
shirkers'. (1) Other men who passed through basic training establishments noted
that they were treated very differently once they graduated to an OCB. While
discipline was, iritially at least, strict,(2) and all cadets, whether sergeant
major or private, were reduced to the same level by the removal of rank badges,
they were treated as gentlemen and potential officers. In sharp contrast to the
RE signal service training centre, where he had previously trained, one cadet
found that at the OCB at Berkhamstead he was encouraged to think of himself as
an officer, and was 'treated as such'.(3) Harsh treatment during basic training
ensured that many non-ranker officers commissioned after January 1916 had, like
their Sandhurst-trained predecessors,
	 an insight	 into	 the life of the
ordinary soldier, however brief, that no doubt served to emphasise just how
privileged officers were in comparison to the rank and file.
As noted above, unlike their prewar counterparts at Sandhurst or Woolwich,
wartime cadets rece.i/t4 instruction in leadership techniques. This is not to
suggest that it was believed that anyone could be trained to be a leader. Like
the modern British army, the army of 1915-18 had a functional approach to
training leaders, believing that the job of the OCB was to 'bring out' inherent
leadership abilities which had been previously detected in an individual. Not
surprisingly, given the prevailing ethos, team games were seen as an essential
tool for training leaders. Accounts of training at officer cadet units are
littered with references to sport.(4) In 1917, No.4 OCB devoted two afternoons a
week to sport. Naturally, extra-curricular sport was encouraged. The cadets of
No.4 OCB, which was
	 located at Hertford College, Oxford,
	 obviously took
(1) Thorburn, pp.11,14.
(2) Unpublished account, p.34, N.A. Pease papers, 86/9/1, IWN.
(3) J.B. Scrivenor, Brigade Signals (Oxford, 1937) pp.18, 22-23. See also
extract from privately printed memoir, pp.69-70, J.C. NacDermott papers, LHCMA.
(4) Letter, 4 Nov. 1916, T. Sherwood papers, IWM; Haigh and Turner, p.81.
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full advantage of their hosts' sporting facilities by establishing a rowing
club. (1)
One instructor recalled that the conduct of cadets on the football and rugby
fields was regarded as a useful guide to their qualities as leaders: 'Those who
played rough but not dirty, and had quick reactions, were the sort needed' and
much of the staff's leisure time was taken up with playing sport with the
cadets.(2) Cadets seemed to have recognised the importance of sport in their
training. One, who trained with No.10 OCB, noted that his fellow cadets
generally believed that good sportsmen were sure to pass their final
examination. (3) Since team games encourage team-work and co-operation, while
leaving room for individual acts of initiative and leadership, it can be argued
that this emphasis on
	 sport was not misplaced.
Cadets also had the opportunity to learn to be leaders on training exercises.
By 1916, relatively sophisticated schemes were in use. The published diary of
CSM Ernest Shepherd, (1/Dorsets) who trained at GHQ Cadet School, Blendecques,
gives an interesting insight into the nature of tactical training. On 14
November 1916 Shepherd was appointed commander of a company serving as an
advance guard. Shepherd had to make
	 an appreciation of the ground, manouevre
his command, and generally demonstrate his ability as a military leader. On the
following day, his scheme and leadership was critically discussed by his peers
at a plenary session. Shepherd began by stating his 'movements, intentions and
results'. Then Shepherd's 'special critic', 'second in command and critic, each
platoon commander and critic and the enemy commander and his critics' had their
say. Finally, an officer instructor 'summed up, and said...the attack was a good
success'.(4) Under the critical gaze of his peers, a cadet's limitations as
(1) F. Hawkings, (A. Taylor, ed.) From Ypres to Cambrai (Morley, 1974) p.111.
(2) R. Graves, Goodbye to All That (Harmondsworth, 1960 edn.) p.203.
(3) J. Greenshields, KRS Q.
(4) Shepherd, p.140.
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a commander and a leader of men would be cruelly exposed. However, some regarded
the command of cadets as a poor substitute for the command of 'real' soldiers.
The average cadet at a YOC or an OCB had few opportunities to exercise his
leadership on the genuine article, and the problem 'became increasingly
difficult during the later periods of the war'.(I) On active service, rankers
might be rather less amenable than fellow cadets.
Practical training in leadership was supplemented by lectures on paternalism.
It was obviously impossible for cadets at a YOC or OCB to gain experience of the
correct way for an officer to behave towards his men, and so practice gave way
to theory. A standard lecture given to drafts of the Artists' Rifles before
their dispatch to camp informed them that on eventually reaching their regiment
your first job is to get to know your men, look after them, study their
interests and show you are one of them, taking a share in their pleasures and
interests as well as their work. If you do this you will find that when the
time comes they will follow you to hell...(2)
Such advice appears to have been fairly standard. During the course of a
lecture on 'Duties of a Platoon Conmimander', cadets at Inns of Court OTC were
advised to take an interest in their men's affairs and to be their friend as
well as their officer.(3) At an OCB in 1917 cadets were exhorted to 'Consider
[the] man's point of view' and informed that 'An officer succeeds only as far as
he lives up to his men's expectations of him'.(4) Lectures on discipline were
also common.(5)
It can be seen that the British army responded in a pragmatic and eminently
practical way to the shortage of public school educated officers. The officer
(1) Henriques, p.79. See also 'Ganpat', 'Fallen Angels', Blackwood's CC,
No.MCCX, (1916) pp.172-3.
(2) Blomfield, pp.152-53.
(3) Notes of lecture, 3 Feb. 1916, C.R. Tobbit papers, 83/43/1, IWN.
(4) Officer training notebook, notes of lecture by Major Shaw, item 1123, Misc
74, IWN.
(5) Notes of lecture, 5. Jan. 1916, C.R. Tobbit papers, 83/43/1, IWM.
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training system institutionalised the ethos of the prewar officer class and
ensured that it was passed on to cadets who in many cases did not have a public
school background. The OCB was a mixture of military training establishment and
public school or Oxbridge college. In addition to training in military skills,
cadets were taught how to behave in a gentlemanly fashion, how to think like
leaders rather than followers, and, perhaps most importantly of all, to behave
in a paternalistic fashion towards their men. The teaching of leadership was a
new departure for the British army. A typical question which appeared on a final
examination paper in December 1916 asked the candidate to imagine that his unit
has been relieved from the trenches and that his men arrive, cold and wet, at
their billets at midnight. The question asked 'Before going to your own quarters
what will be your duties as platoon commander, with regard to your own
platoon?'(l) A question of this nature would have had no place on an examination
paper at prewar Sandhurst, but in a wartime context, such a question was
designed to teach the paternalism and noblesse oblige which was the hallmark
of the Regular officer.
The wartime system of officer training was widely regarded as a success. An
officer who passed out from No. 17 OCB at Kinmel Park in 1917 described the
training, which was intended to give cadets 'a full regard of responsibilities
and all that it (sic) meant' as 'excellent'.(2) Another cadet, who had
previously seen active service in the ranks, approved of the advice he received
on how to look after his men as 'extremely practical'.(3)
The success of the OCB system was due in great part to the enthusiasm of the
(1) Examination paper 1, Military Law, Military Organisation and Interior
Economy, Dec. 1916, 'Officers: Officer Cadets' file, LULLC.
(2) Unpublished notes, pp.8-9, B.D. Parkin papers, 86/57/1, IWM.
(3) Lathain, p.40.
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cadets themselves. Many ex-rankers 	 would, of course, have had personal
experience of the importance of
	
paternal officers to the
	 well-being of
soldiers in the trenches. The wish to avoid being sent back to their units, or
in the case of men fresh from civilian life, being drafted as a private, was an
obvious incentive to do well, for by no means everyone passed the course.
However, many seemed to have internalised the demands of the course, that is
adopted them as part of their personal outlook, achieving a high level of
commit ,ment to the concept of off icership that they were taught at OCBs.(l) The
writer C.S. Lewis commented not unsympathetically on his fellow cadets at Keble
College, Oxford, in June 1917 that they were 'mostly jolly good chaps' but
'their own naive conceptions of how gentlemen behave among themselves lead them
into an impossible politeness that is really very pathetic'.(2) These lower-
class cadets were attempting to adopt the mannerisms of the Regular officer
when off duty, not merely in front of their instructors. One cadet put the
matter in a nutshell: 'We were all pretty keen and did our best and, provided
that you were not lazy and kept alert, you could get by'.(3) Robert Graves, who
served as an instructor and adopted many of the attitudes of a Regular officer
went as far as to claim that the OCB system 'saved the army in France from
becoming a mere rabble'.(4) Graves was essentialily correct. Later in this
thesis it will be argued that the products of OCBs had an important role in
maintaining the morale of their men during the latter years of the war,
displaying as strong a committment to the Regular officers' paternalistic
concept of leadership as had the public school temporary subalterns of 1914-16.
(1) For internalisation, see Handy, pp.138, 140-42.
(2) Hooper, Letters p.63.
(3) Unpublished account, p.34, N.A. Pease papers, 86/9/I, IWM.
(4) Graves, p.203. See also G.N. Wood, KRS Q.
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This chapter has demonstrated the pains that were taken to mould the temporary
officer of 1914-18 into a model of paternalism. (See also Appendix 3, Guides to
Officership) The aim was to produce an officer who made use of personal and
expert power to influence his men, who identified with his men and placed their
well-being above his own. Such an officer is far removed from the popular image
of the British officer of the Great War, as portrayed in popular television
programmes such as Blackadder Goes Forth. Subsequent chapters will examine the
practical application of paternalism.
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Chapter 6
Officer-Man Relations: the Disciplinary and Social Context
The officer's role in enforcing and modifiying discipline was a vital aspect
of the officer-man	 relationship. Therefore, in this chapter officer-man
relations will be placed into the context of the disciplinary regime of the
wartime British army. The other ranks' experience of, and attitudes to, army
life and the officer class will then be related to the working-class experience
of civilian society. Finally, some evidence of the modification of the normal
pattern of military discipline that occurrid during the training of some newly-
raised units in 1914-15 will be examined.
6.1 Hierarchy, Discipline and Punishment in the British Army, 1914-18
In general, the hierarchical structure of the wartime army strongly resembled
that of the prewar Regular army. A temporary officer believed that 'Between
officers and men there was a great gulf fixed'. (1) Pte. J.N. Hall, an American
who enlisted in the Royal Fusiliers in 1914, had to come to terms with 'the
class distinctions of British army life':
The officer class and the ranker class are east and vest, and never the twain
shall meet, except in their respective places upon the parade-ground.(2)
It is somewhat misleading to refer to the wartime army as being class based.
Men were allod places in a rigid hierarchy by virtue of their rank, not their
social class. On receiving the King's commission, individuals were entitled to
all the privileges of an officer: superior food and accomodation, deference from
the ranks, even absolution from having their hair closely cropped,(3) regardless
(I) F. Moor, KRS Q.
(2) J.N. Hall, Kitchener's Mob (London, 1916) p.14. See also M.A. Mtigge, The War
Diary of a Square Peg (London, 1920) pp.24, 35.
(3) N.D. Cliff, To Hell and Back with the Guards (Braunton, Devon, 1988) p.36.
-151-
of their social background. Likewise, possession of a public school education
gave the private, for the most part, no privileges (but see below).
Inevitably the ranker's perspective on army life differed appreciably from
that of the officer. Pte. H.S. Williamson (8/KRRC)
	 wrote in 1918 that
'Probably no one, except those who have been in the Army can fully appreciate
the huge difference between the rankers and the officers (sic) point of view';
earlier, he had written that 'Even in the trenches, everything is done to smooth
things for officers'. As a middle-class artist, whose brother served as an
officer, Williamson was well placed to appreciate the variety of experience. (1)
However, the most basic difference between the experience of the officer and
that of the soldier lay not in the disparity in leave, food or living conditions
but in their treatment by the army itself.
With the brief exception of basic training, officers never experienced the
way in which other ranks were treated by the army, unless they had themselves
previously served in the ranks. Out of the trenches, rankers' lives were often
characterised by boredom and monotony, and by the feeling of being mere pawnç,
unable t influence their fate, moved hither and thither at the whim of faceless
military bureaucrats. Such feelings were, of course not unique to the British
army of 1914-18. (2) Ordinary soldiers tended to see the army as an impersonal,
arbitrary coersive system. Typical complaints concerned moving on of men who had
just established themselves in comfortable billets, because of a sudden change
of plan ('How like the Army!' commented a victim of one such move) and the
army's habit of withdrawing blankets in Nay and issuing them in October,
regardless of the actual temperature.(3) An NCO of 22/Manchesters
(1) Letters, 11 Feb. 1918, 24 Sept. 1916, H.S. Williamson papers, PP/MCR/333,
IWM. The experience of battle was, however, common to regimental officers and
other ranks.
(2) S. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier (Princeton, 1949) I, p.365, II,
p.77.
(3) Smith, Four Years pp.120, 132.
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attended a specialised course in range-finding. After rejoining his unit, he
never used a range-finder again.(1)
The military authorities also had it within their power to impose petty
humiliations and restrictions on non-commissioned ranks ranging from the
withdrawal of any shred of personal privacy by ordering what the men called a
'prick-inspection', to restricting certain shops and estaminets for the use of
officers only, via	 depriving NCOs of acting rank by the summary award of a
commanding officer. (2) On one occasion, a sergeant was publicly 	 humiliated
by having his stripes ripped off in front of the rest of his unit.(3) Soldiers
used various imagery to describe their situation. T.P. Marks, a schoolmaster who
served in the ranks of 1/Gloucesters in the latter part of the war, wrote that
the soldier was no longer an 'entity, but a cog waiting to be set in inotion'.(4)
Another private reported that it was a common saying among other ranks that from
the moment the soldier disembarked at Havre he was 'a slave'.(5)
As Christopher Duffy has commented, 'It is notoriously difficult to evaluate
the severity of the discipline of a military institution. If our attention is
drawn by punishments of a spectacular and barbaric nature, we can easily
overlook the small currency of blows and torments which have been meted out
in every army known to history'.(6) In comparison with the discipline of the
army before the abolition of flogging in 1881, the disciplinary code of the army
of the Great War pales into insignificance. Likewise, the flogging of Indian
(1) Letter, 11 Aug. 1941, R.H. Tawney papers, BLPES.
(2) F. Manning, The Middle Parts of Fortune (London, 1977 edn.) pp.59, 142; GRO
1388, in SS 309, Extracts from General Routine Orders...1 Jan 1918 p.67.
(3) Letter, 27 Sept. 1917, L.B. Stanley papers, LULLC.
(4) T.P. Marks, The Laughter Goes from Life (London, 1977) p.33. See also C.E.
Montague, Disenchantment (London, 1928 edn.) p.84.
(5) Graham, Challenge of the Dead p.121.
(6) C. Duffy, Russia's Military Way to the West (London, 1981) p.132.
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soldiers	 during	 the 1914-18 war highlights the relative mildness of the
treatment of their British counterparts.(l)
Nevertheless, British army discipline of the Great War was severe enough. One
crude and not entirely satisfactory method of assessing the severity of
discipline is to count the number of executions carried out. 346 BritishL
soldiers were executed, all but 37 for 'military' offences such as desertion,
although this only represents 11.23 per cent off all death sentences passed. By
comparison, only 37 men were executed in the British army between 1865 and 1898,
and only one out of the four men executed during the Second Boer War suffered
the penalty for desertion.(2) The German army of the Great War, which was
considerably larger than its British counterpart, executed only 48 men, British
sneers at 'Prussianism' notwithstanding.(3) Indeed, German officers noted the
'iron discipline, maintained by a severe code of punishments' which was in the
'very blood' of the British prisoners they examined. They also commented on
resiliQnce of British morale, and the respect rankers had for their officers.(4)
Interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest that British military
authorities were dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the punishments
available during the Boer War.(5) In 1904, a committee even called for the
reintroduction of corporal punishment on active service,	 although	 this
(1) 8 Oct., 13 Nov. 1914, and Appx. 74, 27 Mar. 1915, WD, Indian Corps, A & Q,
WO 95/1091, PRO. For a flogging in France, see letter, 6 Oct. 1914, and diary,
4 Oct. 1914, G.F. Patterson papers, RNASA; for floggings in Aden, see 11 and 12
Nov. 1915, WD of APN Aden, WO 154/315, PRO.
(2) A. Babington, For the Sake of Example (London, 1983) p.3, 189; E.M. Spiers,
The Late Victorian Army (Manchester, 1992)
(3) N. Messerschmidt, 'German Military Law in the Second World War', in W.
Deist, (ed) The German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington Spa, 1985)
p.324.
(4) w. Nicolai, The German Secret Service (London, 1924) p.188; A.J. Fyfe,
Understanding the First World War - Illusions and Realities (New York, 1988)
p.179.
(5) Maj. W.F. Kelly, 'Report on Adjutant-General's Department...' (Pretoria,
1900), pp.1-2, WO 108/260, PRO.
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recommendation was not acted upon.(1) Although a firm judgement must await a
comparative study on military punishment in the two 	 wars, the impression
remains that the soldier of 1914-18 was subjected to a harsher military regime
than his predecessor of 1899-1902.(2)
During the Great War Field Punishment No.1 was popularly known as
'crucifixion', from the practice of tying men to objects such as posts and
wagon wheels for set periods. The milder Field Punishment No.2, noted a private
of 13/E. Yorks., consisted of
full pack drill; not ordinary pack drill but with a police-sergeant standing
by, shouting "Right turn, left turn, about turn".., one after the other, all
done at something near the "double" .(3)
Despite improvements in conditions in the late nineteenth century, military
prisons and field punishment centres were also characterised by 	 brutal
punishment regimes.(4) One man who served a sentence at Gosport military prison
in 1916 recalled the monotonous and pointless cleaning tasks they were set and
the blows dealt out casually by the warders. (5)
Men who were punished by death, penal servitude or Field Punishment No.1
constituted only a small minority of British other ranks. Yet these punishments
had an impact on British soldiers out of all proportion to the number of men
directly affected. Severe punishments acted as a salutary reminder of the power
that the army had over their lives, and that the military authorities on
(1) '...Report of committee on punishments on Active Service', 5 Jan. 1904,
p.11, WO 32/4512, PRO.
(2) For the discipline of the army in South Africa, see Maj. R.M. Poore, 'Report
on Office of Provost Marshal' (Pretoria, 15 July 1900), WO 108/259, PRO; Nasson,
pp.123-138; G.D. Sheffield, The Red Caps: The History of the Royal Military
Police (forthcoming).
(3) Diary, 4 July 1916, A. Surfleet papers, IWM. See also unpublished account,
p.26, E. Scullin papers, IWM.
(4) 'Report of committee on proposed alterations in Military Penal System', WO
32/8734; Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp.74-75; R. Boyes, In Glass Houses
(Colchester, 1988) pp.54-68.
(5) Unpublished account, p.33, P. Creek papers, 87/31/1, lW?!.
-155-
occasions regarded the enforcement and maintenance of military discipline as
more important than justice. At one level, this could take the form of the
imposition of collective (or 'vicarious') punishments. One example occured in
1915, when the men of 2/RWK were refused permission to drink from their water
bottles on a march through the Mesopotamian desert 	 until a thief gave himself
up.(l) The use of vicarious punishments was denounced by Maj.Gen. Childs, the
Director of Personnel Services, as 	 'hopelessly illogical', and in 1919 they
were officially discouraged by the Army Council. Other senior commanders,
including Haig, were in favour of them. (2)
One of the factors taken into account by senior commanders when deciding
whether or not to confirm a death sentence was the state of discipline within
the prisoner's unit and whether 'an example was necessary'.(3) It is now
generally recognised that at least some men were executed without having had a
trial which would have been regarded as fair by the standards of the Edwardian
civilian judicial system, and some men were actually suffering from
psychological wounds which would have merited treatment, not punishment, in the
war of 1939-45. (4) All of this served to remind ordinary soldiers that they
were very much at the mercy of their hierarchial superiors. An RFA driver, who
received a relatively mild punishment from an officer who 'was the prosecutor,
judge, jury and jailer' noted that	 this	 'seemed to me to be a curious
combination of power in one man' (although as noted in the next chapter, by
awarding punishment at regimental level, a company commander could protect a
man from the harsher punishments inflicted by courts martial). (5)
(1) A.G. Xingsmill, The Silver Badge (lifracombe, 1966) p.30.
(2) See the various minutes and correspondence in a War Office file of June
1919, 'Discipline - Vicarious punishment of troops', WO 32/9543, PRO.
(3) W. Childs, Episodes and Reflections (London, 1930) p.142.
(4) See Babington, For the Sake of Example passim; J. Putkowski and J. Sykes,
Shot at Dawn (Barnsley, 1989) passim.
(5) Unpublished account, p.14, R.L. Venables papers, IWM.
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Although one officer claimed that many soldiers preferred field punishment
to a route march,(l) the reaction of most other ranks seems to have been horror
and disgust. One ranker who witnessed 'crucifixion' wrote that it 'breaks a
man's spirit'(2); another described it as 'disgusting and humiliating',
especially with French civilians looking on; (3) yet another wrote that it made
him 'sick with resentment. Of all the Army forms of punishment, and others are
pretty rotten, I do not know of any more likely to embitter a man for ever'.(4)
A private of a Pals battalion saw an artilleryman being punished:
He was stretched out, cruciform-fashion, his arms and legs wide apart, secured
to the wheel. His head lolled forward as he shook it to drive away the flies.
I don't think I have ever seen anything which so disgusted me in my life and I
know the feelings amongst our boys was (sic) very close to mutiny at such
inhuman treatment...I'd like to see the devils who devised it having an hour
or two lashed up like that.(5)
Rankers' attitudes towards the death penalty for cowardice and desertion were
rather more ambiguous, for as the padre of 12/TILl pointed out, there was a
certain logic in making men who had failed in their duty as soldiers pay the
ultimate penalty, given the death of many of their comrades who had not
failed.(6) Many were opposed. A prewar Regular, Cpl. A. Roberts, recorded in his
diary that a sense of depression descended on 1/KRRC after a man had been
executed. (7) Two other Regular rankers, Cpl. J. Lucy (2/R. I. Rif.) and Pte.
(1) Dunn, p.119. See also J. Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns (London, 1979)
pp.166-7.
(2) Diary, 12 Jan. 1917, A Young papers, 76/101/1, IWN.
(3) Unpublished account, A.W. Fenn papers, 75/16/1, IWM.
(4) Unpublished account, p.74, G. Buckeridge papers, IWN.
(5) Diary, 4 July 1916, A. Surfleet, papers, pp.78-9. For an interesting
discussion of 'crucifixion' by an old soldier, see R. Blatchford's articles in
Sunday Chronicle 29 Oct., 5, 12, 19, 26 Nov. 1916.
(6) R.H.S. Steuart, March, Kind Comrade (London, 1931) pp.94-S. For a ranker's
ambiguous reaction to a death sentence, see H.E. Harvey, Battle-Line Narratives
(London, 1928) pp.129-158. This is a fictionalised account of the events leading
to the execution of Pte. C.W.F. Skilton, discussed in chapter 2 above.
(7) Diary, 16 July 1915, A.H. Roberts papers, 81/23/1, 1W!'!.
-157-
F.M. Packham (2/R. Sussex) believed that executions did not act as a deterrent
but instead depressed morale.(1) The practice of reading out sentences of death
from routine orders to troops on parade shocked many soldiers and prompted some
educated, middle-class volunteers to criticise the death penalty's value as a
deterrent for cowardice. Others resented it as casting an unnecessary slur on
their motives for becoming soldiers, as another example of military mind failing
to adjust to the fact that many units contained a very different type of man
from the prewar Regular.(2)
Discipline can not, of course, be measured purely by punishments. Regular
officers' views on the purpose of discipline were often sharply at variance
with the opinions of many rankers on the same subject. A.A. Hanbury-Sparrow CR.
Berks.), a Regular officer, argued that discipline was not 'meaningless, wooden
obedience' but
the vehicle by which the superior will permeated the subconsciousness of the
troops...close-order drill and rifle exercises were ceremonies by which the
superior will made its presence felt.
The individual ego, which 'subconsciously was continually in revolt' against
discipline, had to be suppressed. Thus the cleaning of brass buttons was
important because it was 'a daily disciplinary exercise'. Discipline was
intended to promote unit cohesion and military efficiency by producing obedient
men who took a pride in developing soldierly skills, and who did not give way
to fear in battle.(3)
By contrast, a middle-class Scots Guards private, Stephen Graham, accepted
the importance of discipline in battle but argued that for many, the greatest
(1) Lucy, p.204; unpublished account, p.10, F.M. Packham papers, IWM.
(2) G. Coppard, With a Machine Gun to Cambrai (London, 1986 edn.) p.20; A.
Rule, Students Under Arms (Aberdeen, 1934) p.52; letter, 15 Oct. 1963, R.
Savage, BBC/IWM; R. Whipp, interview.
(3) A.A. Hanbury-Sparrow, The Land-Locked Lake (London, 1932) pp.2'7-18.
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ordeal was not the battlefield but the training ground. (1) Anthony French, who
served in the ranks of 15/Londons, believed 	 that upon the 'calm self-
confidence' produced by discipline rested 'one's chance of survival'. However,
he resented the 'arbitrary restrictions on the individual [which went] beyond
the requirements of safety and good discipline'.(2) Graham and French, among
other soldiers, recognised that discipline was essential in battle, but did
not agree with the army's methods of producing discipline, seeing it as designed
to crush the temperament, destroy individuality, humiliate the soldier, and
produce a sort of military robot.
The process of instilling discipline began in basic training. On reaching the
depot, Graham was told that 'They try to break you at the begining and take all
your pride out of you'.(3) Guards discipline might be thought to be
exceptionally severe, but was probably not much worse than the discipline of
many other training units in 1916-18. (4) At the beginning of the war discipline
was less strict in many newly-raised units, and in some cases remained so for
some time, but the honeymoon period experienced by some volunteers in 1914 was
mostly short-lived. As one former ranker wrote,
With so much improvisation, a few months passed before those who had enlisted
in newly created battalions discovered exactly what they had let themselves in
for. They had engaged to serve.., in a complex organisation incidently
designed to enforce the will of each and every superior on those in the lowest
rank of all...In order to carry out what they had conceived, for the most part
romantically and generously as a patriotic duty, the young civilians were
compelled to undergo a preliminary process...[involving] an almost total
surrender of personal liberty and an immediate, unconditional obedience to
orders. (5)
(1) S. Graham, A Private in the Guards (London, 1919) pp.1-2, 20.
(2) A. French, Gone For a Soldier (Kineton, 1972) p.23. See also unpublished
account, pp.33, 44, E. Partridge papers, LULLC.
(3) Graham, Private in the Guards p.27. See also Cliff, passim.
(4) Unpublished account, pp.22-23, W.H. Martin papers, PP/MCR/30, IWM; letter,
10 Oct. 1963, J.W. Binns, BBC/IWM.
(5) Brophy and Partridge, p.13.
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Similar methods of training continued at base camps in France, of which the
'Bullring' at Etaples was the most notorious.
It has been argued that many wartime other ranks believed that there was a
deliberate policy to 'crush the individual temperament as a means of securing
compliance with military discipline' (1) and indeed
	 F.P. Crozier, a 'fire-
eating' officer, candidly admitted what many other ranks suspected: that
training was intended to break down the natural humanity of the recruit and turn
him into a ruthless killer.(2) While there was undoubtedly something in
Crozier's views, the army's disciplinary regime is best seen as the result of
preconceptions and traditions, and the inability, or unwillingness, of Regular
officers and NCOs to adjust to the influx of a more educated type of man into
the army, rather than the product of a deliberate policy.
Nonetheless, ordinary soldiers were quite prepared to believe in a conspiracy
theory. One conscripted infantryman believed that the purpose of training was
to make the life of the soldier so miserable that he ceased to worry whether he
lived or died: 'A happy soldier does not want to die and this looked like the
start of our conditioning'. (3) One important result of this was that when
soldiers finally arrived at their units, they were likely to be relieved that
discipline was less severe than in training units, and more inclined to look
favourably upon the officers and NCOs who were responsible for the disciplinary
regime.
However, frontline soldiers were not entirely freed from irksome aspects of
discipline. High command and Regular officers in general laid great emphasis on
the external aspects of discipline. A particular criterion for the state of
(1) Babington, Sake of Example p.131.
(2) F.P. Crozier, A Brasshat in No Mans Land (London, 1930) p.43.
(3) C. Haworth, March to Armistice 1918 (London,1968) p.25.
-160-
discipline in a unit was saluting. The very first routine order issued by the
Inspector-General of Communications on arrival in France in August 1914
concerned the necessity for 'strict attention' to be paid to the saluting of
allied officers. (1) A routine order later that year stressed that there was to
be no relaxation in saluting in the field, 'except when active operations cise.
actually	 in progress'.(2) Reminders about the importance of saluting were
issued at various levels of command throughout the war, for as a III Corps
routine order stated, a failure of men to salute officers indicated 'a want of
discipline [which] reflects seriously on the unit...' (3) Other official
crittria for discipline included smartness of appearance, cleanliness of
billets and trenches, march discipline, smartness in drill. While many, if not
most, officers and men accepted the necessity of such things, some thought that
excessive insistence on them was unnecessary and even counterproductive.(4)
For most of the war, in a majority of units, middle-class men were subjected
to the same training and disciplinary regime as the prewar soldier, and middle-
class soldiers tended to resent 'bullshit' more than working-class ones.
Initiative was effectively discouraged; any spark of independence was ground
down. As a soldier remarked, a private 'could rarely walk twenty yards' without
coming across someone with the power to '"tick him off"'.(5) As noted above,
military service involves a loss of personal freedom, and in general, better-
educated men feel status deprivation more strongly than ill-educated men. Just
(1) Extracts from ROs 13 Aug. to 5 Sept. 1914, WD of IGC, WO 95/3972, PRO.
(2) ARO, 22 Dec. 1914, WD of Adj.Gen., GHQ, WO 95/25, PRO.
(3) RO 29 Jan. 1916, WD of III Corps, A & Q, WO 95/684, PRO. See also S.S. 309,
Extracts from General Routine Orders p.71.
(4) R. Feuding, War Letters to a Wife (London, 1929) pp.224-25; letter, 7 Oct.
1963, F. Blain, BBC/IWM.
(5) S. Southwold, 'Rumours at the Front', in C. O'Riordan et al, A Martial
Medley (London, 1931) p.106.
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as little advantage was taken of talents of temporary officers, the talents of
educated other ranks were largely wasted. This is not of merely academic
interest, for it is arguable that the best use was not made of the available
material. No general attempt was made to develop Auftragstaktik (directive
control) a command philosophy which involved the delegation of authority and
the cultivation of initiative among the lower ranks.(l) Instead, as Frederic
Manning, a novelist who served in the ranks of 7/KSLI, wrote,
Regular officers as a rule did not understand the new armies, they had the
model of the old professional army always in their mind's eye... The
majority...with brilliant exceptions, did not understand the kind of
discipline that they wished to apply to these improvised armies was only
a brake on their impetus. (2)
This failure to develop initiative was also related to the whole question of
officer-man relations, and is further examined below.
6.2 The Social Context of Discipline and Authority
In view of the harsh nature of military discipline, from which officers were
largely exempt, why did relationships between regimental officers and their men
remain, for the most part, cordial? Some clues can be gleaned from an
examination of the society from which the wartime army was recruited. British
forces of the Great War did not represent 'a cross-section of British society'.
Rather, a variety of social, medical, economic and political factors led to.
non-manual workers and professionals being over-represented in the army. From
1914 to 1916 the enlistment rate for manual workers was approximately 30 per
(1) For Auftragstaktik, see N. van Creveld, Fighting Power (London, 1983)




cent, but 40 per cent for non-manual workers. Nonetheless, since 'numerically,
the British army was preponderantly working-class in character' (I) it is
necessary to place the attitudes of working-class soldiers to
	 military
discipline and authority into the context of their experience as civilians.
Contemporary observers sometimes suggested that working-class soldiers of the
1914-18 var had natural discipline: 'However much they girded with coarse and
biting irony at discipline, they were really very well disciplined'. (2) A
number of factors, including strict parental discipline, prepared the working-
class male for the realities of military life. (3) The school and the work
place were perhaps of even greater importance than the home in this respect.
Some wartime officers were horrified at the inadequacies of the elementary
school system as revealed by their contact with products of that system.(4)
Their comments echoed the emotive opinions of contemporary critics (5) and a
modern historian: 'British elementary education served only to turn...sickly and
filthy children into robots able to read and write and count and obey'.(6)
Nevertheless, in some ways the system was a resounding success. In 1908 it was
claimed that it produced 'the habits of obedience and regularity' (7) and
some who experienced such schools came to appreciate the virtues of stern
discipline.(8) Corporal punishment was ubiquitous. (9) According to a former
(1) P.E. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the
First World War', HI, 27, No.1 (1984) pp.199-223; Winter, Great War pp.25-64.
(2) C. Denison [pseud]
	
'From Two Angles' in A Martial Medley
p.82. See also Aldington, p.243.
(3) R. Roberts, The Classic Slum (Harmondsworth, 1973 edn) pp.50-1; S. Meacham,
A Life Apart (London, 1977) pp.161-2.
(4) eg EDS Cairnes] The Army and Religion (London, 1919) pp.101-3, 105.
(5) Quoted in J.H. Whitehouse, Education In My Time (London, 1935) p.170.
(6) C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (Gloucester, 1984 edn) p.104.
(7) W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (London, 1930 edn.)
p.126.
(8) Unpublished account, H. Warner papers, P.462, IWM.
(9) P. Thompson, The Edwardians (London, 1977 edn.) p.73: Meacham, p. 171.
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HM Inspector of Schools, writing in 1911, the school child, like the
army recruit, had his spirit broken by 'severity and constraint'; this reduced
the child 'to a state of mental and moral serfdom'; once this was achieved, 'the
time has come for the system of education through mechanical obedience to be
applied to him in all its rigours'. (I)
The use of military style drill in elementary schools was widespread. One of
its	 primary purposes was to create discipline in school children. Many
supervising instructors in schools were drawn from the army. In 1903 the
Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration recommended that physical
training should be made compulsory for school leavers of 14 years and
older to prepare the male population for future military service 'with very
little supplementary discipline'. (2) Although there were some modifications
from 1904 onwards, physical education remained influenced by military recruit
training down to 1914.
The inculcation of social 	 discipline and orderliness was carried a step
further by uniformed youth organisations such as the Boy's Brigade, Church Lads
Brigade, and the Boy Scouts. As J.0. Springhall has argued, such bodies were
developed for the purposes of social control; 'Fear and self-interest' were
high among the motives of the middle-class originators of such uniformed
organisations.(3) Some organisations were overtly militaristic, such as military
cadet corps, or the Boy's Brigade, which drilled with dummy rifles. Others,
notably the Boy Scouts, the largest youth organisation, placed less emphasis on
(1) E. Holmes, quoted in Barnett, Collapse of British Power p.104. See also J.
Walvin, A Child's World (Harmondsworth, 1982) pp.54-56.
(2) P.C. McIntosh, Physical Education in England Since 1800 (London, 1952)
pp.105, 111-13, 116, 136. See also J.S. Hurt, 'Drill, discipline, and the
elementary school ethos' in P. McCann (ed.), Popular Education ard Socialisation
in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1977).
(3) J.0. Springhall, Youth, Empire and Society (London, 1977) p.16.
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militarism:	 Baden-Powell, despite his military background, forbade the use of
military drill in training. (1) Nonetheless, the overall effect was to produce
a working-class which, like the middle-class, was trained for war, in Orwell's
phrase 'not technically but morally'. Perhaps 41% of all young Edvardian males
may have joined
	 a uniformed organisation at some stage. (2) In sum, the
generation of young men which filled the ranks of the British army of the First
World War carried into the army first-hand experience of military-style drill,
which had the express purpose of inculcating working-class youth with 'habits of
sharp obedience, cleanliness and smartness'.(3)
Writing of his previous job in a department store, one Regular soldier stated
that 'Discipline at Lewis's was the equal of any I've experienced since in the
Army'.(4) Men drawn from regular employment
	 made good soldiers, believed one
staff officer, in part because they were 'accustomed to the discipline of the
workshop', and were a distinct improvement on the quality of many prewar
recruits, who were accustomed to unemployment.(5) Working-class ideas about work
patterns had changed significantly by 1914. Before the industrial revolution
work was 'task-oriented',(6) but the introduction of the factory system
necessitated	 industrial discipline. This involved the internalisation by
workers of a concept of 'time-thrift'. This entailed regular attendance at the
place of work and	 remaining there for the length of the shift, and
	 the
acceptance of 'regularity, routine and monotony quite unlike pre-industrial
rhythms of work'. (7) However, the behaviour of some recruits in 1914 suggests
(1) Thid, p.54.
(2) Simkins, Kitchener's Army p.20.
(3) McIntosh, pp.141, 136, 149.
(4) Hawke, p.43.
(5) [F. Fox] 'GSO',	 (London, 1920) pp.172-73.
(6) E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism', P and P
No.38, (1967) p.60.
(7) E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (London, 1968) p.66. See also S. Pollard,
'Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution' Economic History Review XVI,
No.2 (1963), pp.254-71.
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that the influence of	 factory discipline can be exaggerated (see below).
Industrial workers	 would also have encountered supervisors who have been
described as 'Non-Commissioned Officers' by historians,(1) and	 would have
been prepared for one of the more pleasant dimensions of military life if they
had worked for a paternal company such as the quaker-owned chocolate firms of
Cadbury and Fry.(2)
A working-class soldier would have been well prepared for the nuances of
military society by his previous experience as a civilian. Edwardian society was
divided by economic and cultural factors into a number of mutually exclusive
groups. Social mobility was possible in Edwardian Britain, but this tended to
reinforce, rather than weaken, the divisions between classes, as people who had
recently risen to the middle-classes took pains to distance themselves from the
proletariat. (3) This did not necessarily lead to hostility between groups,
but it did lead to ignorance. The majority of the urban upper and upper-middle
classes only came across members of the working classes acting as servants of
various descriptions, and such relationships were not generally conducive to
intimacy. In rural	 areas landowners came into frequent contact with workers,
but deference robbed these encounters of any real intimacy, the outward signs of
which included touching the cap to a social superior. (4) The parallels with the
military salute are clear.
Deference, or respect for, and obedience to, 'leaders' of society by those in
the lower reaches of that society was one of the principal bonds of Edwardian
(1) J. Melling, 'Non-Commissioned Officers': British employers and their
supervisory workers, 1880-1920', Social History, 5, No.2, (1980) pp 183-221.
(2) G. Wagner, The Chocolate Conscience (London, 1987) pp.48-72.
(3) T.W.H. Crosland, The Suburbans (London,1905) p.105; R. Price, An Imperial
War and the British Working Class (London, 1972) pp.7-10.
(4) H. Macmillan, Winds of Change, I (London, 1966) pp.99-b0; Thompson,
Edwardians p.I47; unpublished account, p.36, A. Simpson papers, Brotherton
Library, University of Leeds.
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Britain.(1) Deference was usually given to those of aristocratic or gentlemanly
background, and, of course, employers. In rural areas, deference had an
'economic basis in the dependence of farmers, servants and the labouring poor on
the patronage or benevolence of individual landowners'. Similar considerations
applied to the urban work force, who accounted for about three-quarters of the
population. In 1911 there were one and half million domestic servants, who were
by their very nature deferential. (2) Paternalistic concern was accompanied by
considerable power over workers' lives. Nany accounts exist of rural labourers
being ordered to enlist by th&remployers in 1914.(3)	 However, an apparently
deferential and paternalistic society such as prewar rural Norfolk disguised
considerable tensions and conflicts, suggesting that attitudes were by no means
uniform. (4)Deference	 was not, however,	 merely a pragmatic	 response to
economic realities. It was also a way of life, which was in part brought about
by the inculcation of deferential attitudes through education and religion.(5)
Deference was recognised as part of an interdependent, reciprocal
relationship. The socially conservative working man of Edwardian Salford, for
example, 'knew his place: he wanted that place recognised, however humble, and
required others to keep theirsY (6) This meant that social superiors should be
prepared to keep their side of the unspoken bargain, by acting in a way that
(1) H. Newby, Country Life (London, 1987) p.58. For a discussion of the
definition of the term, see H. Newby, 'The Deferential Dialectic', Comparative
Studies in Society and History, 17, no.2, 1975.
(2) F.M.L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London,
1971 edn,) p.184, 187; Newby, Country Life p.69; Meacham, p.202; D. Winter,
Death's Men (Harmondsworth, 1979 edn.) p.230.
(3) C. Dakers, The Countryside at War 1914-1918 (London, 1987) pp.26-27; P.
Horn, Rural Life in England in the First World War (London, 1984) pp.28-29.
(4) A. Howkins, Poor Labouring Men (London, 1985) pp.15-21.
(5) Walvin, Child's World pp.101-09.
(6) Roberts, Classic Slum p.168.
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merited respect, and which 	 allowed the 'respectable workingman', who was
neither abjectly submissive nor revolutionary, to keep his self-esteem.(l)
A	 perception	 of	 partnership between the classes, 'however bogus in
reality', was the fundamental reason why
	 the working man played his part in
the deferential relationship. A further obligation of the social superior was
paternalism, (discussed in chapter 1 above), which was the 'natural exchange'
for deference.(2) In return, the individual worker gave loyalty, good service,
and obeyed the not inconsiderable demands of factory discipline, while
collectively accepting the social and political status quo. There is also some
evidence that similar conditions applied to clerical workers. When the employer
resorted to coer don, or where patronage was offensive to working-class
sensibilities, or paternalism failed to live up to expectations, deference broke
down. The social elite accepted their role in the deferential relationship
partly because	 it made economic and social sense to substitute such a
relationship, based to some degree on mutual trust, or at least on mutual
interest, for 'a less efficient,	 potentially unstable, coercive
relatioiiship'. (3)
However, genuine philanthropy and a sense of moral right and duty on the part
of employers should not be ignored as a motive. Much British industry was
organised around the small workshop, the average workshop in 1898-99 employing
only 29.26 male employees. Under such conditions, it has been suggested, 'a
political affinity' and even cameraderie could be fostered between employer and
employee. The personal relationship between master and man was all important,(4)
(1) F.M.L. Thompson, The Rise of Respectable Society (London, 1988) p.198; R.
McKenzie and A. Silver, Angels in Marble (London, 1968) pp.l97-8. Interestingly,
one of the pieces of evidence offered by the latter is an ex-soldier's
reminiicences of paternal officers of the Great War.
(2) P. Joyce, Work, Society and Politics (London, 1980) p.91, 94.
(3) B. Waites, A Class Society at War (Leamington Spa, 1987) p.241. See also
Joyce, pp.92-3; Roberts, Classic Slum pp.4-6.
(4) R. McKibbin, 'Why was there no Marxism in Great Britain?', ERR, 99, 1984
pp.302-303.
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although workers also tended to be deeply suspicious of the representatives
of the state. It was one thing to have a good working relationship with the
'boss', quite another to have one with the policeman, poor law guardian or
gamekeeper. Working-class people sometimes felt themselves to be helpless in
the face of an apparently arbitrary and coercive authority, a situation which
closely parallels the experience of many soldiers during the Great War. (1)
Imperialistic attitudes, which included a diluted form of the public school
ethos, were passed down in a variety of ways to the working classes. This
subject has received much attention,(2) but it may be noted that the late
Victorian and Edwardian period saw the growing acceptance among working-class
families of the notion that a military career could be something less than
shameful. The army, and military life, was depicted in a positive way on the
stage and screen, war was shown in a beneficial light in school textbooks,
while portraits of generals and admirals adorned classroom walls. It has been
argued that a frequent feature of melodrama with an imperial theme was 'a
cross-class brotherhood of heroism' in which white officers and white soldiers
faced 'black barbarism' together. The message was the officer and the ranker
were comrades, rather than class antagonists.(3)
It can be seen that working-class soldiers were in part prepared for military
discipline by their experience in civilian life. Also, the officer-man
relationship that existed in the British army both before and during the war
reflected to an exaggerated degree the reciprocal deferential/paternal
relationship of civilian society. Thus working-class soldiers expected officers
(I) F.M.L.Thompson, Respectable Society p.58-9; B. Waites, 'The Government of
the Home Front and the "Moral Economy" of the Working Class', in Liddle, Home
Fires pp.178-9.
(2) W.J. Reader, 'At Duty's Call' (Manchester, 1988); Spiers, Late Victorian
Army pp.180-203.
(3) J.M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire (Manchester, 1984) pp. 1.3, 181-83.
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to have privileges. Moreover, by striving to protect their men from the worse
excesses of military discipline, and by sharing some of their hardships and
discomforts, junior officers fu'filled their part of the deferential bargain.
Officers may not always fully have understood the nature of the 'unspoken
bargain'. A temporary officer of 2/E. Lancs. recorded that he regarded his
daily inspection of his platoon's feet as 'an indignity for the men', but that
his men did not see it in this light. His men's view is not surprising, since
this attempt to prevent trench-foot was just one of the ways in which this
officer demonstrated his paternalism.(1) It is no coincidence that some of the
most eloquent attacks on military discipline and officers' privileges were made
by middle-class rankers to whom working-class living conditions and thought
processes were alien. Nor is it surprising
	 that	 Field Punishment	 No.1
excited such disgust amongst rankers of all classes, since it offended against
the concept of allowing the dependent class to retain their dignity.
The fact that the British lower classes were deferential and the higher
classes were paternal meant that the two halves of the army had complementary
attitudes. This helped to produce a loyal, hierarchical-minded and disciplined
army with high morale. Some soldiers actually liked military discipline, since
it gave a structure to their lives and removed the necessity to think for
themselves.(2) The fears held by some prewar officers as to the reliability of
the urban working classes in time of war proved to be unfounded.(3) Instead, Sir
Neville Macready, the wartime Adjutant-General, was able to claim that 'the
discipline and the good behaviour of the forces that Great Britain put into the
field were...unequalled in the annals of war'.(4)
(1) Mellersh, p.72.
(2) Cliff, p.26; J.F. Tucker, Johnny Get Your Gun (London, 1978) p.12.
(3) 'Report of a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College'
(1910) pp.74-6, SCL; Travers, Killing Ground, pp.39-40.
(4) N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life I, (London, nd ) p.217.
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6.3 Liberal Codes of Discipline, 1914-15
One major exception to the rule that the British army operated a rigid code of
discipline during the Great War should be noted. For a number of reasons, some
units raised at the beginning of the war were characterised by discipline which
was akin to that of prewar auxiliary units.
Considerable chaos prevailed when the British army underwent its massive and
unplanned expansion in the autumn and winter of 1914. Maj.Gen. Hainmersley, the
commander of the newly-raised 11th Division, recalled that on arriving at Belton
Park, near Grantham, which had been earmarked for a hutted camp, he 'found a
man surveying the ground' but 'no buildings of any sort'. The brigadiers and
regimental officers 'pegged out the camps' on 26 August. On the following day
the first batch of one thousand men arrived, with a further 600 arriving each
day thereafter. Training began on 28 August. Only one unit had uniforms. The
rest had no clothes 'except what they stood up in', and, lacking a supply of
water the men had to be marched to wash in a stream in Belton Park every
afternoon. Only one battalion was in hutted accomodation by 23 September. (1)
The conditions endured by 11th Division were not untypical.(2) In October 1914,
NCOs of 2/6 LF ,(reluctant to give the order 'pick up those feet' for fear of the
clattering of clogs on the parade square.(3) With the best will in the world, it
was not possible to impose strict discipline on men under such abnormal and
slightly ludicrous conditions.
In spite of the impact of industrial capitalism, discussed above,
	 many
recruits were profoundly ignorant of the basic demands of military discipline.
(1) F. Hammersley, Notes on 11th Division, CAB 45/237, PRO.
(2) See Simkins, Kitchener's Army pp.237-44.
(3) C.H. Potter and A.S.0 Fothergill, The History of the 2/6 Lancashire
Fusiliers (Rochdale, 1927) p.3.
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There were many stories of men smoking on parade, falling out of the line of
march to pick blackberries, or acting in a similarly unmilitarily way. (1)
Initially, some recruits seem to have regarded the army as just another
employer, without understanding the enormous difference between civilian and
military methods. One officer commented:
As civilians it had been no serious matter to take a day or a few hours off
from work...So now there were cases of men being absent for awhile (sic) from
duty or parade...and they had not the remotest idea that this might be
treated	 as a "crime".(2)
The RAMC private of 39th Division Field Ambulance who, tiring of army life, gave
notice of his intention to resign, was acting perfectly correctly and honourably
by his own code.(3)
Other civilian attitudes inimical to discipline took some time to subside,
although, as will be demonstrated, many of them never vanished entirely. Maj.
Cooper, an officer of 10th (Irish) Division recorded that many English recruits
drafted to the division in 1914 were miners or other trade unionists who had
'acute suspicion of non-elected authority'. Moreover, married men initially
resented a deduction from their pay, which was sent to their wives, on the
grounds that they had not been informed on enlistment that 'this stoppage was
compulsory, and so they considered that they had been taken advantage of'. That
newly-enlisted trade unionists should think this way was less significant than
the fact than an officer should go into print with a generally sympathetic
account of their attitudes. Cooper argued that a major factor in coming to terms
with the army was the growth of respect for the paternal care of their
officers. (4)
In many cases, the newly-commmissioned junior officers knew little more about
(1) V.W. Germains, The Kitchener Armies (London, 1930) p.111; L. Macdonald,
Somme (London, 1983) pp.15-16.
(2) A.H. Atteridge, History of the 17th (Northern) Division (Glasgow, 1929)
p.14.
(3) A. Jobson, Via Ypres (London, 1934) p.2.
(4) B. Cooper, The Tenth (Irish) Division In Gallipoli (London, 1918) pp.14-15.
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the army than did the other ranks. One subaltern, on arriving at 1/6 DWR, found
himself expected to command his platoon on his first day on parade. Fortunately,
he had read up on drill on the train journey, and ts thus able to keep one step
ahead of his men.(1) Officers underwent much the same training as their men, and
spent their valuable free time learning the additional duties of an officer.(2)
Under these circumstances, officers were less inclined to insist on the niceties
of military discipline, since they might not have personal experience of these
nicejies. In many units there very few Regular or ex-Regular officers or NCOs
who might have offert4 guidance on such matters. Units of Ki, the 'First Hundred
Thousand', had first pick of the available Regular officers and NCOs. 1O/DLI,
for instance, had a Regular commanding officer, adjutant, and RSN. As the
regimental historian commented, this alone counted for a great deal and gave
them an advantage over units raised a little later.(3) Some dugout NCOs and
officers, however, caused more trouble than they were worth. An ex-Regular NCO
of 8/R. Sussex frankly admitted that he did not understand some of the modern
drills and dealt with dissatisfied recruits by threatening to fight them.(4)
The enthusiasm of many of the volunteers of 1914, their genuine willingness
to learn and endure poor conditions should not be underestimated. It encouraged
some officers - experienced Regulars, as well as temporary officers fresh from
civilian life - to be tolerant and tactful in their handling of their troops.
Indeed, contemporaries often cited the enthusiastic spirit of the troops and the
tact of their officers as being among the primary reasons for the success of
the New Armies in turning a mass of raw, untrained recruits into fighting
(1) B.G. Buxton, KRS Q.
(2) J. Ewing, The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division 1914-1919 (London,
1921) p.9.
(3) W. Miles, The Durham Forces in the Field 1914-18, II (London, 1920) p.6.
(4) Letter, 15 Sept. 1914, C. Jones papers, IWM.
-173-
units, under very difficult conditions.(l) Attempts were made to balance the
need to instil discipline with the necessity to recognise that the 	 recruits
of 1914 were often of a very different stamp to those of prewar days. As the
historian of 16/Nanchesters (1st Manchester Pals) wrote, military discipline
did not come easily to the civilian volunteer. Its acceptance 'involve(d] a
revolution in mental outlook, and the higher the intelligence and education of
the men, the harder, perhaps, the lesson'. (2) In many cases, 	 officers
recognised the need to create a more enlightened, 'auxiliary' style of
discipline tko. that of the Regular army, a style which relied less on 'imposed'
than 'self' discipline.
6.4 A Case Study: Liberal Discipline in 8th Battalion East Surrey Regiment
A particularly vivid picture of the ways in which the officers of one
freshly-raised New Army battalion modified discipline emerges from an
unpublished account wriffen by a former temporary officer, P.G. Heath, and a
short book published in 1915, The New Army in the Making. By an Officer. The
author was Capt. J.M.	 Mitchell (3) and the book described the process of
training the men of 8/E. Surreys, disguised in the book as the '9th
Blankshires'. Mitchell, a temporary officer, clearly brings out the officers'
recognition that many of the recruits to the 8/E.Surreys were very different to
the prewar class of recruit, and the discipline of the military unit needed to
be moulded accordingly. They were not from the 'gutter and the pub'. Rather,
(1) See for example 0. Rutter, 	 (ed.) The History of the Seventh (Service)
Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment (London, 1934) p.2.
(2) Anon, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth Battalions The
Manchester Regiment: A Record 1914-1918) (Manchester, 1923) p.6.
(3) Letter, 15 Sept. 1915, W.P. Nevill papers, WPN1/55, IWN.
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they were men 'who counted for something in their civilian sphere'; Maj. A.P.B.
Irwin, the battalion's Regular adjutant, described the men as 'most intelligent
chaps'. (1)
	
The battalion also included miners from South Wales who had 'a
Celtic contempt for the red tape of discipline'.(2) In all, the recruit was
'no automaton%aike the prewar Regular recruit; rather, he had 'a trade at his
finger-ends'	 and had experience of 'the free initiative which is part of
prosperity in civilian life'.(3) However exaggerated and idealised this view
might have been, it seems clear that the men of 8/E.Surreys were very different
in character to those of prewar Regular units.
Inevitably, the process by which Regular and dugout NCOs and officers of the
battalion came to terms with the changed circumstances was not entirely smooth.
Some dugouts who had been retired since before the Boer War had to adjust to
what Mitchell called 'the new discipline' which had evolved in the first decade
of the century. Nineteenth century discipline, Mitchell asserted, was based
purely 'on the principle of authority' while new discipline 'incorporates with
an equal rigidity of discipline the principle of individual responsibility and
initiative'.(4) Although Mitchell did not say so, this new approach to
discipline had emerged from the debates that followed the Boer War (see chapter
2 above). According to Heath, it even took Irwin, who played an important role
in the development of the peculiar style of the 8/E. Surreys, some time 'before
he realised that he was dealing with enthusiastic civilians and not regular
soldiers'. (5)
(1) [J.M. Mitchelli The New Army in the Making By an Officer. (London, 1915)
p.14; A.P.B. Irwin, Oral History Interview, 000211/04, IWN.




(5) Unpublished account, p.25, P.G. Heath papers, DS/Misc/60, IWN.
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Heath and Mitchell both paid tribute to the way in which dugouts responded to
the need to adapt to the new type of soldier. (1) In the attempt to turn, almost
overnight, civilians without arms or uniforms into soldiers, 'hard cases' were
'unavoidable'. A 'few men [were] punished unjustly' and some 'untactfully', but
the punishments were minor, and it was regarded as 'imperative whenever
possible' to 'temper the wind to the shorn lamb'. (2). Above all, Mitchell's
book reveals the understanding and sympathy that the battalion's officers,
temporary and Regular, had for the indiscipline of raw but enthusiastic troops.
Subalterns also began to forge links with their men based on admiration and
paternal pride. The fact that newly-commissioned subalterns	 and men were
learning their trade together aided this process. Heath somewhat rashly told
his men that he knew little more about military life than they did, and asked
them to bear with him in the mistakes that he was bound to make. He wrote that
subalterns 'treated their men as friends and human beings...in return the men
seemed to like and respect their officers, and certainly gave them willing
obedience'. All too aware of the harsh disciplinary code of the army, in which
'The slightest trivial offence constituted a "crime", the officers sought 'to
keep them [the men] out of trouble provided they were pulling their weight in
all things that mattered'. A Pte. Bird, for istance, was five minutes late
appearing on parade. Heath did not punish him, but ordered Bird's platoon
sergeant to tell Bird's friends to ensure that he was more organised in future.
Bird was a keen soldier, and by refusing to follow the official path of
'criming' him, Heath avoided alienating Bird.(3) This is just one example of a
(1) Mitchell, p.22; unpublished account, p.22, P.G. Heath papers, DS/Misc/60,
IW!1.
(2) Mitchell, pp.24, 26.
(3) Unpublished account, p.51-54, 229, P.G. Heath papers, DS/Misc/60, IWM.
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subaltern seeking to protect his men by bending the strict rules of the army,
and it is also indicative of the way in which good relations were built up
between officers and men long before units went on active service.
6.5 Other Examples of Liberal Discipline in Newly-Raised Units, 1914-15
The officers of the 8/E. Surreys were not the only ones to adopt an
enlightened style of discipline for a newly-raised unit. Another 18th Division
unit to do this was the	 8/Norfoiks, where in the early days discipline was
aided by the virtual absence of crime and the fact that the few malefactors
were unofficially, but severely, punished by their peers, before officers could
take action. An officer paid tribute to the battalion commander, Lt.Col. F.C.
Briggs, 'whose tact had very largely contributed to the harmony and efficiency
of the battalion. The efforts made during training seems to have borne fruit on
active service, since in May 1916 Lt.Col. F. Maxwell, who was temporarily
attached to the 8/Norfoiks, noted in his diary that it was a battalion which
was 'happy all through, with excellent officers and NCOs - a real good unit'.(l)
Rankers as well as officers mentioned the use of 'auxiliary' style discipline
in many newly-raised units in 1914-15. A middle-class socialist, 	 Sgt. F.H.
Keeling (6/DCLI), wrote that discipline in Kitchener units was different from
that of Regular battalions 'because the conditions are different', but
discipline also differed from battalion to battalion in the New Army, the
variations being largely caused by the personal idiosyncrasies of officers
commanding companies and battalions , and the distribution of Regular NCOs. (2)
In 5/Wilts, a soldier who went absent without leave by forging the signature
(1) T.s. history of 8/Norfolks, pp.4, 15,	 C.F. Ashdown papers, IW!1; [C.A.
Maxwell] I Am Ready (London, 1955) p.128.
(2) E. Townshend (ed.) Keeling Leers and Recollections (London, 1918) p.219.
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of an officer on a pass (which would normally have been a serious offence)
merely received ten days confined to barracks and ten days stoppage of pay,
apparently because it was realised that he had been treated unfairly in being
denied leave in the first place.(l) C.F. Jones, a middle-class ranker of a
second-line Territorial unit (2/15 Londons) left an account of a
	 warrant
officer modifying discipline in training in England. When Jones was elected
spokesnn for a group of men to complain about an NCO's 'tyranny', the CSM tore
up the charge sheet against Jones (who had incurred the wrath of the military
authorities) and appealed to 'a man of your age and experience' not to encourage
'these b--- boys'. (2)
The 22/RF, a Pals battalion raised by the Royal Borough of Kensington from
Londoners and colonials, was moulded in the image of a retired prewar Regular
officer, Maj. (later Brig.Gen.) R. Barnett-Barker.(3) Rather like Philip Howell,
Barnett-Barker had radical views on discipline, and, in the word of a brother
officer and friend, 'nursed and trained it [the battalion] on his own lines,
with very definite ideas as to the means of extracting the best from the
material', adapting 'his methods with real liberality of thought to the new
conditions of warfare and the new types of soldiers'.(4) There is much evidence
from rankers of the battalion to substantiate this claim. Barnett-Barker was
the second-in-command of the unit from September 1914 until September 1915, when
he took command, and he remained in command for two years. The need to
conciliate two companies of unruly colonials seems to have played an important
part in persuading the more conservative original commander of the 22/RF to
(1) Unpublished account, S.W. Blythman papers, 80/40/1, lW!!.
(2) Unpublished account, pp.29-30, C.F. Jones papers, LHCMA.
(3) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service' passim.
(4) Ibid, pp.32-34, 41-44.
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adopt a liberal disciplinary system. (1)
Undoubtedly, the tolerance of gross indiscipline in the very early days did
not last very long, and as training proéssed, discipline improved. A ranker
of 1l/Suffolks (The Cambridge Battalion) recalled that discipline was tightened
up when they began weapons training. (2) On the whole, the volunteer soldiers
of 1914-15 came to recognise the need for discipline, an acceptance which was,
in many cases, accompanied by the development of esprit de corps. For our
purposes, it is important to note that the growth of trust of, and admiration
for, officers played a part in this process. Sir Ivor Maxse, GOC 18th Division
and a shrewd judge, commented in some confidential notes written in November
1915 on the 'excellent physical and moral' qualities of the subalterns of the
division, who spent eight hours a day with their men and identified with their
charges'	 'interests both on and off parade'. (3) A Regular dugout, Brig.Gen.
J.H. Poett, the commander of 55th Brigade, attributed the excellence of the
brigade's discipline	 to the 'good type' of recruit and to the battalion
commanders 'who were sympathetic and human...while insisting on strict
discipline [they] handled their men with discretion and tact'. Mutual confidence
between officers and men', he stated, 'is the very essence of sound discipline
and a happy battalion'. Under the conditions endured by recruits in the autumn
of 1914, this growth of confidence between the ranks 'needed to be nurtured in
every possible way'. The 8/E. Surreys was one of the battalions under Poett's
command. (4)
Two more examples, both drawn from 18th Division, illustrate the development
of esprit de corps in 'happy' units. R.A. Chell,	 an officer of 10/Essex,
(1) Letter, 18 Oct. 1914, W.J.T.P. Phythian-Adams papers.
(2) E. Renshaw, quoted in A.J. Peacock, 'A Rendezvous with Death', Gunfire No.5,
(1986) p.256.
(3) 'Notes on the New Armies by a Divisional Commander', p.1, File 10, Sir I.
Maxse papers, 69/53/5, IWM.
(4) [J.R. Poett], 'A Dugout in War and Before', The Great War 1914- 1918 1,
No.4, (1989) p.144.
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wrote of long training marches in England:
one saw platoon pride and comradeship happily demonstrated: Platoon pride said
"no one must be allowed to fall out" and comradeship said "two of us carry
Bill's rifle and Jack's pack and they'll make it...We certainly were a happy
team and a gentle, if really firm, discipline was the foundation of this. (1)
The fact that this battalion's all-rank Old Comrades Association continued in
existence until the early 1960s is evidence that the other ranks shared these
feelings. An example drawn from 7/Buffs t,iI4 indicates that the
	 growth of
comradeship between officers and men in 18th Division was not entirely wishful
thinking on the part of the officers comes from the diary of Pte. R. Cude, who
was extremely critical of army life, particularly of the chaos that prevailed
during the first weeks of the battalion. However, by the time he arrived in
France Cude had developed a strong admiration and affection for some (but by
no means all) of his officers, and..strong sense of esprit de corps: 'I am a Buff
above all things'.(2)
In conclusion, the disciplinary regime of the British army was, in general,
harsh, and as such it reflected the nature of British society. However, the twin
concepts of deference and paternalism helped to reconcile working-class soldiers
to military discipline. Moreover, at least some units raised in 1914-15
operated	 a liberal, 'auxiliary' disciplinary system during their training
period in Britain. The extent to which liberal discipline survived on active
service, and the reasons why in some cases it was replaced by the 'Regular'
variety, are considered in the final chapter.
(1) R.A. Chell, 'My first command - service with an Essex battalion', Essex
Countryside (Dec. 1972) p.41.




Officer-Man Relations: The Officer's Perspective
At the beginning of the war the Regular British other rank was generally
portrayed in the press as a brave, dogged, tough, phkgmatic, soldierly working
man in uniform who enjoyed an excellent relationship with his paternal officer.
In the space of two days in September 1914 The Times printed an anecdote about
a soldier who was more concerned about the loss of his pipe than his wound, and
quoted a sergeant's opinion that one of his officers had 'died one of the
grandest deaths a British officer could wish for'.(l) A subheading in The Times
of 12 September 1914 read 'Mutual Compliments of Officers and Men'. The
following article quoted an artillery officer as saying that 'Our men and
horses are wonderful' and cited a sapper's opinion that 'the officers are grand.
They do everything they can for our comfort...I cannot speak highly enough of
them'.(2) Conversely, the soldier-officer relationship in the German army was
portrayed as being based on fear; 'machine-like' German soldiers were bullied in
camp and driven into battle at gunpoint. Sometimes the contrast between the two
armies was made explict, on other occasions it was left unspoken.(3) Similar
views on British and German officer-man relations can be found in British
magazines and books of the time.(4) Broadly similar images of officer-man
relationships appeared in print throughout the war years, even though the social
composition of the army underwent significant change in this period. (5)
The purpose of this and subsequent chapters is to discover whether officer-man
relations in the British army of 1914-18 bore any resemblance to the version
(1) The Times 7, 8 Sept. 1914.
(2) The Times 12 Sept. 1914. See also Daily Sketch 8 Sept. 1914.
(3) The Times 9, 10, 22 Sept. 1914; Daily Mirror 1 Aug. 1914.
(4) The War Illustrated 29 Aug. 1914 p.54; ibid 3 Oct. 1914 p.158.
(5) See A.N. Lyons, Kitchener Chaps (London, 1915) pp.84-85; Mr Punch's History
of the Great War (London, 1919) pp.54, 178; The War Illustrated, 11 Nov. 1916
p.306.
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that appeared in the press. In this chapter some general aspects of inter-rank
relations will be examined, mainly from the perspective of the officer.
7.1 The Bureaucracy of Paternalism
The relationship between the officer and his men began when they met for the
first time. Anyone can be appointed to a position of command, but an individual
can only become a true leader when his subordinates ratify that appointment in
their hearts and minds.(l) Bernard Montgomery, commissioned into the R. Warwicks.
in 1908, believed that
The first thing a young officer must do when he joins the Army is to fight a
battle, and that battle is for the minds of his men. If he wins that battle
and subsequent similar ones, his men will follow him anywhere; if he loses it,
he will never do any real good.(2)
Many of Montgomery's contemporaries agreed with these sentiments.(3) As has been
demonstrated, a subaltern of the Great War, unless perhaps he had joined a
newly-raised unit in 1914, would have been exposed to a great deal of teaching
on the importance of good-officer man relations during his training, and he
would have been well aware of the importance of this first meeting. Alan Thomas,
commissioned into RWK in 1915, was assailed by doubts before arriving at his
battalion, fearing that he would not be 'up to it', and would be unable to win
the respect of his men.(4)
Officers came to know whether or not they had been accepted by their men in a
variety of ways. One officer of the 2/Wilts. discovered that his men approved of
him through censoring their letters on active service.(5) A Jewish officer of
(1) J. Adair, Developing Leaders (Maidenhead, 1988) p.13.
(2) Montgomery, Memoirs pp.486-7.
(3) W. Slim, Unofficial History (London, 1970 edn.) p.94.
(4) A. Thomas, A Life Apart (London, 1968) p.33.
(5) Letter, 24 Dec. 1914, W.B.P. Spencer papers, 87/56/1, IWM.
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4/N. Staffs, was made aware of his batman's approval when the latter took pains
to cook bully beef instead of bacon, while G.H. Cole, a subaltern of 1/20
Londons, 'realised my acceptance' when he heard a spectator call him by a
(fairly respectful) nick-name while Cole was playing football. (1) Sometimes, of
course,	 officers earned
	 disparaging nicknames from their men, such as
'Ragtime', a contemporary adjective for absurdity or inefficiency. (2)
Officers who joined units while in training had a distinct advantage over
those who joined a battalion on active service, particularly on the Western
Front. A ranker officer who joined 2/Camerons in 1916 lamented that it took
I-a
time ,get to know undemonstrative 'Jocks' but 'Almost before you have time to
get to know their names some change is made, or you lose half of them in
action'. (3) By comparison, Alan Thomas, who joined a reserve battalion in
England, was able to spend weeks 'learning the strength and weakness' of each
man in his platoon. (4) It is not inconceivable that some officers's first
contact with their men came just before they went into battle.
Officers who knew and understood their men made the most effective leaders.
Slim's biographer wrote that the future field marshal, commissioned in 1914,
'had the inestimable merit of never having forgotten the smell of a soldier's
feet'.(5) One man, drawing on his experience as a junior officer in the Great
War, wrote that subalterns should 'know personally' every man under his command:
'what he is good for, what he was in civil life, if he is married, etc - and let
the man know that you take an interest in him'.(6) It is clear that
(1) H.D.Nyers, G.R. Cole, KRS Q. For a perceptive fictionalised account of a
similar rite of passage in a later period, see G.M. Fraser, The General Danced
at Dawn (London, 1972 edn.) pp.18-35.
(2) Unpublished account, S.B. Abbott papers, 78/36/1, IWM.
(3) Anon, A Soldier's Diary of the Great War (London, 1929) p.170.
(4) Thomas,.p.37.
(5) R. Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (London, 1978 edn) p.9.
(6) 'Wisdom for Warts' p.3, D. Hamond papers.
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many subalterns conscientiously followed such advice. Lt. C. Meadowcroft
(33/Londons), for instance, kept a record of the addresses of the next of kin
of	 the soldiers in his platoon. Interestingly, in civil life he was a bank
clerk, and thus unlikely to have absorbed the paternal ethos at a public
school.(1) Another temporary officer, E.G. yenning of the R. Sussex, claimed to
'know the ways and peculiarities of every man of mine'. This seemed to be an
effective tactic of leadership. Two of his men refused promotion, because this
would have meant leaving yenning and moving to another company.(2)
The British army of 1914-18, dominated by prewar Regular officers, took no
chances with the welfare of its lower ranks. Paternalistic leadership and man-
management were institutionalised. Junior officers were given little opportunity
to neglect their men. An officer who served in the 2/6 DWR in 1918 was 'always
amused' to have to sign a certificate stating that his men's feet had been
rubbed, their socks had been changed and they had eaten a hot meal, but he
recognised that there was a serious purpose behind it all.(3) Even on the
beaches of Gallipoli, 'endless returns', wrote a subaltern in October 1915,
'have to be made about one's men - health, clothes, equipment, arms, ammunition,
etc...'(4) Official divisional trench orders issued	 in 1917 commanded that,
among other things, at night the duty officer and NCO should frequently patrol
the trench line, and that arrangements should be made to provide a hot drink for
the men between midnight and 04.00.(5) Other official documents ordered the
officers to inspect men's respirators and apply 'Glasso' to the eye-pieces to
prevent fogging,(6) to ensure the water they drank was pure,(7) and to drain
(1) Document in C. Meadowcroft papers, LULLC.
(2) Letter, Nay 1915, E.G. yenning, in L. Housman (ed.) War Letters of Fallen
Englishmen (London, 1930) pp.282.
(3) Unpublished account, Notebook III, B.D. Parkin papers, 86/57/1, IWM.
(4) P.M. Campbell, Letters from Gallipoli (Edinburgh, 1916) p.26.
(5) Divisional Trench Orders 1917 (AP&SS 1667 1500 1/17) pp.3, ii.
(6) Supplement to SS 419 - Protection against Tear Gas Shells'.
(7) 'Entrainment and Move Orders 33 Division 26 Aug. 1916', 71-210, RMASA.
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trenches to prevent trench-foot.(1) At divisional level, staff conferences
discussed 'the comfort and health of the men'.(2) In February 1918 66th Division
issued a memorandum in which the divisional commander drew attention to the wide
discrepancies in sick rates of various battalions under his command, which
were, he said, partly due 'to the men's moral (sic) and state of happiness,
which are largely dependent on the thoughtfulness and care of their
officers' .(3)
The much-derided obsession of the staff with apparent trivialities had its
roots in concern that temporary officers, mere civilians in uniform, might
neglect their paternalistic duties towards their men. Wyn Griffith, a temporary
officer	 of 15/RWF, described what might be called the 'bureaucracy of
paternalism' in these terms:
every man above the rank of private is his brother's keeper... This concern,
this anxiety, and interest, minute and unceasing, ...[isJ characteristic of
the British Army...It can be harassing, and often is, but it is omnipresent
throughout the hierc.hy of the command and the staff. (4)
7.2 Officers and Practical Paternalism
Most temporary officers of the Great War confounded official fears by
displaying an extremely high level of paternalism. Officers' paternalism was
most practically expresed in welfare work. In contrast to the 1939-45 war, no
centrally organised welfare service existed in 1914-18, although organistions
such as the YMCA and the Salvation Army did sterling work. Much responsibility
was placed on the regimental officer and padre.(5) The primary responsibility
(1) Routine Orders, 23 Nov. 1914, WO 95/25, PRO.
(2) W.N. Nicholson, Behind the Lines (London,l939) pp.33-4, 45. See also
conference reports and memoranda in Sir. I. Maxse papers, 69/53/5, IWM.
(3) Memorandum from AA&QNG, 66th Division, 28 Feb. 1918, P. Ingleson papers,
LULLC.
(4) V. Griffith, Up to Mametz (London, 1981 edn.) pp.18O-81.
(5) M.C. Morgan, The Second World War 1939-45, Army, Army Welfare (War Office,
1953) pp.1-2.
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of the officer was to see that men were veil fed and clothed, and given at
least a minimum of comfort. There vere many instances of officers taking this
duty very seriously indeed. On one occasion during training in England, the men
of 1/15 Londons were given inadequate rations and a sergeant complained. Later,
an officer's servant arrived with a packet of sandwiches for the NCO, much to
the latter's embarrassment. More importantly, there was a general increase in
rations.(l) Sometimes officers would forego their own comforts to ensure that
their men were well cared for. On one occasion, the all-important rum ration
failed to arrive at a TF unit. The battalion commander promptly handed over six
bottles of whisky, which were 'as precious as molten gold', so that the men
should not go without their warming tot.(2) To a large extent, this was simply a
continuation of the prewar convention that officers should place their men's
comfort above their own.
In the years 1914-16, it was extremely common for officers to use their own
money to	 purchase gifts for their men. Many officers' letters to their
families included requests for cigarettes, clothing and chocolate for their
men. Wealthy officers engaged in philanthropy on a spectacular scale. In
December 1915 an officer of 2/Coldm. Gds. sent home for 200 large mince pies
for distribution to his inen.(3) Other, less affluent officers kept their gifts
to more modest proportions. Two gunner subalterns may stand as representative.
The first wrote home	 in December 1914 for four pairs of gum-boots for his
NCOs 'who would appreciate them highly'. (4) The second, concerned that the army
(1) Unpublished account, p.40, C.F.Jones papers, LHCNA.
(2) C.E. Carrington, 'Some Soldiers',in Panichas, p.161. For a similar incident
in a Regular unit (2/Leinsters) see F.C. Hitchcock, "Stand To" A Diary of the
Trenches 1915-18 (Norwich, 1988 edn.) p.211; for a New Army unit (10/Essex), see
R.A. Chell, KRS Q.
(3) Letter, 24 Dec. 1915, Sir W. Baynes papers, LIJLLC.
(4) Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Combat (London, 1963) p.51.
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was not issuing enough socks, set his seven sisters to work on knitting these
essential items for his men. Each sock arrived at the front with five Woodbines
tucked inside.(1) The example of an officer of 9/Devons, who continued to send
parcels to his men at the Front while he was recovering from wounds in England,
and that of an officer who returned to his former unit to distribute cigarettes
to men who were no longer under his command, indicates that such acts of
generosity were sometimes, perhaps usually, carried out in a spirit of affection
as well as pure pragmatism. (2) Not surprisingly, officers who took pains to
attend to the needs of individual men, such as Maj. Heelas of 19th Divisional
Artillery who obtained a pair of brown officers' boots for a soldier whose own
footwear had worn out, were regarded with affection by their men.(3) (The
officer-man relationship is considered from the ranker's persepctive in chapter
8).
Officers' regard for their men's welfare was not confined to attending to
their creature comforts. A revealing passage occurs in the memoirs of Bernard
Martin, a temporary subaltern of 1/N. Staffs. Martin wrote of his regret at not
being able to keep a pipe he had taken from an enemy corpse: 'my men...Ewouldl
have laughed at its swanky German appearance, tried smoking it turn and turn
about...' This sentence, casually inserted into a passage concerned with other
matters, demonstrates one of the unspoken assumptions that governed the conduct
of many Great War subalterns, including the eighteen-year-old Martin: that
keeping his men amused was an important part of the officer's duties.(4)
(1) Unpublished account, p.30, H.D. Paviere papers, 81/19/1, IWM. See also
letter, 5 Aug. 1915, G.E. Miall Smith papers, LULLC.
(2) Letters from soldiers to Pocock, 1915, in J. Pocock papers, LULLC; Anon,
Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories, 32nd Division (London, 1932) p.662.
(3) Letter, 10 July 1963, H. Boater, BBCIGW, IWM.
(4) B. Martin, Poor Bloody Infantry (London, 1987) p.115.
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The soul and mental well-being of the soldier were also the responsibility of
the conscientious officer. When, in April 1916, no padre was available to take a
church service, an officer of 8/E. Surreys took one himself: 'Just the
Confession, Gospel, Lord's Prayer, Creed, a tiny address on Easter & Lent & a
couple of hymns'. (I) It is clear that many officers were extremely diligent in
dealing with their men's personal problems. A ranker of llColdm. Gds. recorded
in June 1916 that a fellow Guardsman had broken down at the graveside of his
brother: 'the officer has been very good to him and has got him sent to a
convalescent camp for a time'.(2) Conversely, in February 1916 2/Lt. H.A. Bowker
(91W. Yorks.) discovered from censoring his men's letters that one of them had
family problems and intended to speak to Bowker about them. Bowker went into
'a most horrible funk' and avoided the soldier until cornered. Bowker's youth
and inexperience seem to have been at fault here, since he displayed otherwise
impeccably paternal attitudes, buying food for his men to make up for the
inadequacies of the food on a troopship.(3)
An important part of the unwritten contract between officers and their men
was the	 defence of helpless men from higher authorities and the military
machine. If many men felt themselves to be at the mercy of an impersonal and
arbitrary coercd.ve system, many officers tried their best to defend them from
what were perceived as the unfair demands of military authorities. In extreme
cases, this could involve a commanding officer jeopardising his career to defend
his men. On the Somme, in September 1916, for instance, the commander of a
Regular unit, 1/DCLI, reported his battalion as 'unfit to go into action':
200 men had gone sick, largely as the result of the poor conditions of their
(1) Letter, 9 Apr. 1916, WPN/177,	 W.P. Nevill Papers, IWM. See also V.F.
Eberle, My Sapper Venture (London, 1973) p.60.
(2) Diary, 3 June 1915, H. Venables papers, LTJLLC.
(3) Letter, 4 Feb. (actually Jan.) 1916 3 Oct. 1915, H.A. Bowker papers, LIJLLC.
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trenches	 and a logistic breakdown. To take such a stand was, as a fellow
battalion commander of 5th Division commented, an act of 'great moral
courage'.(l)	 A similar event had occured in May of that year when the
commanders of the hR. Berks and 22/RF had cancelled an attack on Vimy Ridge.
Their corps commander, Sir Henry Wilson, contemplated trying them by court
martial, although in retrospect their decision was clearly correct on military
grounds. (2)
Protecting their men did not, of course, always entail commanding officers
taking such outspoken and personally risky stands. Probably far more typical was
the attempt of the commander of a home service unit, 6/Middlesex, to save a
thrice wounded private from returning to the front. (3) A rather similar
incident occured during the fighting in the spring of 1918 when the commander of
a battalion in 51st (Highland) Division gave a man with a superficial wound
permission to retire to a dressing station. A subaltern was surprised at this
leniency, until he noticed that the soldier wore no less than six wound stripes
on his sleeve.(4)
7.3 Garth Smithies Taylor - A Case Study in Paternalistic Love
The incidents cited above may be interpreted as nothing more than extensions
of the prewar code of paternalism. However, the language used by many junior
officers during the war indicates that their relationship with their men was
based on something more than just a professional concern for their wellbeing.
Indeed, the care and affection of the temporary officer for his men is a
(1) Letter, 17 Nov. 1935, E.W. Flanagan, CAB 45/133, PRO.
(2) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service' pp.70, 78-79.
(3) Notebook II, p.50, 9 June 1916, G.G.A. Egerton papers, 73/51/1, IWM.
(4) Extract from privately published memoir, p.76, Lord NacDermott papers,
LHCMA.
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constant theme running through British memoirs, letters and diaries. An officer
of 1/RWF spoke for many of his contemporaries when he wrote that 'the only way
to run a company is by love'. (1) One junior officer, the novelist Gilbert
Frankau, described the relationship in terms of a 'marriage' between the officer
and his platoon.(2) A sapper subaltern used a slightly different metaphor, that
of parenthood, to make much the same point.(3) Both neatly capture the idea of a
tender, caring relationship. It is possible that for some officers this
relationship may have been tinged with homoeroticism, if not homosexuality, but
for the vast majority of officers the relationship was entirely innocent. (4)
An officer did not have to serve in a frontline unit to experience love for
his men. In February 1916, Garth Smithies Taylor, an ASC subaltern, put his
feelings about his men into verse:
To me the men and horses are my friends
With whom I daily mingle and converse
To learn their needs and help them when their life
Seems burdened with a sense of uselessness
Or weary with their daily toil as slaves
They do not know it, but I love them all
And mean, by being fair to gain their love
And confidence by showing that I trust
Each ohe to work and play as man, with head
And heart as high as I pray mine might be.(5)
Shortly afterwards Taylor transferred to an infantry battalion, 2/SF, where
he began a love affair with his new charges. In April 1916 he wrote to his
family 'My platoon is mine now, and not lent to me as it has been for the last
6 weeks. The men are ripping, and what more could one want'? In another letter
(1) B. Adams, Nothing of Importance (Stevenage, 1988 edn.) p.211.
(2) P. Beaver, (ed.) The Wipers Times (London, 1973) p.79.
(3) G. Nacleod Ross, KRS Q.
(4) See P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London, 1975) pp.270-309,
and C.E. Carrington's hostile review in Newletter of the Friends of Amherst
College Library, (Winter, 1976).
(5) Poem in.G.S. Taylor papers, LHCMA.
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written a month later, Taylor referred to his men as 'absolutely splendid' and
'always ready to do anything that is wanted of them' despite their constant
grumbling.(l) Taylor's attitudes are worth examining at some length, for they
raise a number of interesting points.
Firstly, although his attitudes might seem to be steeped in public school
concepts of duty and paternalism, Taylor actually attended a grammar school.
Secondly, Taylor both idolised and idealised his men. The language he used to
describe them, ('ripping', 'splendid', 'always cheerful') which might have come
straight from the pages of a newspaper, indicates the degree to which he
identified with his men as their leader. Taylor would have agreed with Slim's
t kt.
view that the young officer's pride in his troops is such 1(would back 'his men'
against 'the Brigade of Guards itself'. (2) Commanding men was, for Taylor, a
fulfilling experience, and being of his generation, and of his social and
educational background, he had no hesitation in using the word 'love' to
describe his feelings for his men. Another poem, Herbert Read's 'My Company',
cQvers much the same ground.(3)
Taylor's pride in commanding men gave birth to a sense of responsibility for
them and a desire to discover each man's needs. This is in accordance with
modern leadership theory. Adair's model, used by the modern British army at
Sandhurst, stresses 1(meeting the needs of the individual s one of the three
essential elements of leadership. Taylor also implied that he tried to protect
his men from the unfair demands of the higher echelons of the army. Taylor's
sense of responsibility was mingled with sympathy for the men's condition. He
tried to establish an informal relationship, mingling and conversing with
(1) Letters, 28 Apr. and 26 Nay 1916, G.S. Taylor papers, LHCMA.
(2) Slim, p.32.
(3) H. Read, 'My Company', in Gardner, Up The Line To Death pp.87-90. See
also Fussell, pp.164-65.
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them, lending a sympathetic ear to their troubles. One of Taylor's
contemporaries believed when the men 'come to you with their private worries',
this was a sign that the officer had won their confidence.(1)
Taylor sought to establish a relationship in which the parties were not equal,
but which was characterised by mutual trust. He tried to gain the love of his
men through his just treatment of them, while demonstrating that he trusted
them not to take advantage of him. All of this, of course, looks at only one
side of the relationship. In all probability, Taylor's view of his men was
highly romanticised and naive. Taylor's men might have had a very different view
of their officer, although one sergeant took the trouble to write a letter to
his officer's family, nearly a year after 	 Taylor's death on the Somme, in
which he mentioned Taylor's concern for the men's welfare. (2) This brief case
study does, however, offer an interesting insight into the paternal attitudes
of an unusually articulate subaltern. His views were not untypical, but while
in most cases one can only find brief references to the attitudes of officers
towards their men, Taylor gives his feelings eloquent expression.
It would be rash to assume that officers' views of their men were always
benign. A major source of annoyance was the apparent inability of the private
soldier to help himself. This no doubt reinforced the officer's feeling of
paternal responsibility, but it also added to his burden of work. A fairly
typical comment can be found in a letter written by E. Taylor, 	 a subaltern of
1/King's, in late 1914: 'how like children the men are. They will do nothing
without us...You	 will see from this some reason for the percentage of
casualties among officers'. Elsewhere, however, he expressed his admiration of
his exasperating charges. This officer was writing of Regular soldiers, who at
(1) 'Wisdom for Warts' p.3, D. Hamond papers.
(2) T. Waterfield to Taylor's family, 29 Sept. 1917, G.S. Taylor papers, LHCNA.
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that stage of the war would still have been largely working-class in origin.(l)
However, it seems that the men of the New Armies were little better in this
respect. A Times correspondent wrote in late 1916 that the
dependency of the men upon their own officer, while it is an immense and
unwitting tribute to that officer, is at times so absolute as to be
embarrassing, and in these men, who have so many of them high intelligence and
a retrospect (sic) of civilian responsibility, it is surprising.
The writer went on to argue that the problem arose from the surrendering of
individual liberty when the men became soldiers. The men did not become
'automatons' but since the officers are appointed to think for them 'well, they
are not going to deprive him of his job...willingly, whole-heartedly they let
him, and if he does it well they will follow him anywhere'.(2) In chapter 6 it
was argued that this apparent helplessness was in part a natural consequence of
civilian conditioning as well as the disciplinary system of the army. In sum,
the institutionalising of paternalism created a sort of 'dependency culture' in
which the soldier was given little incentive to help himself.
7.4 Practical Paternalism
Nevertheless, it is clear that	 many junior temporary officers actively
disliked	 the system that they thought treated 'their' men unfairly. John
Nettleton, who served in the ranks of the Artists' Rifles and later as an
officer in a Regular unit, 2/R. Bde., commented on the lack of trust that
Regular officers had for their men. Nettleton believed that Regulars' insistance
on 'iron control' of other ranks at times placed the men's lives at risk,
although he accepted and admired the paternalism of Regular officers. (3)
(1) Letters, 12, 13 Dec. 1914, E. Taylor papers, LULLC. See also Adams, Nothing
of Importance p.29.
(2)'A Citizen Army From Within', part III, The Times 5 Dec. 1916.
(3) Nettleton, pp.68-69, 123-24.
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Another temporary officer who served in a Regular battalion, Robert Graves
(2/RWF), went even further. Graves,
	 although in many respects a far from
typical subaltern, articulated the feelings of many of his peers when he wrote
that he and Siegfried Sassoon	 believed that one of their most
	 important
duties was to 'make things easier' for their men. Graves believed that
being commanded by someone whom they [the other ranks] could count as a friend
- some one who protected them...from the grosser indignities of the military
system...made all the difference in the world.(1)
An example of these 'grosser indignities' was encountered in February 1917 by
E.C. Vaughan, a subaltern of 1/8 R. Warwicks., when his men were forced to stand
in the snow for an unnecessarily long time as a result of bad staff work.
Vaughan marched into the office of a staff lieutenant and
told him vehemently, 1) That my men had marched a long way and were tired, 2)
That it was damned cold outside, 3) That he had kept them waiting nearly
half an hour...(2)
For Vaughan, who lacked self-confidence and had made a bad impression on
joining his unit, this too was an act of moral courage in defence of his men's
welfare. His action was not untypical of the way in which junior officers were
prepared to take unpopular stands against their superiors in defence of what
they perceived as their men's interests, although the practical expression of
officers's sympathy for their men usually took a less dramatic turn. The junior
officer was as much trapped by the military system as was the private, and the
officer could only modify the system at the most local level.
There was often a reluctance on the part of regimental officers to punish
their men. The first level of, relatively minor, punishments were awarded by the
company commander at 'orderly room' or 'Company Orders'. Capt. J.H. Dible, a
(1) R. Graves, Goodbye To All That (Harmondsworth, 1960 edn.) p.192.
(2) Vaughan, pp.25-26. For a similar incident, see unpublished account, p.43,
H.D. Paviere papers, 81/19/1, IWM.
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temporary RMO, wrote in 1917 that 'orderly room' could be an 'instrument of
oppression and injustice' instead of an impartial court: there was a fine line
between 'Discipline and Tyranny'. The avoidance of tyranny was, in Dible's
opinion, not merely a matter of sympathy for the men, but it also made good
military sense, be.jause it could prevent unrest among the other ranks. (1)
Similar sentiments were expressed by G.S. Taylor of 2/SF. In a letter of October
1916, written just after his battalion had come out of action, he confessed
'The thing I hate doing is holding Orderly Room & dealing out punishments such
as 3 Days Confined to Camp. The men get a bad enough time anyhow'.(2)
The company commander presiding at 	 Company Orders could, however, forward
the case to the commanding officer, who could reduce men holding acting rank or
take away privileges, impose stoppages of pay, or sentence the soldier to
field punishment. More serious offenders could be sent for trial by Field
General Courts Martial (FGCN). The nature of military punishments and discipline
were considered in chapter 6, and here it will suffice to cite Charles
Carrington's opinion that many FGCMs tried military crimes which would have
been 'no crimes at common law, and imposed sentences which seem shocking in
retrospect'. Carrington himself served on a court martial of a man accused of
murder; 'I'm glad to say', he wrote many years later, 'we brought it in as
manslaughter' .(3)
Given the hazards of trial by FGCM, some officers were prepared to turn a
blind eye to what, in military terms, were serious crimes. There are many
accounts of exhausted men being found asleep on sentry duty in the trenches, but
(1) Note of 20 Nov. 1917, J.H. Dible papers, 1W!'!.
(2) Letter, 7 Oct. 1916, G.S. Taylor papers, LHCNA.
(3) C.E. Carrington, Soldier From the Wars Returning (London, 1965) p.172. For
an example of a court martial 'lean(ing] over backwards' to ensure a soldier had
a fair trial, see Nettleton, p.166; for an officer's reactions to the court
martial of another officer, see R. Devonald-Lewis, (ed.) From the Somme to the
Armistice: The Memoirs of Captain Stormont Gibbs, MC (London, 1986) pp.161-62.
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according to Pte. A.M. Burrage, a middle-class soldier who was often critical
of the military system, officers were usually 'too decent to make a song about
it'.(l) The trick was for the officer to wake the sentry up without
acknowledging that the soldier was asleep. The officer could thus both adhere
to the spirit of military law and demonstrate his sympathy with an exhausted
man. Even more importantly, he could save the soldier from the full rigour of
the disciplinary code. An officer of 1/20 Londons on discovering 'one of my
best men' asleep, fired a Very pistol to wake him up. As a ranker, Nettleton
was discovered sleeping during Stand To, and was whacked across the behind
with an officer's cane. 'Quite irregular' he commented, but he 'felt no
resentment at the time'. (2)
W.R. Acklam, a ranker of 41st Divisional Artillery, recorded in 1917 that a
drunken bombardier had sworn at an officer who was entering the canteen: "Get
out, get out you bloody ugly bugger". Fortunately for the soldier, the officer,
Mr Mason, 'took no notice & went away'. Mason was acting in character, since he
was	 an approachable man and, after an uncertain start, a steady growth of
affection and respect for Mason can be traced in Acklam's diary.(3) This case
neatly demonstrates the dilemma that paternal officers, perhaps with no great
love for the niceties of military law, could be placed in by the misbehaviour of
their men - did their duty lie in the strict enforcement of discipline, or in
the protection of their soldiers? 2/Lt. Bowker of 91W. Yorks. experienced a
similar clash of loyalties. One of his men was accused of stealing boots from a
store, and Bowker knew perfectly well that the man was guilty. But Bowker
thought that the thief genuinely believed that he was merely exchanging a pair
(1) EA.M. Burrage] 'Ex-Pte.-X' , War is War (London, 1930) p.74.
(2) G.H. Cole, KRS Q; Nettleton, p.200.
(3) Diary, 9 Jan. 1917, W.R. Acklam papers, 83/23/1, IWM.
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of old boots for a new pair. Bowker decided that he had a duty to 'run him in'
or the entire fatigue party 'would have absolutely refitted itself at the
expense of ordnance', but he then protected the soldier by refusing to swear
that the boots the man was wearing were stolen. This neat compromise - enforcing
military discipline, in spirit if not to the letter, while protecting his errant
charge from punishment - earned Bowker a stiff lecture from a senior officer.(l)
Another way that regimental officers could spare offenders from harsh
punishments was to impose their own form of rough justice. 'Will you accept my
award, or will you go before the CO?' was (and is) a common formula used by
company commanders. Commanding officers could similarly present an offender with
the choice of accepting a relatively mild punishment or electing to go before a
court martial, although some officers met their match in 'old soldiers' who knew
their rights under military law.(2) In 1918 a company commander of 2/4 KOYLI
dealt with a case of a self-inflicted wound by sentencing the offender - a
youngster who had experienced some kind of a breakdown - to shoot the rabid
dogs that roamed the area. If military law had taken its course, the boy would
have been court martialled and would have probably received a severe sentence.
(3) Such a sympathetic use of the wide discretion given to company commanders
was common, and may be accounted a good example of practical paternalism in
action. (4)
It would be tediou8 to list every other practical manifestation of the
sympathy that many officers felt for their men. However, a private of 15/RWF
wrote a fictional, but wholly convincing, vignette of a moment of leisure
snatched in a busy day behind the lines which neatly captures one facet of the
(1) Letter, 16 Feb. 1916, H.A. Bowker papers, LULLC. For a similar example, see
D. Williams, 'An Artilleryman's War 1914-19', ST 29, (1990) p.27.
(2) J.L. McWilliams and R.J. Steel, The Suicide Battalion (St. Catharine's,
Ontario, nd) p.186; Eberle, p.73.
(3) Turner and Haigh, pp.86-87.
(4) Carrington, Soldier from the Wars p.170.
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paternal subaltern:
Platoon drill was tiresome, but Mr. Jenkins was kind. He used to sit by the
little stream where they got their washing-water, and look into it for
long at a time without moving, whilst they smoked under the turnip-stack,
with someone watching to see if anyone - the Adjutant, or that shit Major
Lillywhite, was anywhere about.(1)
7.S Balancing Discipline and Friendship: A Case Study of 2/21 Londons
One matter, absolutely central to the whole question of officer-man relations,
has yet to be addressed: how could officers demonstrate friendship for their men
and yet retain their authority? Capt. Hamond, in his unpublished treatise on
officership, had some firm, common-sense views on this question. He stated that
men will follow an officer who has a strong, attractive personality and who
'personally looks after their bellies and beds'. However, he continued, 'any
form of familiarity that lowers your own position' should be instantly checked,
'but for God's sake don't always be thinking about your own dignity, it should
be there without any possibility of mistake for everyone to see'. In sum, the
officer needed to tread a narrow line between paternalistic friendship for his
men, and undue familiarity. (2)
An interesting practical example of how easy it was to cross this line occurs
in a book written shortly after the war. The author was Rowlands Coldicott, a
company commander in 2/21 Londons, who served in France and later in Palestine.
Coldicott was a Territorial officer with no illusions about the limitations of
Regular-style discipline when applied to his men: 'Nothing on earth...could turn
our clerks into members of a regular army...'(3) Yet Coldicott, a paternal
officer with considerable sympathy for his men, felt it necessary to remonstrate
with one of his subalterns, 'Trobus', over his relationship with his platoon.
(1) D. Jones, In Parenthesis (London, 1963 edn.) p.15.
(2) 'Wisdom for Warts', p.9, D. Hamond papers. See also 'Mark VII', p.21.
(3) R. Coldicott, London Men in Palestine (London, 1919) p.125.
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Trobus liked to surround himself with
his admirers, to whom he would tell stories, reaping huge admiration
thereby.. .He was popular, and liked, but at the expense of something
common to both parties that ought not to have been sacrificed.
Trobus's men, in Coldicott's opinion, were taking advantage of his good nature
by marching sloppily, and more importantly, by falling out unnecessarily on the
march. Coldicott unfavourably compared Trobus's leadership with that of another
subaltern:
"Assing along, telling tall stories to a sergeant, isn't looking after a
platoon on the march...Look at number ten [platoon]. Of course they detest
Jackson, but he does manage to get them along when they're whacked. What the
devil does it matter if the men like you or not now? They like the fellow
in the end who pulls them through and drops on them occasionally."
Coldicott knew that the terrain that they were currently marching over was not
as taxing as the hills of Judea which lay ahead of them. By failing to
build up his platoon's stamina, Trobus was storing up trouble for the future.
Coldicott required his officers to exercise 'lynx-like' supervision of his men
and was prepared,	 if necessary, to be harsh towards laggards in order to
protect them from themselves. Trobus's relationship with his men caused him to
overlook malingering ("Look at that great hulking chap Thunder, who pretended
he couldn't carry his pack"'). By opting for short-term popularity Coldicott
felt that Trobus was risking the lives of his men. In short, the thing which
Trobus's relationship with his men had 'sacrificed' was the degree of detachment
from those under his command that enabled the officer to make unpopular, but
essential, decisions.(l)
This passage demonstrates very neatly the problems inherent in a close,
informal relationship between an officer and his men. If all of the other ranks
could be relied upon to exercise self-discipline, and not to take advantage of
their officer, the notion of a 'gap' between officers and men could largely be
(1) Coldicott, pp.66-70.
-199-
dispensed with. But in a less-than-perfect world it could not. Coldicott was one
of the few officers to articulate this dilemma. Another was 2/Lt. R.W. McConnell
(6/King's Own), who in late 1915 succinctly summarised what was probably the
credo of most officers, temporary or otherwise: 'The men are all topping
fellows. But one has to let them know who is master. First an officer has to be
an officer, and then he become a man'.(l)
7.6 The Circumstances Which Encouraged Close Officer_Man Relations
While the transmission of the prewar ethos of paternalism and the influence
of the public schools might help explain why officers regarded the welfare of
their men as part of their duty, it does not entirely explain the enthusiasm
that many officers showed for this task and the love and devotion that many
felt for their men. Other factors, a product of the peculiar circumstances of
the Great War, also need to be considered.
The age profile of British regimental officers of 1914-18 tended to extremes.
Regimental officers of the prewar army were fairly young (2) and this trend
was exaggerated during the war. The expansion of the army normally ensured
fairly swift promotion for those Regular officers who survived. The casualty
rate among junior officers was extraordinarily heavy. To give but one example,
in September 1915 normal wastage rates for officers on Gallipoli were calculated
at 20 per cent per month.(3) By September 1917 the casualty rate among officers
resulted in most battalions being commanded by officers of 'not more than' 28
years old, and most companies by men no older than 20.(4)
(1) Housman, p.186.
(2) D. Ascoli, The Mons Star (London, 1981) pp.8, 101.
(3) Winter, Great War pp.83-92; Hamiljon to Kitchener, 1 Sept. 1915, WD of A
and Q MEF, WO 95/4266, PRO.
(4) Anonymous book review, AQ II No.1, (1921) p.164.
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Conversely, the raising of the New Armies in 1914-15 also brought a number of
older men into the army as overage subalterns. In 22/RF in 1914 approximately
one-half of all officers, and one-third of all subalterns, were aged thirty-one
or over, although some of these men did not go overseas or did not remain long
with the battalion on active service. (1)
Many subalterns were thus of an impressionable age. Young officers enjoyed
the excitement and comradeship of war, revelled in the newfound freedom after
school or university and the novel responsibilty of commanding men. 'Leadership,
the most heady and intoxicating draught for a young man' wrote one of them,
'became a duty and a delight'.(2). F.A. Shuffrey, an officer of 11/DWR, spent
his 21st birthday in the trenches. He later wrote that the experience of war
was often frightening, but 'outweighing' the fear, for 'very young' men such as
himself, was the fact that 'the war was still an adventure which thrilled us,
stimulated as we were by comradeship much more vital than is ever found in
peace'.(3) This comradeship, it is argued in the next chapter, was able to
transcend the barriers of rank.
Many	 rankers were also young. It was not uncommon for units on the Western
Front to receive drafts of eighteen year old, and in 1918, seventeen year old,
soldiers.(4) It is perhaps unsurprising that boys of similar ages made friends
across the rank and class divide. Some of the older officers had a literally
paternal attitude towards soldiers who were of an age to be their sons. Ernest
Parker, who served in the ranks of lO/DLI and was later commissioned, remembered
with affection 'our dear old Bombing officer', Capt. Pumphrey,'who said just the
(1) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', pp.21, 24a.
(2) [C.E. Carrington] 'C. Edmonds', A Subaltern's War (London, 1929) p.18.
(3) Unpublished account, p.IO, FAS/3, F.A. Shuffrey papers, PP/MCR/261, IWM.
(4) Such a draft arrived at 6/Northants. early in 1918. Letter, 14 Feb. 1918,
C.E.G Parry Okeden papers, 90/7/I, IWM. For the experience of a young soldier,
se F.J. Hodges, Men of 18 in 1918 (lifracombe, 1988) passim.
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right things to encourage a youngster like me'.(l) Some older officers
sympathised with men of their own age who were enduring conditions in the ranks
(see chapter 8).
Many officers came to admire the fortitude and stoicism displayed by their
men in enduring the conditions of trench warfare while enjoying few of the
comforts available to officers. Expressions of admiration are frequently found
in officers' writings.'A private's life out here is a very rotten one', an
officer of a New Army unit, 9/DWR, confided to this diary in 1916, ' - the more
one thinks about it, the more one admires the men - they're absolutely wonderful
to stick what they do stick...' (2) Capt. Shuffrey thought that the spirit of
the ordinary soldier in enduring the hardships of military life was a major
factor in winning the war. (3) In retrospect, one officer admired men for
enduring life at the bottom of the military hierarchy, while retaining 'their
individuality and their courage'.(4)
The rationale behind the disparity in the army's treatment of officers and men
was that,	 having greater responsibilities, officers were entitled to more
comfort. However, very occasionally, one detects in officers' writings a twinge
of guilt that they had privileges denied to their men.(5) Officers who had
previously served in the ranks in particular knew only	 too well what-
ordinary soldiers had to endure. 'When I think of the men who have none of my
1,000 comforts', a subaltern wrote in February 1916, 'I am glad that I didn't
stay in the [ranks of the] 16th Middlesex'. (6) On the 1918 March Retreat, a
self-confessed 'stoney-hearted' RMO (Regimental Medical Officer) discovered for
(1) E. Parker, Into Battle (London, 1964) p.36, 38.
(2) Diary, 15 May 1916, J.W.B. Russell papers, LULLC. See also G. Frankau,
Peter Jackson - Cigar Merchant (London, nd) p.60; J. Gillam, Gallipoli Diary
(Stevenage, 1989 edn.) p.52.
(3) Diary, 1 Apr. 1919, F.C. Shuffrey papers, FAS/7, PP/MCR/261, IWM.
(4) V. Bartlett, No Man's Land (London, 1930) p.168.
(5) W.R. Bion, The Long Week-End 1897-1917 (Abingdon, 1982) p.119.
(6) Letter, 12 Feb. 1916, C.R. Stone papers, IWN.
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the first time what it was like to be utterly exhausted. As a consequence his
attitude towards men reporting sick 'changed entirely'. Significantly, the
adoption of a more sympathetic approach by this RMO did not alter his basic
attitude towards his men, for he had always taken 'an intense parental pride'
in his battalion, 8/Queen's. (1) Another RMO, J.H. Dible, was angered by the
question of leave, which was available once every six or seven months for the
officer, but once in every fifteen to eighteen months for the soldier. Dible
felt that this disparity was 'inexcusable',(2) and his anger was shared by Haig.
If anything, the disparity grew more pronounced as the war went on, for in 1918
a scheme was introduced which gave junior officers the opportunity of serving
for six months in Britain.(3) The only equivalent for other ranks was the
granting of leave to pre-war Regular and Territorials whose period of service
would, under normal circumstances, have expired.(4) As will be discussed below,
many officers had particular sympathy for educated, middle-class rankers who
under other circumstances might have found themselves in the officers' mess.
Although officer-man relations were undoubtedly good in newly-raised units in
1914-15, when officers and men who had only recently joined the army learned
the business of soldiering together, it was often said that officer-man
relations were, in general, much closer on active service than at home. An ASC
private, a former miner, believed that the officers on the Western Front and
their counterparts in England were very different creatures. Those he had
(1) Unpublished account, p.69, C.J. Lodge Patch papers, IWM 86/9/1.
(2) Note, 11 Nov. 1917, pp.179-80, J.H. Dible papers, IWM. In December 1917,
Haig commented on the disparity with the French, whose soldiers were given
leave every four months. S. Fay, The War Office at War (Wakefield, 1973 edn.)
p.106.
(3) Circular from Military Secretary to C-in-C, 9 Jan. 1918, P. Ingleson papers,
LULLC.
(4) Until 1916, thousands of men were leaving the army on expiry of their
service. F.W. Perry, The Commonwealth armies (Manchester, 1988) p.18; The Times
6 Apr. 1916.
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encountered in training camps at home, he said, had mainly been Regular
officers, who regarded wartime soldiers as mere cannon fodder to be trained
as quickly as possible. In France, by contrast, officers 'had been through
the mill, had recently been civilians themselves, and so were in sympathy with
those they commanded' and traditional discipline was 'largely ignored in favour
of "esprit de corps"'.(l) 	 Later in the war convalescent temporary officers
also served in camps in England, but an infantry officer who first arrived in
France at the end of 1917 expressed very similar sentiments. Commenting shortly
after his arrival on the high level of esprit de corps in his battalion (2/4
DWR), he wrote: 'The spirit of the Army out here is quite different from what
it is in England. The men are fine & the officers are their comrades'.(2)
In contrast to the situation which existed in Britain, where the important
role played by the NCO in training minimised contact between officers and
other ranks, the conditions on the Western Front were exceptionally favourable
to the establishment of close relationships between leaders and led. Regimental
officers and other ranks alike lived in rat and vermin-infested holes in the
ground, although the officer's hole was usually better appointed, and all shared
much the same discomforts caused by weather. Shells and bullets were no
respecters of rank, and indeed officers were more likely to become casualties
than other ranks. It is important that the gulf between the officer and the
ranker should not be underestimated. This is graphically illustrated by a 1/N.
Staffs. officer's comment that his working-class soldiers were 'bilingual'.
Among themselves, the rankers spoke a language virtually incomprehensible to a
middle-class officer. When addressing an officer they used 'pukka talk'.(3)
The officer's lot was, in general, far better than that of the other rank (see
(1) Unpublished account, p. !., J. Woollin papers, PP/MCR/11O, IWN.
(2) Notebook I, B.D. Parkin papers, 86/57/1, IWM.
(3) Martin, p.131.
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above). (1) However, the regimental officer's experience of warfare had far
more in common with that of the private than it did withLof the general.
Constant patrolling of the trenches and supervision of various activities
ensured that there was constant contact between the officers and men in the
trenches.(2) One subaltern noted that even 'the most taciturn' sentry would
talk when visited at night by an officer.(3) Capt. B.G. Buxton (1/6 DWR)
recalled that
I would go round the lines, perhaps between two and three a.m. on a soaking
day, and a sentry would turn on the fire step and make a remark. I would get
up by him, and he would tell me of some problem at his home - a child ill;
anxiety about the loyalty of his wife; whatever it might be; and we would talk
it over together. It was a wonderful human relationship, not least seeing that
I was often ten or twenty years younger than he.(4)
Under some circumstances, suchwhen holding	 'elastic' defensive positions
in the spring of 1918, small parties of men commanded by an officer might have
to man isolated posts for days at a time. In 1915-16 trench warfare 'was
carried on by small detached units, companies split into platoons and parties,
who seldom saw their own battalion headquarters'.(5) Inevitably under such
conditions officers and men were forced into a degree of intimacy, and
opportunities arose for fraternisation between what one temporary infantry
officer described as the men who took 'nine-tenths of the risk and ...[did]
practically all the hard work in the Army...the private and the subaltern'.(6)
An example of informal fraternisation occured in August 1917 when a gunner of
the RGA was trapped in a dugout by intense shelling along with some officers,
(1) I.F.W. Beckett, 'The British Army, 1914-18: The Illusion of Change' in J.
Turner (ed.) Britain and the First World War (London, 1988) p.107.
(2) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', pp.57-58.
(3) 'Mark VII', p.95.
(4) B.G. Buxton, KRS Q.
(5) R.H. Mottrain, 'A Personal Record' in R.H. Mottram et al Three Personal
Records of the War (London, 1929) pp.62-63.
(6) I. Hay, The First Hundred Thousand (Edinburgh, 1916) p.297.
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who 'began to talk of guns and all sorts of things. Then tea was made and an
officer went out and fetched it from the cooks (sic) dugout. Had good feed'. (1)
One officer declared that the 'characters of any officer or man when under fire
were laid to the bare'.(2) After spending eight days in the line in July 1916,
enduring heavy shelling, Lt. R.E. Wilson (1/4 York and Lancs.) wrote 'officers
& men have suffered and worked together & have come to regard each other as real
men...'(3) Active service, a Regular officer of the Devons noted, highlighted
the importance of 'looking after' his men. (4) Some officers came to believe
that they formed what might be termed a 'community of the trenches' with their
men (see chapter 9). It is also relevant to note that there were many occasions
on which temporary subalterns were out of the reach of their superiors. Under
such conditions, junior officers were under less pressure to conform to Regular
norms of behaviour towards their men than would have been the case behind the
lines. It is significant that discipline in small units such as machine gun
companies and trench mortar batteries, commanded by captains, was in many cases
more relaxed than in larger units such as infantry battalions (see Appendix 2).
7.7 Commanding Officers, Padres, Medical Officers, Generals and Staff Officers
This thesis is mainly concerned with relations between other ranks and junior
regimental (platoon and company) officers. However, a brief examination of the
relationship of other types of officer with their men is necessary to complete
the picture. Individual commanding officers have been discussed elsewhere. COs
usually held the rank of lieutenant colonel in infantry battalions and major
(1) Diary, 16 Aug. 1917, P. Fraser papers, 85/32/1, IWM.
(2) L. Humphreys, KRS Q.
(3) Letter, 9 July 1916, R.E. Wilson, KRS Q.
(4) A.H. Cope, KRS Q.
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in artillery batteries, these ranks often being held on a temporary basis. The
ideal CO was a benevolent paternal figure. One padre in 1918 went as far as
to describe the Almighty as ' a gallant and fatherly Colonel who went over the
top with his men'.(l) Some COs were indeed loved by their men. A private of 1/4
R. Sussex declared that 'I would do anything for our colonel as he is a real
gentleman & leader of men & is liked by all the ranks'.(2) An NCO of 5/Welsh
noted in his diary the general sense of loss at the death of Lt.Col. Pridham,
whom he described as a 'good man'.(3) However, comments such as these must be
balanced by other, less complimentary remarks by soldiers of other units for
whom their CO was a remote figure who had little apparent impact on their
lives, for it took a particularly dynamic personality to impose itself on a unit
as	 large as an infantry battalion.(4)
The personality of the CO could shape the character of a unit.(5) Moving
from inspecting one training unit to another in May 1916, Maj.Gen. G.G.A.
Egerton found himself 'in a different world altogether', the principal
difference between the two units being the characters of the respective COs.(6)
On active service the influence, for good or ill, of the unit commander was even
more important. In the autumn of 1917 the poor leadership of the CO of
li/Argylls demoralised the men, who made obscene remarks about him within
earshot of their officers, who shared their men's opinions. His successor
possessed all the qualities he lacked; 'efficiency', 'sense of duty' 'common
sense' 'good humour', and this new broom revitalised morale in the unit.(7) A
(1) G.A. Studdert-Kennedy, 'Religious Difficulties' in F.B. MacNutt, (ed.) The
Church in the Furnace (London, 1918) p.391.
(2) Diary, 17 Feb. 1917, R.H. Sims papers, 77/130/1, IWM.
(3) Diary, 16 Dec. 1916. J.M. Thomas 88/56/I, IWN.
(4) N. Gladden, Somme 1916 (London, 1974) p.173; Coppard, p.13.
(5) P. Maze, A Frenchman in Khaki (London, 1934) p.270.
(6) Notebook I, pp.31-33, G.G.A. Egerton papers, 73/51/1, IWM.
(7) Diary, 25 Oct, 31 Dec. 1917, R.L. Mackay papers, IWN.
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rather similar situation existed in a divisional battery in early 1918, where
an unpopular commander caused morale to sink. The mere arrival of his
replacement caused the tension to relax. (1) It is important to note that the
fact that a commanding officer was popular and paternal did not necessarily
mean that he was efficient. A Liberal politician, Sir George McCrae, raised and
commanded 16/R.Scots (2nd Edinburgh City battalion). Following the battalion's
failure in an action in August 1916, his divisional commander reported that
although McCrae was personally gallant and always cheerful, and his men were
devoted to him, his deficiencies as a commander (which, it was hinted, included
a reluctance to accept casualties) rendered him unfit to command a battalion on
active service. McCrae was appointed to command a reserve unit.(2)
The average private would have encountered the average CO much less frequently
than other, more junior officers. However the commanding officer could have
considerable influence on the state of officer-man relations within a unit.
The sheer power wielded by the CO over the lives of his men was impressive; he
was well	 placed to modify the military system, or conversely, enforce the
disciplinary code with utmost rigour. In some cases the attitude of the CO to
officman relations and discipline could set the tone for all the officers of
the unit (see chapters 6 and 9). Since commanding officers were very often
Regular soldiers, sometimes with a substantive rank as low as captain, they
could provide a valuable thread of continuity with the prewar army, passing on
the Regular tradition of paternalism to temporary officers.
Chaplains (or padres) and RilOs are also discussed, on an individual basis,
elsewhere in this thesis. Neither were, formally, combatant officers, and thus
(1) P.J. Campbell, 'The Ebb and Flow of Battle' in In the Cannon's Mouth
(London, 1986 edn.) p.203. See also 'F.O.O.', The Making of a Gunner (London,
1916) p.101.
(2) Report by Maj.Gen. Nicholson, GOC 34th Division on operations of 16/R.
Scots, 3/4 Aug. 1916, in Sir. G. McCrae papers, LHCNA.
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their relations with rankers were inevitably slightly unusual. PilOs could have
a great influence on the fate of individuals. A soldier coming to an RMO with
an ailment might be treated sympathetically, which could mean a man being
excused trench duty, or he might receive 'medicine and duty'. Thus the RhO
constantly had to judge whether or not a soldier was shamming sickness.
Individual RMOs were largely judged by rankers on the basis of their compassion
(or, to put it another way, their leniency). Capt. Lodge Patch, RhO of
8/Queen's, was regarded by his men as callous and nicknamed 'Iodine Dick', a
judgement which receives some confirmation from Lodge Patch himself (see
above).(l) By contrast, a private recorded in his diary his admiration of the
RMO of 10/Essex, who had worked unstintingly with the wounded after an
action. (2) It seems that rankers tended to judge RMOs, like line officers, by
the criteria of paternalism and courage.
Padres had to overcome a number of difficulties to establish close
relationships with rankers. There was inherent tension between the padre's
spiritual role and his position in the military hierarchy. In the words of one
divisional chaplain, the padre's	 status as an officer was 'a hindrance to
overcome; it removes him to a distance'.(3) Padres could, however, use their
anomalous position to good effect, moving 'between the ranks with diplomacy and
understanding'.(4) In some cases, restrictions were placed on padres visiting
the trenches, which automatically set up a barrier between soldiers who had
experienced the stress of trench warfare, and padres who had not. Those padres
who did visit the trenches could form rewarding relationships with rankers.(5)
While some soldiers were impressed by the spiritual side of the padre's work,
(1) Unpublished account, p.38, A.J. Abraham papers, P.191, IWM.
(2) Diary, 2 May 1917, R. Cude papers, IWM.
(3) N. Linton-Smith, 'Fellowship in the Church' in MacNutt, p.110.




the rule of thumb being that the greater the degree of sharing of the soldier's
conditions by the padre, the greater attention paid to the Christian message,
(1) it appears that chaplains were also judged by criteria unrelated to their
effectiveness as priests. Capt. Noel Mellish VC, the padre of 4/RF, had,
according to a private, the 'men's interests and comfort always in his mind',
once rigging up a makeshift swimming pool for the men with the help of some
pioneers.(2) The chaplain attached to 32nd TMB was similarly admired for his
courage and paternalism, receiving a considerable compliment from one ranker, a
Yorkshire miner: '"He's a man is our padre."'(3) The most effective chaplains
were those who had their full complement of courage and paternalism, allied to
the ability to overcome the barriers of rank and class. It is instructive to
compare rankers' views of two padres who served with 22/RF. The first, E.P.
St. John NC, was a jovial, soldierly, paternal figure, popular with all ranks.
His successor, C.E. Raven, a noted theologian and the Dean of Emmanuel College,
Cambridge, was by contrast largely ignored by his military flock. Raven, as his
wartime letters reveal, was a lonely and isolated figure, who failed to adjust
to the demands of ministering to an infantry battalion on the Western Front.(4)
Few bodies of men have been subjected to as much vilification as the generals
and staff officers of the British army of the Great War. A number of former
soldiers of all ranks, and many historians, have taken the view that they were
remote from the fighting soldiers, callous, and incompetent.(5) Senior officers
who fulfilled the criteria of paternalism and courage could however be admired
by other ranks. Plumer, commander of Second Army, achieved a reputation as a
(1) Brown, Imperial War Museum p.241.
(2) A. Brown, Destiny (Bognor, 1979) pp.5-6.
(3) Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories p.672.
(4) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service' pp.25-26, 73.
(5) See for example, Siegfried Sassoon's poem 'The General' in Gardner, Up the
Line to Death p.97 and A. Clark, The Donkeys (London, 1961).
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'caring' general who did not waste his men's lives.(1) At a much lover level,
two brigadier-generals, F.W. Lumsden VC and R.O. Xellett, commanders of 14th
and 99th Infantry brigades respectively, were well thought of by other ranks.
All three commanders were admired for their bravery, paternalism or both. A
private of 5/6 R. Scots described Lumsden as
one of the very best. Wearing his cheesecutter with red tabs...just as if he
had been on the parade ground, he went into the front line trenches amid all
the mud, barbed wire etc... (2)
Rather than generalising about soldiers' attitudes to 'the generals', it is
necessary to examine each case on its individual merits.
Inevitably, staff officers' duties made it difficult for them to demonstrate
courage or paternalism, although it should be noted that the term 'staff
officer' is a broad one and the position of, say, a captain on the staff of a
brigade could at times be highly dangerous. Inevitably, the staff were seen by
some as gilded popinjays, living in the lap of luxury, in stark contrast to
front line soldiers.(3) In reality, staff work was unglamourous and exhausting.
As Charles Carrington pointed out, animosity between fighting soldiers and
the staff had a long tradition that certainly predated the Great War.(4)
However, when the infantry were victims of bad staff work, their bitterness came
to the fore. (5) Other rear echelon officers were also loathed. Pte. J. Woollin
described a Railway Transport Officer encountered on his way to demobilisation
in 1919 as 'omnipotent. The serving soldier was to him merely a unit to be
entered on the forms he filled'.(6) Ironically, Woollin himself, as a member of
the ASC, would have been envied and despised by many infantrymen.
(1) G. Powell, Plumer: The Soldier's General (London, 1990) p.281; Mottram,
Journey p.27.
(2) D. Clarkson, Memoirs of A Company Runner (Edinburgh, 1972) p.18. For
Kellett, see Sheffield, 'War Service' pp.68-71.
(3) P.R. Munday, XRS Q; unpublished account, p.1, S. Ragget papers, 90/1/1, IWM.
(4) Carrington, Soldier from the Wars p.99.
(5) Smith, Four Years p.187.
(6) Unpublished account, p.8, J. Woollin papers, PP/NCR/ho, IWM.
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Lecturing to Staff College students in 1938, an officer who had served with an
infantry battalion in 1914-15 stated that, from the perspective of the frontline
soldier, good generals and staff officers were distinguished by 'man mastership'
(ie man-management). Those who visited units in the trenches during dangerous
periods or after a unit had returned from battle were 'amply rewarded by
increased confidence on [the part] of the regimental officers and men'.(l) It
might be argued that unpopular staff officers and generals helped to define
relations between regimental officers and men. The colonel of a battalion was
usually the highest ranking officer who was regarded as 'one of "us", as part
of a community.(2) As has been demonstrated above, defending their men against
the unfair demands of higher command could give regimental officers a focus for
their paternalism, while, it will be suggested in future chapters, soldiers'
morale was enhanced by the knowledge that their officers were behaving in such a
fashion. By appearing to both regimental officers and other ranks as an enemy
against which they could unite, unpopular generals and staff officers helped to
turn military units into cohesive communities.
7.8 'Temporary Gentlemen' and Officer-Nan Relations
The broadening of the social base of the officer class did not meet with
universal approval. In the early years of the war there was some fairly
predictable criticism in the press on the grounds of social snobbery, which can
be summed up in the perjorative phrase 'temporary gentlemen'.(3) This term
needs to be clarified. Some temporary officers adopted it out of a perverse form
of pride. Dennis Wheatley, a man of some social standing, entitled his war
(1) Col. N.G.N. Stopford, lecture, p.13, Couf. 3898, SCL.
(2) Carrington, Soldier from the Wars p.100.
(3) For an example, see Mr Punch's History of the Great War p.123.
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memoirs Officer and Temporary Gentleman.(1) A temporary officer could be a man
with a public school education who had initially enlisted in the ranks, or he
could be a man of lower middle-class or even working-class origins. There were
certainly occasions when temporary officers lived up to their unflattering image
by committing faux pas such as arriving at the exclusive Sudan club riding a
camel, or using red or green ink to apply for their commissions. (2) However,
some Regular officers genuinely believed that men lacking a traditional social
and educational background would also lack paternalism, and would therefore
make poor officers.
A newly commissioned old Etonian subaltern, J.E.H. Neville, of the socially
prestigious 52nd Light Infantry (2/OBLI), described an officer of 23/RF as 'a
most temporary gentleman'. 'A man like that gives himself away badly', Neville
claimed in a letter of 7 January 1917,
because he shows at once that he has not got the spirit of his regiment, or he
would not run down another better than his own. Heaven help the Army if chaps
of his kidney are going to be its officers of the future.(3)
A more measured but essentially similar opinion was that of R.T. Rees, a public
schoolmaster serving as a temporary infantry officer. He was to write that
although non-public school officers 'often made good', it took time for them
'to acquire the sense of responsibility and facility of leadership' which was
fostered by the public schools: 'We had some anxious moments at first because of
the lack of these qualities'.(4) Much the same fear was implicit in the
views of the Adjutant-General at GHQ, who in May 1915 suggested that Regular
officers serving in New Army and Territorial units should not command companies
(1) D. Wheatley, Officer and Temporary Gentleman (London, 1978).
(2) Unpublished account, p.22, W.G. Wallace papers, LHCNA; Parsons to Secretary,
WO, 29 Nov. 1914, Sir L.W. Parsons papers, LHCMA.
(3) J.E.H. Neville, The War Letters of a Light Infantryman (London, 1930) p.6.
(4) R.T. Rees, A Schoolmaster at War (London, rid) p.79.
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or 'expose themselves unnecessarily, as it is impossible to find regular
officers to replace them'.(l)
Although these assumptions died extremely hard - controversies occured on
similar lines during the Second World War and in the 1960s (2) - these views
were by no means held by all public school educated officers of the Great War.
In the 1930s Naj.Gen. Sir Ernest Swinton roundly denounced views that the
officers of 1918 were 'poor in quality' as 'largely rubbish'. Swinton conceded
that in the circumstances it was not surprising that officers were only half-
trained but 'they did their best, and what more could a man do?', implying that
the performance of such men was all the more remarkable for their lack of
training.(3) One retrospective view which is particularly worthy of attention
is that of Hubert Essame, who served as a Regular subaltern in the 2/Northants.
in 1918,	 and who subsequently became a distinguished general and military
historian. Essame emphasised 	 the importance of the junior officer in the
battles of 1918, but stressed that the junior commissioned ranks were no longer
dominated by the public school educated officers. In 1918 regimental officers
were drawn from a number of 'levels of society', forming a society 'based on
mutual loyalty and trust from which distinctions of class had long since
vanished.' However, the Regular code of officer-man relations, with all that
implied in terms of paternalism, was adhered to by the temporary officers of
1918.(4) There is little here that indicates that the quality of junior officers
had deteriorated in 1918, in the sense that they were less effective as military
(1) 12 Nay 1915, WD, Adjutant-General, GHQ, WO 95/25, PRO.
(2) A. Calder, The People's War (London, 1971 edn.) p.285; The Times, 29 Apr.
1963.
(3) Sir. E. Swinton, in Twenty Years After II, (London, 1938) p.1188.
(4) H. Essame, The Battle For Europe, 1918 (London, 1972) pp. 12-13, 107-8, lii,
179-81. See also Barclay, pp.100-I.
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leaders.
These retrospective views are buttressed by a mass of evidence of temporary
officers themselves, who in the main seem to have been received into their units
with the same degree of pragmatism that lay behind their commissioning in the
first place. There were some exceptions, particularly at the beginning of the
war, where some lower-class ranker officers were patronised and even insulted by
other officers. (1) In mitigation, it might be said that the treatment of newly
arrived temporary officers in 1914-15 in Regular units was in many ways a
continuation of the treatment of their pre-war predecessors who received the
unflattering soubriquet of 'warts'. In addition, the rapid expansion of the army
at the beginning of the war undoubtedly resulted in commissions being given to
men who were unfitted to hold them. (2) F.P. Crozier estimated that one in three
of the officers that went to France with 9/R.I. Rif. in 1915 were 'duds', and
that the proportion was probably higher in other battalions.(3) However,
Regular officers, whatever their private feelings, seem to have avoided out-and-
out rudeness.(4)
In the latter years of the war, when officers were selected on merit and
there were fewer Regular officers serving in units, prejudice against temporary
officers seems to have subsided. A ranker officer who joined the 2/RWF in June
1917 commented that there was not 'another Regular battalion where the Temporary
Officer had as much fair play if he had anything in him', which presumably
means that the officer was accepted if he was congenial company and
attempted to behave in a officerlike fashion. (5) The latter factor was all
important. 'One did not want to spend one's life in a barrack room atmosphere' a
(1) F. Moor, KRS Q.
(2) 'F.O.O.', p.121.
(3) F.P. Crozier, Impressions and Recollections (London, 1930) p.162.
(4) Sir. A. Bishop, KRS Q.
(5) Dunn, p. 357. See also Pilcher, General's Letters pp. 9, 11.
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former Regular officer wrote long after the war. 'Others who may criticise this
statement did not have to do so'.(l) Potentially, an 	 even more delicate
situation arose when an ex-private or NCO was returned to his former unit
as an officer, and in fact most ranker-officers were posted to new units on
receiving their commission. However, John Lucy, who joining 2/R.I. Rif. (a
Regular battalion) as a second lieutenant in 1917, was one of many ranker
officers who received a 'a warm welcome' on joining their former unit.(2)
While temporary officers were accepted readily enough as platoon, company and
even battalion commanders, there was a common belief that Regular prejudice and
jealousy never vanished entirely. Col. W. Robertson, GSO 1 of Second Army,
complained 'We had the best brains of the Empire at our disposal, and we failed
to make full use of them'. (3)
By one obvious criterion, the officers of 1917-18 may appear to have been less
paternal than their predecessors. it is fairly rare to find references to them
buying gifts for their men. Those references that can be found tend to be the
letters of atypical officers such as chaplains and prewar Regulars.(4) This
does not necessarily indicate a lack of paternalism on the part of the
temporary officers of 1917-18. The British civilian population was short of food
in these years, which led to some alarm in official circles at the possible
impact on the morale of the BEF.(5)	 As an infantry private's letters
demonstrate, small quantities of food could be sent out from home as late as
(1) L.H.M. Westropp, KRS Q.
(2) Lucy, p.353; G.H. Cole, KRS Q; Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', p.61.
(3) Letter, nd, c. 1936, W. Robertson, CAB 45/137, PRO. For a discussion of
this question see [B.H. Liddell Hart] 'Bardell' 'Study and Reflection v.
Practical Experience', , VI, No.2 (1923) pp.318-31; I.F.W. Beckett, 'The
Territorial Force', in Beckett and Simpson, pp.11.O-3.
(4) Letter, 14 Feb., 29(?) Mar., 8 May 1918, C.E.G.Parry-Okenden papers, 90/7/1,
IWN; letter, 7 May 1917, H.M. Dillon papers, IWM.
(5) 'Rationing: Food Queues: notes and memoranda on their prevention', MAF
60/243, PRO. See also Waites, 'Government of the Home Front' pp. 188-98.
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the autumn of 1918 (1) but it is likely that bulk orders of 500 large mince
pies (or whatever) would have presented greater difficulties.
Perhaps more importantly, many officers commissioned in 1916-18 simply would
have been unable to afford large scale purchasing of gifts for their men. In
1916, a second lieutenant's pay was 7s 6d or 8s 6d per day. (2) While various
allowances were made, expenses could eat up much of this pay. An officers'
field kit from Humphreys and Crook of Haymarket cost £7 Is 9d. A mess bill of a
subaltern of 2/7 Middlesex in England in July 1915 amounted to £3 l6s 4d, after
a messing allowance had been deducted from the original bill. (3) On joining a
Regular battalion in France in 1916, Nettleton was horrified to find that his
first week's mess bill exceeded his pay.(4) While some officers may veil have
been reasonably well-off on active service,(5) others, particularly poorer men
who sent money home to their families, would not have had sufficient spare cash
to buy gifts in bulk for their men on a regular basis. That was the prerogative
of the moderately affluent officer, of whom there were decreasing numbers in
the British army of 1917-18.
By 1917-18 officers were usually selected because they had demonstrated
leadership or leadership potential on the battlefield as privates or NCOs. (6)
Given the fact that the BEF's morale remained high, and that a wealth of
evidence, examined in chapter 9, suggests that there is a connection between
leadership and morale, it may be argued that the 'traditional' view of the
attributes of an officer - summarised by Keith Simpson as the possession of 'a
certain style of dress, behaviour and speech which had to be quite different
(1) Letters, ad and 12 Oct. 1918, A.H. Swettenhain papers, 83/31/1, IWM.
(2) T. O'Toole, The Way They Have in the Army (London, 1916) p.163.
(3) These figures are drawn from items in H.F. Bowser papers, 88/56/1, IWN.
(4) Nettleton, p.57.
(5) Simpson, The Officer?p.77; Nellersh, p.56.
(6) R.H. Arhrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War
(London, 1958) p.51.
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from that of the rank and file' (1) - was, by 1918, outmoded. The average
temporary regimental officer of 1918, unlike his public school educated
predecessor of 1914, was a 'professional' in the sense that he had earned his
commission on the battlefield, rather than attaining it through the possession
of social and educational advantages. He was no less imbued with paternalism,
however. This last point can be illustrated by reference to a revealing passage
in an autobiographical novel which displays the thought processes of a
'temporary gentleman'.
'Phillip Maddison', newly commissioned into the 'Gaultshires' from the ranks
of a Territorial unit, is invited to drink tea with some of his men:
[He] had...made a point of speaking to each man by name...He must imitate the
Duke's way, in the Gaultshires, according to "Spectre" West, [a senior
officer] of asking questions about their homes, encouraging them to speak...
He wanted to leave while the good impression of him remained. Should he say
Goodnight, men, as was correct, or Goodnight, you fellows? Which?
"Goodnight, boys!"
"Goodnight, sir!" in instant chorus...[He was jubiliant that] at last, he
felt that he belonged to the men of his platoon, as they to him...(2)
The career of the author of this passage, Henry Williamson, closely paralled
that of his fictional alter ego. The passage is interesting in that it
illustrates the effort made by a ranker-officer, who had an inferiority complex
about his lower middle-class social origins, to conform to expected standards of
paternalism by consciously imitating the behaviour of Regular officers, and his
elation as he felt that his efforts were rewarded. (3)
In conclusion, the newspaper stereotype of British officer-man relations was
accurate in	 that	 the vast majority of officers, Regular, Territorial or
temporary, shared a coon belief in the need for paternal care of their men,
(1) Simpson, The Officers'p.84.
(2) H. Williamson, The Golden Virgin (London, 1984 edn.) pp.225-26.
(3) For Williamson's military career and the value of his novels as historical
evidence, see H. Cecil, 'Henry Williamson: Witness of the Great War' in B.
Sewell, (ed.) Henry Williamson, The Man and his Works: A Symposium (Padstow,
1980) pp.69-82.
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and many officers' paternalism developed into deep affection for their men. The
next chapter will look at the question of officer-man relations mainly from the
perspective of the other rank.
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Chapter 8
Officer-Nan Relations - The Rankers' Perspective
In this chapter the
	 officer-man relationship will be examined from the
standpoint of the ordinary soldier. It will be shown that the ranker's
perception of the
	 relationship was in some ways similar, but in others
dissimilar, from that of the officer. In keeping with the general concept of
deference, soldiers were not prepared to respect officers merely because they
held the King's commission.(1) Rather, the soldier's respect had to be earned by
the officer, who had to
	 demonstrate a number of leadership qualities. The
nature of relations between officers of lower-class origin and their men will
then be examined, as will off icer-NCO relations. Finally, the validity of the
concept of a British 'war generation' will evaluated.
8.1 The Qualities of a Good Officer: Other Ranks' Views
Working-class rankers tended to judge officers by a simple set of criteria.
According to Pte. W.V. Tilsey (2/5 LF), a 'Derby ' man, rankers believed that
officers fell into [one ofi two categories. If they passed dirty rifles,
handled a spade, or carried a bag of cement, they were "aw reet". If not,
they were "no bloody bon."
A middle-class volunteer, Pte. Ivor Gurney of 2/5 Gloucesters., recorded the
views of his working-class comrades in similar terms:
A bad officer, that is, a bully, is a _______! A good officer, that is, a
(sic) considerate, is "a toff". "I'd follow him anywhere". "The men's friend;"
or simply, but in significant tones, "gentleman"!
(1) F. Manning, The Middle Parts of Fortune (London, 1977 edn.) p.75.
(2) V.W. Tilsey, Other Ranks (London, 1931) p.126.
(3) I. Gurney, (R.K.R. Thornton, ed.) War Letters (London, 1984) p.217.
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Other ranks tended to judge officers almost entirely in terms of the deferential
dialectic. More simply, the ranker's view of his officer was largely determined
by	 the way the officer behaved towards him, as at least one officer
realised.(l) Officers had to juggle two aspects of their duties. They had to
be militarily efficient, but also had to protect their men, and these two
roles could sometimes conflict. This meant that a ranker's view of his officer
could vary according to the circumstances. A ranker recalled that on one
occasion hungry, cold men on a long march took a dim view of even a normally
popular officer, but that attitude changed to one of genuine gratitude when the
officers provided a surprise Christmas dinner for the men. (2)
Other factors were far less important in determining a soldier's perception
of an officer. Rank in itself was almost irrelevant. The mere fact that a man
possessed the King's commission was not enough to inspire the respect of those
whom he commanded. Strict disciplinarians were not necessarily unpopular, as
they could also possess other qualities, such as courage, of which the men
approved. (3)- An officer's youth was not necessarily a barrier to winning
men's aproval. In later life, Lt. W.R. Bion (Tank Corps) wondered if anybody,
'outside of a public-school culture, believe in the fitness of a boy of nineteen
to officer troops in battle?' The answer was that the non-public school classes
of 1914-18 accepted nineteen-year-old boys as military leaders provided the
latter behaved in an officer-like manner. An incident in Bion's career suggests
that a form of reverse paternalism could exist, in which rankers made
concessions to the youth of officers. When his tank broke down in action in
1917, Bion was calmed by the thirty-eight year old 'grandfather' of the crew
(1) 'Mark VII', pp.101-102.
(2) Privately published article, L.B. Stanley papers, LULLC.
(3) See the views of a gunner of 61st Divisional Artillery on his CO, Maj.
Harris, expressed in letters and diary entries; unpublished account, pp. l.7, 61,
78, S.L.C. Edwards papers, IWN.
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who showed him photographs of his family. (1) Pte. Clarkson of 5/6 R. Scots
recalled that green young officers were inclined to try teach old sweats
their business, as it were, but nevertheless, he admired their courage.(2)
Pte. A. Jobson (39th Division Field Ambulance) placed officers into three
categories: 'Good, Bad and perfectly B...y'. (3) While this oversimplifies the
ambiguities inherent in the officer-man relationship, Jobson's view may be
interpreted as meaning that good officers fulfilled their paternal role, bad
officers did not, while 'perfectly B...y' officers were those who were
deliberately unpleasant or oppressive towards the men. Broadly speaking, there
were three major reasons why officers were disliked by other ranks: failures in
paternalism; failures of leadership; and deliberate unpleasantness.
Possibly the most important factor in determining a soldier's attitude to his
officer was the extent to which he cared for the wellbeing of his men. The
diary of a ranker of 27th Division Ammunition Column shows a direct correlation
between his low morale and poor conditions and food, for which he blamed his
officers: 'Rotten lot of officers - they are alright but they don't mind about
us'.(4) (The relationship between paternalism and morale is considered at length
in chapter 9). Rankers also expected by their men to show leadership qualities
in battle. Pte. S.B. Abbot (86th N.G. Coy.) condemned one of his officers
(nicknamed 'The Orphan') as a 'thruster', prepared to endanger his men's lives
by unnecessary displays of excess zeal in 'strafing' the enemy positions, while
simultaneously appearing to be over-concerned for his own safety. Abbot
implicitly compared The Orphan with another officer, referred to respectfully as




(4) Diary, 1, 14, 20 Jan. 1915, J.W. Gower papers, 88/56/1, IWN.
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'our brave and kind officer' when he was killed in April 1917.(1) The essence
of leadership is diverting the cohesion of the group into the ends desired by
the military hierarchy, but this example demonstrates that if officers are
perceived to be too eager to take risks, and thus jeopardise their troops, at
the very least they forfeit the respect of their men. This seems to have
happened, temporarily at least, in 2/R. Sussex after the battle of Aubers Ridge
in May 1915. According to one sergeant, the men blamed the officers for adopting
linear tactics which resulted,heavy casualties.(2) Conversely, in the eyes of
his men, an officer's courage could compensate for other failings. A group of
rankers, discussing their officer, were heard to say 'No that little one don't
know much, but he's always about when it comes on to shell'.(3)
En general, a middle-class Territorial ranker wrote, 1 fficers' 'outward and
visible standard of courage' was higher than that of the other ranks.(4)
'Windy' officers were usually regarded with some disgust. Both senior and
junior non-commissioned ranks felt contempt for an officer of 1/13 Londons 'for
showing his fear in front of the men he was supposed to be leading', by ducking
on hearing shells explode, the RSM going so far as to shout at him to 'keep his
head up'.(5) An officer of 22/RF was once found cowering at the bottom of a
trench at the beginning of an attack; his platoon sergeant swore at him, and
physically bundled him over the parapet.(6) George Coppard (37&LM.G. Coy)
mingled his disgust for an officer who refused to emerge from a dugout with
(1) Unpublished account, S.B. Abbot papers, 78/36/1, IWM; 28-30 Apr. 1917, WD,
86 Bde. MG Coy, WO 95/2302, PRO.
(2) Unpublished memoir, p.10, F.M. Packham papers, P.316, IWM.
(3) Nettleton, p.191.
(4) J. Gibbons, Roll On, Next War! (London, 1935) p.69.
(5) J.R. Thcker, Johnny Get Your Gun (London, 1978) p.152.
(6) Sheffield, 'War Service', p.76.
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pity for his physical and mental condition. (1) Although one ex-ranker wrote of
men covering up the deficiencies of 'dud' officers, this attitude does not
seem to have been typical.(2) Many soldiers appeared to have shared Lord
Moran's view that courage was very much a matter of character and willpower,
that everyone felt fear, but only cowards gave way to it. (3) Officers were
expected by their men to set an example of courage. Cowardly officers had, in
the eyes of the other ranks, forfeited all right to commissioned status - and
the superior conditions and privileges that went with it.
Rankers also expected their officers to behave in a fitting, gentlemanly
manner when out of action. Genteel disgust at the loutish behaviour of some
'temporary gentleman' was shared by some rankers. An interesting insight into
this is given by Pte. Eric Linklater (4/5 Black Watch). One evening Linklater
was sitting in an estaminet with some sergeants when the peace was disturbed
by a drunken, argumentative and obviously sexually aroused temporary officer
chasing the hostess. The sergeants, working-class slum dwellers in civilian
life, were 'incensed by such behaviour in an officer of our regiment'. (4)
Officers did not have to make an exhibition of themselves to be condemned as
ungentlemanly by their men. Passages in the diary of the officers' mess sergeant
of a TF unit, 1/5 Buffs, indicate that he respected the original officers of
the battalion, who were gentlemanly and paternal, but he disliked their
replacements who lacked these qualities. The sergeant was greatly aggrieved when
his pay was reduced because the six surviving officers judged that he had less
(1) Coppard, pp.117-18. See also Gibbons, p.70.
(2) Anon, 'Memories V. Concerning Officers and NCOs', Twenty Years After,
supplementary vol. p.371.
(3) Moran also argued, however, that no man has an inexhaustable supply of
courage. Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London, 1945) pp. X, 10, 19-20, 26,
67.
(4) E. Linklater, Fanfare for a Tin Hat (London, 1970) p.61.
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work to do: 'A gentleman's thanks', he commented sarcastically, 'for what you
have done for them'.(l) This sergeant was	 reacting to his hierarchical
superiors failing to keep their side of the deferential bargain.
While failures of paternalism and leadership might be 	 ascribed, by
charitably-minded soldiers like Coppard, to the frailties of human nature,
deliberate unpleasantness on the part of officers was deeply resented. Pte.
A.J. Abraham came across two officers who were regarded as petty tyrants. One,
at a training unit, was nicknamed the 'Black Bastard'. He was 'a mean type and
we hated his guts'. The other, Abraham's platoon officer in 8/Queen's, made a
decision which long rankled with Abraham, when he refused to allow the men to
wear greatcoats or groundsheets in heavy rain. This failure to improve the
conditions of the men was just one of many reasons why Abraham had a low
opinion of this officer. However, Abraham had a very different attitude towards
others: 'Some of our officers were born leaders, men we instinctively trusted
and respected' .(2)
It is rare indeed to find a blanket condemnation of officers in soldiers'
memoirs, diaries or letters. A furious denunciation of one officer is likely to
be followed by a complimentary reference to another. Pte. Frank Dunham of
1/7 Londons was scathing about one officer, nicknamed 'Nellie', but wrote about
Capt. K.O. Peppiatt in 	 glowing	 terms.	 Peppiatt was 'a sport', a 'fine
soldier, who was not afraid to take his share in any of the risky jobs'.(3)
In fact, it is uncommon to discover an officer who was actively hated by his
men, as opposed to	 one who was criticised for neglecting his men or for
thoughtlessness. One such wasNorthamptonshire Yeomanry officer, known	 as
(1) Anon, 'Mesopotamian Diary: With the 5th Buffs along the Tigris 1915-16',
GW, 2, no.1, (Nov. 1989) pp.24-25; ibid, 2, No.3, (Feb. 1990) pp.65-66.
Ti) Unpublished account, pp.8a, 54, 84, A.J. Abraham papers, P.191, nm!.
(3) F. Dunham, (R.H. Haig and P.W. Turner, eds.) The Long Carry (Oxford, 1970)
pp.10, 31, 36, 42, 68, 82.
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'the Bloody Bastard', described by one ranker as 'the most detested and hated
officer I ever met in two world wars'.(l) The interesting point is not that this
officer was despised, but that he suffered by comparison with the officer whom
he had replaced, who had been popular with the men. Because most officers were
paternal and lived up their side of the unspoken deferential bargain, officers
who did not conform to the general pattern of officer-man relations were
regarded with especial distaste by rankers.
Favourable references to officers	 can often be found in the writings of
other ranks, although not as frequently as complementary references to men
occur in officers' letters and diaries. In part this is a reflection of the
differing perceptions of the relationship. It is also a product of the generally
healthy state of officer-man relations. Only if an officer was exceptionally
good, or exceptionally bad, or if a particular officer suddenly came to mind, if
he was killed or wounded for instance, was he likely to be mentioned in the
letters or diaries of an other rank. To take one instance, the first specific
death mentioned in the diary of Pte. Joe Griffiths (l/KRRC) was that of 2/Lt.
Bentall, 'who was only 18 a real good sort & was liked & respected by his
men'.(2) His sense of loss prompted Pte. Griffiths to record his appreciation
of this officer which otherwise would have been unknown.
Officers' privileges were resented by some, mostly middle-class, rankers.
One was a private of the London Scottish who objected to the greater
opportunities for leave available to officers.(3) His complaints were echoed
three years later by a conscript Pay Corps private.(4) The artist Stanley
Spencer, who served in the ranks of 7/R. Berks.in Macedonia, slipped an oblique
(I) Unpublished account, G.S. Chaplin papers, IWM.
(2) Diary, 3. Oct. 1915, J. Griffiths papers, 1W!!.
(3) Diary, 16 Feb. 1916, A. Mof fat papers, LULLC.
(4) Letter, 5 Sept. 1918, H. Innes papers, LULLC.
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comment into his painting of 'The Resurrection of the Soldiers' displayed in
Sandham Memorial Chapel. In amongst scenes of dead soldiers rising from their
graves and shaking hands with their mates is a glum-looking officer - identified
by his brown boots - cleaning his own kit.(1)
These criticisms were fairly exceptional. Pte. Coppard had no doubt about the
reason why most soldiers accepted the disparity in privileges without complaint:
'the Tommy accepted it as the natural order of things', although they might joke
about the differences, for example by referring to 'Old Orkney' whisky as
'Officers Only'.(2) Provided that an officer behaved in a certain way, his
privileges were not resented by the ordinary working-class soldier. If an
officer behaved in an 'unofficerlike' way, by acting unfairly, neglecting his
men or acting in a cowardly manner, in his men's eyes he forfeited his rights to
his life-style.
This point is illustrated by incidents that occured on a troop ship en route
to the Dardo.nelles in August 1915. On two consecutive days officers were allowed
ashore while the men were kept on board ship. Pte. G. Brown of the Royal
Engineers made several revealing remarks in his diary. Firstly, he commented
that	 the officers 'didn't play the game with us'. Secondly, while
admitting that to send a large number of men on shore leave presented
difficulties, 'the OCs should have been sports and tried some arrangement'. The
use of public school sporting imagery serves to reinforce the sense of
unfairness experienced by these rankers. Whether in the trenches or on board a
troopship, it was generally accepted by or1inary soldiers that the officer
might retire to a well-appointed dugout or cabin, but only after he had ensured
that his men were fed and made as comfortable as possible. In this case the
(1) Personal observation of Sandham Memorial Chapel, Burghclere, Berkshire. The
official guide leaflet misses the significance of this figure.
(2) Coppard, pp.17, 69.
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officers had neglected their paternal duty and officer-man relations suffered as
a result: '[There was] Bad feeling about the business and officers were booed
leaving'. (1)
8.2 Beloved Captains
In 1916, a middle-class ranker wrote of a temporary officer who had joined a
New Army battalion at the beginning of the war, knowing as little about military
life as the men he commanded. Gradually he learned the skills of a soldier
alongside his men. Little by little he learned the character of each individual
soldier of his platoon. By his kindly and tactful handling of the men, he won
their confidence, affection and love. The troops grew to feel that they belonged
to him, and he belonged to them. His smile 'was something worth living for, and
worth working for', while 'his look of displeasure and disappointment was a
thing that we would do anything to avoid'. In the trenches, the men worried for
his safety, and they mourned him when he was killed. In the final paragraph, the
'Beloved Captain' appears alongside Christ in heaven. (2)
The author, Donald Hankey, served in the ranks of 7/R. Bde.for a year in 1914-
15. His idealised portrait of 'The Beloved Captain', which first appeared in the
Spectator, reflects, in exaggerated form, the feelings of many rankers towards
good officers. It would be ludicrous to claim that all rankers regarded
all officers in this way, but some soldiers, working-class and middle-class
alike, certainly had a very high opinion of some of their officers. Some
younger soldiers hero-worshipped their officers, just as other youths idolised
(1) Diary, 10, 12 Aug. 1915, G. Brown papers, 85/Il/i, IWM.
(2) D. Hankey, A Student in Arms (London, 1916) pp.59-70.
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sportsmen or popular masters at school. (1) More mature men respected officers
for their courage and their demeanour. Ernest Shephard, a prewar Regular NCO of
1/Dorsets, described Captain Algeo as 'a real example of the Regular "Officer
and Gentleman"...Absolutely fearless and [whose] first and last thought [is] for
the men'. (2) A private of 1/15 Londons wrote that his company commander
held the devotion and respect of all who served him...His officers and men
were his family. He knew their foibles and most of their hopes and fears. They
executed his orders explicitly and confidently.(3)
Rifleman Giles Eyre (2/KRRC) also wrote of men defending the honour of their
officer against a rival platoon:
"There ain't no one in the Batt. like Mr. Walker, and you can swank as much as
yer likes. Ee know's 'im and wouldn't swap 'im for nuffink'(4)
Just as the Beloved Captain's platoon throve on his smile, it does seem that
small acts of kindness and friendship on the part of officers had a
disproportionate effect on rankers' morale. In a letter of July 1915 a lance
corporal of 7/Norfoiks, who, intetestingly, was of middle- rather than working-
class background, an artist in civilian life, mentioned that he had attended an
early morning Communion service. His former platoon commander, a fellow
scoutmaster, 'came up and spoke to me afterwards, which was very decent of him'.
(5) Rather more practically, in mid-1915 an officer of 2/R. Bde. told his men
who had been selected for a working party, that it was unfair for them to be
called upon 'to do fatigues while we were at rest, and told us not to work too
hard'.(6)
There are two points of particular interest about this incident.
(1) Coppard, p.S.
(2) Shephard, pp.82, 97.
(3) A. French, Gone For A Soldier (Kineton, 1972) p.29.
(4) G.E.M. Eyre, Some Harvest (London, 1938) p.168.
(5) Anon,. George Elton Sedding, The Life and Work of an Artist Soldier
(Letchworth, nd) pp.152, 154.
(6) Unpublished account, p.54, J.W. Riddell papers, 77/73/1, IWM.
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Firstly, it appears in the unpublished memoirs of J.W. Riddell, who was not a
sensitive middle-class artist but a hardbitten Regular NCO with prewar service.
Secondly, the officer's advice was well-intentioned but if the troops had taken
it, they would have been condemned to a longer spell in the trenches. The fact
that Riddell bothered to record the incident in his postwar memoirs, which were
extremely critical of military authority, indicates that the officer's kindness
and concern for his men, and his desire to protect them against the unfair
demands of the military systemwere appreciated. It also illustrates the gulf
in perceptions between the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.
How common a figure was the 'Beloved Captain'? A partial answer occurs in an
interesting analysis of the officer-man relationship which appeared in 1938.
Its author was a former ranker, who unfortunately chose to remain anonymous.
This article drew attention to the ambiguities in the officer-man relationship,
most notably when he wrote that a trick of memory produced a composite figure
whenever the author tried to recall his officers:
Boyish and middle-aged, cool and reckless, grave and humourous, aloof and
intimate; a martinet lapsing into an indulgent father; a thwarter becoming an
aider and abetter; an enemy melting into a friend.
This ex-ranker's analysis of the attributes of the good officer, interestingly
enough, had many points in common with the 'official' view of military
leadership discussed in an earlier chapter. He regarded the officers'
battlefield role as important: '[we] despised some for their deficiencies on
parade, while admiring their iinpeturbability under fire'. However, other
attributes of the 'good' officer were perhaps less likely to be approved by the
military hierarchy: 'no officer was good who had not learned when to be deaf,
dumb, and blind - and when not to be'. Most officers acquired these skills,
the writer asserted, on active service. They also learned to question Rudyard
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Kipling's	 opinions of the	 private's 'psychology	 and	 character', which
were,after all, some forty years out of date by the 1914-18 war,
	 and also
textbook views on 'the behaviour of men in the mass'. In the field, officers
learned man-management, and their effectiveness in this sphere greatly
influenced their men's opinion of them. The ideal officer, in the writer's
view, would have been a man of all-round talent. However, paternal officers who
genuinely cared about the welfare of the troops under Tht command would be
forgiven many sins of omission and commission by the ordinary soldier. One of
the writer's officers was renowned for his ineptitude on the drill square 'yet
this officer was the best in the battalion for the care of his men in the
trenches'.
'Looking back', the writer argued,
with a better appreciation of their difficulties than we then had,
at the officers under whom we served, we can have nothing but admiration
for almost all of them - admiration with a tinge of affection.
Officers who fell short of the ideal in some way, 'we can afford to forgive':
We do not need to be reminded that if in civil affairs we could get as square
a deal and as much consideration from our superiors as we got from officers
when we were in the Army, the world would be a pleasanter place to live in
than some of us are finding it.
Thus the writer was suggesting that most regimental officers were effective
man-managers who possessed, in some measure, the attributes and attitudes of the
'Beloved Captain'. This view lacks the sentimentality of Hankey's idealised
portrait, depicting instead officers as fallible human beings. However, like
Hankey's article, it expresses the rankers' admiration of brave and paternal
officers,	 and recognises the officer's role ir making life bearable for the
soldier. The impact of the officer on the morale of the private perhaps only
became apparent in retrospect. Back in civilian life former soldiers who were
now unemployed, or who worked in dangerous or unrewarding jobs, had no
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paternal subalterns to look after their interests.(1)
8.3 Relations Between Ranker-Officers and Their Men
Traditionally, Regular officers believed that working-class soldiers
preferred to be commanded by gentlemen, rather than by officers of humble
origin who had been promoted through the ranks.(2) How, then, were the large
numbers of officers of lover-class origin who received commissions during the
Great War regarded by the other ranks?
During the war, a number of public school educated officers, in addition to
middle-class and working-class soldiers, continued to cling to the traditional
attitude to ranker officers, partly out of sheer social snobbery. Pte. John
Tucker (1/13 Londons) recalled that a subaltern was disdained by the lower
ranks of this class corps because he had been a bank clerk and spoke with a
'slight cockney accent'. Interestingly, Tucker, who recognised in retrospect
that this prejudice was ludicrous, had himself been a city clerk before the
war.(3)	 A.M. Burrage, a middle-class journalist turned embittered private
soldier, wrote scathingly of some officers he encountered in a London restaurant
who
judging by the[ir] manners and accents...were nearly all "Smiffs",
late of Little Buggington Grammar School, who had been "clurks" in civil
life.. . (4)
In 1917 Pte. R. Cude (7/Buffs), commented that some newly-arrived officers
would not have been commissioned if it was not for the manpower shortage: 'Pon
my word, if this is the best that England can do, it is time she packed [up]'.
(1) Anon, 'Memories V', Twenty Years After, supp. vol, pp.369-72.
(2) Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p.103.
(3) Tucker, Johnny Get Your Gun p.41.
(4) 'Ex-Pte. X', p.216.
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It is interesting that Cude, who seems to have been an artisan in civilian
life, also described his platoon officer as 'a thorough Gentleman'. (1) The
latter comment was made in September 1915, before his unit had taken heavy
casualties and replacements for the original public school subalterns were
needed.
Some commentators attempted to rationalise the dislike of other ranks for
lower-class officers. G.W. Grossmith's evidence supports the traditional view of
ranker-officers. He believed that rankers preferred officers to be recognisable
as such by their speech and behaviour, and once heard a ranker comment that
his new platoon commander was 'only one of us'.(2) Grossmith served in the ranks
of 7/Beds. and was later commissioned into a Regular battalion, 2/Leicesters.
Such views may have been typical of Regular units, for a Regular RSM of 1/HLI
believed that humbly-born temporary offices, not being 'born and bred' to
leadership, did not command the same loyalty given by the men to public school
educated officers. (3)
Others offered more specific reasons why lower-class officers might be
disliked. A temporary officer of 1/6 RWX believed that ranker-officers were
unpopular with the men because 'they knew their job' and were aware of the
various tricks and dodges employed by the ranks; in other words, they were
poachers turned gamekeepers, and as gamekeepers they were rather too effective
for the men's liking.(4) A working-class private of 23/RF thought that former
NCOs found it necessary to assert themselves with officious behaviour. (5)
Burrage held a similar view:
(1) Diary, 6 Feb. 1917, 8-16 Sept. 1915, R. Cude papers, 1W!.!.
(2) G.W. Grossmith, KRS Q. See also the comments of a Regular officer of the
Devons in A.H. Cope, KRS Q.
(3) M.W. Parr, KRS Q.
(4) Thomas, A Life Apart p.67.
(5) C. Mizen, interview.
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Quite the worst type of officer was the promoted sergeant-major...Whatever
rank they achieved they were still warrant-officers in spirit. They could
never be anything else.(1)
An ex-Regular NCO who served as an officer in 2/Camerons seems to fit this
pattern. According to a fellow officer, writing in 1916, 'like most rankers, but
not all, [he isi not too well liked by the men. He is apt to be fussy and
bullying in matters of detail'. (2) This opinion is of interest not least
because the writer was himself a ranker-officer, although having served in the
ranks of the London Rifle Brigade, a Territorial class corps, he clearly
regarded himself as being in a very different category from a former Regular
NCO.
It is not surprising that attitudes such as these should be so widespread,
given the degree of class consciousness in British society and the assumptions
underlying the deferential/paternal relationship. Dr. Patricia N. Morris went as
far as to conclude in her study of the Leeds Rifles (1/7 and 2/7 W. Yorks.) that
the men of these Territorial units insisted on gentlemanly officers, and would
not accept officers who were not gentlemen, although this may not have been an
attitude which was typical of the Territorial Force in its entirety. (3)
Other wartime soldiers thought differently. J. Gibbons, who served in the
ranks of a London TF unit, believed that working-class replacements for public
school officers were just as effective as their socially elite predecesssors,
and swiftly learned many of the same mannerisms. (4) M.L. Walkington, an ex-
grammar school boy who served as a ranker in a TF class corps (16/Londons)
before being coimnissioned, believed that competent but poorly educated NCOs who
received commissions generally made valuable officers. The prospect of officer
(I) 'Ex-Pte. X', p.73.
(2) [Bell,] Soldier's Diary p.170
(3) P.M. Norris, 'Leeds and the Amateur Military Tradition: The Leeds Rifles and
its antecedents, 1815-1918', (Ph.D., University of Leeds, 1983) p.804.
(4) Gibbons, p.72.
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status gave 'great encouragement to young NCOs who developed ambition'.(l) The
usual practice was for newly-commissioned officers to be posted to units other
than the one in which they had served as rankers, but some cohesive 'family'
Territorial and New Army units preferred to take back their 'old boys'. (2)
This practice can also be found in some Regular units throughout the war. CSM
Sayers of 4/Middlesex was commissioned in the field in October 1914 and served
with the battalion until his death in 1915, while Sgt. Fenner, (3/R. Bde.) was
commissioned in his battalion in 1917. (3)
Commanders of units such as these presumably considered that the discipline
and cohesion of their battalion or battery was strong enough to overcome any
problems that might have resulted from allowing ranker officers back into their
original unit, although often such men were posted to different companies. One
such officer, G.H. Cole, commented that he had no problems adjusting to officer
status because he 'grew up' as a ranker in his battalion, 1/20 Londons. Cole had
also seen the matter from the ranker's perspective. While still a private, his
company commander had been a man who had been in his form at school. 'In
public, of course,' Cole wrote, 'No-one would have known that we had ever met.
(Iê) Although there was some prejudice against ranker-officers among other ranks,
it is rare indeed to find criticism of a specific officer whom a ranker had
known in his previous incarnation in the ranks.
Even outside 'family' units, soldiers meeting friends who were now
commissioned officers seem to have observed the spirit, if not the letter, of
(1) M.L. Walkington, KRS Q. See also F.H. Keeling's letter, 4 May 1916, in
Townshend, p.281.
(2) G.S. Mitchell, "Three Cheers for the Derrys" (Derry, 1991) pp.141-2 (10/R.
Innis. Fvs); Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service' p.61 (22/RF); L. Milner, Leeds
Pals (Barnsley, 1991) p.51 (151W. Yorksi.
(3) Diary, 19 Oct. 1914,	 T.S. Wollocombe papers,
	 RNASL; E.S. Woods, (ed.)
Andrew R. Buxton, The Rifle Brigade (London, 1918) p.278.
(4) G.H. Cole, KRS Q. See also A. Rule, Students Under Arms (Aberdeen, 1934)
p.77.
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discipline. Other ranks sometimes talked informally with officer friends but
rarely attempted to take advantage of this relationship. (1) The British army
could have followed the Australian practice and allowed more ranker-officers
to return to their old units (see chapter 9). Generally speaking, the self-
discipline of other ranks was strong enough to ensure that military efficiency
did not suffer from the commissioning of officers within a unit. It may even
have enhanced it, rather as Walkington suggested, by encouraging rankers to
strive for excellence, in the knowledge that they would not have to be posted
away from their battalion on becoming an officer.
By the end of the war the officers of the British army were drawn from a wider
social spectrum than ever before. It is possibly significant that Tucker's
comments cited above refer to 1915, a time when lower-class officers were
somewhat rarer than was to be the case later in the war, for if mistrust of
working-class and lower middle-class officers had been as widespread as some
have claimed, officer-man relations should have been poor throughout the army by
1918. Indeed, following this argument through to its logical conclusion, the
British army should have disintegrated in 1917-18 because other ranks refused to
follow the lower-class officers who were commissioned to replace the
'gentlemanly' officers who had been killed off. Of course, this did not happen.
The	 bulk of evidence offered in this thesis suggests that officer-man
relations remained cordial throughout the war.
Ultimately, an officer's relations with his men wtr. determined not by his
social class, or by his previous service in the ranks, but by his competence,
leadership skills, paternalism, and courage. It is probably fair to say that
some former Regular NCOs did not find the transistion to commissioned rank
easy, and that some officers drawn from outside the traditional officer-
(1) See for, example, A. Bird, (ed.) Honour Satisfied (Swindon, 1990) p.31; R.H.
Nottram, Journey to the Western Front (London, 1936) p.161.
-236-
providing strata of society had a more difficult task in establishing their
credibility with their soldiers than a former public schoolboy. However, it
should not be forgotten that officer training was remarkably effective in
educating ranker-officers in the ethos and methods of the Regular officer class,
and that from early 1916 onwards most commissions had to be earned on the
battlefield. A newly-commissioned officer had to give practical demonstrations
of his paternalism and leadership qualities in the trenches and on the
battlefield, and this would have compensated for any lack of social standing,
whatever misgivings private soldiers might originally have had about the social
origins of an officer. Confirmation of this theory comes from a surprising
source. That scourge of the temporary gentleman, Pte. A.M. Burrage, concluded
that officers
who caine from shops and offices, with little education and less tradition, did
their job somehow and did it well. I hated being jiggered about (we used a
slightly different phrase) by people that I considered my inferiors...but I
who was a private, and a bad one at that, freely own that it was the British
subaltern who won the war.(l)
8.4 Officer-Man Relations in Practice
There is a very useful phrase of Great War vintage: 'On parade, on parade; off
parade, off parade', meaning 'what was permissible on certain occasions might be
a military crime on others'. (2) This phrase aptly describes the relations of
many officers with their men; 'regimental' on some occasions, informal on
others. In the trenches, relations between officers and men were generally
characterised by a greater degree of informality than was the case behind the
lines. Officers and men quietly dispensed with much of the pomp and ceremony. In
(1) 'Ex-Pte. X', p.71.
(2) Brophy and Partridge, p.225. Officers also used this phrase, or a
variation on it, in the context of relations between senior and junior officers.
Notes for Young Officers (London, HMSO, 1917) p.2; Mosley, p.46.
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one extreme example, an 18th Division private reported (in a scandalised manner)
that officers and men of a 32nd Division unit were on Christian name terms. (1)
The use of soldiers' nicknames by officers was probably more common.(2) Such
informality was not always appreciated by higher military authorities, the lack
of 'regimental' soldiering in XI Corps in 1916 leading, in the view of Corps
staff, to a dangerous slackening of discipline. (3)
In the trenches, it would often be difficult for the casual observer to tell
officers and men apart. A newly-commissioned ranker-officer was helped to play
the part of a gentleman by his uniform, which was 'the khaki equivalent of
hunting dress', very different from the 'shabby garb of the artisan' worn by the
private. (4) However, in some units, officers carried rifles and packs and
wore privates' uniforms, the rank badges on the sleeve replaced by unobtrusive
pips on the shoulder. (5) While this adoption of rankers' dress as a protection
against snipers was not universally popular, some officers arguing that it was
wrong that men could not easily recognise their officers,(6) it aptly
symbolised the decrease in formality in inter-rank relations that generally
occured in the line.
George Coppard, the author of one of the most perceptive ranker's memoirs to
emerge from the war, somewhat cynically referred to the decreased gap between
officers and men in the trenches as 'a temporary attempt at chumminess'. (7)
In some units it might be the case that only in the trenches were junior
officers, out of sight of their superiors, able to establish informal relations
with their men. However, in other units officer-man relations achieved a degree
(1) Diary, December 1915, R. Cude papers, IWM.
(2) C. Crutchley, Shilling a Day Soldier (Bognor Regis, 1980) p.51.
(3) 'Notes on A. and Q. Conference, 29-5-16 at Headquarters XI Corps', WO
95/885, PRO.
(4) D. Winter, Death's Men (Harmondsworth, 1979 edn.) p.67.
(5) Letter, 22 Aug. 1915, W.P. Nevill papers, WPNI/34, IWN; Dunn, p.4.
(6) Letter, 9 May 1936, K. Sykes, CAB 45/137, PRO.
(7) Coppard, p.69.
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of informality out of the trenches. A sergeant of 2/6 LF recalled that in June
1917 D company was like 'one great happy family. After parades discipline was
relaxed and we were at liberty to spend most of our time in our own way'. There
was a 'close bond' between officers and men, a'very dear thing in the throes of
war'.(l) (See also chapter 9).
Coppard was not unsympathetic to officers. He commented on the weight of
responsibility that they bore for their men's lives. One mistake could kill the
men of their platoon: 'The nervousness, strain and irritability of his officers
could be responsible for a lot of what Tommy had to put up with'.(2) Similarly,
the stress of waiting to go into battle caused one artillery officer to 'play
hell' with the officers' servants.(3) 	 Coppard also made an important point
about the way in which one of the artificial barriers of rank was reduced on
active service. He believed that he became less scared of officers as time went
on, not because officers became 'any more friendly, but because we youngsters
were growing up'.(4) In action, officers could not hide behind their status and
rank. They had prove themselves as leaders, and inevitably some made mistakes
and demonstrated that they were far from omnipotent. A private of 32nd Field
Ambulance saw this process in operation on 7 August 1915, at Suvla Bay:
You could see the spreading dismay as the ordinary Tommies recognised their
own fear and hesitation in the eyes of these one-pip striplings [second
lieutenants]. Men under fire...watch each other with nerves on edge. "Blimey!
even the bloody officers are lost..."(5)
Such comments suggest that Capt. T.M. Sibley was to some extent correct when
(1) Quoted in C.H. Potter and A.S.0 Fothergill, The History of the 2/6th
Lancashire Fusiliers (Rochdale, 1927) p.49.
(2) Coppard, p.69.
(3) Campbell, Cannon's Mouth pp.59, 65.
(4) Coppard, p.69.
(5) J. Hargrave, The Suvla Bay Landing (London, 1964) p.116.
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he wrote in June 1916 the gulf between officers and men was 'a very important
part of the British Army system' and soldiers would lose their respect for some
officers if they came to know them. This remark gives a salutary reminder of
the difficulties of generalising about inter-rank relations in an organisation
as big as the BEF. (1)
In the words of a subaltern of 2/KOYLI, 'the horizon of the Infantryman in the
Great War was small, but his philosophy was straightfward'; the war had to be
fought, and if mail, food and cigarettes were available, the war was going
well.(2)	 One private was not untypical in regarding himself as belonging
firstly to his platoon, then to his company, and then to his battalion.(3) For
the most part, higher formations meant little to the private, although some
divisions such as 18th (Eastern), 51st (Highland) and 56th (London), did acquire
a measure of divisional esprit de corps. Junior officers and rankers alike
shared this narrowness of vision. (4) In this tiny, insular world, it is not
surprising that men turned in on each other for affection, or that minor acts of
benevolence were greatly appreciated. Many officers regarded it as part of
their duties to write letters of condolence to the families of soldiers who
had been killed or wounded while serving under their command. While this could
be interpreted as just another aspect of military paternalism, there are also
many examples of NCOs and privates writing to the families of their officers. It
was not uncommon for soldiers on leave to visit the families of their officers,
or officers the families of soldiers. (5)
(1) Letter, June 1916, T.M. Sibley papers, DS/Misc/44, IWM.
(2) Letter, nd C. 1963, K.J. Box, BBC/GW, IWM.
(3) Unpublished account, R.D. Fisher papers, 76/54/1, IWM.
(4) Crozier, Impressions and Recollections p.25.
(5) For a good selection of such letters, see N. Brown, Tommy Goes to War
(London, 1978), pp.199-200; Brown, Imperial War Museum p.234.
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Apart from demonstrating the affection and comradeship felt by men for their
officers, and vice versa, such letters also helped to relieve one of the
principal factors that undermined the morale of fighting men: worry about their
families. The soldier could face death knowing that
	 their loved ones would
receive some comfort, however small. Letters of sympathy from ordinary rankers
were perhaps especially comforting to officers' families, because they gave
evidence of the effectiveness of their military leadership, of a duty performed
unto death, of a sacrifice nobly given. In many cases, it took a real effort for
ill-educated privates to write a formal letter of this sort. This obviously did
not apply to Pte. S. Brashier of 22/RF who wrote to the family of the late Capt.
G.D.A. Black:
To us he was life itself, and the confidence we placed in him was great.
Really we used to say -"He knew no fear" and so though we greatly miss him we
realise what a sorrow and grief it (sic) has come to you, and so our thoughts
go out to you in your great sorrow.
This letter was copied and circulated among Black's family. It obviously did
provide some comfort, since it has been treasured in the family down to the
present day.(1)
Some point of mutual interest, such as common regional loyalties or language,
helped to break down barriers between the ranks. Edmund Blunden actually found
it easier to get on with his soldiers, fellow Sussexmen, than with some of his
brother officers.(2) Welsh-speaking officers and men of 15/RWF talked freely
together; English was regarded as 'the language of the Army, Welsh the language
of friendship and companionship' and the use of Welsh formed 'a bond of unity,
that sense of being an enclave within a community'. (3)
Close relationships could develop between officers and men when a soldier
(1) Letter,	 24 June 1916, S. Brashier. I am grateful to Mr. N. Lucas for
sending me a copy of this letter.
(2) B. Webb, Edmund Blunden: A Biography (New Haven, 1990) pp.52-53.
(3) L.W. Griffith, 'The Pattern of One Man's Remembering', in Panachias, p.287.
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emerged from the khaki mass. NCOs would sometimes find themselves alone with
officers, and mutual respect could blossom into greater intimacy. This happened
in, of all units, the South Persia Rifles, where a middle-class officer
(formerly a ranker in the 7/RDF) was thrown into the company of a British
sergeant.(1) Similarly, Anthony Eden (21/KRRC) wrote movingly of nights spent
on watch in Plugstreet Wood, when he would hold long discussions with a platoon
sergeant, Norman Carmichael, whom Eden counted as a friend. (2) (See below for a
further discussion of officer-NCO relations).
In apparent contradiction of the dictum that no man is a hero to his valet,
soldier servants and officers could become friendly within the bounds imposed
by rank and class.	 A public school officer of 1/N. Staffs. summed up his
relationship with Tidmarsh, his working-class 'old-soldier' batman, in these
words:
We were not exactly friends because of the differences in social class, but
accepting these differences we were not separated by them. Each regarded the
other as a personality to be respected.(3)
Soldier servants had a unique opportunity to get to know their officers,
'warts and all'. A prewar soldier servant's duties commenced each morning at
06.00, when he had to take	 a glass of whisky to his	 officer's bedroom,
followed by two boiled eggs and more whisky. (4) Soldiers had good reason 	 to
be friendly to their officers. As a private of'rWorcesterhire Yeomanry pointed
out, being an officer's servant 'is much better than being in the troops' since
he received many luxuries and was excused night guards. (5) It is certainly
(1) Letter of 6 Apr. 1918, T. Sherwood papers, IWM.
(2) A. Eden, Another World (London, 1976) pp.80-81.
(3) Martin, pp.156-57.
(4) Unpublished memoir, p.8, W.H. Davies papers, 8201-13, NMI.
(5) Letter, Mar. 1915, C.H. Rastall papers, IWM; see also letters of 17 and 21
Apr. 1916.
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true that many servants had a privileged position. These privileges might take
the form of physical comforts - a company commander of 2/21 Londons shared a
tent and pooled rations with his servant while on campaign in Palestine (1) -
but there were also more subtle benefits to being an officers' servant. This
is indicated by the obvious delight of a mess cook who summoned other servants
to watch the spectacle of a newly-arrived subaltern making a fool of himself.(2)
This incident, in which the officer had to be disentangled from coils of wire by
the grinning cook, also indicates that soldier servants were allowed a certain
amount of licence, an aspect of the relationship which is beautifully captured
by some of the comic scenes in Sherriff's play Journey's End. (3)
An unfriendly or surly servant, let alone an incompetent one, ran the risk of
being returned to normal duty and forfeiting their privileged existence, so it
was in their own interests to be pleasant. 	 However, some genuine friendships
developed between officers and servants. An officer of Il/Cheshires 'witnessed
a most touching farewell' between the battalion commander and his old servant
they embraced 'and both shed tears'. (4) Pte. Harry Adams (6/Queen's) developed
a 'real attachment' to his officer, Mr. Jefferies, and experienced 'great grief'
when he heard of his death in 1918.(5) Capt. V.F. Eberle (48th Division RE)
commented that 'the relationship between a good batman and his officer is often
no mean criterion of the latter'.(6)
Other rankers who emerged from the anonymity of the ranks also enjoyed more
than usually intimate relations with officers. Pte. Clarkson, a runner for a
company commander in 5/6 R. Scots, wrote that mutual respect was high and that he
learned to trust his officer. In a common act of friendship, the officer would
(1) Caldicott, pp.1i5, 176.
(2) Vaughan, pp.17-18.
(3) Sherriff, Journey's End pp.8-9, 16-17.
(4) Letter, 7 July 1930, C.F. Hill, CAB 45/134, PRO.
(5) Unpublished account, p.12, H.L. Adams papers, 83/50/1, IWM.
(6) Eberle, p.149.
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often give Clarkson extra rum on cold nights.(I) Another soldier with a semi-
independent existence was Sgt. Jones, 'of Jones's water dump', on Gallipoli.
Officers and men alike would congregate in Jones's dugout to hear the latest
rumours. Naj. John Gillam (29th Division ASC) noted that 'We do not look upon
him as a soldier or an N.C.O....Personally, I feel that my relations with him
are as they would be to the landlord of a familiar roadside inn'. (2) All of
these examples indicate the type of informal, friendly relations which could
develop between officers and men when circumstances allowed individuals to get
to know each other as men.
However, it is clear that for the most part, circumstances did not allow
rankers and officers to develop this sort of relationship. The restraining hand
of the NCO was one of the factors why 	 inter-rank relations did not often
develop from friendliness into real intimacy. This is well illustrated by a
scene in an autobiographical novel by a ranker-officer, where a newly-arrived
subaltern briefs his men and then asks	 them if they have any
questions. This was clearly regarded as unusual, and to 'continue the feeling
of semi-intimacy with the officer' a private took advantage of the invitation
and actually asked a question. On receiving a polite and informative answer the
private was emboldened to ask others. However, the private was well aware of
the disapproval of his sergeant, who suspected insolence, although none was
intended. The moral of this episode was even if the private and the subaltern
were prepared to establish an informal relationship, the NCO, who in many ways
had the greater influence over the life of the private, was capable of being
less broad-minded. (3)
(1) Clarkson, p.13.
(2) J. Gillain, Gallipoli Diary (Stevenage, 1989 edn.) p.283.
(3) H. Williamson, A Fox Under Ny Cloak (London, 1985 edn.) pp.35-6.
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8.5 Of ficer-NCO Relations
The relationship between the Non-Conmiissioned Officer and the officer deserves
special consideration. The NCO played a crucial role in the maintenance of
discipline, and the administration and management of military units. During
the Great War, as before and since, NCOs were the 'backbone' of the British
army. They formed the crucial link between the officer and the ranker, passing
orders down the chain of command and performing, as a contemporary commentator
noted, the 'grave and all-important task of enforcing that prompt obedience to
orders that is the life's blood of an army'. (1) As noted above, the NCO, rather
than the officer, was often the figure of authority who had the greatest impact
on the life of the ordinary soldier, (2) although it is fair to say officers
and men came into contact more frequently on active service than in peacetime.
NCOs varied greatly in status. They included the lance corporal, 'one who has
position, but no magnitude'(3), an appointment which was only one step up from
a private and was	 often held in an acting and unpaid capacity. For our
purposes it also included the senior non-commissioned rank in a unit, the
regimental sergeant major (RSM), who was technically a warrant officer (wo). The
RSM, in contrast to the unfortunate 'lance jack', was a powerful and often
respected figure. The British NCO of 1914-18 is worthy of a major study but
here there is only space to reflect on those aspects of the NCOs' role that
directly affected officer-man relations.
Two	 varieties of NCO need to be distinguished. Firstly, there were the
Regular NCOs encountered by all soldiers at training establishments throughout
(1) Baynes, p.171; O'Toole, pp.148-9.
(2) For one such NCO, Sgt. Ross of 32nd Division TMB, see Artillery and Trench
Mortar Memories p.677.
(3) N. Hancock, 'War from the Ranks', in O'Riordan et al p.183.
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the war, some of whom were the 'old soldier' types immortalised by C.E.
Montague: men who preferred drinking to training, who were open to bribes, and
who stole army property.(1) Many were older men, reservists who were medically
unfit for active service. Secondly, there were NCOs appointed from the ranks
of wartime volunteers and conscripts. In the earlier part of the war, some
difficulty was experienced with such NCOs, as attempts to enforce the separation
from the rank and file deemed necessary by the army were not always successful
in New Army and Territorial units.(2)
NCOs had reached positions of responsibility because they were deemed by the
army to be more intelligent than privates and to have the ability to
adminster, and indeed accept, discipline (3) although the degree of trust
reposed in NCOs varied from unit to unit, depending on the personality of the
commanding officer. (4) A former farm labourer, serving as a junior NCO in a
trench mortar battery, summed the relationship between NCOs and men in these
words:
it dose (sic) not do for us [the NCOs] to sleep with 	 them [the men] for we
are like Masters on a farm and the men under us you see how the thing
works. (5)
Like civilian foreman, NCOs were needed to ensure smooth running of a unit, to
'keep a finger on the pulse' of a complex organisation. Thus the word of a NCO
was usually taken at face value, even if it conflicted with that of a private.
Reinforcement of the NCO's authority was seen as being of greater importance
than the strict administration of justice, and NCOs sometimes 	 imposed
(1) C.E. Montague, Disenchantment (London, 1928 edn.) pp.16-20, 24-25.
(2) Simkins, Kitchener's Army p.228; Middlebrook, First Day on the Somme p.18.
(3) Jobson, pp.177-78; Baynes, p.197. See also Andrews, Haunting Years pp.74-75.
(4) H. Dalton, With the British Guns in Italy (London, 1919) p.70.
(5) Letter, 26 Jan. 1917, 0. Hopkin, quoted in A.J. Peacock, 'A Rendezvous with
Death', Gunfire No.5 (1986)
	 p.368.
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punishments which were illegal but nonetheless tacitly condoned by officers.(1)
Thus it was vital that NCOs could be trusted by their officers. Capt. Hamond,
in a typically forthright sentence, wrote that an NCO who was a liar or who
manufactured evidence 'must be destroyed at once'.(2)
The NCOs' duties were not simply concerned with discipline. They had a vital
role in training, both on active service and at home. One gunner commented that
he did not come into contact with a single officer during his training in
England, for NCOs carried out all the work. (3) C.S. Levis, an officer of 3/SLI,
a Special Reserve unit based in England, wrote in October 1917 that all the
training was carried out by NCOs; 'All you do is to lead your party onto parade,
hand them over to their instructor, and then walk about doing nothing at
all'.(4) On active service, a whole host of other duties came the way of the
NCO, including ensuring a fair division of food when in the line, and also
responsibility for kit, arms and equipment.(5) Less formal duties included
protecting soldiers against higher authority, and inculcating regimental
traditions.(6) On the battlefield, NCOs had to lead men, to take over from
officers as platoon commanders if the latter were killed or wounded, and promote
and sustain morale.(7) It is not surprising that one ex-ranker wrote 'Platoon
sergeants - what would the War have been without them? Why, they ran the thing!
At least, that was the impression we received'. (8)
The NCO's role therefore overlapped with that of the officer. In some ways,
(1) Baynes, p.190, 193.
(2) Wisdom for Warts p.6, D. Hamond papers.
(3) Unpublished memoir, p.30, P. Creek papers, 87/31/1, Ii.
(4) Hooper, Letters p.67.
(5) For a list of platoon sergeant's duties, see B.C. Lake, Knowledge for War -
Every Officer's Handbook For The Front (London, nd) p.149; for a description of
the duties of a CS)!, see Shephard, p.125.
(6) Marks, p.110; Shephard, p.126.
(7) Riddell, p.50; R. Whipp, interview.
(8) Anon, 'Memories V', Twenty Years After, supp. vol., p.374.
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NCOs were better placed to lead men than were their officers. Although the
military hierarchy imposed 'distance' between the private and the NCO, it was
not always as great as that between privates and officers. Junior NCOs, for
instance, often shared many of the living conditions of other ranks, and some
NCOs operated the principle of 'on parade, on parade; off parade, off parade'
with their men.(1)	 NCOs were also in a position to do things that were beneath
an officer's dignity, such as physically lay hands upon them. Most importantly
of all, since NCOs were usually appointed from within the unit, they were in a
position to gain more detailed knowledge of the men than even the most paternal
and informal officer could ever hope to obtain. In 1917, RQMS Young of 2/17
Londons reflected on his methods of command: 'By a word, I can hold them in
check, when they get unruly, because I know them and their East End spirit'. (2)
Given the wide range of types and functions of NCOs, it is difficult to
generalise about the state of relations between NCOs and privates. Driver R.L.
Venables, for instance, served under two very different battery sergeant majors.
The BSM in his battery of 31st Division artillery was a foul-mouthed 'nasty
piece of work' from 'the metropolis gutter', while the BSM in his previous
battery, in 32nd Division, was 'first-class'. He never used foul language on
parade but Venables believed that the discipline in his former unit was
superior.(3) Broadly speaking, the relationship between privates and NCOs within
the unit was more often than not characterised by respect. Clearly, this is a
subject which deserves further research.
It can be seen that	 many of the NCOs'	 duties, responsibilities and
experiences were paralleled by those of officers:
(1) Kingsmill, pp.75-76; Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', pp.46-47.
(2) Letter, 5 Nay 1917, A. Young papers, 76/101/1, IWM.
(3) Unpublished account, pp.94-95, R.L. Venables papers, IWN.
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...I am learning how to mix discipline with persuasion...I have got to know
the roughs in our platoon pretty well...You never get to the stage of really
trusting them, but you can establish working relationships with them by
expedients which seem almost childish, silly jokes and a kind of assumed (for
me) music-hall, pub-loafing heartiness. It's acting, of course, but I come to
feel more and more that all leadership is in a way acting, conscious or
unconscious. (1)
This passage could easily have been written by a subaltern but it was in fact
penned by a Wykehamist NCO of 6/DCLI. The experiences of Sgt. C.F. Jones of
2/15 Londons also have many points of comparison with those of officers. In his
time he defended a new draft of boys, 'as a lioness its whelps' against what he
perceived to be the unfair demands of a higher authority, in this case, the
orderly sergeant. The good NCO, Jones believed, could play a vital role in
'getting the best out of his men' by seeing that rations were fairly
distributed. (2) Clearly, the good NCO, like the good officer, was a
paternalist.	 An officer of 1/RWF wrote that the acid test of
	 'good' and
'useless' NCOs was their behaviour during a 'working party in the rain'. The
useless NCO would take shelter. The good NCO would help the men with their
tasks. (3)
In practice, NCOs could become the junior partners of regimental officers in
running a platoon, company or battalion. Frederic Manning's fictional RSM
concisely expressed the importance of the relationship between the officer and
the NCO:
...[Wlhen you're an officer you won't know your men. You'll be lucky if
you know your NCOs, and you'll have to leave a lot of it to them.
You'll have to keep them up to the mark; but you'll have to trust them,
and let them know it.(4)
(1) Letter, 15 Nov. 1914, F.H. Keeling, in Townshend, p.199.
(2) Unpublished account, pp. 86-7, 302, 348, C.F. Jones papers, LHCMH.
(3) Adams, Nothing of Importance p.62.
(4) Manning, p.237.
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The fact that in the latter part of the war many officers had served as NCOs
undoubtedly aided the building of good working relationships. Sgt. R.II. Tawney
(22/Manchesters), writing of the moments just before going into action on the
Somme in 1916, noted that his platoon officer 'had enough sense not to come
fussing around'; sense gained, it is implied, as a result of his previous
experience as an NCO. (1)
Wyn Griffith, a company commander in 15/RWF, left an excellent pen-portrait
of his relationship with his company sergeant major. Relaxing together over a
glass of whisky and a pipe in the company officers' mess, they would gossip
about the men of the company. Griffith made two revealing remarks about this
relationship. Firstly, 	 'Our life thrust us close together; his [the CSM's]
position was in its way as solitary as my own'. Both had responsibility for
their men. Both needed to strike a delicate balance between being part of the
company 'team' and being slightly aloof from it. Secondly, the gossip allowed
Griffith to find out incidents in the life of the company 'unknown to the least
unapproachable of company commanders, unguessed at in spite of the close contact
of life in the trenches'. For example, 'Had I heard what Delivett said when a
pip-squeak blew some mud in his mess tin...?' In short, the CSM provided an
important link between the private and the company commander. In this case, and
many others,	 the NCO and officer worked together as a harmonious team.(2)
Similar relationships could exist between other grades of NCO and officer, but
in all cases,	 they had to be founded upon mutual goodwill and carefully
nurtured.
It is instructive to compare GrifBths' relationship with his CSM with the
(1) R.H. Tawney, The Attack and Other Papers (Nottingham, 1981 edn.) p.12.
(2) Griffith, Up to Mametz pp.135-6.
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comments of Sgt. S.F. Hatton (Middlesex Yeomanry) concerning an officer who
tried to
court popularity by being over-friendly with the sergeants, and coming into
the sergeants' mess to stand drinks...In fact, you have to be just the right
type of officer to ever receive an invitation into the sergants' mess, to be
able to drink with them, and preserve their loyalty and your own dignity.
This passage neatly encapsulates the problem that faced officers who wished
to demonstrate respect and friendship for their NCOs. Hatton used an analogy
that would have been readily appreciated by his male readers. A 'sergeant no
more wants a young and inexperienced officer in the mess', he wrote, 'than a
man really wants a woman in a public-house'. Hatton's subaltern breached some
of the important ground rules that were recognised by officers and NCOs alike as
essential for the maintenance of discipline. Apart from anything else, the
standing of drinks could be interpreted as an attempt to buy loyalty. In
addition, the good officer understood that the NCOs were entitled to privacy in
their mess, their home. No matter how friendly an officer might be, it was
impossible for a subordinate to be completely relaxed in a superior's company.
While an experienced officer would know enough not to abuse the privilege of
admission to the sergeants' mess, to talk to the sergeants in an appropriate way
and to make a tactful withdrawal, this inexperienced officer clearly out-stayed
his welcome on a number of occasions. The fact that the Middlesex Yeomanry
contained a large number of middle-class men, and enjoyed very informal
relations with their officers, makes Hatton's insistnce on the rights of the
NCO all the more striking.(1)
More generally, it may be suggested that for the most part privates and
NCOs did not want their officers to be too friendly, but rather preferred them
to maintain a certain social distance, to avoid role ambiguity. Even before a
man left his unit to go for officer training, a subtle change came over his
(I) S.F. Hatton, The Yarn of a Yeoman (London, nd) pp.87-88.
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relations with his comrades, impending promotion 'already dividing him from
them'.(l) It is in fact very rare to come across an officer misguided enough
to endanger his authority by becoming over-familiar with his soldiers. One
suspects that service in the ranks and training at an OCB gave most subalterns
a firm grasp of the correct way to treat their men.
Many officers	 relied heavily on their NCOs. This was especially true of
young subalterns, fresh out from England, with no previous war experience. The
steady experienced NCO supporting the 'green' subaltern with a whispered word
of advice is almost a commonplace. In late 1915 one gunner officer wrote that
subalterns fresh from the 'Shop' [Woolwich] 'know very little about the interior
economy of their batteries. They step into their machine and glide along with a
first class BSM and QMS behind them'.(2) The Guards sergeant-major of 60
Squadron RFC instructed newly-promoted nineteen-year-old captains in their
disciplinary duties 'without in the smallest particular transgressing that code
of military etiquette which regulates so strictly the relations between
commissioned and warrant officers'. (3) This WO not only gave sound advice to
young officers but also provided valuable continuity between the new mass army
and the old Regular force.
For the sake of discipline, it was important that the position of the NCO
should not be undermined. In 1915, Sgt. T. Boyce (1/10 Londons) was rudely
treated by his CO in front of his men. it is significant that this incident
still rankled with Boyce fifty years later.(4) In fact most senior officers were
well aware of the importance of the NCO in the smooth running of a unit. If a
subaltern was to undermine the position of an NCO, for instance by swearing at
him or rebuking him in front of his men, a senior officer was likely to take
(1) Aldington, p.338. See also Manning, p.132.
(2) Fraser-Tytler, p.21. For an example from the infantry, see Martin, p.50.
(3) A.J.L. Scott, Sixty Squadron R.A.F. 1916-1919 (London, 1990 edn.) p.4.
(4) Letter, 16 July 1963, T. Boyce, BBC/GW, IWN.
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the part of the NCO.(l) Experienced NCOs were invaluable, while subalterns were
all too easy to replace. The chastening experience of one young Territorial
gunner officer underlines the relative importance of the newly-arrived subaltern
and the battle-hardened NCO. On one occasion in 1917, a working party was
unloading wagons under sheilfire. Lt. P.J. Campbell called to Sgt. Denmark
to come over to him. Denmark flatly disobeyed, demanding, with a 'face of
thunder', 'Who's taking charge here, are you Sir, or am I?'. Campbell was left
feeling humiliated and crushed. Denmark's appreciation of the situation was
correct, as Campbell apparently recognised in retrospect; the NCO was carrying
out a dangerous task that needed to be completed as swiftly as possible
without interruption. Campbell did not even contemplate making a disciplinary
issue of Denmark's insubordination, fearing that even to confide in a fellow
officer would only 	 result in Campbell looking even more foolish. Instead,
Campbell worked to try to win his sergeant's respect. (2)
A case could be made that the NCO corps was damaged by the wholesale
commssioning of corporals and sergeants who showed leadership ability. One
temporary officer believed that the commisioning of warrant officers was a
mistake, because an RSN enjoyed much greater prestige than a mere subaltern.
(3) A number of Regular NCOs had poor opinions of their New Army and Territorial
counterparts.(4) One officer's belief that most NCOs were ineffective under
shellfire and the exceptions 'ought to be officers', while no doubt a broad
generalisation, is indicative of the general belief that the place for those
soldiers with leadership qualities was in the officers', not the sergeants',
(I) Notes for Young Officers p.6; H. Gordon, The Unreturning Army (London,
1967) pp.60-61.
(2) Campbell, Cannon's Mouth pp.70-71.
(3) F. Moor, KRS Q.
(4) See for instance	 Shephard, pp.68-69. See Simpson, 'The Officers' p.83 for
some points which could be used to construct a contrary argument.
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mess. (I) There is ample testimony in the writings of officers that many NCOs
were held in high regard, as men, as leaders, and as partners in the
administration and management of military units. A particularly clear statement
comes in the diary of an officer of il/Argylls. After taking part in some heavy
fighting near Ypres in August 1917, Lt. R.L. Mackay described Sgt. McQuarrie as
one of the bravest and best gentlemen I have ever met. He has been utterly
invaluable to me on this job...I have more respect for this man than for
any other dozen I have ever met. (2)
The language Mackay used is revealing. McQuarrie was a courageous 'gentleman' -
perhaps not by birth, but certainly by behaviour - who had earned Mackay's
respect. In short, he fulfilled most of the criteria demanded by other ranks
of their officers. McQuarrie had, one might say, 'leadership qualities'.
Similarly, the picture that emerges from the diaries of CSM Ernest Shephard, a
prewar Regular soldier of 1/Dorsets, is of a man who 'nursed' inexperienced
officers, who acted as a rock of stability and continuity after the battalion
had taken heavy casualties, and who admired, and had good relations with,
various officers.(3) One of the major factors in maintaining the cohesion of
the British army through the long years of attrition was the presence of
Regular, Territorial and New Army NCOs like Shephard, Denmark and McQuarrie.
8.6 A 'War Generation'?
During the war years, there was much talk among civilians about the positive
effects of war service on social cohesion. (4)
	
In 1916 the Bishop of London
(1) Devonald-Lewis, p.69.
(2) Diary, p.33, 2 Aug. 1917, R.L. Mackay papers, P.374, IWN.
(3) Shephard, passim.
(4) See for example B. Clarke, 'From "Cog" to Partnership', The War Illustrated
21 Dec. 1918 p.311.
-254-
spoke of a 'brotherhood' being 'forged of blood and iron' in the trenches, which
should be maintained into peacetime, thus ending the class war between 'Hoxton'
and 'Belgravia'. (1) Subsequently historians have pointed to the growth of
solidarity among front-line soldiers of all nations as a reaction to the
politicians, capitalists and shirking or striking workers on the home front, and
as I have argued above, generals and staff officers.(2)
Is it then possible to talk about the existence of qrabenkamera&schaft, a
comradeship of the trenches, which united British frontline soldiers, regardless
of rank, into a common fraternity? Many officers believed that one could.
'Through all their ordeals and sufferings', wrote a Victoria Cross winner,
long after the war, 'they knew they had become a brotherhood of all ranks...'
(3) The padre of 12/HLI argued, from personal experience, that men who had
fought in battle had 'proved our manhood to ourselves and to one another', the
bond of a shared experience of battle being 'finer and more intimate than could
be forged by any other association...we shall for ever have in common a host of
dearly-bought memories, sacred and incommunicable'. (4) I have argued elsewhere
that war experience did make an impact on 'officer-class' perceptions of the
working classes, a phenomeneon which had considerable repercussions for postwar
British society and politics.(5) But how far, if at all, did other ranks regard
(1) The Times, 23 Oct. 1916. For the sceptical reaction of an officer to a
similar speech by the Archbishop of York, see letter, 28 July 1917, in Neville,
p.50.
(2) N. Ferro, The Great War 1914-1918 (London, 1973) p.145; B. Bond, War and
Society in Europe, 1870-1970 (London, 1984) p.120; N. Howard, introduction to
Manning, p.vi.
(3) G.H. Woolley, Sometimes A Soldier (London, 1963) p.54.
(4) Steuart, p.69.
(5) G.D. Sheffield, 'The Effect of The Great War on Class Relations in Britain:
The Career of Major Christopher Stone DSO MC', War and Society, 7, No.1 (1989)
pp.87-105.
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themselves as sharing a conon war experience with their officers, an experience
which transcended rank?
At one level, men of whatever rank who had undergone the experience of battle
shared in an experience denied to the majority of the population. One of the
clearest statements of this simple truth came from Sgt. R.H. Tawney
(22/Nanchesters), who wrote of the 'cleavage between the civilians who remain
civilians and the civilians who become soldiers'.(l) The working-class private
who wrote to Edmund Blunden after the war to say that Blunden's book Undertones
of War had put his war experience into words was also testifying that, even if
the officer and the private had nothing else in common, they shared the
experience of battle, which set them aside from most of their fellow human
beings.(2) Shared experience of battle had the ability to dissolve the formal
bounds of rank, at least temporarily. Capt. E.G.D. Living (2/19 Londons) wrote
of returning from an action in Palestine. A ranker marched beside him:
and, officer and man, we opened our hearts to one another as every one else
in the stumbling fours in front of us was was doing, and as only those can
who have been through terrible experiences together.(3)
Studies on other twentieth century armies drawn from western industrialised
societies suggest that the small cohesive group, offering mutual support and
affection, is of vital importance in sustaining morale in war.(4) A private's
view that the 'set of mucking-in pals' was 'the true social unit of the army'
of the 1914-1918 war would tend to reinforce this view. (5) Some very deep
(1) Tawney, p.22.
(2) Webb, p.94.
(3) E.G.D. Liveing, 'Cut Of f in a Cave', in J. Buchan, (ed.) The Long Road To
Victory (London, 1920) p.225.
(4) See R.W. Little, 'Buddy Relations and Combat Performance' in Janowitz,
pp.195-223; E.A. Shills and M. Janowitz, 'Cohesion and Disintegration in the
Wehrmacht' in D. Lerner, (ed.) Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York, 1972)
pp.367-415. 0. Bartov, Hitler's Army (New York, 1991) challenges, somewhat
unconvincingly, the role of the primary group in the Wehrmacht's unit cohesion.
(5) Brophy and Partridge, p.151. See also letter, 21 Mar. 1917, Pte. B.F. Eccles
papers, 82/22/1, IWM.
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relationships were forged between soldiers during the First World War,
especially on active service. The coon	 view that, in war, life and
human relationships were especially vivid was held by a very ordinary private
of 2/4 Londons,	 Jack Mudd, who wrote to his wife of the importance of
comradeship in the trenches:
Out here, dear, we're all pals, what one hasn't got the other has, we try to
share each others troubles get each other out of danger you wouldnt believe
the Humanity between men out here...Its a lovely thing is friendship out
here. (1)
There is much evidence from the writings of Great War soldiers that
comradeship was indeed of vital importance in maintaining morale.(2)
Conversely, men who were excluded from primary groups generally had a miserable
time, and was in some cases an important factor in the disillusionment of
specific individuals (who, pace popular opinion, were not typical of the
majority of officers and inen).(3)
Primary groups could transcend social class, for although some middle-class
rankers could be rather uncomfortable serving alongside working-class soldiers,
(4) others	 happily 'mucked-in' with their proletarian comrades. An artist
serving in the ranks of 81R. Bde. noted that:
I have gained a knowledge of the "workers" point of view, opinions and
workings of his mind, that would be invaluable if I were going to do anything
in the political or sociological line! (5)
In his diary, a middle-class conscript infantryman referred to 'The splendid
qualities of the men with whom one is associated'. Later he wrote:
(1) Letter, 22 Oct. 1917, J. Nudd papers, 82/3/1. IWM.
(2) See for instance, unpublished story, p.33, E. Partridge papers, LULLC;
unpublished account, p.88, R.D. Fisher papers, 76/54/1, IWM; P.G. Ackrell,
Life in the Machine Gun Corps (llfracombe, 1966) p.14.
(3) Steuart, pp.97-98; 'Ex-Pte. X', passim. For a critical analysis of the
concept of disillusionment, see G.D. Sheffield, '"Disillsionment" and Other
Myths of British Army Morale in the First World War', paper given to BCNH
conference, University of Buckingham, July 1992.
(4) P. MacGill, The Red Horizon (London, 1984 edn.) p.9 1.; E. Linklater, The Man
on My Back (London, 1950) p.36.
(5) Letter, 11 Feb. 1918, H.S. Williamson	 papers, PP/MCR/3, IWM.
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It is very educative to mix among these men, whose ideas and characters are as
diverse - sometimes as grotesque - as the burrs or drawls of their
speech...They are all very nice to me...(1)
These quotations sit neatly alongside similar ones from socially privileged
officers such as Alec Waugh (MGC), who wrote in the 1960s that
for many young soldiers, certainly for me, there came a newly awakened social
consciousness...The young officer began to feel differently about the men he
led in action. (2)
Other officers who were later prominent in public life, men such as Anthony
Eden, Harold Macmillan, John Boyd Orr, and Christopher Stone,also acquired and
maintained a life-long affection, respect and sense of responsibility for the
working classes through their war service. (3)
Could this process be taken a stage further? Could officers, as well as
middle-class other ranks, form a 	 comradeship group with working-class
soldiers? Rank and discipline placed considerable barriers in the way of
uninhibited friendship between leaders and led, but some individuals came close
to breaking these down. R.C. Foot, a temporary gunner officer of D/310 Battery
(62nd Division), claimed that
Officers shared the same food and slept in the same ditches as their
soldiers; about the only thing they [the other ranks] could not share was
their responsibility, and the soldiers recognised this.
It is possible that Foot exaggerated the closeness of inter-rank relationships
in his unit, but he certainly seems to have formed a bond of mutual friendship
and trust with an NCO.	 Long after the war Foot was visited by the daughter of
his old sergeant. This lady had a personal problem, and she had been told
tho± she could refer to Foot in time of trouble, but as Foot wrote,
(1) Undated extract from diary, quoted in Grey, Confessions of a Private pp.35,
72.
(2) A. Waugh, 'A Light Rain Falling', in Panachias, pp.342-43.
(3) Sheffield, 'Class Relations' passim.
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that incident, some twenty-five years later than her father's service
and friendship with me, rather took my breath away at the time.
Foot	 went on to argue that 'such friendships, based on mutual individual
respect'	 and the comradeship engendered by a male society made it possible to
endure the horrors of war.(1)
A similiar incident occured in 1969, when	 W.M. Jenner, a former ranker,
wrote to the family of Capt. Peter Blagrove, after seeing his old officer's
obituary in a newspaper. Jenner wrote that 'To me he was a friend as well as a
superior officer', and said that all of the men of his trench mortar battery
were proud of Blagrove, who was regarded as 'a real gentleman and a very brave
man'. One of the things which endeared him to Jenner was that, when short of
men in June 1916, the officer had helped the men to move ammunition 'in the gun
pit of a 4.5 Howitzer Bty (sic)'. In the eyes of his subordinates, Blagrove
displayed the traits of a 'Beloved Captain', being gentlemanly, courageous, and
paternal. Blagrove and Jenner last met in December 1918. The implications of
this fact are addressed below, when the nature of the postwar British war
generation is considered. However, here it will suffice to point out that for a
ranker to treasure the memory of an officer for over fifty years is evidence
that crabenkamera&fichaft existed in this particular case. (2)
Perhaps Maurice Bowra, who served as a temporary gunner subaltern, captured
the essence of many relationships between officers and soldiers when he wrote
that his dealings with his men 'were more formal but in the end hardly less
intimate' than his relations with his brother officers. The men looked after one
another, and Bowra, with 'protective care' and
(1) Unpublished account, pp.121-25, R.0 Foot papers, IWM.
(2) Letter, 24 June 1969, W.M. Jenner, P. Blagrove papers, LHCMA.
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in moments of danger or excitement or even of frustrating tedium they would
relax their restraints and tell me about their families and their jobs in time
of peace. (1)
The fact that junior officers and rankers shared much the same dangers in
battle was important. As has been demonstrated above, one of the criteria by
which rankers assessed their officers was by their performance under fire.
Charles Crutchley, who served in the ranks of l35 MG Coy in Mesopotamia,
captured the way in which shared danger could forge men into a community, if
only temporarily, regardless of rank:
Thousands of rounds of empty ammunition cases were strewn around a deserted
machine-gun emplacement. "Nasty bit of goods" said our officer..."I wonder how
many they got with that little lot".
The look on his face made me wonder if he were (sic) also thinking of our
own 'nasty bit of goods'...We squatted around: a mere handful of us, on a
lonely ridge in the desert...Dreamy said it was his twenty-first birthday, and
my officer fished out a flask [of whisky] from his haversack.
"Pass it around, sergeant," he said... That drink, taken from the same
flask, cemented our comradeship.(2)
The evidence presented in this thesis indicates that at least some officers
were regarded by some men as comrades; even if rank and the disciplinary
structure prevented the uninhibited friendship possible between two privates.
Without a host of case studies of individual units and individual soldiers, it
is impossible to state categorically how widespread this sense of inter-rank
comradeship was. A clue is offered, however, by the resolutions passed by the
'Soldier's and Worker's Council, Home Counties and Training Reserve Branch' held
at Tunbridge Wells on 24 June 1917. These resolutions were for the most part
closely akin to trade union demands, calling for an increase in separation
allowances, relaxation of the Defence of the Realm Act, and so on. However, two
of the resolutions read:
(1) C.11. Bowra, Memories 1898-1939 (London, 1966) pp.89-91.
(2) Crutchley, Shilling a Day Soldier pp.73-4.
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5. That the general treatment of soldiers be brought into line with the
spirit of the Officers and men in daily contact. As things stand, the
Army Council continually issues orders which have the effect of reducing
the organisation to a cross between a reformatory and a lunatic asylum.
Only the goodwill and tolerance of the Officers and men make life
endurable. We be neither dogs, criminals, or children.
6. We ask for a more generous treatment of younger Officers who, out of a
daily casualty list of over 4,000, suffer the heaviest proportionate
burden. (1)
This document gives a clear indication of the general state of officer-man
relations, although it is fair to note that, by definition, rankers who were
involved with this council were atypical. Although far from revolutionary in
its aims (2) the very existence of this body represented a direct challenge to
the formal hierarchical and disciplinary structure of the army. Yet resolution 5
demonstrates that the council members drew a sharp distinction between senior
officers, who were seen as inflicting a humiliating disciplinary system on the
men, and regimental officers who were 'in daily contact' with the men and who
did their best to modifify the system.
Resolution 6 not only offers evidence of the sympathy that existed for junior
officers among some other ranks, but can also be interpreted as recognition
that a community of interest existed between between soldiers and regimental
officers, many of whom had risen from the ranks. It was in the interests of
those striving for better conditions for the ranks to do the same for junior
officers, because many of the rankers would eventually receive a commission. By
1917, it was no longer valid, if indeed it had ever been, to think of officers
and men as belonging to two distinct, watertight groups, possessing no knowledge
of each other's conditions.
The existence and longevity of a postwar Old Comrades Association (OCA)
can offer a broad hint as to the esprit de corps and state of officer-man
(1) WO 32/5455, PRO.
(2) I.F.W. Beckett, 'The Nation in Arms, 1914-18' in Beckett and Simpson, p.24.
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relations of a wartime unit. While not all cohesive units formed an
OCA,and some units and formations such as 66th Division had associations for
officers only,(l)	 many OCAs seem to have been organisations where former
officers and former other ranks could meet on approximately equal terms. In the
interwar years, the OCA of 32nd Division Trench Mortar Battery met once a year
for dinner on the Saturday nearest Armistice day. This OCA, wrote its Honourary
Secretary, a former ranker,
spells brotherhood first and last, and class distinction is taboo'd (sic). The
old Tock-Emma [ie trench mortar soldier] is welcome for what he did "out-
yonder", and not necessarily for what he is today. (2)
Many OCA members probably had little in common apart from a wish to share and
rekindle memories of wartime service in a particular unit. For the most part,
former soldiers dwelt on the humour and comradeship, rather than the horrors,
of war.(3) Some OCAs, and other veterans' organisations such as the British
Legion and the Old Contemptible's Association had a charitable function. In
these bodies the paternal pattern of the war years was extended, with ex-
officers and ex-soldiers working together to provide financial and other help
for poorer members and their families. Some these OCAs continued in operation
for an extremely long time. The 22/RF's OCA existed from 1919 to 1976, while
the Machine Gun Corps OCA had a similar lifespan. (4) Nostalgia for comradeship
and paternalism, which contrasted starkly with many ex-soldiers' experiences of
the harshness of 	 life in a land which was far from 'fit for heroes', was
undoubtedly a factor in the popularity of OCAs.(5)
Even in the absence of a formal unit OCA, former members of a unit could
(1) 66th East Lancashire Division Dinner Club (Manchester, 1924).
(2) Artillery and Trench Mortar Memories 32nd Division p.687.
(3) R. Whipp, interview; Hatton, p.228.
(4) Woolley, p.175; Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', pp.95-96; C.E.
Crutchley, Machine Gunner 1914-18 (Northampton, 1973) p.174.
(5) See the embittered epilogue in Hatton, pp.283-86.
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continue to demonstrate comradeship and respect in time of peace. When, in the
1920s,	 a former officer of the Accrington Pals died, his chief mourners
included five members of the battalion, four of them other ranks, the officer
having no family. (1) Former officers and soldiers of many units, particularly
locally raised battalions,	 also met to commemorate the dead, whether at
memorial services in Britain or on 'pilgrimages' to the battlefields overseas.
(2) Unit histories, especially those of disbanded service units, were another
means of commemorating the dead and recapturing wartime esprit de corps. Those
produced between 1918 and 1923 in particular, 'although not overtly consensual
in tone' often portrayed officer-man relations in terms of a community of
interest. (3) Although contributions from other ranks were often included,
most unit histories were written by officers. That of the 13th Londons, a TF
class corps, written by two NCOs, was a rare exception to this rule.(4)
All members of the Old Contemptibles Association, were, somewhat artificially,
referred to as 'chum', regardless of rank. (5) Regimental journals, particularly
those produced by OCAs of service units, were full of obituaries, articles and
reminiscences written by former officers and former rankers which stressed,
consciously or not, that a spirit of comradeship which encompassed all ranks had
existed and continued to exist.(6) In sum, the postwar activities of veterans of
(1) W. Thrner, Pals: The 11th (Service) Battalion (Accrington) East Lancashire
Regiment (Barnsley, nd) p.188.
(2) For the process of commemoration of the dead of 1/4 KOSB, see G. Richardson,
For King and Country and Scottish Borderers (Hawick, 1987) pp.84-89.
(3) K.R. Grieves, 'Making Sense of the Great War: Regimental Histories, 1918-
23', JSAHR LXIX, No.277 (1991) p.14.
(4) Dunn, passim; C. Stone, A History of the 22nd (Service) Battalion, Royal
Fusiliers (Kensington) (London, 1923) pp.16-26; O.F. Bailey and H.11. Hollier,
The Kensingtons: 13th London Regiment (London, 1935).
(5) Circular from Old Contemptibles Association, nd, in letter, July 1963, O.Y.
Smith, BBC/GW, IWN.
(6) See, among many others, City of London Rifles Quarterly Journal; Old
Comrades Journal, 2/4 The Queents; newsletter of 19th Division RFA Old Comrades
Association; Mufti, The Peacetime Record of the Fighting 22nd (22/RF OCA
journal].
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all ranks offers further evidence that rankers could, and did, regard officers
as comrades.
Taking all this evidence into account, one is led to the conclusion that it is
indeed	 valid to talk of a British
	 'war generation' who shared a common
experience. In Janet Roebuck's words,
Under battle conditions class lines came to be overshadowed by the shared
experiences of combat and the mutuality of death...The conditions of war made
contact between upper-class officers and lower-class soldiers inevitable and
gave them a set of common experiences which neither group shared with
civilians of their own class. (1)
There is much to be said for Marc Ferro's belief that a 'special
"ex-serviceman's" outlook grew up from bitterness and nostalgia' leading to
postwar idealisation of the war years although, in the case of Britain, he
underestimates the degree of continuity with wartime relationships. (2) Clearly,
it would be wrong to assume that all other ranks regarded all officers as
comrades. It is likely that some of the more sweeping claims made by officers
about the existence of a community of the trenches which united soldiers of all
ranks contained a large element of wishful thinking; we return to the fact that
other ranks tended to judge their officers on an individual basis, rather than
giving their loyalty to officers as a group.
Some politicians	 attempted to capitalise on their war service in an attempt
to win veterans' votes. One such was Sir George MCrae, the Liberal MP who
had raised and commanded 16/R. Scots (see above). In an election address of
1923 he claimed to be 'an Ex-service man' who, having 'shared their dangers and
hardships' would support the fight of former soldiers for fair treatment.(3)
However, it is instructive	 that men like Mc.Crae and two future prime
ministers, Clement Attlee (described as 'Major Attlee' between the wars
(1) J. Roebuck, The Making of Modern English Society From 1850 (London, 1973)
p.101. See also A. Marwick, The Deluge (Harmondsworth, 1967 edn.) p.218.
(2) M. Ferro, The Great War 1914-1918 (London, 1973) p.156-i, 225.
(3) Election address in Coll. Misc. 567, BLPES.
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partly in an attempt to stress Labour's respectability) and 	 the Conservative,
Anthony Eden (who used a photograph of himself in uniform on the cover of his
election address in the 1922 general election) were members of the three major
established parties.(l) No 'military party' emerged as a force in postwar
politics.	 Sir Oswald Mosley's 	 British Union of Fascists, which promoted
militaristic values	 and	 attempted to	 appeal to ex-servicemen,	 was
electorally unsuccessful. Ex-serviceman's organisations had a minimal political
impact. (2) All this suggests that the British war generation was a very
different phenomenon from its German counterpart.(3)
That is not to say that a war generation did not exist. It existed in the form
of individual relationships between officers and men, forged in the face of
hardships shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by all ranks, and dangers
which were shared almost equally. Many of these relationships continued after
the war through the medium of an ex-serviceman's association. Almost certainly
more ex-soldiers remained outside veteran's organisations than joined them, but
memories of wartime officer-man relationships continued to be treasured long
after the war, even if like Capt. Blagrove and Gnr. Jenner, contact was lost in
1918. Writing nearly fifty years after the event, ex-L/Cpl. S.A. Boyd of 1O/RF
stated that 'My lasting impression of the Somme battle is the fine young
officers who led us so well. They were extremely brave but so young, many under
the age of 20'.(4)
Just as the character, ethos and experience of no two military units during
the war was the same, veterans of these units reacted to peace in different
(1) K. Harris, Attlee (London, 1982) p.64; R. Rhodes James, Anthony Eden
(London, 1986), plate between pp.186 and 187.
(2) S.R. Ward, 'Great Britain: Land Fit for Heroes Lost', in S.R. Ward, (ed.)
The War Generation (Port Washington, NY, 1975) pp.31-35.
(3) See J.M. Diehl, 'Germany: Veterans' Politics under Three Flags' in Ward, War
Generation.
(4) Letter, nd c.1963, S.A. Boyd, BBC/GW, 11411.
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ways. Cohesive 'family' units were probably more likely to establish and
maintain OCAs than other units. Nevertheless, as the evidence of soldiers
referring in affectionate terms to officers with whom they had lost contact
long ago suggests, the British war generation should not be located solely in
the reunion dinners and magazines of OCAs of disbanded Pals battalions. The
British war generation was characterised by general, if unquantifiable friendly
feeling between ranks and classes. Although unquantifiable, it was nonetheless
real.
The failure of British veterans to create cohesive political organisations did
not mean that their war generation was politically insigificant. In their
study of French, German and British literature on the Great War Bessel and
Englander concluded that the war generation 'existed only for so long as it
remained under fire', and that on demobilisation 'it appears to have
disintegrated into its constituent parts'.(l) This interpretation ignores the
many ties of affection and comradeship that continued to bind former soldiers
of all ranks in peacetime Britain. G.H. Roberts, a trade unionist NP and
Minister for Labour, noted after a tour of the Western Front in September 1918
that not only were
	 officer-man relations
	 'excellent', but that officers
wanted 'conditions at home' to improve for their men after the war. Men had come
to 'respect their officers' while officers had come
to know and appreciate the lives of their men at home. They have been taught
to give every consideration to their comfort in the field, and many of them
evidently regard it as their duty to do the same for them at home when the
war is over.(2)
This wartime comradeship and concern was not simply abandoned or forgotten at
the Armistice. As noted above, some veteran&organisations were an extension
(1) R. Bessel and D. Englander,'Up From the Trenches: Some Recent Writing on the
Soldiers of the Great War', European Studies Review 11, (1981) p.393.
(2) Quoted in Wilson, Myriad Faces p.802.
-266-
of wartime paternalism by other means, and more importantly, in John Keegan's
words, many officers conceived 'an affection and concern for the disadvantaged
which would eventually fuel that transformation of middle-class attitudes to the
poor which has been the most important social trend in twentieth century
Britain'. (1) To try to assess something as nebulous as the social attitudes of
such a large group as British veterans of the Great War over twenty or more
years is a difficult task, to put it mildly; but as Trevor Wilson has pointed
out, by the 1940s the idea that a total war entitled the participating
population to a 'decent existence' was firmly established, alongside the belief
that after 1918 'the rank and file of the nation had been denied their
entitlement'.(2) This of course is a prime example of Andreski's 'military
participation ratio' in action. (3) Undoubtedly, Keegan's 'process of discovery'
played a part in this phenomenon. (4)
Bessel and Englander's argument that the concept of the war generation as such
should be left behind in favour of analysis of 'those constituent parts which
temporarily comprised it' has much to commend it, but to abandon the idea of a
war generation altogether is to risk throwing out the baby with the revisionist
bathwater.(5) Although this subject is in need of further examination, it is
safe to state that many British officers and rankers believed themselves to be
part of a war generation, united by comradeship and the shared experience of
combat.
(1) Keegan, p.225.
(2) Wilson, Myriad Faces p.827.
(3) S. Andreski, Military Organisation and Society (London, 1968 edn.).
(4) Sheffield, 'Class Relations', passim.
(5) Bessel and Englander, p.393.
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Chapter 9
Officer-Nan Relations, Morale and Discipline
In this chapter the consequences of good officer-man relations for the morale
and discipline of the British army of 1914-18 will be addressed in greater
detail than hitherto. The extent to which distinctive styles of officer-man
relations and discipline survived in Territorial, New Army and Regular units
will also be examined, and some comparisons will be drawn with the French army,
Dominion forces, and the British army of the immediate postwar period.
9.1 Has the Role of the Officer in Maintaining Morale Been Overestimated?
In 1968, R.C. Sherriff, who served as an officer in 9/E. Surreys from 1916-18,
wrote that his play Journey's End had been criticised because 'there was too
much of the English public schools about it'. Sherriff retorted that 'Almost
every young officer was a public school boy' and if he had omitted them from
Journey's End, 'there wouldn't have been a play at all.' Furthermore,
Without raising the public school boy officers onto a pedestal it can be said
with certainty that it was they who played the vital part in keeping the men
good-humored (sic) and obedient in the face of their interminable ill
treatment and well-nigh insufferable ordeals.(2)
In a recent	 book based largely on trench journals and other published
material, J.G. Fuller has criticised these views. He argues that public school
officers, educated to believe that they were natural leaders of society, could
not have been objective in their assessment of their role in maintaining the
morale of their men. In addition, he suggests that officers generally tended to
overrate the esteem in which they were held by their men; the institutionalised
(1) Sherriff, 'English Public Schools' pp.134, 152.
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gulf between the ranks was too great to be bridged; and the rapid turnover in
personnel precluded the establishment of close relations.(1) All of these
arguments have some validity; the question is, do they have enough to nullify
the general thrust of Sherriff's thesis?
The arguments advanced in this present work, supported by much evidence drawn
from unpublished sources, offers a broad measure of support for Sherriff's
claims. However, Sherriff was indulging in hyperbole by neglecting to mention
the large number of non-public school officers 	 that served in the army.
In fact, in an account of his early days with his battalion written in the
l930s Sherriff mentioned 	 a number of ranker officers, including one who had
great influence on the subalterns, and others with whom he shared a railway
carriage on a long journey. Is it impossible to imagine a 'public school'
subaltern discussing life in the ranks, and the soldier's view of his officers,
with such men? (2) However, in a more general sense, Sherriff was absolutely
correct to insist on the importance of public school values in the maintenance
of morale, since these were inculcated during officer training.
By the end of 1915 officers' messes were being filled with men who had seen
active service in the ranks, who had first-hand experience of the importance
of paternalistic leadership to the ordinary soldier, such as the middle-class
lance-corporal of 1/4 Gloucesters who wrote of the insights he had gained.
These served him in good stead when he was commissioned into 16/Manchesters,
his	 divisional commander paying tribute to 	 his understanding	 of, and
sympathy with, his men.(3) In August 1914 a private noted in his diary his
(1) J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion
Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1991) pp.53-56.
(2) R.C. Sherriff, 'My Diary' in The Journal of the East Surrey Regiment I,
No.2, (1937) pp.109-18. For some comments on ranker-officers by an officer of
9/E.Surreys, see L.C. Thomas, KRS Q.
(3) T.A.M. Nash (ed.), The Diary of an Unprofessional Soldier (Chippenhain, 1991)
p.ix, 27.
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gratitude to his paternal colonel who provided soft drinks at the end of a
long route march. Small wonder that in September 1918 we find the same soldier,
now a company commander, distributing to his men cigarettes which had been
brought up by the padre. (1)
There were several other ways in which officers could come to know the
'character and thoughts' of their soldiers. (2) Simply working alongside the
men could be beneficial. (3) Junior officers had to read and censor their men's
letters. This was an activity disliked by both officers and men, even if they
reluctantly recognised its necessity. (4) A number of officers commented that
reading these letters gave them an insight into the mind of the writer. Charles
Douie (1/Dorsets) entered 'a new world, with interests and standards of which I
had previously no experience'.(5) Harold Macmillan (4/Gren. Gds.) gained 'an
insight into the lives of his men' which contributed to his lifelong interest
in, and sympathy for, working-class people. Indeed, as an MP in the interwar
years, Macmillan found his relationship with his constituents in Stockton to be
similar to that of a company officer and his troops.(6)
It may be argued that censoring his letters was not the best way to
understand a man. The letters were often 'similar and childish', (7) and one
historian has described them as 'a demotic literary genre' which disguised the
true feelings of the writer. (8) Some were pure fiction, sent as a joke, or even
(1) F. Hawkings (A. Taylor, ed.) From Ypres to Cambrai (Morley, 1974) pp.6, 133.
(2) G.S. }lutchison, Warrior (London, 1932) p.13.
(3) Eberle, p.44.
(4) F.0.0., pp.79-80; unpublished account, p.4, S.H.Raggett papers, 90/1/1, IWM.
(5) Douie, p.42.
(6) A. Home, Macmillan 1894-1956 (London, 1988) p.36. See Lewin, pp.261-2 for
a comparison with Attlee, who believed that industrial relations should be
conducted on the lines of the officer-man relationship that he had experienced
in the Great War.
(7) Letter, 13 Nov. 1915, J.0. Coop papers, 87/56/1 IWN.
(8) Waites, 'Government of Home Front' p.188.
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to win money from gullible newspapers.(1) Against these arguments must be set
the fact that many of the rankers' letters surviving in archives are very frank,
(2) although it is only fair to mention that some rankers went to considerable
lengths to avoid censorship by sending letters home by unofficial routes, such
as giving them to men going on leave to post in England.(3) Some officers were
less than whole-hearted in their censoring duties: at one stage, 1/5 BW even
issued envelopes pre-stamped with the censor's mark. (4)
Officers were sometimes struck by the openness with which men displayed their
emotions in their letters home. After 2/4 DWR had been engaged at Cambrai in
November 1917, Capt. B.D. Parkin censored his men's letters and gained 'a peep
into the soul of those who had acted so bravely for three days of battle'. These
letters contained few exaggerations, and were frank and 'full of relief' at
having survived	 the ordeal. They contained both good and bad news; and
interestingly from the point of view of officer-man relations, many made
favourable	 references to the pre-battle address delivered by their popular
brigade commander, Brig.Gen. Bradford.(5) Whatever their normal diffidence about
committing their thoughts to paper, these men treated their letters home as a
form of catharsis. Although many other ranks' letters were indeed uninformative
and stereotyped, it was possible for officers to gain real insights into the
(1) Anon, 'Memories III - The Minor Pleasures of War', in	 Twenty Years After,
supp. vol. p.238; Dunn, p.65.
(2) See for example letter,	 22 May 1917, W.T. King papers, 89/7/1, IWM in
which a private comments on the incidence of shellshock among officers and men.
(3) Letter, 6 Aug. 1917, W.E. Hoad papers, LULLC; 1 Nov. 1914, 23 Feb. 1915, WD,
Chief Censor, Advanced Base, WO 95/3987, PRO; GRO 602, 612, Extracts From
General Routine Orders, 71-273, RIIASA; Army Order 121, 24 July 1916 71-225,
RMASA.
(4) 1 Apr. 1915, WO 95/3987, PRO. For an individual officer's perfunctory
censorship of letters, see letter, 10 Oct. 1915, H.A. Bowker papers, LTJLLC.
(5) Unpublished account, notebook II, B.D. Parkin papers, 86/57/1, IWN.
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minds of their men by reading them. Furthermore, the weight of evidence
presented in this thesis strongly suggests that officers, public school or
otherwise, were in a good position to assess the importance of leadership in
maintaining the morale of the other ranks, not least through consultation with
NCOs (see chapter 8).
Dr Fuller's analysis of inter-rank relations forms only a very small part of
his book, which breaks new ground in emphasising the importance of working-
class culture in maintaining the morale of British troops on the Western Front.
His work on this topic is not incompatible with the notion that officer-man
relations played an important role in the maintenance of morale.
9.2 Officer-Man Relations and Morale
It is not suggested that officer-man relations were solely responsible for
keeping morale high. Food, drink and tobacco; recreation; comradeship; humour;
reminders of home, such as letters from family and friends; trust in leaders and
belief in their cause; success in battle; and sheer stoicism were all of vital
importance.(l) Correlli Barnett has argued that the hardships and poverty
endured by the working classes in their everyday life, and the danger
everpresent in many of their peacetime occupations, prepared them for the
conditions endured by soldiers on the Western Front. He asserts that many
soldiers were 'better off in the trenches than at home'. In France, unlike at
home, the working man 'had the support - moral and material - of an immense
organisation' which looked after his welfare. It might be added some middle-
(1) For a comparison with 1939-45, see D. Butler, 'The British Soldier in
Italy', pp.13-32, CAB 101/224 and S.R. McMichael, A Historical Perspective on
Light Infantry (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1987) pp.33-35.
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class soldiers felt that military life was an improvement on their civilian
exista.nce, the 'prison-like life of a city office', as one described it.(1) The
thrust of Barnett's thesis has been echoed by other modern writers such as
Michael Howard and J.M. Bourne. (2)
Barnett's work is important, not least because he places the experience of the
working-class soldier at centre-stage, rather than generalising 	 from the
writings of a tiny number of officer poets, as too many literary specialists
and cultural historians have done. (3) There is little direct evidence from
working-class soldiers to support his central argument, although it is hardly
surprising that poorly educated men were not inclined to analyse their state of
morale in sociological terms. However, occasionally one comes across comments
such as that of the soldier	 who recalled that one 'got used to' being
'wet cold and hungry'; this stoicism can perhaps be related to his poverty-
stricken background. (4)
Many contemporary observers testified to the stoicism and powers of endurance
of working-class soldiers. Writing of the men of 2/DLI, many of whom were
miners, a ranker in a London class corps noted that the life of the Regular
private 'was a pretty hard one':
He gets little consideration from his officers, he is paid very little,
in fact he has every encouragement to down tools and strike, instead of
which he plods on steadily, grousing and grumbling, always kept hard at
work, getting drunk as often as possible, but ready and willing at the
(1) Tucker, p.49.
(2) C. Barnett, 'A Military Historian's View of the Great War', Essays by Divers
Hands, Being the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, XXXVI, 1970,
pp.1-18; Barnett, Collapse of British Power pp.428-35; J.M. Bourne, Britain and
the Great War 1914-1918 (London, 1989) p.220; N. Howard, 'The Art of the Tat',
TLS 9-15 Feb. 1990, p.138.
Y See Fussell; E.J. Leed, No Man's Land (Cambridge, 1979); S. Hynes, A War
Imagined (London, 1990).
(4) Unpublished account, pp.1-6, 41, P. Creek papers, 87/31/1, IWN.
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final call - "faithful unto death".(l)
Similarly, after watching his men play two games of football a week after his
battalion had taken heavy casualties, an officer of li/Argylls confided to his
diary that 'the recuperative powers of the British Tommy are wonderful'.(2)
The major weakness in Barnett's argument lies in the fact that not even the
most dangerous of civilian jobs could prepare a man for the reality of battle,
and many working-class occupations, servants, for instance, were not especially
dangerous. It should also be noted that Stoicism was not confined to working-
class soldiers. Army life, particularly on active service, blunted the
sensibilities of many middle-class men. An infantryman of the Second World War
believed that the secret was to 'conquer the abnormal by the simple device of
treating it as if it were normal'. (3) There is something of this in one middle-
class NCO's tongue-in-cheek theory that men who were killed 'had failed to keep
up their	 spirits'; the spirit, he felt, could divert shells from their
course.(4)	 One veteran believed that soldiers 'chose to make fun of their
situation'; had they acknowledged the reality, 'the men would have "cracked" and
collapsed'. (5) Some soldiers became fatalists, accepting the prospect of death
and becoming reconciled to it. One such was an MGC private, a prewar clerk, who
wrote a moving letter to be posted to his family in the event of his death in
which he spoke calmly of dying, and which ended with a prayer. (6)
(1) Letter, 21 Nov. 1915, P.H. Jones papers, P. 246, IWM. For similar
sentiments expressed by another middle-class ranker see letter, 15 Mar. 1915,
N.F. Ellison papers, DS/Misc/49, IWM.
(2) Diary, 6 May 1917, R.L. Mackay papers, 1W1!. See also H. Dearden, Medicine
and Duty (London, 1928) p.IX.
(3) F. Majdaleny, The Monastery (London, 1957 edn.) p.103.
(4) Unpublished account, p.284, C.F. Jones papers, LHCMH.
(5) Letter, Oct. 1963, A.R. Armfield, BBC/GW, IWM.
( ) Letter, 28 Aug. 1917,
	 W.L. Fisher papers, 85/32/1, IWM. See also H.
Williamson, introduction to [Bell], A Soldier's Diary p.xiv.
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Nevertheless, the efforts of 	 individuals to keep up morale were greatly
enhanced by the 'immense organisation' to which Barnett refers, in which
regimental officers played a crucial, although underrated, part. The role of
popular culture was, as Fuller convincingly demonstrates, of considerable
importance. The replication of patterns of civilian leisure - sport, concert
parties, social drinking - helped to keep the reality of service on the Western
Front at bay. While rankers were perfectly capable of making their own
entertainment, the importance of officers in providing organised leisure at
unit level should not underestimated.
To take several battalions at random, officers of 9/R. I. Rif.	 encouraged
their men to 'indulge in their favourite pastimes' (1) while 2/6 Krboasted an
orchestra, raised from former professional musicians. (2) 1/16 Londons provided
a regimental canteen, directed by an officer, where very cheap food, beer and
tobacco were sold to the men, profits being used to supplement official rations.
While training in 1917 most afternoons were devoted to sport, with trips being
arranged to a swimming pool. There were also horse shows and sports days,
complete with the Divisional band, the 'Bow Bells' concert party, coconut shy,
tea and beer. The unit historian noted that 'it may appear somewhat incongruaus,
in a war history, to devote space to a sports meeting', but went on to argue
that 'such events have a direct bearing on the development of that esprit de
corps and the will to win' which brought about victory. Such 'trivial' pleasures
should be seen in the context of recent grim experiences. The sports engendered
'A spirit of enthusiasm and lightheartedness, which is difficult for those who
have not experienced the ups and downs of war fully to realise...'(3) As a
(1) 1-10 Feb. 1917, WD, 9/R. I. Rif., 	 WO 95/2503, PRO.
(2) C.F. Wurtzburg, The History of the 2/6 (Rifle) Battalion 'The King's'
(Liverpool Regiment) 1914-19 (Aldershot, 1920) pp.93-94.
(3) Henriques, p.164.
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Guards officer commented, 'the simplest change gave the men pleasure'. (1) The
importance of the provision of amusements was well understood by officers.(2)
Officers performing in unit concerts provided a valuable safety mechanism.
Officers stepped down from the pedestal of rank and hierarchy, albeit briefly,
allowing rankers to cheer or jeer them with impunity. Surprisingly few of
these officer 'turns' seem to have undermined discipline. Indeed, it may have
enhanced it. An undersized officer of 2/6 LF provided some impromptu cabaret at
a concert at Christmas 1915 by colliding with the bass drum. Thereafter, this
officer, a favourite with his men, was often greeted by calls of '"Who fell
thro' t'big drum? Little Tich!"' Not only does this incident demonstrate the way
in which officer-man relations could be enhanced by sharing in entertainments,
the fact that it was recorded in the battalion history, written by two former
officers, speaks volumes about the relaxed nature of officer-man relations in
this TF unit. (3)
9.3 Leadership, Morale and the Alleviation of Stress
The morale-enhancing infrastructure notwithstanding, few men could undergo
the strain of frontline service indefinitely. Lord Moran, who served as RNO
of 1/RF, believed that a man has only a limited 'bank' of courage or
'willpower' 'and when in war it is used up, he is finished'. There was no such
thing as getting used to battle. Men, like clothes, simply wore out. The time
(1) C. Dudley Ward, The Welsh Regiment of Foot Guards 1915-1918 (London, 1936)
p. 52.
(2) Col. M.G.N. Stopford, lecture on trench warfare, p.13, Conf.3898, SCL;
G.F.R. Hirst, KRS Q:
(3) Potter and Fothergill, p.16.
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taken to expend the 'capital' varies with the intensity of combat, but if a
soldier fights for long enough, his courage will be exhausted.(l) Moran's basic
theory, although modified by more recent scholars, is still influential. (2)
It is difficult to establish precise figures for rates of 'shellshock' (3) (in
1914-18, a generic term for psychiatric disorders brought about by combat). In
1939, some 120,000 men were receiving pensions for 'primary psychiatric
disability' as a result of service in the First World War, which represented
about 15 per cent of all pensioned disabilities.(4)	 These bare figures do
not tell the whole story. A distinction can be usefully drawn between 'battle
stress', which is experienced by all soldiers in action, and 'battleshock',
stress	 so severe that it renders the soldier a casualty. Clearly, many men
suffered from battle stress which was serious but not severe enough to
incapacitate. In August 1916 86 MG Coy reported that about eight per cent of
the unit had been admitted to hospital 'owing chiefly to the strain of the
previous 5 weeks' (5) while a doctor believed that 'practically every man'
evacuated from Gallipoli to Lemnos in December 1915 'was neurasthenic' whether
'he was supposed to be fit or not'.(6) One infantryman frankly admitted that a
week of fighting on the Somme in 1916 had deprived him of courage. To use
Moran's terminology, he had made a sudden withdrawal of capital, which all but
(I) Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London, 1945) p.X.
(2) Holmes, Firing Line pp.214-15; A. Kellett, Combat Motivation (Boston, MA,
1982) p.276-78, 300; T. Copp and B. McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion (Montreal, 1990)
pp.5, 81-82.
(3) P.J. Leese, 'A Social and Cultural History of Shellshock, with Particular
Reference to Experience of British Soldiers During and After the Great War',
(Ph.D, Open University, 1989) pp.22-24.
(4) Ahrenfeldt, p.10; Kellett, p.274.
(5) 7 Aug. 1916, WD of 86 M.G. Coy, WO 95/2302, PRO.
(6) Evidence of A.F. Hurst, Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry Into
"Shell-Shock" (1922) Cmd. 1734, p.25.
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closed the account. However, a period spent in a rest camp or in a quiet sector
could help to restore an individual's morale.(1) At the very least, it can be
said that pyschiatric casualties were something	 which most officers and men
were likely to encounter on the Western Front.
The widely held belief that shelishock was the product of weakness led to a
reluctance to admit to the existence 	 of	 pyschiatric casualties. (2) Some
frontline	 soldiers disputed the view that victims of shellshock displayed
'weakness', and	 traditional views also began to be challenged within the
medical profession.(3) By the end of the war, psychiatric casualties were
beginning to be	 treated according to the principles recognised by modern
armies. (4)
Many Regular officers believed that there was a close link between the
incidence of psychiatric casualties and the state of a unit's morale,
discipline, and leadership. These views were enshrined in the 'Summary of
Findings' of the 1922 Shellshock Committee, which baldly stated that 'A
battalion whose morale is of a high standard will have little "shell shock"'.(5)
A modified version of this view is held by most modern scholars, who suggest
that membership of a cohesive unit with high morale and good leadership can
retard - although not prevent - the onset of mental collapse. (6)
(1) Unpublished account, p.95, E. Partridge papers, LULLC.
(2) See for instance A. Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the
Great War 1914-19: The Medical Services (Ottawa, 1925) p.278.
(3) G. Sparrow and J.N. MacBean Ross, On Four Fronts with the Royal Naval
Division (1918) p.237; T. Bogacz, ' War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England
1914-22: The Work of the War Office Committetof Enquiry into "Shell Shock", JCH
24, (1989) pp.227-256.
(4) See C.S. Myers, Shell Shock in France, 1914-18 (Cambridge, 1940). For a
modern view on the nature and treatment of battle stress, see Gabriel, esp.
pp.25-45, 137-58.
(5) Shell-Shock Report pp.13-14, pp.36-i, 50, 93. See also K. Simpson, 'Dr. Dunn
and Battle Stress - The Experiences and Reflections of the Regimental Medical
Officer of the 2/Royal Welch Fusiliers 1915-1918', GW, 3, No.3 (1991) pp.84-85.
(6) Copp and MeAndrew, pp.5, 81-2; Holmes, Firing Line p.259.
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The role of the officer in minimising pyschiatric casualties was twofold.
Firstly, officers could spot men approaching breakdown, and remove them from
frontline duties, to allow them to replenish their stock of courage. This
technique, practised by contemporary armies, 	 does not seem to have been much
used in 1914-18, although it is possible that it was carried on unofficially.
The RMO of 1/10 Xirç Capt. Noel Chavasse, is one of the few officers who is
recorded as adopting this approach. (1)
Secondly, the officea could minimise the physical and mental factors that
contributed to stress by exercising a paternal concern for the welfare of their
men, such as ensuring that the men were well fed. Although the rations of the
British soldier tended to be monotonous and unappetising,(2) regular supplies
of food, drink and tobacco were all important in maintaining the morale of
soldiers of all social classes. One ranker believed that 'Nothing changed one's
spirits from buoyancy to utter despondency more quickly than a shortage or
surfeit of rations'. (3) In a quiet moment, the immediate reaction of the
British soldier was to light a cigarette and brew tea. Letters home are full
of requests for cigarettes, for as one ranker of 1/21 Londons put it, 'it is
rotten to be without a smoke'.(4) At one stage in the Palestine campaign, noted
a sergeant of 5/Welsh, the lack of tobacco reduced men to smoking tea leaves.(5)
A ranker claimed that tea, 'even when made in onion-haunted dixies and stewed
over a smoking fire...conserved and yielded a delicate fragrance, an exquisite
suggestion of civilisation'.(6)
(1) A.M. McGilchrist, The Liverpool Scottish, 1900-19 (Liverpool, 1930) p.103.
(2) Anon, 'Memories XIV - The Minor Miseries of War', in Twenty Years After, II,
p. 1121.
(3) Smith, Four Years p.100.
(4) Letter, 5 Sept 1915, G. Banks-Smith papers, LTJLLC.
(5) Diary, 8 Nov. 1917, J.M. Thomas papers, 88/56/1 IWM.
(6) J. Brophy, 'The Soldier's Nostrils', in C. O'Riordan et al, A Martial Medley
(London, 1931) pp.124-5. See also Dunn, p.18.
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The officer also had an important role in the distribution of rum, which was
supposed to be drunk in the presence of an officer to prevent it being
hoarded.(l) The rum issue was undoubtedly popular, and gave some men 'dutch
courage' before battle. Pte. B.F. Eccles (7/R. Bde.) admitted that he went
through battle 'far better than I ever imagined' as a result of drinking rum.(2)
Brophy's comment, quoted above, indicates one of the principal reasons for the
popularity of	 caffine and nicotine: they represented a slender thread of
continuity with normal life, and reminders of home are important in reducing
stress and maintaining morale. This fact underlines the importance of the
practice of distribution of gifts of cigarettes and other luxuries by officers,
and the considerable efforts made by regimental officers to ensure that their
men had hot meals and tea. The regimental officer had a vital role in ensuring
that soldiers benefitted from the 'bureaiiracy of paternalism', which was
dedicated to the upkeep of the soldier's morale. This role helped to cement
comradeship between the ranks. In that it was also an example of officers
adhering to the unspoken assumptions inherent in the deferential relationship,
it also provided further continuity with the civilian experience of working-
class soldiers.
Conditions at the front were an important source of stress. A Guards private
recorded that some men appeared to rather more afraid of the ever-present rats
than they were of shells and bullets. (3) Bad weather, mud, lice and boredom
also ranked high among the stresses of war. (4) At the front, most soldiers were
(1) F.C. Hitchcock, Stand To (London, 1988 edn.) p.122; R.D. Fisher papers,
p.12, 76/54/1 IWM; Divisional Trench Orders 1917 p.9; S.S. No.408, Some of the
Many Questions a Platoon Commander should ask himself on taking over a Trench,
and at intervals afterwards, p.7; Steuart, p.182.
(2.) Letter, 19 Sept. 1916, B.F. Eccles papers, 82/22/1, 11414.
(3) Letter, 19 July 1915, H. Venables papers, LULLC.
(4) Bowra, p.81: R.J. Wyatt, 'The Major "Minor Horror of War", ST, 23, (Aug.
1988) pp.29-30; Aldington, p.250.
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permanently tired. In the trenches, sleep was a rare and precious commodity. Men
who managed to ignore the cold, rain, noise, bustle and rats would, before long,
be roughly shaken awake for their turn on sentry-go or to stand-to. Even the
periods out of the line, which were quaintly termed 'rest' by the army, were
punctuated by exhausting bouts of physical labour. Men were not infrequently
reduced to a drugged, dream-like state, unable to react even to threats to life
and limb.(1)
On marches, and sometimes on the battlefield, the soldier was heavily weighed
down with a pack and equipment which weighed as much as 60 lbs. One private
complained that the military authorities never seemed to realise that 'our
spirits rose with the lightening of our bodies'.(2) In fact many regimental
officers sympathised with the rankers' struggle to endure route marches bowed
down with what L/Cpl. R. Mountford (10/RF) described as 'a cruel, unnatural
weight that no man should be called upon to carry'.(3) There are many examples
of officers (and NCOs) putting paternalism into practice by carrying men's
rifles and packs on long marches. G.H. Cole (1/20 Londons) would have his groom
bring up his horse on leaving the trenches but he rarely rode it, using it
instead to carry the packs of weary soldiers.(4) Pte. R.H. Sims (1/4 R. Sussex)
wrote of a four hour route march under the heat of an Egyptian sun. The march
was a sore trial but for Sims the one redeeming feature was the conduct of his
officers:
our company captain is a true gentle man & a brick & so are all the officers
as those who had horses carried chaps equipment & those who were marching
(1) R. Whipp, interview. See also J. Ellis, Eye Deep in Hell (London, 1976)
passim.
(2) Unpublished account, pp.19-20, R.D. Fisher papers, pp.19-20, 76/54/1, IWN.
(3) Quoted in Brown, Tommy Goes to War p.56.
(4) G.H. Cole, KRS Q.
-28 1-
carried the mens rifles, our captain alone carrying two...(l)
A rarely considered aspect is the mental and physical strain endured by
officers as they strove to set an example on long marches by suppressing signs
of weariness.(2)
The role of the officer in providing mental comfort for the ranker, by
countering fears that the individual soldier was impotent in the face of the
military moloch, has been discussed above. Here, the fate of one group of men
who were especially vulnerable to stress will be considered. During the war the
army received many men who were unsuited to the rigours of life in the ranks
through age, infirmity, or physical unfitness.
Life in the army could be. grim for such men. One, Pte. James Williams (29th
Labour Coy., Queen's) may stand as representative. He was conscripted at the
age of 38 in March 1917, having spent twenty years working as a clerk. Although
he enjoyed some aspects of military life, he did not adjust to life at the
bottom of the military hierarchy. Williams resented discipline, describing being
ordered to be innoculated as 'being treated like so many dogs', and he disliked
his working-class fellow rankers. Having worked for so long in a sedentary
occupation, he found it difficult to cope with the physical demands of military
life. Much of his work consisted of heavy loading. (3) Williams once wrote
that he 'Turned in thoroughly worn out & worked up to a pitch of intense hatred
to (sic) the life out here what with the filthy mouthed men one has to work
with out here'.(4) Williams did not have the compensation of service in
a cohesive unit with high esprit de corps. Neither did he have a particularly
(1) Diary, 4 Mar. 1916, R.H. Sims papers, 77/130/1, IWM.
(2) Brown, Tonuny Goes to War p.56.
(3) Diary, 2, 5, 6, 8 Mar., 11, July 1917, J. Williams papers, 83/14/1, IWM.
(4) Diary, 21 July 1917, J. Williams papers, 83/14/1, IWN.
-282-
sympathetic NCO or officer, although at least one officer seems to have been
paternal in a general way, buying beer for the men, which Williams
characteristically 'declined with thanks'.(l)
Williams' experience can profitably be compared with that of Pte. Frank Grey
(8/R. Berks.) a middle-class journalist who was conscripted at the age of 37.
Grey benefited both from service in a cohesive unit and the leadership of
paternal officers. Grey was given an easy job on account of his advanced years
and showed his gratitude by dedicating his war memoirs to his commanding
officer, Lt. Col. R.E.	 Dewing, whom he described as 'a humane, kind and
courageous' man.(2) The difference in cohesion between an infantry and a
labour unit is worth noting; the former had the experience of combat to bind the
ranks, the latter did not. Many other similar examples could be cited. Pte.
Birdsall of 2/4 DWR was appointed as an officer's servant because he was older
than most other privates, and was physically weak, having been wounded.(3) In
7/KSLI, according to 2/Lt. N. Hughes-Hallett, older men were often given jobs as
sanitary men. The work was unpleasant but such men were excused most parades.(4)
Younger middle-class soldiers were also treated with sympathy by some of their
officers. A former London clerk, Pte. R.D. Fisher (1/24 Londons) shared a keen
interest in serious music with his officer, Lt. Poll, and sometimes they would
talk briefly about the subject. Occasionally, Poll would slip a copy of a
musical magazine into Fisher's pocket. Such relationships were not without
their difficulties. The need to avoid overstepping the bounds of 'familiarity'
woc obvious: Fisher refered to Lt. Poll as 	 'a friend in spirit rather than
fact, owing no doubt to the difference in rank'.(5) Traditionally-minded NCOs
(1) Diary, 16 June 1917, J. Williams papers, 83/14/1, IWN.
(2) Grey, Confessions of a Private dedication and pp.127-8.
(3) Unpublished memoir, notebook 1, B.D. Parkin papers, 86/57/1, IWN.
(4) Quoted in Brown, Imperial War Museum p.55.
(5) Unpublished account, pp. 89-90, R.D. Fisher papers, 76/54/1, IWN.
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could be horrified by such relationships. In Aldington's novel Death of a Hero,
'Winterborne', an educated ranker, is singled out by an officer who asks him to
take a commission, and then they shake hands, 'to the impressed horror of the
NCOs' .(1)
As so often, Manning's great war novel provides a valuable insight:
although the conventions which separated officers from men were relaxed to
some extent on active service, between men of roughly the same class they
tended to become more rigid. Even when momentarily alone together, they
recognised, tacitly, something a little ambiguous in the relation in which
they stood to each other...(2)
Nevertheless, in the opening scene of The Middle Parts of Fortune, where Pte.
Bourne encounters a subaltern in the aftermath of a battle, Manning captures a
moment in which the two men meet in a dugout, share a drink from a whisky
bottle, and talk almost as equals. The formal barrier of rank has temporarily
dissolved and is replaced by a relationship characterised primarily by mutual
respect. Although both men dispense with formalities, neither man tries to take
advantage of the situation, and the fundamentals of discipline are not
challenged. They then leave the dugout where they resume normal relations. In
this instance, as in so many others, the army adage 'on parade, on parade; off
parade, off parade' can be usefully applied.(3)
Manning's portrait of relations between privates and NCOs and privates and
officers has been criticised as unrealistic. (4) The suggestion that Bourne is
on 'unusually informal terms with his officers and NCOs' (5) is more accurate,
but as this thesis has demonstrated, informal and friendly relations between




(4) C.N. Smith, 'The Very Plain Song of It: Frederic Manning, Her Privates We',
in H. Klein (ed.) The First World War in Fiction (London, 1978 edn.) pp.176-B.
(5) B. Gammage, The Broken Years (Ringwood, Victoria, 1975 edn.) p.240.
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even in units which did not employed a liberal disciplinary regime. Manning's
portrait, based on his experience in the ranks of 7/KSLI, although at variance
with the stereotype of inter-rank relations, should be seen as entirely
realistic.
The experiences of middle-class rankers such as Williams and C.E. Jacomb
(23/RF), who complained that he had been 'spoken to and treated like a dog by
practically everyone of higher rank than myself' (1) cannot be ignored, but at
the very least it is possible to say that some older and middle-class rankers
were singled out for sympathetic treatment by their officers. The effect of
good, paternal leadership in alleviating stress and thus enhancing the morale of
rankers of all social backgrounds should not be underrated. Rankers knew that
they were not simply at the mercy of the military system. As a conscript private
of 14/Argylls noted, while recalling a friendly and paternal officer, 'It makes
all the difference when one is treated with kindness and consideration by one in
authority' . (2)
9.4 Leadership in Battle
The battlefield role of the regimental officer can be divided into command
and leadership functions. The former, which falls outside the scope of this
thesis, encompassed tactical decision making, allocation of resources and the
like. The leadership function can be summarised as the need to ensure that
the goals of the primary group are congruent with the goals of the army. One
of the most important methods used by the British regimental officer in
(1) C.E. Jacomb Torment (London, 1920) p.320. This statement conflicts with some
of Jacomb's earlier comments about paternal NCOs and officers. Ibid pp.73, 171.
(2) C. Havorth, March to Armistice 1918 (London, 1968) p.28.
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carrying out this function was to act as a leader in the most literal sense.
The disproportionately heavy casualty rates for junior officers suggests that
Crozier's belief that officers had to have a 'three seconds lead' over their
men in the advance, so they could say 'come on' rather than 'go on' to their
men, was widely held.(1)
Social relationships between soldiers lie at the core of combat motivation:
soldiers do not want to appear cowardly in front of their comrades.(2) However,
given the closeness of inter-rank relationships, fear of letting down an officer
could be a source of motivation.(3) It should also be noted thatregimental
officer had to strike a balance between leading from the front and being
regarded by his men as a 'thruster', all too ready to sacrifice his men's lives.
(4) In the attack, the officer had to overcome his men's fear and lead them
into battle; on the defensive, he had to keep them from running away. Training
and discipline helped the soldier to choose the 'fight' rather than 'flight'
option, but an officer's example was also important.
First, the officer had to suppress his own fears of death or mutilation,
although the experienced soldier came to learn how to judge the degree of danger
in everyday trench life.(5) Waiting to go into battle was particularly
stressful. A conscript private of 6/Queen's believed that 'only those who have
faced the ordeal can form an adequate conception of the anxiety of those long
minutes which sometimes seemed like hours'.(6) More specific fears included the
(1) Crozier, Impressions and Recollections p.214.
(2) R. Little, 'Buddy Relations and Combat Performance', in N. Janowitz, pp.195-
223.
(3) See for example letter, 6 July 1916, Pte. W.A. Hollings, quoted in Nilner,
p.141.
(4) II. Home, KRS Q; Tilsey, pp.30, 170; Thorburn, p.183
(5) Diary, 22 (?) Nov, 15 (?), 28 Dec. 1915, J. Griffith papers, IWM.
(6) Unpublished account, p.2, H.L. Adams papers, 83/50/1, IWM. See also Col.
N.G.N. Stopford, lecture on trench warfare, Conf. 3898, SCL; Gabriel, pp.31-
32.
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fear of death and pain, fear for the soldier's family at home and fear of
weapons such as gas.(1) Even the noise of friendly artillery could be 'nerve
wracking to an amazing degree'. (2)	 In battle,	 the soldier's emotions were
'numbed', while their senses 	 were heightened; this is biological reaction of
the human body to severe stress. When the immediate danger had passed, the
senses 'gradually returned to normal and we looked around us like men awakened
from a nightmare'. (3) Manning wrote of the sensitive way officers treated men
who were beginning to reassert normal patterns	 of life and come to terms with
the death of their comrades, although long exposure to danger could reduce the
impact of such	 deaths.(4) Nonetheless, as an officer wrote in 1916 'The
majority of men... are more or less scared stiff all the time'. (5)
The constant battle of the officer to suppress fear, and set an example to
his men, was described by Capt. Hanbury-Sparrow of 2/R. Berks., who was trying
to nerve himself to look over a parapet:
For very shame's sake pull yourself together, man...Set them an example.
With a dozen pairs of eyes watching you, you unstrap your field-glasses
and, kneeling, look over the parapet. (6)
Many officers referred to the strain of command: 'you owed it [to the men] to
stick it too', as one phrased it. As this man had previously served in the
ranks, he would have been well aware of the importance to the private of the
officer's example.(7) By contrast, other officers were exhilarated by command.
(1) Letter, 22 Oct. 1917, J. Mudd papers, IWM; MAF 60/243, PRO.
(2) Letter, 27 Apr. 1915, G.W. Durham papers, IWM.
(3) H.R. Williams, The Gallant Company (Sydney, 1933) pp.62-63.
(4) Manning, pp.13-21; H. Munday, No Heroes, No Cowards (Milton Keynes, 1981)
p.17.
(5) Letter, 12 June 1916, H.R. Hammond papers, LIJLLC. See also V.M. Yeates,
Winged Victory (London, 1974 edn.) pp.122, 124-26.
(6) Hanbury-Sparrow, Land-Locked Lake, pp.18-19.
(7) Nettleton, p.113. See also Bion, p.201.
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One claimed that responsibility for his men's lives actually reduced his fear
in battle, because he had no time to concentrate on himself.(l)
There is plenty of evidence that other ranks of all social classes were
influenced by the example of their officers on the battlefield. A young private
of 7/R. Bde. commented	 that 'Our officers were splendid and showed
great coolness' during the battle of Arras. (2) Pte. John Gibbons, in a
judicious assessment of the role of the officer, implied that the officer did
indeed set an example: their 'outward and visible standard of courage' being
superior to that of the other ranks.(3) Pte. Frank Dunham (1/7 Londons) claimed
that 'One thing only helped to keep our spirits up' while serving at Ypres in
September 1917: 'a daily visit from Capt. K.O. Peppiatt. He set us an excellent
rc..
example in cheerfulness and good humour...' (4) It will be 	 recalled	 thaf
Gibbons nor Dunham were uncritical admirers of the British officer corps. Other
officers were remembered for their leadership in specific situations. Pte. Jimmy
Walton (1l/Suffolks)	 admired an officer for his courage in rallying men in
Lochnagar Crater on the Somme on 1 July 1916:
"Gentlemen, we're going to be faced with a counterattack. We stand and
fight". He might have been on a barrack square - so calm, so collected.(5)
The presence on the battlefield of a few men with the ability to impose
their will on their fellow soldiers plays a vital role in preventing men from
running away. (6) Such individuals are not necesarily officers or even NCOs,
but such formal leaders were trained to set an example. One was Lt. J. Proctor
(lO/Lincoins), who was decorated for his leadership during the battle of Arras
(1) H. Boustead, The Wind of Morning (London, 1974) p.37;. See also A. Behrend,
As From Kemmel Hill (London, 1963) p.147; E. Foster-Hall, KRS Q.
(2) Letter, 16 Apr. 1917, B.F. Eccies papers, 82/22/1, IWM.
(3) Gibbons, p.69.
(4) Dunham, pp.68, 82.
(5) Quoted in Peacock, 'Rendezvous with Death', p.344.
(6) Keegan, p.332.
-288-
on 9 April 1917, when his company was held up by uncut wire in front of an
enemy position. Such an event could be fatal for the impetus of an attack,
therefore Proctor's actions were particularly significant:
He ordered his men to lie down, as snipers were active, while he searched for
a gap. He walked up and down making jokes and imitating Charlie Chaplin,
keeping the men laughing. The officer was wounded at this point but continued
to display the utmost sangfroid.(1)
Proctor's actions, although eccentric, epitomised the leadership traits that
characterised the British junior officer. He led from the front, searching for
the gap in person, rather than sending an NCO. He demonstrated his courage by
walking about despite the threat of snipers and by maintaining a calm demeanour
after he had been wounded. Proctor showed concern for his men's lives by making
them lie down. Finally, he attempted to keep up the men's morale by his words
and actions in a situation in which the men must have been gripped with fear.
An officer commented that the subalterns of 1915-17 were not expected to
be tactical geniuses, but they were expected to motivate their men.(2) In 1918
junior leadership by example continued to be vitally important, particularly in
the March Retreat, which was very much a 'soldier's battle'. The major
difference between leadership in 1918 and in previous years was that it took
place in a context of increasing tactical sophistication. By the second half of
the year most units	 had discarded the the crude 'waves' of 1916 in favour of
the 'blob', or dispersed section column. Yet in an action of 1 September 1918
2/Lt (acting captain) Griffiths (2/4 Londons) 'strode steadily ahead of the
advancing line...waving his walking stick above his head and blowing his
whistle'. Griffiths showed a 'light-hearted contempt for death'. 2/4 Londons




had adopted the 'blob', illustrating that tactics had changed by September
1918	 but concepts of junior leadership had not.(1) Conversely, on some
occasions in the British advance of 1918, leadership from the front by officers
who were themselves inexperienced was necessary because of the poor training of
the infantry.(2)
Leadership by example on the battlefield must be set against a darker side of
the officer's role. It has been claimed by Dave Lamb that officers acted as
'battle police', forcing reluctant soldiers into battle at gun point. (3) I have
dealt with the subject elsewhere, and here it will suffice to say that
while battle police did exist, they were usually drawn from a unit's regimental
police, not officers.(4) Battle police had various official tasks, including
traffic control, rounding up stragglers, and arresting deserters, but summary
execution was not one of them.
That is not to say that summary executions did not occur. At moments of
extreme crisis, officers and,indeed NCOs and ordinary soldiers did threaten, or
even carry out, summary executions. In October 1918 a brigade commander
discovered some troops bolting under an enemy barrage. He threatened to shoot
the first man that passed him, thus bringing the others to a halt; but then
managed to win them over, wilt the help of a joke.(5) However, while a tiny
handful of officers did make a practice of summary executions, (6) this practice
was never sanctioned by GHQ.	 Indeed, when on one occasion of extreme crisis
(1) Letter, Oct. 1963, A.R. Armfield, BBC/GW, IWM.
(2) Appx., Sept. 1918, WD of 1/Gordons, WO 95/1435, PRO.
(3) D. Lamb, Mutinies (Oxford and London, nd) p.3.
(4) G.D. Sheffield, 'The Operational Role of British Military Police on the
Western Front, 1914-18', in P. Griffith, British Fighting Methods in the Great
War (forthcoming).
(5) J. Terraine, (ed.) General Jack's Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1964) pp.277.
(6) F.P. Crozier, A Brass Hat In No Man's Land (London, 1930) 109-110; F.P.
Crozier, The Men I Killed (London,1937) pp.54-56, 61-63.
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the Aisne in May 1918, the commander of 19th Division attempted to speed up the
process of executions by requesting from GHQ	 permission to 'confirm and
have carried out' death sentences on stragglers, permission was refused.(1)
It is significant that Crozier, who is used by Lamb to illustrate the use of
officers as battle police, was described by a fellow officer of 36th Division
as having	 'unbalanced' views. Furthermore, he claimed that the divisional
commander hesitated to promote Crozier because of his 'roughness and the
ruthless way he handled his men'. (3) Crozier was not, in this respect, a
typical officer. If other ranks had lived in constant fear of being shot by
their own officers, it would have destroyed the element of trust which lay at
the heart of the	 officer-man relationship. Further research might uncover
more examples of unofficial policies of summary executions being instituted at
a local level, but the notion that fear of the officer's revolver was a major
factor in officer-man relations can be safely dismissed.
9.5 Failures of Paternalism: Insubordination and Mutiny
In 1918 an artillery sergeant, informally chatting to his officer, told him
that there were two reasons why the men remained cheerful in appalling
conditions: comradeship and fair treatment by their officers and NCOs.(4) With
the latter half of this statement in mind, it is useful to examine some negative
evidence about the importance of officer-man relations; that is, occasions
on which poor officer-man relations and leadership resulted in low morale.
British rankers were by no means blindly obedient cannon-fodder. They were
(1) Letter, nd, Sir G. Jeffrys, CAB 45/114, PRO.
(2) Lamb, pp.3-5; C. Denison, 'From Two Angles' in C. O'Riordan et al p.80.
(3) Letter, 3 May 1930, W.B. Spender, CAB 45/137, PRO.
(4) Gordon, Unreturning Army p.116.
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perfectly capable of conveying their displeasure in a number of different ways
if they thought themselves unfairly treated.
The most drastic, and risky, way was to assault or murder an officer. In
separate incidents two soldiers were executed on the Western Front for striking
a superior officer, even although both assaults were minor in nature. (1) Capt.
Hamond, in his treatise on officership, wisely urged officers to avoid placing
themselves in a situation where even an accidental blow could be laid on an
officer. (2) It would have been relatively easy to murder an unpopular officer
or NCO under the cover of battle, although, naturally, it is impossible to
ascertain how prevalent this practice was. The only new piece of evidence on
this subject which has emerged during the research for this thesis is the
testimony of a former private of 2/Bedfords who claimed that an officer of the
battalion was murdered early in 1915 by a grenade thrown into his dugout. (3)
Between 4 August 1914 and 11 November 1918 only one soldier serving on the
Western Front was executed for the murder of an officer (this figure excludes
Chinese and Cape Coloured labourers). This murder was apparently motiveless, and
was committed during a rifle inspection behind the lines - hardly the classic
scenario for a 'fragging'. (4) Six men were executed for the murder of NCOs.
The paucity of rumours concerning the murder of officers is another factor to
be considered when assessing the nature of the officer-man relationship.
To argue with or insult an officer was also a serious offence, but insults
were sometimes shouted from the anonyminity of the ranks. While blanket
(1) J. Putkowski and J. Sykes, Shot at Dawn (Barnsley, 1989) pp.84-5, 130.
(2) 'Wisdom for Warts', p.6., D. Hamond papers.
(3) H. Myers, interview.
(4) Putkowski and Sykes, p.278.
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condemnations of officers did occur - shouts of 'death to our officers' were
reported from the camp cinema at Catterick in January 1918 - (1) most protests
0
of this sort seem to have been aimed at individuals who failed to live upthe
standards of behaviour that soldiers expected of their officers. A draft of
Lancashire Fusiliers leaving for	 foreign service in 1915 called for 'three
cheers' for one officer; but then followed it with 'three boos' for another, who
was called 'a slave-driver, a coward, a pig, and several other names not fit to
mention'. (2)	 A variation on this theme occurred in March 1916 when 2/17
Londons, drawn up on parade to witness the presentation of medals, refused to
cheer an unpopular officer who had been awarded the MC. (3)
Such methods	 were used not merely to relieve feelings but also to convey to
officers that the men considered behaviour to be unacceptable. On occasions,
when senior officers agreed with their men, steps were taken to rectify the
situation. An officer of a TF unit, 2/15 Londons, newly arrived from England,
was regarded as officious by his men, an opinion which was shared by his
company commander. With the latter's tacit sympathy, the men communicated their
views to 2/Lt 'Counterjump', as he was nicknamed, for instance by loudly
commenting on the poor type of man currently being commissioned. 'Counterjump's'
authority was undermined by a conspiracy between the CSM, men and company
conmiander. According to an NCO, 'Counterjump's' career was 'an object lesson on
the powerlessness of the officer when his men are against him'. (4)
Such incidents were not confined to TF units with relaxed standards of
(1) GHQ Great Britain, Weekly Intelligence Summaries, 22 Dec. 1917 to 29 Mar.
1918, AIR 1 538/16/15/55, PRO.
(2) Ashurst, p.61. For a similar incident see unpublished account, p.13, A.J.
Abraham papers, P.191, IWM.
(3) Diary, 9 Oct. 1916, A. Young papers, 76/101/1. IWM
(4) Unpublished account, pp.61-4, C.F. Jones papers, LHCMA.
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discipline. During the winter of 1915-16, a mounted officer of a crack Regular
unit, 2/R. Bde., 'very foolishly' shouted "Left-Right-Left" to men emerging
from a trench. As Sgt. Riddell. noted, 'This is all right at the right time' but
to shout orders to exhausted men who had spent six days in muddy trenches, who
were marching in thigh boots and were slipping about 'was asking for trouble'.
The men shouted abuse from the safety of the darkness. This incident damned
the officer in the eyes of his men. Riddell commented that 'if men are beat the
same as we were, then was the time to encourage them, even if he had to walk'.
Interestingly, Riddell hints that the company commander disapproved with the
officer's actions, but for discipline's sake had to side with the officer. One
can easily imagine the latter receiving an uncomfortable lecture from his
superior. (1)
Mutiny was defined in 1916 as implying 'collective insubordination, or a
combination of two or more persons to resist or to induce others to resist
lawful military authority'. (2) Most of the mutinies of the Great War era were
not ideologically motivated. Even after being socialised into military life,
working-class temporary soldiers did not abandon civilian patterns of
behaviour or thought, and were liable to react to what they perceived as unfair
treatment by their military superiors by going on strike. (3)
A number of minor mutinies occurred during the training of Kitchener and TF
units in 1914-15 when conditions were poor and men were relatively unaccustomed
to discipline, although such incidents were sporadic rather than widespread. (4)
(1) Unpublished account, p.62 J.W. Riddell papers, 77/73/1, IWN.
(2) F.D. Grierson, The ABC of Military Law (London, 1916) p.74.
(3) L. James, Mutiny (London, 1987) pp.9-15. For some interesting reflections
on the nature of strikes, see H. Benyon, Working For Ford (Harmondsworth, 1984
edn.) pp.180-I.
(4) Simkins, Kitchener's Army, pp.200-02, 238-89, 243-44.
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Tactful handling by sympathetic officers could 	 often defuse such strikes.(1)
Only on one occasion did a major mutiny of British (as opposed to Dominion
take place on the Western Front, at Etaples base camp in September 1917. (2)
At this date Etaples base camp contained many of the classic ingredients for
mutiny. (3)
	
Food and conditions were poor, and there were few leisure
facilities in the camp. It is noteworthy that the mutiny began on a Sunday
afternoon, when crowds of men had gathered in the camp with nothing to do.
Moreover, many of the men who were subjected to a fairly brutal form of recruit
training in the 'Bull Ring' had front-line experience, and were returning for
a further spell after recovering from their wounds. Men whom had previously
undergone this right of passage, and were accustomed to being treated with a
measure of respect by NCOs and officers with whom they shared the dangers of
active service,	 were especially resentful of the military police and the
'canaries' (instructor NCOs), who were perceived as 'column dodgers'. Pte. A.F.
Sheppard, (11/R. Sussex), who trained at Etaples in early 1917 after having
fought on the Somme, spoke for many when he dismissed the canaries as all 'out
of the same box of soldiers competing with each other who could grow the longest
moustache and shout the loudest'.(4) In short, there was general resentment that
combat veterans were being bullied by men who, unlike regimental officers and
NCOs, had not experienced the danger of the trenches.
(1) Levin, p.16; P. Croney, Soldier's Luck (Ilfracombe, 1965) pp.10-11.
(2) For general discussions of the mutiny see G. Dallas and D. Gill, The Unknown
Army (London, 1985) pp.63-81; James, pp.89-98; J. Putkowski, 'Toplis, Etaples &
"The Monocled Mutineer", ST 18, (1986) pp.6-11. As Putkowski convincingly
demonstrates, W. Allison and J. Fairley, The Monocled Mutineer (London, 1978)
should be treated with extreme care.
(3) J. Putkowski, 'British Army Mutinies in World War One', paper given to RMA
Sandhurst War Discussion Group, 19 Feb. 1990.
(4) Letter, nd, A.F. Sheppard, BBC/GW, IWM.
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The army's disciplinary regime was expanded to nightmarish proportions at
Etaples. Writing of a similar camp at Rouen in 1915, a ranker supposed that in a
base where 'thousands of men' drawn from many regiments 'are herded together'
there was 'bound to be a lack of esprit-de-corps (sic) and sense of
comradeship'. He went on to write that the result was that everyone hated
drill, implying that drill carried out in the parent unit was at at least
tolerable, and that esprit de corps	 could offset bullshit.(1) Likewise, at
Etaples two of the pillars of unit cohesion, esprit de corps and paternal
junior officers who could intervene to modify the disciplinary system and
protect their men, were absent. Officers were kept well away from the men, and
the usual unit structure did not exist. The creative tension that existed
between the army's disciplinary system and the paternalism of the junior
officers was absent at Etaples, where unalloyed discipline ruled supreme.
Capt. J.H. Dible, a medical officer at Etaples, blamed the disturbances on
those officers who treated citizen soldiers 'with the same rigid methods' more
appropriate to long service Regulars. Although 'very often' officers realised
'the changed conditions and made allowances', he believed that one bad officer
could negate the work of twenty good ones. This problem was aggravated by the
fact that there was disparity in the conditions of officers and men, which was
the fault of the staff rather than the regimental officer. (2)
Although one mutineer was executed for inciting a picquet to attack its
officer, there is little other evidence of mutineers expressing resentment of
regimental officers, providing they did not attempt to defend the military
police or 'canaries'. (3) The war diary of the commandant of Etaples base
(1) Letter, 3 Aug. 1915, p.131, P.H. Jones papers, P.246, IWM.
(2) Diary, 11 Sept. 1917, pp. 178-9, J.H. Dible papers, IWM.
(3) Babington, Sake of Example pp.132-33, but see Liddle, Soldier's War pp.79-
80.
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states that on the first day of the mutiny 'Feeling in the crowd was only
against the police and Officers were treated respectfully. The officers
gradually got the men back to camp, and by 9.45-lOpm all was quiet'. On 10
September it was recorded that 'The demeanour of all crowds towards Officers
was perfectly good'.(l) This evidence is corroborated by a middle-class female
ambulance driver who recalled the mutiny as 'an orderly affair, with officers
mingling with the men in sympathy and keeping order'.(2) Likewise, a ranker-
officer of the 2/RF stated in his memoirs that the mutineers 'had no quarrel
with fighting officers...we went over to Paris Plage every day unmolested by the
mutineers...'.(3) The 'canaries' and military police, not regimental officers,
were the targets of the mutineers' hatred.
Dallas and Gill see the Etaples mutiny as marking a major change in officer-
man relations, with generals no longer prepared to trust the other ranks.
They also dismiss junior officers' opinions on the essential reliability of
their troops as wishful thinking. (4) The evidence presented in Chapter 3 of
this thesis throws some doubt on both of these statments. If the Etaples mutiny
is seen as the military version of a strike, there is no need to question the
reliability of the army as a whole. At unit level, a basic reserve of goodwill
between the ranks, together with a measure of tact and man-management skill on
the part of the officers and the essential willingness of the men to obey,
(1) 9-10 Sept. 1917, WD of Commandant, Etaples Base Camp, WO 95/4027, PRO.
(2) Letter, G.F. Oppenshaw, Observer 23 Feb. 1964.
(3) E. Parker, Into Battle 1914-1918 (London, 1964) p.86. See also C.B.
Brereton, Tales of Three Campaigns (London, 1926) for the views of a NZ officer
sympathetic towards the mutineers. Although the accounts of Oppenshaw, Parker
and Brereton are inaccurate in details, they are are very revealing of junior
officers' attitudes towards the mutiny.
(4) Dallas and Gill, p.76.
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providing, of course, that the unspoken code of the deferential relationship
was observed, served to defuse most problems. In the very different conditions
prevailing at Etaples, rankers began what Julian Putkowski has termed
'collective bargaining in khaki'.(l) This was not dissimilar to workers'
behaviour in prewar industrial disputes, and there are obvious parallels with
'collective bargaining by riot' inighteenth century. (2) The men took direct
action by breaking out of camp and enjoying the forbidden fruits of Etaples
town, but the;r	 aims were limited, not revolutionary.
The Etaples strike resulted in the removal of an unpopular APM and Base
Commandant, the town of Etaples being thrown open to the men and, ultimately,
the training function being removed from Etaples and made a Corps
responsibility, where more sympathetic treatment for the men might have been
expected. Capt. Dible recorded that officers were divided into two schools of
thought over the appropriate response to the events at Etaples. Older, Regular
officers were in favour of repression, while others were in favour of
discovering the men's 	 grievances and rectifying them. To adopt the former
response, Dible argued, would be to risk a further outbreak, risking 'mutiny,
bloodshed, and possibly civil war and revolution'. (3) In fact, the military
authorities, by making relatively minor concessions, succeeded in halting the
single most serious disturbance of the war, and removed the basic ingredients
which might have caused a second major mutiny. In sum, the only major British
mutiny on the Western Front 	 highlights the importance of good officer-man
relations in maintaining military morale and cohesion, and the generally sound
(1) Letter, J. Putkowski, The Guardian 26 Sept. 1986.
(2) See J. Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England 1700-1870 (London, 1979)
pp.113-135.
(3) Diary, p.182, 11 Sept. 1917, J.H. Dible papers, 1W11.
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state of officer-man relations in the BEF.
A number of minor mutinies occured on active service. In 1917 Alan Thomas,
an officer of 1/6 RWK, was faced with what he described as a 'sit-down strike'
of men on a carrying party. Thomas, who had some sympathy with the men's
grievances, threatened them with his revolver but in retrospect believed he
should have accepted the protest as a fait accompli, rather than risking a test
of his authority. One should imagine many such situations occuxeing but going
(for understandable reasons) unrecorded, being defused 	 by immediate
disciplinary action, or the threat of it, or through tactful handling. (1) The
latter course was adopted in 1915, when a battalion was ordered to carry out
stamping exercises to help prevent trench-foot. The men reacted angrily, but
their officers exercised tact and turned the order into a joke, thus securing
'the fulfilment of the orders without much ill humour'. (2)
Some officers took this style of tactful, consultative leadership a stage
further. On taking command of 12/Middlesex in 1916 Lt.Col. Frank Maxwell
anticipated the leadership style of Montgomery in 1942. Maxwell had all the men
of the battalion gather around informally, and gave them a 'pep' talk, spicing
his remarks with a number of jokes. His words were matched by his deeds, for he
arbitrarily abolished Field Punishment No.1 in his battalion. Maxwell firmly
believed that men should be treated as 'a human being with intelligence'; too
many officers, he believed
	 did not have the knack of engaging the men's
interest when giving orders.(3) Not all officers went as far as Maxwell or
Barnett-Barker of 22/RF, but many learned tact and a few basic man-management
(I) Thomas, pp.115-117. See also E.L.G. Griffith-Williams, KRS Q.
(2) Mosley, p.66.
(3) [C. Maxwell, (ed.)] Frank Maxwell, Brig.-General VC CSI DSO, A Memoir and
Some Letters (London, 1921) pp.139, 140, 172.
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techniques.
The extent of such leadership by negotiation should not be exaggerated. Pte.
J. Cuthbert (9/Cheshires), executed in 1916 for disobeying an order to go into
No Man's Land with a wiring party, was the victim of an attempt at negotiation
which went disastrously wrong.(l) The scale of such activities, and the
circumstances under which they took place must await further detailed research.
However, the very	 existence of leadership by negotiation is an important
corrective to the idea the other ranks were blindly obedient cannon-fodder.
British officers learned that in dealing with citizen soldiers, the application
of 'Regular' methods did not always produce the most effective results.
9.6 The Survival of Auxiliary Discipline on Active Service
The continued existence of auxiliary styles of officer-man relations and
discipline on active service depended on the survival of personnel to pass on
the traditions and spirit of the original unit to replacements, or on receiving
replacement officers sympathetic to the original ethos. Under the Left Out Of
Battle (LOOB) system, which was introduced on 1st July 1916 (some units may
have adopted it earlier) ten per cent or so of personnel were held back from
action to form a cadre on which a unit could be rebuilt. (2) An officer of RDF
argued that the LOOB system was important 'in preserving the tradition and
experience so essential after heavy losses...'(3) The LOOB system helped
to offset both the effects of the mass casualties of the Somme offensive and
the cross-posting of drafts which also seems to have begun in July 1916. This
(1) Putkowski and Sykes, pp.83-4.
(2) Letter, nd, G.W. Shepperd, CAB 45/137, PRO.
(3) Letter, 29 Mar. 1930, W.F. Jeffries, CAB 45/135, PRO.
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unpopular system resulted in, for example, LRB men arriving at the London
Scottish and vice versa. (1)	 Occasionally, it seems that transfers of men
between battalions were arranged, but in general they were prohibited.(2) The
integrity of many units was dealt a further blow with the wave of amalgamations
and disbandments in February 1918. The angry reaction of all ranks of Il/Argylls
when it was announced that they were to be absorbed by 1/8 Argylls was typical
of many men facing the disappearance of their unit: 'It will completely destroy
the esprit de battalion of a good mob'.(3)
The nature of a unit's	 disciplinary regime could be judged by whether
soldiers were forced to attempt parade ground levels of smartness on active
service. Attitudes to 'spit and polish' could vary greatly between units of
similar types. Sgt. L. Davidson, a sapper, on moving from one Regular division
to another, found that much more emphasis was placed on smartness in the 8th
than in the 2nd Division. (4) Cleaning and polishing was usually left to rest
periods, although it was not unknown in the trenches. Such activities were
resented by many soldiers, because they ate into the little time available for
relaxation, and were seen as essentially pointless: in one war novel written by
a former temporary officer, it is implied that a unit's combat performance was
actually enhanced by disregarding bull.(5) New Army and TF units tended to be
(1) Unpublished account by F.H. Wallis, CAB 45/132, PRO. For an official
explanation of this policy, see N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life (London,
nd) I, pp.255-57.
(2) Letter, nd, P. Alder, BBC/GW, 11114. See also LW. Mitchinson, 'The
Reconstitution of 169 Brigade: July - October 1916', ST No.29 (Summer 1990)
pp. 8-11.
(3) Diary, 15 Nay 1918, R.L. Mackay papers, P.374, IWN. See also J.P.W. Jamie,
The 177th Brigade 1914-18	 (Leicester,	 1931) p.34; Dunham, pp.121-3.
(4) L. Davidson, interview.
(5) Bartlett, No Man's Land p.165; F.A.J. Taylor, The Bottom of the Barrel
(London, 1978) p.99.; French, Gone for a Soldier p.32; B. Newman, The Cavalry
Went Through (London, 1930) pp.25, 35.
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more likely to forego bull in the trenches than Regular units, but this rule was
not infallible. (1)
9.7 Territorial Discipline on Active Service
In most cases, direct recruiting into the TF came to an end after 11 December
1915. Thereafter, men enlisted for general service. TF battalions thus began
to receive drafts of men without any experience of the Territorial ethos,
although the occasional draft of men might 'fortuitously strengthen the
territorial element'; (2) thus in 1918 1/5 DLI received a draft of 'splendid
material' from the yeomanry.(3) More typical was the experience of 1/7
Middlesex. Continuity with the prewar unit was sufficiently strong for the
companies to be referred to by territorial titles: A Company was known as
'Hampstead and Highgate' and B as 'Enfield', until heavy casualties in September
1916 brought about 'practically the end of the original 7th Middlesex'. (4)
The impact of heavy casualties on a cohesive unit was discussed by an officer
of 1/6 W. Yorks. This unit, whose prewar disciplinary code was discussed in
chapter 2,
	 was	 'from April to December 1915...a self-conscious Territorial
unit'. Pre-var experience had produced a cohesive unit with excellent esprit de
corps and officer-man relations, but it was a 'closed corporation'.
Reinforcements were regarded
	 as 'interlopers' and 'ragged unmercifully,
or, worse still, left severely alone'. However, the fighting in 1916 'smashed
up a good deal of this "Territorial" influence'. Large numbers of original men
(1) H. Colbourne,	 W. Gilbert,	 L. Davidson, interviews;
	 Marks, pp.69-70;
Coppard, p.29.
(2) Beckett, 'Territorial Force', p.137, 147.
(3) Letter, A.B. Hill, nd (c. 1935) CAB 45/114, PRO.
(4) Unpublished account, in letter, 24 Mar. 1935, E.J. King, CAB 45/135, PRO.
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and officers became casualties, and their replacements came from all over the
country: 'what was narrow and "local" in the Battalion died out in the "blood
bath" on the Somme'. (1) Heavy casualties could bring about the destruction of a
community which predated the war, a point graphically illustrated by the grief
of an NCO of 1/5 Buffs after their first major action had cost the battalion
250 casualties. (2) Similarly,	 an officer of 1/4 R. Berks. remarked that
during the Somme campaign the nature of the battalion underwent a profound
change. However, those original members who were wounded but later returned to
the unit were able to restore some of the Territorial spirit of the early
part of the war. (3)
The replacement of Territorial officers by more experienced Regulars was bound
to cause problems, even if the 'basic wisdom' of such postings w& accepted by
TF units. (4) When such Regular officers made no attempt to understand the
ethos of the Territorial unit, considerable bitterness could result.(5) By
contrast, Lt.Col. R.N. O'Connor, a Regular appointed to command 2/HAC in Nay
1917, was surprised by its 'auxiliary' style of discipline, but in reshaping
the battalion (which had recently taken heavy casualties) managed to tighten
discipline without	 transforming the ethos of the unit. Initially, a junior NCO
of the battalion admitted, the introduction of some Regular ways was resented,
but in the long term they were 'a very good thing for morale and discipline'.
Significantly, some Territorial ways remained. The CSM of C company, 'Gee'.
Grose, 'did his best to make life endurable for [the me n ]' and 'never shouted an
order except when on parade. Of f parade he ASKED you to do
(1) Tempest, pp. L?O-fl.
(2) 'Mespotamian Diary: With the 5th Buffs along the Tigris 1915-1916, Part
Two', GW 1, No.4, (Aug. 1989) p.152.




something and if it was a lousy job invariably did so with his arm across
one's shoulder'.(l)
It seems that the peculiar disciplinary code of TF units was steadily eroded
on active service. An officer of 1/20 Londons recalled that early in the war
discipline was based on a 'spirit of comradeship and pride', founded on a common
'volunteer' spirit and local feeling, most soldiers and officers being drawn
from the same area of south-east London. Inevitably, in time the local character
became diluted, and the battalion atmosphere 'changed and depreciated'.(2)
However, the prewar ethos survived for a considerable period in a number of
units. W.H.A. Groom, a ranker of 1/5 Londons (LRB), recalled that in October
1916 the officers and other ranks were still largely drawn from the same class
and	 discipline	 was based on 'good understanding and esprit de corps'. A
'definite change' in the disciplinary system did not occur until April 1918,
when 'orthodox army discipline' was introduced, because of the influx of men
who lacked experience in the ways of the battalion.(3) However, Aubrey Smith,
another ranker, placed the modification of discipline much earlier, in the
autumn of 1916, although he gave similar reasons for the change.(4) Even so,
Pte. S. Amatt, who arrived at 1/5 Londons in the second half of 1916, noticed
a considerable difference between the disciplinary regime of his old unit, 2/7
Essex, and his new one, where less emphasis was placed on 'bull', and there was
(C)
a 'matey, chummy' relationship between officers and men.D1screpncies between
the different pieces of evidence ort probably explained by the fact that Smith
(1) Unpublished account, p.13-i4, 32, W.J. Bradley papers, LULLC; J. Baynes,
The Forgotten Victor (London, 1989) pp.21-22.
(2) GH. Cole, XRS Q. For similar comments about 1/4 Gordons, see N.C.S. Down,
KRS Q.
(3) W.H.A. Groom, Poor Bloody Infantry (New MaIden, 1983 edn.) pp.4S,l6O.
(4) Smith, Four Years p.157.
(5) Quoted in Mitchinson, p.10.
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had come out with the battalion in 1914 and thus would have known the unalloyed
auxiliary discipline of a class corps, while Groom and Ainatt sampled a modified,
but still 'un-Regular', version.
Other TF units, largely because of the chance survival of key personnel, also
retained the Territorial ethos. 1/7 Manchesters (discussed in its prewar form in
chapter 2) which was fortunate to be commanded by one of its prewar officers,
falls into this category, as does 4/5 BW.(1) 47th (London) Division's historian
claimed that it remained	 'to the end what it was from the beginning - a
division of London Territorials' retaining 'homogenity' and 'Civic patriotism'.
This is probably an exaggeration but the many Territorial officers who
commanded battalions and brigades, and the Division's Regular officers who had
experience of the prewar TF, undoubtedly assisted it to maintain its ethos. (2)
Yeomanry regiments were particularly tenacious in clinging to their traditions
and character. This was symbolised by the adoption of a broken spur as the sign
of 74th Division, which was formed from dismounted yeomanry units. As late as
June 1916 an officer joined the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars in Egypt to find
that 'The regiment was essentially a landlord and tenant affair...a Farmer could
lose his son and his landlord in the same battle',(3) while on joining 25/RWF,
which was formed from 	 yeomanry units, an officer found 'an entirely different
atmosphere' from any other unit he had served in.(4) A party of New Zealanders
arrived at the 1/1 Lincs. Yeomanry, fearing they would be subjected to the
'repressive discipline' of the British army. An officer 'told them something
(1) G.B. Hurst, introduction to S.J. Wilson, The Seventh Manchesters
(Manchester, 19201 pp.XI-XIII; Andrews, Haunting Years pp.270, 286-88.
(2) Maude, p.211.
(3) Wilson, Palestine 1917 p.42.
(4) V. de Sola Pinto, 'My First War', in Panichas, p.79. For factors in the
survival of the yeomanry ethos of another unit, see E.W. Gladstone, The
Shropshire Yeomanry (Manchester, 1953) pp.216, 233.
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about the Yeomanry and told them that in the case of difficulties, they must
come straight to me'. This regiment was converted to a battalion of the 11CC in
April 1918, but the peculiar yeomanry ethos survived, thanks to a sympathetic
commanding officer: 'he understood and was happy with Yeomen'. (1)
Some Regulars had initial doubts about the paternalism of TF officers. A
Regular officer of 51st (Highland) Division argued that during the early
period of training paternalism had not yet become second-nature:
They had not been taught to carry the rifles of the footsore...They did not
yet know that the welfare of their command must always be their first
consideration. (2)
On active service, most Territorial officers seem to have matched the
paternalism of the Regulars, even in the early months of the war: the CO of 1/6
Londons, for example,	 attempted to get extra sugar for his sweet-toothed
soldiery in Nay 1915. (3) There are, however, some examples of poor man-
management in TF units. Pte. Gibbons wrote that the officers of his London TF
unit tended to go to their billets at the end of a march, leaving the men to
the care of an NCO. (4) Similarly, Pte. Tilsley , who served in a TF battalion
of Lancashire Fusiliers in 55th Division complained
	 about poor officer-man
relations in his unit - although he did praise one officer.(5)
The differences that existed between individual units, and the problems of
generalisation, are
	 demonstrated by the belief of an officer of another TF
unit of the Lancashire Fusiliers, 1/5th, who asserted:
that an officer should look after his men, see to their billets and food
before anything else. Treat them on Parade with correct discipline and off
(1) Unpublished account, pp.3-4, J.w. Wintriugham papers, 78/9/1, IWN. This
incident is dated as 1916, but seems to be a mistake for 1918.
(2) W.N. Nicholson, Behind The Lines (London, 1939) p.48.
(3) 'Note by Lt. Col. J.W. Simpson' Nay 1915, in WD of 1/6 Londons, WO 95/2729,
PRO. For the paternalistic attitudes of another officer of this unit, see H.D.
Meyers, KRS Q.
(4) Gibbons, p.71.
(5) Tilsley, pp.202, 249.
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Parade as human beings. Above all, one had to be fair. If one had to dish out
punishment and it was fair, there was no ill feeling.(1)
9.8 New Army Discipline on Active Service
Many of the points made above about Territorial units are also applicable to
the New Armies, although unlike first line TF units, Service battalions lacked a
longstanding tradition of informal discipline, and were perhaps more vulnerable
to Regular discipline creeping in.
The 22/RF's enlightened disciplinary system survived until 	 the battalion's
disbandment in February 1918. Barnett-Barker	 took the 22/RF to France in
November 1915 as its commander, and was succeeded in late 1917 by Naj. W.J.T.P.
Phythian-Adams, who had joined the battalion as a temporary subaltern in 1914.
Maj. C.R. Stone, who had joined the unit early in 1915, became second-in-
command. Barnett-Barker expressed his fears as to what would have happened if
the command of the 22/RF should fall to an outsider, who, he implied, would not
have understoond the ethos and peculiarities of 	 the unit. A hard core of
original rankers also seems to have remained with the 22/RF. (2) By contrast,
the discipline of another Pals unit, 11/Welsh (Cardiff City)
	 became more
'Regular' following the arrival of a new colonel in November 1915. This event
seems to have ended the use of auxiliary-style discipline in this unit.(3) One
private complained in late 1916 that 'discipline is getting harder to stick
every day'.(4)
Keith Grieves' research into the Southdown battalions (11, 12 and 13/R.Sussex)
raised by Claude Lowther NP in 1914 suggests that these units had 'a greater
(1) G. Horridge, KRS Q.
(2) Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service', pp.64-66.
(3) Diary, 18, 21, 26, 27 Nov. 1915, W.A. Rogers papers, 87/62/1, fl4N.
(4) W. Ireland, The Story of Stokey Lewis VC (Haverford West, nd) pp.30, 54.
-307-
sense of independent will and resistance to ill-considered military procedures'
than was normal in the Regular army. The distinctive character of the
battalions was diluted by non-Sussex drafts which arrived from September 1916
onwards, and the tradition of looser discipline probably declined as a
consequence. However, it is noteworthy that 11/R. Sussex enjoyed a measure of
continuity of command, which had obvious implications for the survival of the
Pals ethos of the battalion.(1)
The extent to which a surviving cadre of rankers 	 and commanders committed
to a non-Regular ethos could preserve auxiliary discipline is illustrated by a
formation akin to a Kitchener division,	 63rd (Royal Naval) Division. The RND
clung to its distinct naval identity, which helped to create and nurture a
high level of esprit de corps and inter-rank solidarity.(2) It also had a non-
Regular	 approach to discipline, placing, for example, little emphasis on
parade-ground drill. Three crucial factors in the survival of the RND's unique
ideology may be mentioned. Firstly, throughout the war, with one brief
exception, the division's commanders fought tenaciously to retain its naval
character against military attempts to make it confrom to army ways. Secondly,
large numbers of men were promoted from the 'Lower Deck' to become officers in
the RND, ensuring that a substantial proportion of the officer corps would
consist of men schooled in the peculiar ethos of the formation. Thirdly, the
return of RND veterans to the Division as reinforcements was all important. As
an RND officer	 commented, 'A division filled up day by day with strange
reinforcements would in a week have lost its identity'. (3)
(1) K. Grieves, "Lowther's Lambs": Rural Paternalism and Voluntary Recruitment
in the First World War', Rural History 4, No.1, (1993) pp. 65, 67, 69;
communications with author.
(2) W.S. Churchill, introduction to D. Jerrold, The Royal Naval Division
(London, nd) pp.xiv-xv.
(3) Jerrold, pp.185-88, 208-9, 311, 322-23.
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A Kitchener unit which suffered this fate was 16/R.Scots (2nd Edinburgh Pals).
It sustained heavy casualties and by the end of 1916, in the assessment of
R.W.F. Johnstone, a temporary ranker-officer, 'the coinage was becoming debased
as few of the original volunteers remained and as the experienced personnel
became casualties'. A draft of men with less than three months service arrived
in November 1917, along with men who had formerly served with the ASC and
cavalry: 'They were disgruntled and unwilling, in the main, to acquire the
regimental spirit which must be fostered if personnel are to become good
infantrymen'. Generalising from his experience with 16/R. Scots, Johnstone, who
also served with Regular and TF battalions, claimed that in 1917 Kitchener
units lacked the 'regimental pride' of the military professional. (1)
Clearly, this	 judgetnent is too sweeping. Many units, 1O/Lincolns for one,
maintained their identity to the end of the war.(2) On being posted in October
1918 to 13/RF, a Kitchener battalion, an officer was surprised and pleased to
find that	 'something of the old friendly spirit' had survived despite the
turnover of personnel.(3) Maj. R.S. Cockburn, a ranker-officer, gave an
important insight intovolution of discipline in 1O/KRRC. He argued that the
battalion's	 discipline was founded on comradeship and 'mutual support' of
officers and men, who both recognised the need 'to carry on the best we could'.
Early in the war 1O/KRRC 'made a pretence' of abiding by Regular discipline,
while in reality such standards could not be achieved: 'we had not the time,
nor had we the NCOs'. However, a belief that the battalion 'as a body' was 'more
intelligent' than prewar recruits 'militated 	 against a desire to be ruled
entirely by the rod'. Therefore the 'ideal' was recognised, even if 'Regular'
(1) Unpublished account, p.88, R.W.F. Johnstone papers, 82/38/1, IWM.
(2) Bryant, pp.23, 29-30, 182-83.
(3) Parker, Into Battle p.93. He mistakenly states that 13/RF was a TF unit.
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disciplinary methods were not always employed, but
Even the ideal itself faded into the very far distance at a later stage, when
any satisfactory sort of discipline became difficult; when, that is, we were
given untrained drafts to replace casualties. (1)
The CO of 8/E. Surreys, Lt.Col. A.P.B. Irwin, believed that replacements that
arrived in late 1917 were distinctly inferior in quality to the volunteers of
1914. However, to his great surprise, these 'huge drafts', which included
conscripts, 'all became 8th East Surreys in no time at all'. This survival of
esprit de corps owed much to the continuity of command (Irwin had been the
adjutant in 1914). Officers and NCOs made a practice of briefing new drafts on
the regimental history of the East Surreys, and the past glories of the
battalion.	 Finally, as Irwin himself said, the fighting reputation of the
battalion (and indeed the 18th Division as a whole) inspired strong loyalty to
the unit. (2)
As the example of 12/Nanchesters, bled dry on the Sonune but revitalised by
the apppointment of an inspirational CO, Lt. Col. Magnay, demonstrates,
battalion spirit could be rekindled, given the right commanding officer. (3)
Likewise, the usual process whereby informal discipline was replaced by Regular
discipline could be reversed, as in the case of 17/RF (4) and 6/RSF. Winston
Churchill, who commanded the latter in 1916, was a 'fire-eating', aggressive
commander, who in some respects attempted to introduce Regular methods into the
battalion by drilling the men, improving their appearance and providing 'more
style & polish'. () However, he also modified the disciplinary code of
(1) Unpublished account pp.2 1.-25,	 R.S. Cockburn papers, 78/4/1, IWN.
(2) A.P.B. Irwin, Oral History Interview, 000211/04, IWM; regimental history
lecture in WD, 8/E. Surreys, WO 95/2050, PRO.
(3) Nicholson, p.152.
(4) Unpublished account, S.V.P. Weston papers, LULLC; Sheffield, 'Effect of War
Service' pp.53-54.
(5) Unpublished account, p.16, C.E.L. Lyne papers, 80/14/1, IWN; letter, 17 Jan.
1916, W.S. Churchill, in N. Gilbert (ed.) Winston S. Churchill Companion
Vol.111, Part 2, p.1377.
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the battalion, most obviously by reducing 'punishment both in quantity, &
method'.(l) What has not been grasped by previous writers (2) is that Churchill,
despite his service as a Regular officer, applied to 6/RSF the style of
discipline he had known in the Yeomanry. This was very different from that
imposed by 6/RSF's previous (Regular) CO, and the unit's temporary officers,
schooled in Regular ways, initially reacted with hostility to Churchill's
innovations. There is also some evidence that the paternal role of the officer
had been neglected, since Churchill took pains to organise sports and concerts
for the men, who appreciated their colonel's efforts on their behalf. (3)
9.9 Discipline in Regular Units on Active Service.
A recent study of the casualties sustained by one Regular unit, 2/Yorks., in
1914-15 concluded that the prewar Regular army 'had virtually ceased to exist
after some fifteen months of fighting'.(4) For the most part, the replacements
received by Regular units were wartime volunteers and conscripts. Yet Regular
units were more likely to have retained a distinctive character than their New
Army or Territorial counterparts. Rawlinson noted in December 1918 that despite
containing only 'a sprinkling of professional soldiers', 1st, 2nd and 4th
Divisions clung to 'the traditions of the Regular army', possessing even at
that late stage a different character to 46th and 50th (TF) Divisions.(5)
(1) Letter, 14 Jan. 1916, W.S. Churchill, 	 in ibid p.1374; [A.D. Gibb] 'Capt.
X', With Winston Churchill at the Front (London, 1924), pp.75-78.
(2) eg N. Gilbert, The Challenge of War: Winston S. Churchill 1914-1916 (London,
1990 edn.) pp.637-38.
(3) Letter, 17 Jan. 1916,W.S. Churchill, in Gilbert, Companion Vol.111, Part 2,
p.1377; Gilbert, Challenge Of War p.640. The WD of 6/RSF contains little
evidence of sports or baths organised for the men; W095/1772, PRO.
(4) J.S. Sly, 'The Men of 1914', ST No.35, (Summer 1992) pp.11-13.
(5) F. Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London, 1928)
p.252.
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Continuity of command helps to explain the survival of a distinctive Regular
ethos. Regular officers tended to be appointed to command Regular units,
which also seem to have received many, if not most, of the wartime products of
Sandhurst. In addition, temporary officers posted to Regular units generally
quickly absorbed the ethos of their regiment.(1) Surviving prewar Regular and
Special Reservist rankers	 would also pass on the traditions of the unit.
Writing of early 1915, Cpl. John Lucy (2/ILl. Rif.), horrified by new NCOs
calling privates by their Christian names, stated that the Regular army 'was
finished', but went on to say that 'We remnants' clung together in a 'form of
freemasonry', which 'preserved and passed on the diluted esprit de corps of our
regiment'.(2) Nuch the same process seems to have occured in hR. Scots. When
R.W.F. Johnstone joined this unit as an NCO in December 1915, that is, after it
had served for eleven bloody months on the Western Front, he found that the
Regular ethos was very much alive. He felt that 'life was easier and more
agreeable	 in the rather different atmosphere' of his previous unit, 1/9 R.
Scots (TF); in the Regular battalion discipline was stricter and 'everything
was done in the regimental way'. Johnstone felt that 'the professionalism of
the Regular Army even in 1918 was definitely evident to everyone despite its
serious losses in officers and men'.(3)
This is not to say that discipline in all wartime Regular units remained as
strict as it had been before the war. Both prewar officers and NCOs of 2/RWF
believed that standards had declined on active service.(4) On joining 2/R.
Berks. from its sister Regular battalion in 1915, Capt. Hanbury-Sparrow was
perturbed to find the second battalion's combat performance had 	 suffered
(1) J. Greenshields, KRS Q.
(2) Lucy, pp. 293-94.
(3) Unpublished account, R.W.F. Johnstone papers, pp. 41, 51, 105-06.
(4) Dunn, pp.46, 64; Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die p.315.
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because, he felt, 'strength-giving discipline' had been rejected in favour of
'easy-going' discipline.(1) Several sources suggest that a closer relationship
began to develop between Regular soldiers and officers in the first months of
fighting in France. (2) The example of one Regular battalion, 2/W.Yorks.,
suggests that this could have a modifying effect on discipline.
Sydney Rogerson, a temporary officer, published a book in 1930 which described
life in 21W. Yorks. in late 1916. Liddell Hart described it as the most accurate
recreation of the 'normal atmosphere of a Battalion' that he had read. Rogerson
felt that it was ridiculous to try to enforce 'the conventional formalities of
discipline' while in the trenches. Indeed, he believed that the best way for an
officer to motivate his men was to 'treat them as friends'. This entailed 'a
relaxation of pre-war codes of behaviour', but without allowing familiarity. (3)
There are	 several points worthy of note about this passage. Firstly,
Rogerson's attitudes were something of a halfway-house between those of a
prewar Regular officer and those of TF and New Army officers, some of whom
clearly did allow what Rogerson would have considered to be 'familiarity'.
Secondly the battalion was commanded by a Regular officer, Lt. Col. J.L. Jack
of the Cameronians, who clearly did not share the radical views of a Philip
Howell or a Barnett-Barker. Nonetheless, Jack quietly modified the Regular
discipline of 21W. Yorks. In periods of bad weather, for instance, he relaxed
his rule that men should shave daily. (4) Jack had the
	 typical Regular
officer's paternal concern for his men and it appears that he came to
(1) Hanbury-Sparrow, Land-Locked Lake pp.147, 150. See also A.A. Hanbury-
Sparrow, 'Discipline or Enthusiasm?', BAR, No.20 (1965) pp.8-13.
(2) Unpublished account, p.9, L.A. Haves papers, IWM; J. Charteris, At GHQ
(London, 1931) p.41; T. Carey , Wipers (London, 1972) p.220.
(3) S. Rogerson, Twelve Days (London, 1930) pp.86-88.
(4) Terraine, General Jack's Diary p.186.
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believe that a slight modification of discipline contributed to the well-being
of the ranks.(1) Clearly, Rogerson learned his approach to offic.f-man relations
from his colonel, whom he greatly admired. Jack, wrote one of his subalterns,
exuded an air of 'dignity and control', winning the 'respect' of the men by
his courage and by occasionally 'lifting the barrier of rank' and engaging in
'personal man-to-man encouragement', without ever courting 'familiarity'. (2)
As ever, generalisations	 about officer-man relations and discipline are
difficult. One conscript private of 2/Worcesters bluntly described the notions
of 'the comradeship between officers and men in the front line', and that 'an
officer always looks after his men' as 'legendEs]'. (3) By contrast, a middle-
class ranker in another regular unit, 1/Gloucesters, resented discipline and
bull but singled out one of his officers as 'a nice fellow'.(4) Discipline was
modified in many Regular units during the war. An officer of 3/Gren. Gds.
recalled, in words reminiscent of Rogerson's,	 that 'the ultra-strict and
sometimes too impersonal enforcement of discipline' was 'gradually modified' and
a more informal and friendlier relationship evolved. However, 'the essentials
of discipline were very much retained'.(5) 	 Changes in discipline were not so
drastic as to bring Regular units to resemble prewar auxiliary regiments; yet
changes there were.
It has been argued that:
By 1917 the distinctions between what had been regular, territorial or New
Army units had blurred or disappeared. Although many soldiers clung to their
distinctive identity, for all intents and purposes the British soldier on
the Western Front had become a "National Serviceman".(6)
(I) Rogerson, pp.97-98.
(2) M. NcConville, quoted in Terraine,	 General Jack's Diary p.186.
(3) Taylor, Bottom of the Barrel pp.8l, 107.
(4) Marks, p.41.
(5) G.F.R. Hirst, KRS Q.
(6) IC. Simpson, 'The British Soldier on the Western Front', in Liddle, Home
Fires p.144.
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As a generalisation, this view has much to recommend it, although there were
numerous exceptions to the rule. It does seem that unless a cadre of 'original'
soldiers and officers survived to pass on the traditions of a unit, or a
sympathetic	 outsider	 was	 appointed to command it, a Regular style of
discipline tended to replace auxiliary discipline in New Army and Territorial
units.	 However, as argued in earlier chapters, this did not affect the
relationship of the officer and his men - indeed, it may even have enhanced it,
as junior officers sought to protect their men from the excesses of the
disciplinary system.
9.10 A Contrast: Officer-Nan Relations in the French Army, 1914-18
It is useful to place the British army's officer-man relations and discipline
into context by examining the experience of the French army. French army
discipline of the Great War has gained a reputation for savagery in the Anglo-
Saxon world, although the traditional view has been considerably modified by
recent research. However, as David Englander has pointed out, soldiers'
dj,satisfacti.on with discipline was a factor in the growth of 'tension' between
French officers and their men.(1) This factor was compounded by the French
officer's lack of paternalism. Unlike the British army, the French army was
not renowned for its provision of 	 baths, canteens, sports and other amenities
for its troops. Officers of the French army 'did not, by tradition or by custom
picked up in the service', share the British concept of noblesse oblige and
(1) A. Home, The Price of Glory (Harmondsworth, 1964 edn.) p.72; L.V. Smith,
'The Disciplinary Dilemma of French Military Justice, September 1914-April 1917:
The Case of 5e Division d'Infanterie', J. Nil. Hist. 55, No.1 (1991) pp.47-68;
Englander, 'French Soldier' p.54.
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the primacy of the welfare of the men.(1) This was despite, or possibly as a
consequence of, the fact that some fifty per cent of officers in the prewar
French army were former NCOs. Unlike the British ranker, the poilu did not
receive, in exchange for deference, his officer's paternal care. Regimental
officers could be admired for their bravery in action, but as David Englander
comments, it was their 'humanity', not their courage, that was called into
question. (2)
These problems had their roots in the prewar period, when, for a variety of
social and political reasons the Frerch army was beset by indiscipline, and the
authority of officers and NCOs was undermined. Douglas Porch has argued that the
officer's role increasingly became one of administration rather than
leadership, not least because to concentrate on administration was to avoid the
difficult job of commanding indisciplined troops. Inevitably, officers and men
became more and more distant. This situation was exacerbated by the heavy
casualties sustained by the Regular officer corps in the opening months of the
war. (3) While in Britain, the French officer-man relationship continued to be
portrayed in terms of friendship and paternalism,(4) in reality the replacement
officers had even less idea of translating the ritualistic verbal paternalism
of calling their men 'mes enfants' into practical concern for their men than
(1) A. Brett-James, 'Some Aspects of British and French Morale on the Western
Front, i914-i9i8',p.7, unpublished paper given at RMA Sandhurst, Nov. 1978; D.
Porch 'The French Army in the First World War', in Millett and Murray, p.200.
For examples of failures of paternalism, see M. Bloch, Memoirs of War 1914-15
(London, 1980) pp.'61-62.
(2) Englander, 'French Soldier' pp.55, 59. See S. Audoin-Rouzeau, Men At War
1914-1918 (Oxford, 1992) pp.57-59, 63 for a rather rosier view of French
officer-man relations.
(3) D. Porch, The March to the Marne (Cambridge, 1981) pp.131-32; Porch, 'The
French Army' p.222-23.




Poor inter-rank relations played an important part in the mutinies of the
spring of 1917. In a report of June 1917 postal censors noted that middle-aged
rankers resented being treated in a cavalier fashion by officers who were
little more than boys, while confidential reports of 15 and 21 July emphasised
the importance of the officers' attitudes, noting the damage done by officers
who were contemptuous of, or haughty towards their men. By contrast,friendly,
paternal officers were liked. (2) Ptain certainly realised the importance of
restoring confidence between leaders and led. On 19 May Ptain issued orders
which attempted to correct faults in the officer corps, including a lack of
paternalism, and followed this up by visiting units, where he would give
practical demonstrations of paternalism by ordering improvements in food and
checking on leave rosters.(3) By the suimner of 1917, official reports were
indicating that French officers were changing their attitudes to the ranks,
and this change was appreciated by the men.(4) By September, the immediate
crisis was over.
While it is not suggested that poor officer-man relations were solely
responsible for the mutinies of 1917, they did play a significant role. The
French experience throws into stark relief the importance of the paternalistic
ethos of the British officer corps in maintaining morale, and the successful way
in which this ethos was passed on to temporary officers. The loss of large
numbers of	 Regular officers in 1914-15 did not bring about the end of
paternalism in the British army.
(1) C. Dawbarn, Joffre and his Army (London, 1916) pp.98-99; Brett-James, p.7.
(2) G. Pedroncini, Les Mutinries de 1917 (Paris, 1967) pp.246, 250.
(3) P. Pétain, 'A Crisis of Morale in the French Nation at War, 16 April-23




9.11 Australian and Canadian Officer-Man Relations and Discipline
The discipline and inter-rank relations of Canadian and Australian troops
also provide useful comparisons with the British army. These forces were for
most intents and purposes part of the British army, and many Dominion officers
and men were born in Britain. However, Australian and Canadian discipline has
traditionally been seen as looser, and officer-man relations more informal, than
the British variety. This was supposedly the result of a frontier ethos which
ensured that 'colonial' troops	 were characterised by the dash, elan, and
initiative which was allegedly lacking in British units.
C.E.W. Bean's influence on perceptions of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF)
has been immense, and only in recent years has it begun to be challenged. Bean,
the official historian,	 argued that the AIF was an egalitarian, democratic
army, characterised by the 'bush values' of toughness and self-reliance which
influenced urban dwellers (who formed the majority of the army) as well as
soldiers from rural areas. Bean saw these values, and the quality of the AIF's
officers, most of whom were commissioned from the ranks, as vital factors in its
military	 effectiveness. (1) Furthermore, he argued that British 'feudal'
discipline and... class-based inter-rank relationship was inappropriate for
products of a society which was characterised by democracy and 'mateship'.
Therefore, self-discipline and informal officer-man relations prevailed within
the AIF. (2)
Clearly, Australian officer-man relations tended to be rather less formal
than those of most British units. Cpl. J.F. Edey (5/AIF) long remained a friend
(1) J. Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge, 1990) pp.91-92.
(2) C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in War of 1914-1918 [hereafter
Aus. OH] I, (Sydney, 1921) pp.7, 47, 607; C.E.W. Bean, Aus. OH, VI, (Sydney,
1942) p.1085.
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of one of his officers. Lt. Frank Corlett would come along the trench	 to
supervise Stand-To:
Frank would grasp me by the PH helmet laying on my chest and... say 'And how's
the Western Front this morning, Jimmie?'(l)
In 1916, a private of a British unit was amazed to hear an Australian ranker
address an officer as 'Joe' (2) while a British ranker attached to 2nd. Aus.
Tunnelling Coy. in 1917 recorded that Australian officer-man relations were
too informal for his taste, but 'I never saw an Australian officer lose the
respect of his men'.(3)
Bean's views have often been repeated, sometimes in a form simplified almost
to the point of parody, (4) for 'Mocking the upper-class Englishness of English
officers was part of the [Anzac] tradition, the obverse of its egalitarian
element, and so was condescension towards English soldiers'.(5) Part of Bean's
purpose in writing was celebrate the 'Digger', the ordinary Australian soldier.
Indeed, Bean's reliability as an analytical historian has been challenged, one
historian describing him as 'a myth maker, or bard - the Homer of the AIF'.(6)
The AIF was indeed raised from a society which was very different from
Britain's, and its officer-man relations and discipline reflected this fact. Sir
Ian Hamilton was one of a number of Britons who wrote on the differences
between British and Australian society, commenting on the unwritten Australian
(1) Unpublished account, J.F. Edey papers, LULLC. For other examples of informal
officer-man relations, see L.H. Harris, Signal Venture (Aldershot, 1951) p.21;
diary, 4 Aug. 1915, G.B. Edwards papers, LULLC.
(2) Unpublished account, S.B. Abbott papers, 78/36/1, IWN.
(3) Unpublished account, P.R. Hall papers, 87/55/1, IWN.
(4) For example, in Peter Weir's 1981 film Gallipoli. See also P. Firkins, The
Australians in Nine Wars (London, 1973 edn.) pp.125-26, 136.
(5) K.S. Inglis, 'Anzac and the Australian Military Tradition', RIHN 72 (1990)
p.3.
(6) E.M. Andrews, 'Bean and Bullecourt: Weaknesses and Strengths of the Official
History of Australia in the First World War', RIHM, 72, (1990) p.47. See also J.
Mordike, 'The Story of Anzac: A New Approach', JAWM, 16, (1990) pp.5-17.
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rule that there should be no displays of respect, and arguing that privates did
not understand what the officer stood for.(1) However, in reality the AIF was
less egalitarian than Bean would have the reader believe.
It was not until January 1915, for example, that it became de rigur for
officers to come from the ranks. In addition, it appears that few officers of
the AIF came from 'labouring backgrounds'. (2) Bean himself rather
inconsistently admitted that educational and social factors did play a role in
the selection of officers, although he was at pains to argue that socially elite
officers were no more effective than products of state schools.(3) Several
examples may be given to illustrate both sides of the argument. Lt. F.M.
Stirling (29/AIF), an Australian public school and 'Varsity man, displayed
impeccable sporting and paternal attitudes more normally associated with the
product of Eton or Harrow.(4) However, Cpl. W.C. Gamble (25/M.G. Coy, AIF), who
served in France in 1917 and 1918, stated that ex-public schoolboys were made
officers 'irrespective of whether they had the backbone or ability to lead
men' . (5)
In practice, the Australian system of commissioning officers was virtually
identical to the	 British. The major difference was that it was usual for
Australian ranker-officers to return to their former units, although Bean
exaggerated when he wrote that this
	 policy 'was entirely opposed to the
(1) Report on An Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of
Australia, by General Sir I. Hamilton (20 May 1914) p.34. See also C.E. Jacomb,
God's Own Country (London, 1913) pp.43-44. For a modern view, see B. Kingston,
The Oxford History of Australia, III, 1860-1900 (Melbourne, 1988) p.280.
(2) Grey, Military History p.92.
(3) Ibid p.92; C.E.W.Bean, Aug . OH, III, (Sydney, 1929) p.54. For Australian
public schools, see Kingston, p.202.
(4) Diary, 12, 22 Sept. 1916, F.M. Stirling papers, LULLC.
(5) Unpublished account, p.58, W.C. Gamble papers, LULLC. See also letter,
1916, T. Gardner, quoted in J. Morice, Six-Bob-A-Day Tourist (Ringwood, Vic.,
1985) p.59.
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practice in the British Army'. (1) Bean also claimed that 'A beneficial result
of the whole system was that the Australian officer was much closer to his men
than was his British colleague'.(2) In fact, a close reading of Bean's own text
reveals that inter-rank relations in the AIF were in some ways similar to
those in the British army. Even on Gallipoli, a 'clear distinction had to be
preserved between officers and men', (3) By 1916 & ranker-officer had, for the
sake of 'good discipline', to 'break with his old associates'. After a farewell
dinner 'their relations were formal'.(4) Although Bean's claim that the
'character and competence' that men demanded of their leaders 'came to be the
sole criteria' for the granting of 	 commissions ignores the importance of
social factors in this process, (5) it was in essence true enough. However,
much the same could have been said of the British army from mid-1915 onwards.
Other virtues claimed by Bean for the AIF officer, such as
	 battlefield
leadership and paternalism, also characterised the British officer. (6) Like
Bean, Sir John Monash, in an influential work, gave a fundamentally misleading
comparison	 of British and Australian officers and inter-rank relations.(7)
Finally, it should be noted that the fact that Australian inter-rank relations
tended to be less formal than British does not imply that there was any less
mutual respect, admiration and affection between the ranks in the BEF than there
was in the AIF; each relationship reflected the nature of the home society.
Senior British, and indeed some Australian officers tended to blame AIF
(1) C.E.W. Bean, Aus. OH, III, p.51. In Aus. OH, VI, p.20, Bean repeats
then contradicts this statement in the space of a paragraph.
(2) Bean, Aus. OH, VI, p.21. See also Bean, Au g . OH, III, p.125.
(3) Bean, Aus. OH, I, p.530.
(4) Bean, Aus. OH, III, p.52.
(5) Bean, Aug . OH, I, p.530.
(6) Bean, Aus. OH I, p.550, VI, p.21.
(7) J. Monash, The Australian Victories in France in 1918 (Sydney, 1936) pp.265-
67.
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officers for the indiscipline of their troops.(1) After the war, Monash proudly
proclaimed that in the AIF the individuality of the Australian soldier was used
as a basis on which to build collective 'battle discipline',(2) implicitly
comparing	 Australian with British discipline, to the disadvantage of the
latter. In the words of an AIF ranker, 'Australian discipline does not permit
of unthinking obedience to senseless orders...'(3)
Many myths have been built up around Australian discipline. The popular image
of the indisciplined Australian is based largely on the 1914-15 period, when
the AIF	 experienced many disciplinary teething troubles. The British New
Armies, another citizen force raised at the same time, faced similar, although
less acute, disciplinary problems. By the time the AIF reached the Western Front
in 1916, its discipline had improved considerably. Moreover, self-discipline, as
opposed to 'imposed' discipline,was not a uniquely Australian trait, as this
thesis has demonstrated.
Battle-discipline cannot, of course, be treated as entirely separate from
more general discipline. While the failure of Australian soldiers to salute
officers may be seen as inconsequential, the 1915 riots in the Wasser, Cairo's
brothel district, cannot.(4) Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that,
pace the postwar writings of Bean and Monash, Australian discipline had a great
deal in common with British. Monash's postwar views were somewhat at variance
with his wartime ones. Senior Anzac officers saw the tightening of discipline as
essential to the maintenance of the reputation of their divisions as the elite
'shock-troops' of the BEF. Thus, although many believe that Australians 'would
(1) Sir A. Murray to Robertson, 18 Mar. 1916, Sir W.R. Robertson papers, Rob
1/32/13/1, LHCNA; Birdwood to Murray, 25 Feb. 1916, Sir W.R. Robertson papers,
Rob 1/32/13/2, LHCMA.
(2) Monash, pp.265-56.
(3) Harris, Signal Venture p.56.
(4) Gammage, pp.38-40; S. Brugger, Australians and Egypt 1914-1919 9 (Carlton,
Vic.) 1980 p.145-47.
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not stand for' Field Punishment No.1, (1) in reality, 'The Anzacs accepted the
standards in force in France and pursued them rigorously' (2), although for
reasons of Australian domestic politics, the 121 soldiers sentenced to death
were not executed.
Until the publication of Ashley Ekins' major study, any	 assessment of
Australian discipline must remain provisional. However, the view of the Anzac
Provost Corps in July 1918 that discipline was 'good', with the few incidents
being ascribed to small numbers of 'men of bad character' who 'have done their
best to ruin the good name of the AIF' (:3) contrasts sharply with the widespread
indiscipline of 1915. A private of 59/AIr wrote in 1916 in terms which might
have been used by a middle-class ranker in a British unit:
One is practically a prisoner. You have to have lights out at certain
hours and cannot talk after lights out. Even going on swimming parade
you are marched by an officer or NCO in the strictest manner. I think
they begrudge you our brains to think with at times.(4)
Lacking a Bean, the tradition of a Canadian frontier ethos producing informal
discipline and officer-man relations is not as well developed, but it
nonetheless exists. (S) This school has been attacked by scholarly historians,
one arguing that:
[Canadian] battlefield excellence derived not from any innate superiority born
of the North American frontier...but primarily from British tutelage and
the hard crucible of war.(G)
The myth of Canadian indiscipline is, like its Australian counterpart, rooted
(1) Fuller, Troop Morale p.50.
(2) Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell pp.101, 131-35. Pugsley has drawn upon
Ekins' unpublished work.
(3) Appx. to July 1918, WD, Anzac Provost Corps, 	 WO 154/129, PRO. This report
refers to Palestine.
(4) Letter, T. Gardner, 1916, quoted in Morice, p.59.
(S) P. Berton, Vimy (Markham, Ontario, 1987 edn.) pp.4950.
() J.A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign (New York, 1991)
p.308. See also A.M.J. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie (Toronto, 1987) pp.114-
15; D. Morton,'The Canadian Military Experience in the First World War, 1914-
18', in R.J.Q. Adams, (ed.) The Great War, 1914-18 (London, 1990) pp.88-89.
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in the earliest months of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF)'s existence.
The problem of raising a citizen army virtually from scratch was exacerbated by
politically appointed officers. (I). During this period the Canadians acquired a
reputation for indiscipline (2) but in time, discipline developed, aided by
tactful but firm handling by Byng, the British commander of the Canadian Corps
in l916-17.(3)	 In many cases Canadian units seem to have relied on 'self'
rather than 'imposed' discipline, although they were quite capable of insisting
on a measure of 'spit and polish' behind the lines even if it had been neglected
in the trenches.(4) The British commander of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade
concluded that Canadian discipline was informal but good:
the Canadian army was very flexible. It found room for everybody,
and managed with great success to put people to their own jobs. But let
nobody think that these eccentricities relaxed real discipline. I can
truly say that...I never had a rebellious word or look, nor once was an order
disobeyed. (5)
It has also been claimed that 'an easiness' existed between Canadian officers
and men that was 'foreign' to British forces.(6) Isabella D. Losinger's
authoritative work on Canadian officer-man relations throws considerable doubt
on the first part of this statement,(7) as does the memoir, based on diaries,
of Pte. D. Fraser (31/CEF and 6th Can. Bde. MG Coy.). If specifically Canadian
references were removed, Fraser's journal could easily pass for an account by a
soldier in a British Service or Territorial battalion.
(1) G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 (Ottawa, 1962)
pp.24-38. For problems in li/CEF see letters, 4 Nov., 28 Dec. 1914, G.W. Durham
papers, IWN.
(2) Letter, 21 Nov. 1914, G.F. Patterson papers, RNASA.
(3) J. Williams, Byng of Vimy (London, 1983) p.131.
(4) For the example of 46/CEF, see J.L. McWilliams and R.J. Steel, The Suicide
Battalion (St. Catharines, Ontario, nd) p.49.
(5) J.E.B. Seely, Adventure (London, 1931 edn.) p.236.
(6) Berton, p.161.
(7) I.D. Losinger, 'Officer-Man Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,
1914-1919', (NA thesis, Carleton University, 1990).
-324-
Fraser was an immigrant Scots clerk with no previous military service. Like
his	 contemporaries in the BEF he judged his officers largely by their
treatment of the men and their performance as leaders.(1) When he wrote of
'the officers fraternizing with the men' on Christmas Day 1915, the obvious
implication was that normally officers did not fraternize with the rankers.
However, the CEF often posted ranker-officers back to their old units and this
probably enhanced the informality of the relationship. Thus Fraser wrote of one
of his officers, a fellow Scot who had served as a private in Fraser's company:
'[he] was a great friend of the writer. He confided in me greatly...'. This
situation does not seem to have presented any great problems of familiarity.(2)
The ranker who unfavourably compared inter-rank relations in his old unit,
3rd Canadian Division DAC, with those in his current unit, a TMB of the same
division, is a saluatory reminder of the difficulty of generalising about
officer-man relations, which differed from unit to unit, (3) but in one case at
least, Canadian indiscipline was linked to poor leadership. A prewar Canadian
regular officer, Capt. H.R. Hammond, steeped in the paternalistic ethos of the
British Regular army, was not impressed by the officers of 47/CEF, although he
judged them to be little worse than officers of other Canadian battalions. He
criticised a major for failing to set an example to his men, and the colonel for
lacking paternalism and man-management skills, which led to indiscipline: 'It
is not really the men's fault', commented Hammond, 'they are like children and
have not been handled properly'.(4)
(1) R.H. Roy, (ed.) The Journal of Private Fraser (Victoria, BC, 1985) pp.30-31,
81, 172, 241.
(2) Ibid pp.70, 270. For an example of informal inter-rank relations in Canadian
Corps Cyclist Battalion, see letter, Oct. 1916, G.W. Durham papers, IWM.
(3) Letter, 22 Dec. 1917, W.E. Hoad papers, L13LLC.
(4) Letters, 27 Nov., 5, 11 Dec. 1915, 2 Feb. 1916 H.R. Haninond papers, LTJLLC.
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One can conclude that Canadian and Australian discipline tended to be looser
and officer-man relations a little more informal than was usually the case in
many British units, but the differences between 'Imperial' and 'Dominion'
troops should not be overstated. The Dominion approach was rather more, and
the British rather less, formal than is commonly believed, with the Canadian
style perhaps more closely resembling the British than the Australian.
Moreover, the idea that enlightened Dominion commanders deliberately tailored
the disciplinary system to match the needs of their men, who were imbued with a
frontier ethos, is at very least open to question.
9.12 Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the Postwar Army
On hearing the news of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 an NCO exclaimed
"Now that the war is over, we can get back to real soldiering": and 'everyone
knew what he meant'. (1) In reality, another four years passed before the
British army returned to a pre-1914 pattern of life. 1919-22 marked a period
of transition from a mass citizen army to a small Regular colonial gendarmerie.
The army, 3.75 million strong at the Armistice, was rapidly deinobilised. Most
var-raised units were disbanded at a time when Britain had greater military
cominiçments than ever before. (2) The army of this period, consisting of re-
enlisted serving soldiers, young volunteers, and men conscripted in the latter
part of the war and compulsorily retained until the end of April 1920, was a
very different force from the wartime BEF. (3)
(1) Bowra, p.87.
(2) See K. Jeffery, The British army and the Crisis of Empire (Manchester, 1984)
passim.
(3) K. Jeffery, 'The post-war army', in Beckett and Simpson, pp.214-15.
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The end of the war was followed by a significant change in many soldiers'
attitudes to authority and discipline. The demobilisation procedure was widely
perceived as being unfair, and perhaps more importantly, many wartime volunteers
and conscripts seem to have believed that their 'contract' with the army had
expired, for in defeating Germany they had completed the job for which they had
enlisted. In the words of one sapper NCO, there was 'a spirit of revolt against
the system which had held the individual for so long'. (1) Men who had
uncomplainingly accepted military discipline while hostilities were in progress
now began to resent it, particularly if the miltary authorities attempted to
impose prewar standards. A 1914 volunteer serving with 2/6 SF in the Rhine
Army spoke for many when he wrote: 'Spit & Polish we dont like that after
Active Service'. (2)
While the most dramatic manifestations of indiscipline were the large-scale
strikes in rear areas and in England, mainly involving lines of communication
troops, there were also numerous minor incidents in front line units.(3) A
Regular staff officer noted that temporary officers as well as rankers adopted
an attitude of 'We'll soldier no more'. (4) Certainly, many temporary officers
had considerable sympathy with their men. Alan Thomas of 1/6 RWK recalled a
company refusing to parade: 'They could scarcely be blamed. They were still,
like most of us, not soldiers but civilians in uniform'.(5) According to a
private of 1/Devons, the battalion's officers pragmatically accepted the
inevitable and eased discipline. This was one of many units in which this
(1) Unpublished acccount, p.90, G. Buckeridge papers, 11*1.
(2) Letter, 3 May 1919, A.E. Slack papers, IWM.
(3) See A. Rothstein, The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919 (London, 1985 edn.), passim.
(4) Nicholson, pp.294-96.
(5) Thomas, Life Apart p.159. See also unpublished account, p.35, A.S. Benbow
papers, PP/MCR/146, IWM.
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process occurred. (1) Some officers found that their authority was defied, in
a rather half-hearted fashion, by their men (2) but there is no evidence of
widespread hostility to regimental officers per se. Indeed, given the nature of
the wartime officer-man relations, it would be surprising if there had been.
Even Pte. Aif Killick (AOC) a revolutionary socialist involved in the Calais
mutiny of January 1919, recalled Capt. Rees, a 'fair man', and mentioned that
the mutineers 'felt quite sorry' that the revolutionary struggle should begin
while he was in command. (3)
The regimental officer had a vital role in managing the crisis of discipline
that followed the armistice. In 1919 the men of 13 Siege Battery RGA were
provoked into striking by clumsy attempts to force them to endure 'long hours
of tedious and unnecessary drill'. However, as an officer remarked, 'they are
still the same men who won the war and if treated in the right way and told the
reason for things they are ready to do anything required of them'. (4) Tactful
handling by sympathetic officers, who continued in their wartime role of
defending their men against capricious authority, and the residual trust of men
for their regimental officers, helped the battery to maintain a measure of
cohesion. In the same way, a junior officer was able to defuse a strike in an
infantry unit (probably 17/W.Yorks.) by adopting a conciliatory role.(5) The role
of the regimental officer vis a vis his men had not changed, even if rankers'
perceptions of the relationship had. In 1919 W.R. Bion (Tank Corps), imbued
with the paternalistic ethos of the junior officer and accustomed to the close
(1) Unpublished account, G.W. Sullivan papers, IWN. See also unpublished
account, p.89, G. Buckeridge papers, 11*1.
(2) Unpublished account, p.95, J.K. Stanford papers, DS/Misc/75, 1W?!.
(3) A. Killick, Mutiny! (Brighton, nd) p.6.
(4) Unpublished account, L. Parrington papers, 1W?!.
(5) Diary, 1 Dec. 1918, E.R. Hepper, PP/MCR/138, 1W?!.
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relationships existing within a combat unit felt himself to be, at 21 years old,
'an antiquity, a survival from a remote past'. (1)
Three specific cases of postwar indiscipline suggest that good officer-man
relations were as important in the army of 1918-22 as they had been in the
BEF. Robertson, the commander of the Rhine Army in 1919, believed that a
major factor in the unsatisfactory morale and discipline of this formation was
that officers and men, serving in what amounted to 'new units', were to a large
extent 'utter strangers to each other'.(2) Referring specifically to two cases
of indiscipline, Robertson denounced officers who were 'out of touch with their
men' and who had shown 'lack of consideration and efficiency in handling their
units and in managing their interior economy'.(3)
Similarly, Maj.Gen. Childs, the Director of Personnel Services, believed that
the strike of 3/Coldm. Gds. on 10 June 1919 resulted from an over-zealous
training regime inflicted upon soldiers who held a number of not unreasonable
grievances, and who were primarily concerned with their imminent demobilisation.
(4) By contrast, the mutiny of 1/Connaught Rangers in July 1920 was in large
part a politically motivated reaction to the situation in Ireland. However,
the two most recent studies of the mutiny, which differ considerably in their
interpretations, agree that a subsidiary factor was a failure of leadership on
the part of the officers of the battalion.(5)
The indiscipline of the months immediately following the Armistice wa not
typical of the inter-war period as a whole. Anthony Clayton has pointed out
(1) Bion, p.286.
(2) Robertson to WO, 11 May 1919, Robertson papers, Rob I/28/21C, LHCMA; D.G.
Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930 (Oxford, 1991) pp.32-37.
(3) 'Notes of Conference...', 17 May 1919,
	 Robertson	 papers, Rob I/28/8b,
LHCNA.
(4) Minute by Childs, WO 32/9543, PRO.
(5) A. Babington, The Devil to Pay (London, 1991) pp.86-88; J. Putkowski, 'The
Mutiny of 1st Bn. (sic) Connaught Rangers', lecture delivered at DLI Museum, 28
June 1992.
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after the initial turbulence of 1919-20 subsidect 	 the all-volunteer Regular
army of the inter-var years experienced only two, minor, outbreaks of
indiscipline. Clayton highlights the role of the officer-man relationship in
ensuring that 'loyalty to regiment took pride of place in men's minds'.(l)
The overall character of the officer class did change a little in the years
following the war. The percentage of sons of 'Gentlemen' entering Sandhurst fell
from 20.5 per cent in 1910 to 9.1 per cent in 1930. Conversely, the percentage
of sons of military professionals rose from 43.8 to 50.8 per cent.
	 Two other
groups may have also contributed to this change in social profile. Firstly,
wartime	 officers who converted their temporary commissions into Regular
commissions. Secondly, officers of fairly humble origin who graduated from
Sandhurst during the war, when the usual fees were waived.(2) Against this must
be set the surprisingly large number of surviving prewar officers.()
The findings of the 1923 Haldane Committee on officer training and education
would appear to show that there was an official wish to institutionalise the
rough meritocracy of l915-18SIt argued that 'In these days it is neither
necessary nor desirable' draw officers from 'any one class of the community'
and that their proposals with regard to entry to Woolwich and Sandhurst would
have the effect of 'democratising' the system of officer recruitment. The
reality was rather different. Rather than lowering fees, it was decided to ask
county councils	 to make scholarships tenable at the two officer training
establishments as well as universities. This was not a policy likely radically
(1) A. Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower (Athens, Georgia, 1986)
pp.510-11.
(2) Simpson, 'The Officers', p.91; T.A. Heathcote, The Military in British
India, 1600-1947 (forthcoming).
(3) Beckett, 'The British Army' p.114.
(4) Report of Committee on the Education and Training of Officers, p.3, WO
32/4353, PRO.
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to alter the social profile of the officer class. Moreover, the recommendation
that the Territorials, should, as in
	 1914-15, be utilised as a source of
officers prompted the comment that
it is essential to review the exact conditions under which commissions
were formerly given. Otherwise the door might prove inconveniently wide.(1)
Between 1922 and 1930 some 189 rankers received commissions under the Y Cadet
scheme, which was supposed to ensure that 13.5 per cent of the officer corps
was composed of ex-rankers, but a large proportion joined the unfashionable
RASC. This threatened to create a social chasm with the rest of the army, and
led to the halting of direct recruitment of officers into this corps. In the
mid-1930s, Sandhurst intakes consisted of only about 5 per cent of ex-rankers.
(2) In sum, although	 the social profile of the average British officer
changed a little, the meritocratic officer corps of 1915-18 quietly died in the
1920s.
The ethos of the officer class of the interwar period, with its emphasis on
sport, social life, horses and the regimental family, was very similar to that
of the prewar period. As before, the average ranker was poorly educated, of
a low medical standard, and possibly drawn from the unemployed, and his life
style would have been instantly recognisable to his predecessor.(3) Not
surprisingly, the officer-man relationship in the Regular army of the early
1920s was also very similar to that of twenty years before. Spike Nays, who
enlisted as a trooper in
	 the Royal Dragoons in this period, was
	 not
uncritical of military life, but he nonetheless wrote that officers
(1) 'Precis for Army Council No.1152', pp.23, WO 32/4353, PRO.
(2) G.F. Spillan, 'Manpower Problems in the British Army 1918-1939: The
Balancing of Resources and Cominittments' (D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford,
1985) pp.125-26.
(3) B. Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980)
pp.62-70, 143, 145; S. Nays, Fall Out the Officers (London, 1969) pp.4-5, 60,
66, 152-53.
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always inspired confidence and respect in their men... There was a deep
division of status between commissioned and non-commissioned, which did not
interfere with the good relationship between officers and men, and the Other
Ranks in no way resented the money and splendour of their seniors. On the
contrary, they admired them for it because it gave them a bit of cavalry dash
and importance. There was friendship as well as discipline, and both were sure
and certain. (1)
The evidence of rankers who served in other units in the early 1920s confirms
that this picture of officer-man relations was not unique to the Royal Dragoons.
(2) There were	 popular and unpopular officers: Bdr. H.L. Horsfield, who
enlisted in the Royal Artillery in 1920, recorded the general dislike of an
unpopular commanding officer, but his admiration for one of the majors.(3)
Officers testified to the importance of paternalism, although some believed
that postwar rankers showed less automatic deference, the inter-rank
relationship	 relying	 more on	 the professionalism and character of the
officer. (4)
The character and ethos of the postwar Territorial Army (as the TF was renamed
one year after its reconsitution in 1920) also had much continuity with the
prewar period. (5) TA officers seem to have been of broadly middle-class origin,
with many professional men taking commissions. As before, yeomanry officers
tended to be of a higher social class. The expense incurred by officers ensured
that there was a constant shortage of officers and this fact would seem to
preclude	 working-class men from becoming officers, although paradoxically
service as a TA officer was popular with university students, who welcomed
(1) Ibid, p.92.
(2) S. Finch (B. Yorks), 000943/03; L.P. Gaines (Dorsets) 000874/09; T.N.
Stevens (RGA), 000776/07, Oral History Interviews, IWM.
(3) H.L. Horsfield, 000874/09, Oral History Interview, IWM.
(4) J. Prendergast, Prender's 	 Progress (London, 1979) p. 1.2;	 J.G. Halstead,
KRS Q.
(5) P. Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907-1940 (Woodbridge, 1987) pp.151+-5;
I.F.W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradtion 1558-1945 (Manchester, 1991)
p.249; B. Peacock, KRS Q.
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the modest stipend. Territorial rankers also seem to have been mainly drawn
from the working class, including the unemployed.(1)
A wartime officer of 1/5 York and Lancs. believed that informal, friendly
officer-man relations remained 'the great asset' of the postwar Territorials.
(2) As late as 1938 a book on the TA devoted several pages to comparing the
informal discipline of Territorial units with the more formal approach of the
Regulars. It	 claimed that, impressive as the 'mutual understanding and
cameraderie' that existed between the Regular officer and soldier was, officer-
man relations in a TA unit were 'far deeper and more intimate'.(3) The reasons
given for the peculiar nature of discipline in the TA - 'the class of men
concerned, the spirit which animates them, and the leadership which knows how to
handle them and make use of that spirit' - (4) are very reminiscent of
descriptions of pre-1914 auxiliary forces. An officer who had served with the
1/4 Gordons believed that the atmosphere of the postwar 4/Gordons was even more
democratic and egalitarian than it had been before the war.(5)
	
Given the
drawbacks of service in the TA of the interwar years - official indifference,
hostility in some circles, inadequate rewards - the 'club' spirit was probably
more essential than ever. (6)
(1) Dennis, pp.161, 164.
(2) C.D. Fox, KRS Q.
(3) G.R. Codrington, The Territorial Army (London, 1938) p.68.
(4) Ibid, p.66.




This thesis has argued that officer-man relations were generally good in the
British army of the 1902-22 period. The relationship was a reciprocal one:
deference was given in exchange for paternalism. The relationship had its roots
be
in the nature of British society, and can in retrospect,(seen	 a source
both of strength and of weakness.
The morale of the British army of 1914-18 remained essentially sound
throughout the war. The ethos of the prewar officer corps, which stressed the
need for the officer to exercise paternal care for his men, was a major factor
in the maintenance of wartime morale. This code of paternalism was passed on to
wartime temporary officers, many of whom came from outside the traditional
officer-providing classes, via a highly successful system of officer training
and education, reinforced by the operation within the army of what I have termed
a 'bureaucracy of paternalism'. Thus the lower middle-class and even working-
class officers of 1918 were as paternal as their public school educated
predecessors of 1914. The fate of the French army in 1917 illustrates the
problems of morale which can befall an army which lacks an officer corps imbued
with the paternal ethos.
Paradoxically, good officer-man relations were accompanied in many units by
harsh discipline. There were two disciplinary traditions represented in the
wartime army; the 'Regular' tradition, and that of the auxiliary forces, which
was somewhat looser and was characterised by a greater reliance on self-
discipline. However, Regular discipline tended to dominate in a majority of
units as the war went on. Regimental officers helped to protect their men from
some of the excesses of the disciplinary system. Also, as the army appeared to
many rankers, particularly wartime volunteers and conscripts, as a vast,
arbitrary coercive machine, sympathetic and paternal regimental officers helped
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to offset the impression that ordinary soldiers were helpless and friendless in
the face of an all-powerful authority. Good officer-man relations in some cases
enhanced the combat effectiveness of units. An important side effect of good
officer-man relations was that they helped to create a British 'war
generation', which united ex-soldiers of all ranks.
It is also important to note the limitations of good officer-man relations.
They could not prevent some cases of 'rough justice'. Nor could good officer-
man relations do more than limit the damage of the widespread indiscipline in
the army after the armistice. It is also the case that good officer-man
relations in a unit do not necessarily lead to combat effectiveness. If officers
identify too closely with their men, this can lead to a reluctance to take
aggressive action and thus put them at risk. It might be added that there is
little evidence to suggest that the regimental officers of 21st and 24th
Divisions were any less paternal than those of any other New Army formation. Yet
failure of battlefield leadership by these officers was one reason, among many,
for the poor performance of these divisions at Loos in September 1915.
The most important weakness of the officer-man relationship in the British
army was that it created a culture of dependency which reduced the scope for
independent thought or initiative among the lower ranks because men relied so
heavily on their officers, although this tendency can be exaggerated. In
addition, it was not always appropriate to apply the paternal/deferential
relationship and rigid discipline to educated middle-class men who served in
the ranks. While the inter-rank relationship and discipline were sometimes
modified at unit level, the best use was not always made of intelligent rankers.
However, this factor should be weighed against the relative ease with which men
could pass from the ranks to a cousnission.
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When one comes to draw up a balance sheet, the advantages of the officer-man
relationship greatly outweighed the disadvantages. Above all, the role of the
officer-man relationship in sustaining the morale of BEF through four years
of gruelling attritional fighting on the Western Front was of vital, although
hitherto neglected, importance.
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Appendix 1: British Army Conscripts
50.3 per cent of all wartime enlistments occured after the introduction of a
form of conscription in January 1916. However, no attempt has been made to
discuss relations between officers and conscripts per se, although the
experiences of individual conscripts have been examined. The problems involved
in such a study are considerable, largely because relatively few soldiers who
wrote memoirs, or left diaries or letters, admitted to the stigma of
conscription.(1) The only full-length study of British army conscripts gives an
interesting overview of conscripts' experience of military life, but its
usefulness for this study is unfortunately limited.(2)
Furthermore, conscripts had widely differing experiences. Men were conscripted
into every arm, and served in Regular, Territorial and New Army units, which
had varying approaches to discipline and officer-man relations. The conscripts
themselves were of widely differing social backgrounds, with, as noted above, a
disproportionate number being drawn from middle-class, white collar occupations.
Their attitudes towards enlistment varied greatly. Some men had attested under
the Derby scheme, a 'half-way house' between voluntarism and conscription. Some
men had deliberately avoided enlisting during the voluntary phase of recruiting
in 1914 and 1915. Others were, for various reasons, unable to volunteer, and
welcomed conscription. Some men, who probably would have volunteered, only
reached the age of enlistment after conscription had come into force.(3) Given
these variables, it would be just as meaningless an exercise to treat 'the
conscripts' as a discrete group as would be to treat 'the volunteers', who had
(1) I.F.W. Beckett, 'The Real Unknown Army: British Conscripts 1916-19', GW 2,
No.1 (Nov. 1989) p.4.
(2) I.R. Bet-El, 'Experience into Identity: The Writings of British Conscript
Soldiers, 1916-18' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1991)
(3) Beckett, 'Real Unknown Army' p.8.
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many different motives for enlisting,(1) in the same fashion.
Some general remarks about conscripts are not out of place. The discipline,
motivation and military effectiveness of conscripted soldiers were often
denigrated both by officers and by rankers who volunteered for military
service.(2) Thus the commander of 19th Division lamented that the replacements
that arrived after the end of the Somme campaign in 1916 'lacked the cheerful
eager look of the volunteer. We never had the same gallant adventurers in the
ranks again'. (3) To be set against this subjective view is the fact that,
whatever the facial expressions of its soldiers, 19th Division 	 advanced
eighteen miles over difficult terrain in the last week of the war, taking
'fairly severe' casualties in the process.(4) Judged by the yardstick of
military success, 19th Division's conscripts were effective soldiers. The same
was true of the men of 9/DLI who were praised by their commander for their
performance in an action in September 1918:
[They] showed the highest form of discipline while under the enemy barrage,
never flinching although caught like rats in a trap. The conduct of the men
was worthy of the highest traditions of the British Army.(5)
In 1918, as in 1916, some units were more effective than others, and a host of
reasons determined military effectiveness. Leadership, morale, training and
tactical skill were among the most important. DominicK Graham has suggested that
in 1917-18 new men 'blended with surviving natural leaders to keep the show
going'.(6) The survival of distinctive traditions and ethos in some units
supports this contention. The method by which the majority of soldiers in a unit
joined the army did not, in itself, affect combat performance.
(1) Simkins, Kitchener's Army pp.165-75.
(2) Beckett, 'Real Unknown Army' pp.4-5.
(3) T. Bridges, Alarms and Excursions (London, 1938) p.162.
(4) Anon, A Short History of the 19th (Western) Division (1914-1918) (London,
1919) p.108.
(5) Letter, 22 Aug. 1933, E.G. Crouch, CAB 45/126, PRO.
(6) S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power (London, 1982) p.117.
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It has been said that in the conscript army of World War Two British recruits
were prepared to accept the demands of military life if they experienced
'Competent, understanding leadership and a well-run and pride-filled unit'.(I)
Much the same might be said of the conscripts joining the army in 1916-18, and
indeed of the volunteers of 1914-16. Conscripts of the Great War seem to have
differed little in their attitudes from comparable volunteers. The attitudes of
two conscripts, Alfred N. Hale, a 41-year-old artist and composer who loathed
army life, and E.C. Barraclough, an 18-year-old who approached his military
service with enthusiasm and excitement, are paralleled by those of volunteer
soldiers. (2)
In conclusion, then, it can tentatively be suggested that the consaipt's
attitudes and assumptions mirrored those of other soldiers of his age, social
class, and civilian and military experience. In this respect, the method by
which a man joined the army was relatively unimportant.
(1) D. Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them (London, 1988 edn.) p.104.
(2) P. Fussell, (ed.) The Ordeal of Alfred N. Hale (London, 1975), passim;
unpublished account, p.1, E.C. Barraclough papers,86/86/1, IWM; Simkins,
Kitchener's Army pp.206-208.
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Appendix 2: Discipline and Continuity in Small Units
Trench Mortar Batteries, Royal Engineer Field Companies, Machine Gun Companies
and similar units were relatively small, perhaps one hundred men strong, and
were commanded by fairly junior officers such as captains or even subalterns.
Units such as TNBs were often used as dumping grounds for officers and men who
were not wanted by infantry units.(1) Paradoxically, members of such units
tended to regard themselves as an elite, as 'craftsmen' who had a skilled task
to perform, unlike the 'general purpose' infantry. It is not surprising that
officers and men who regarded each other as part of an elite team should
develop a working relationship which set aside the niceties of military
etiquette.(2) Officers and men also shared a common identity as 'outsiders', who
were disliked by the infantry. This antagonism arose partly because of their
privileged, independent status, but also because TMBs were likely to disturb
the 'live and let live' system and draw fire upon the infantry, and the sappers
often required working parties to be furnished by the infantry.(3)
Away from the supervision of more senior, perhaps tegular, officers,
commanders of small units often operated informal disciplinary systems. Lt.
P.G.G. Heath transferred from 8/E. Surreys to 55th TMB in 1916, and enjoyed an
excellent relationship with his men: 'their discipline according to Army
standards was deplorable...But I preferred it that way...'. He argued that in a
TMB there was more scope for initiative, and many unorthodox soldiers and
officers thrown out of infantry battalions revelled in the atmosphere of a
(1) Letter, 13 Apr. 1934, officer of 8/KRRC with illegible signature, CAB
45/133, PRO.
(2) Latham, pp.49, 51.
(3) Ashworth, pp.163-68; L. Davidson, interview.
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TMB.(l) A junior officer of 1/17 Londons volunteered for duty with a TMB in
part to escape 'from "bull" and spit and polish'. He enjoyed the responsibility,
which was far greater than that of a platoon commander in a battalion, and the
'free and easy' life. He reduced fatigues 'to a minimum', and was able to give
his men all sorts of privileges. As a rankerofficer, he was well aware of the
private's point of view.(2) While not every small unit operated a system of
relaxed discipline (3) it is clear that many did.
Falling betvee the TMB and the infantry battalion in size and disciplinary
style was the field artillery battery. SomedIng of a 'craft union' attitude
emerged among gunners of all ranks. One former ranker argued that good off icer-
man relations in artillery batteries stemmed from the need to co-operate as part
of a team. (4) The pattern of casualties that an artillery battery could expect
to sustain also helped to maintain continuity of command and personnel. R.C.
Foot, an officer of 62nd Divisional artillery, calculated that in 22 months of
action the unit had a casualty rate of 250 per cent for officers and 100 per
cent for rankers. There was a mitigating factor. These losses were sustained in
a 'steady drain' over the period. By contrast, it was not uncommon for infantry
battalions to take losses that crippled it 'in an hour of battle'. 62nd Division
was a Territorial division originally recruited in Yorkshire. Although
individual replacements came from all over Britain, non-Yorkshire soldiers
assumed a Yorkshire defiant and stubborn quality that characterised the
62nd division from its earliest days, and were proud of it. D/310 Battery,
never with more than twenty Yorkshire born men, had by now become Yorkshire to
(1) Unpublished account, pp.92-93, 161-62, P.G. Heath papers, DS/Misc/60, IWN.
(2) Unpublished account, p.20, H.D. Paviere pa1'ers, IWM. For the relaxed
atmosphere of 99 MG Coy., see Sheffield, 'Effect of War Service' p.66-67.
(3) P.G. Ackrell, My Life in the Machine Gun Corps (lifracombe, 1966) p.Vi; A,
Russell, With the Machine Gun Corps (London, nd) p.166.




This survival of traditions owed much to the steady, rather than rapid, rate
of loss experienced by this battery. There always remained a hard core of
officers and men to pass traditions on to new drafts.
(1) Unpublished account, pp.89, 121-22, R.C. Foot papers, 1W!'!.
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Appendix 3: Published Guides to Officership
A large number of articles and books on the nature of officership appeared
during the Great War. Their influence	 is difficult to gauge. Many were
widely distributed, (1) some being used by instructors at OCBs. (2) Given the
conscientiousness that most temporary officers displayed in their duties, it is
reasonable to assume that such guides were in fact read by their intended
audience.
The advice offered by guides to officership rarely varied. Officially-
sponsored and unofficial guides alike preached much the same message, although
the latter generally had a rather more humorous approach. 'The Duties of an
Officer', one of the most widely acclaimed works, is an example of the cross-
fertilization of unofficial and official advice. This pamphlet had its origin
in an address given by a 'Senior Officer' to a tactical school for young
officers. A version was published in The Times in April 1916, and then, 'in
response to many requests', it was published	 as a pamphlet. It was
eventually issued as official Army pamphlet SS 415. (3)
These guides	 assumed that officers could be drawn from outside the
traditional officer-providing classes, providing they were taught leadership
skills. This marked a significant break with prewar practice and beliefs (see
chapter 5). As the author of one pamphlet, based on his wartime experiences in
1914-18 wrote:
many hold that...[leadership] is an inherited quality which descends naturally
(1) The Times 14 Nov. 1916; A.H. Trappman, Straight Tips for 'Subs' (London, May
1915 edn.) p.4.
(2) Blunderbus 2, p.60;	 'Regular', Customs of the Army. A Guide for Cadets
and Young Officers (London, 1917) p.3.
(3) Anon, 'The Duties of an Officer', The Times 1 April 1916; Ibid 4, 10, 11
April 1916. See 'General Aspects: Duties of an Officer' file, LIJLLC, for copies
of the pamphlets.
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on the elect, who are called upon to officer our army. I think this is a
profound mistake and that history bears me out in this view.(1)
'CNW' had a somewhat less radical view, but his fears that temporary officers
would behave as jacks-in-office were less significant than his acceptance that
officers could be drawn from non-traditional sources.(2) Works such as Customs
of the Army started from the premise that 	 its readers would have the
disadvantage of lacking 	 the basic social skills learned by prewar Regular
officers at home and at public school.(3)
The advice offered by these guides closely followed the teaching of officer
training units. The need for the subaltern to win the respect of his men was
often stressed. This was seen as the foundation of military success: 'Without
this respect men will not show that confidence in an officer which will enable
him to exact instant obedience to orders and to maintain the strictest
discipline'. (4)
How was the officer to gain respect? The short answer was 'character', defined
in 'The Duties of an Officer' as 'resolution, self-confidence, self-sacrifice'.
It was judged to be essential 'to inspire your men by your example, sustain
their courage in danger by your example, and their endurance in hardship by
your example'. (5) Whereas harsh officers were hated by their men, one expert
opined, incompetent officers were despised.(6) In peace, it is conceivable
that an inefficient officer could rely on his institutional position alone. On
(1) 'Basilisk', Talks on Leadership Addressed to Young Officers (London, 1941
edn.) p.1.
(2) 'CNW', 'An Open Letter to the Very Young Officer', JRIJSI LXIII, No.445,
(1917) pp. pp.69-70.
(3) 'Regular',	 pp.17-18; [T.D. Pilcher], A General's Letters to his Son on
Obtaining His Commission (London, 1917) p.9.
(4) B.C. Lake, Knowledge for War - Every Officer's Handbook for the Front
(London, nd,) p.18. See also 'Esterel', 'To the Junior Subaltern', JRA XLIII
(1916-17) p. p.231; Notes for Young Officers (HMSO, 1917) p.3.




active service, this was no longer possible.
Guides to officership also emphasised the need for an officer to be exemplary
in his personal conduct.(1) Most importantly, the platoon officer was urged to
develop a relationship with his men which struck a balance between paternal
care and discipline. To develop paternal care, the officer was advised to get to
know his men; it was essential to remember that 'the soldiers under you are
individual human beings and not sheep or cattle; they have their individual
feelings, tempers and temperaments'. (2)
The officer's knowledge of his men had to extend to 	 an understanding of
their	 prejudices and thought-processes. (3) Above all, the subaltern was
encouraged to cultivate a literally paternal relationship. He had to be a kindly
but firm father to his men, not a 'dry-nurse'(4): 'we are all comrades...make
the men feel that you realise this relationship and love it.'(5)
These works attempted to give the reader a practical as well as a theoretical
guide to leadership. Readers were warned of various 'old soldier' dodges,	 and
the conditions under which it might be appropriate to disobey an order were
discussed.(6) An important theme in many guides is the practical limitations of
a subaltern's power:	 'Never give an order which you cannot enforce. It is
better to cancel an order than to allow it to be disregarded'.(7) A delicate
balance had to be maintained between tact and discipline. Officers should avoid
familiarity, and 'slackness, disobedience, slovenliness' had to be punished.(8)
Popularity grew from respect; officers should not attempt to seek popularity, or
(1) Notes for Young Officers p.3; 'Esterel', pp.232-33; The Times 1 Apr. 1916.
(2) Trapmann, pp.48-49. See also Notes for Young Officers p.3.
(3) Trapmann, p.50; Pilcher, p.24.
(4) 'Basilisk', p.56.
(5) The Times 1 Apr.1916.
(6) Notes for Young Officers p.5.
(7) Pilcher, p.56. See also 'Esterel', p.231.
(8) 'Regular', p.10.
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conversely, to be afraid to court unpopularity in the course of improving
efficiency. (1)
Curiously, little attention was devoted to relationships between officers and
NCOs. 'The Duties of An Officer' does not discuss the topic. Pilcher devoted
some paragraphs to NCOs, but did not discuss the crucial question of how a
junior officer could rely on an experienced NCO for advice without sacrificing
the authority of the officer.(2)
By contrast, advice on the welfare of the soldier was plentiful. Notes for
Young Officers stated, unequivocally,	 that 'the care of his men must take
precedence of every consideration of [the officer's] personal comfort'. It was
argued that 'the trials and hardships of a campaign [will be] materially
reduced...[and] the goodwill of the men will be gained' as a result of paternal
care. An entire section was devoted to 'Relations between officers and men off
duty' which stressed that:
An officer must not think that his duties end with the dismissal of his
platoon after parade. The life of the average private soldier is a dull one,
the class from which he comes has not much time for amusement, and it is his
officers who have to teach him to amuse himself in the right way.
This was followed by a list of ways in which the officer might brighten the
lives of his soldiers.(3) Very similar advice appeared in other guides.(4)
In conclusion, officially and unofficially produced guides on of ficership were
a response to the widening of the social base of the wartime officer corps.
Aimed at officers without a public school education, they reinforced the
teachings of officer training units, and were a further means by which such men
were inculcated with paternalistic concern for their soldiers.
(1) Trapmann, pp.49-50.
(2) Pilcher, p.57-60.
(3) Notes for Young Officers pp.6-9, 68-70.
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